Having given careful consideration to the entire record, based upon the above testimony, the competent and substantial evidence presented and the applicable law, I find the following:
Claimant requests an award for benefits because of an occupational injury from repetitive trauma referable to her right upper extremity on January 7, 2004. According to Claimant's testimony she had been experiencing pain in her right arm and shoulder since becoming a heavy equipment operator for the Employer. Claimant does not assert that her injury by a specific accident but rather by repetitive trauma. Claimant has the burden of proof to show by competent and substantial evidence that the occupational injury arose out of and in the course of her employment.
An occupational disease is defined to mean an identifiable disease arising with or without human fault out of and in the course of the employment. §287.067.1. After its contraction, the disease must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence. Id. The disease is compensable if it is clearly work related but is not compensable merely because work was a triggering or precipitating factor. $\S 287.067 .2$.
For an occupational disease claim to be compensable, Claimant must show by competent and substantial evidence that the disease is not an ordinary disease of life. The exposure to the disease must be greater than that or different from that which affects the public generally and there is a recognizable link between the disease and some distinctive feature of the Claimant's job which is common to all jobs of that sort. Kelley v. Banta \& Stude Const. Co., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 43 (Mo.App. E.D., 1999). There must be a direct causal connection between the conditions under which the work is performed and the occupational disease. Kelley, at 48.
The claimant must also establish through expert testimony the probability that the claimed occupational disease was caused by conditions in the work place. Dawson v. Associated Electric, 885 S.W.2d 712, 716 (Mo.App. W.D. 1994). The claimant must prove a "direct causal connection between the conditions under which the work is performed and the occupational
disease." Webber v. Chrysler Corp., 826 S.W.2d 51,54 (Mo.App. 1992). While it has been held that a single medical opinion can support a finding of compensability even when the cause of the disease is indeterminate, (Dawson at 716), where the medical opinions of experts are in conflict, the fact finding body determines whose opinion is the most credible. Hawkins v. Emerson Electric Co.., 676 S.W.2d 872, 877 (Mo.App. 1984). Where there are conflicting medical opinions, the fact finder may reject all or part of one party's expert testimony in which it does not consider credible and accept as true the contrary testimony given by the other litigant's expert. George v. Shop-N-Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 855 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Mo.App. E.D. 1993).
Claimant alleges that the injury was brought about by repetitive use of her shoulder at work while driving a trash truck. Claimant's rotator cuff tear, an identifiable occupational disease, cannot reasonably be said to have had its origin in the risk connected with the employment (operation of the lift lever) nor does it appear to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence. Claimant complained of right shoulder pain which was conservatively treated and resolved. She returned to work doing her same job for months and then years without further treatment of the occupational disease alleged. If, however, Claimant sustained an injury on or about January 7, 2004, that injury resolved with no permanency prior to July 20, 2004.
No direct causal connection between the conditions under which the work was performed and the occupational disease has been proven. The evidence does not support Claimant's assertion that her work duties led to the injury she sustained. Claimant has not met her burden to prove that she sustained an injury by occupational disease/repetitive trauma on January 7, 2004 which arose out of and in the course of her employment.
Claimant's own doctor diagnosed impingement and cervical strain on January 6, 2004. When seen by a company doctor the next day Claimant had full range of motion in her right shoulder and was released to return to work full time with only conservative treatment. Claimant sought no additional treatment for her shoulder for nearly two years. Even when she fell in July 2004, there was no finding of acute injury or repetitive trauma to the right shoulder when examined at Concentra. Claimant in fact made no concurrent complaint of an injury to her shoulder in July 2004.
Furthermore, the arthrogram performed in 2006 was negative for a right shoulder rotator cuff tear. It cannot be reasonably concluded with any reasonable probability that the development of a rotator cuff tear in her right shoulder is an identifiable disease referable to the injury date of January 7, 2004. Neither can it be found that the right shoulder injury arose out of and in the course of her employment based on the mechanism of injury described. I do not find Dr. Schlafly's opinion persuasive. His method of determining causation by tracing the complaints of pain is only persuasive to indicate the time period when the complaints were initially made but not the reason for the injury.
Claimant has not proven with reasonable probability that the injuries to her shoulder and right upper extremity arose out of and in the course of her employment from a repetitive trauma initially diagnosed in January 2004. Her symptoms were treated conservatively and she recovered to the point she could continue to work her job without complaint of pain or further injury to her right shoulder for two years.
Having ruled that Claimant did not sustain an occupational injury on January 7, 2004 arising out of and in the course of her employment, the remaining issues of nature and extent of permanent disability (PPD), temporary total disability (TTD), liability for past medical bills relating to treatment, and liability of the Second Injury Fund are moot.