We agree with the administrative law judge that employee's claim is not barred by his failure to provide written notice meeting the requirements of $\S 287.420$ RSMo. The administrative law judge, however, found that because employer received actual notice of employee's injury, employer "is prohibited from raising failure to receive written notice of claimant's injury as a defense." Award, page 5. Because nothing in the statute suggests that employer is "prohibited" from raising notice as a defense where it receives actual notice, we write this supplemental opinion to clear up any confusion and to apply the appropriate analysis under $\S 287.420$, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
No proceedings for compensation for any accident under this chapter shall be maintained unless written notice of the time, place and nature of the injury, and the name and address of the person injured, has been given to the employer no later than thirty days after the accident, unless the employer was not prejudiced by failure to receive the notice.
The purpose of the foregoing section is to give the employer timely opportunity to investigate the facts surrounding an alleged workplace accident and also to provide the employee with timely medical attention in order to minimize the effects of a work injury. Soos v. Mallinckrodt Chem. Co., 19 S.W.3d 683, 686 (Mo. App. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 224 (Mo. banc 2003). Employer was entitled to raise notice as a defense, and did so. As a result, employee was required to prove either (1) that he provided a written notice meeting all the requirements of $\S 287.420$ to the employer no later than 30 days after the accident; or (2) that the employer was not prejudiced by the employee's failure to provide timely notice. If employee fails to prove one or the other of these circumstances, his claim is barred. Sell v. Ozarks Med. Ctr., 333 S.W.3d 498, 510 (Mo. App. 2011).
Here, employee does not even allege that he provided written notice to employer that met each of the requirements under $\S 287.420$. Thus, the question is whether employee demonstrated that employer was not prejudiced by his failure to provide statutory notice of his right shoulder injury. The administrative law judge found that employee provided actual notice to employer when he told his supervisor, Ronnie Schenk, on May 22, 2009, that he had been injured at work that day. The administrative law judge heard the testimony from both employee and Mr. Schenk and found employee to be more credible on the question whether employee provided notice to Mr. Schenk. The administrative law judge explained his reason for believing employee's testimony over that provided by Mr. Schenk.
After carefully reviewing the testimony presented at the hearing and also the arguments of the parties in their briefs and oral arguments before this Commission, we discern no compelling basis for overturning the credibility determination of the administrative law judge, who, having viewed the live testimony from both employee and Mr. Schenk, was probably in a better position to make such findings. We agree with the administrative law judge that employee is more credible than Mr. Schenk. Accordingly, we affirm and adopt the administrative law judge's finding that employee provided actual notice of his right shoulder injury to Mr. Schenk on May 22, 2009, when, at the end of his shift that day, he went inside the office, told Mr. Schenk that he'd hurt his right shoulder, and even took off his shirt to show Mr. Schenk his injury.
Mr. Schenk, as we have mentioned, was employee's supervisor. As a result, Mr. Schenk's actual notice of employee's injury is imputed to employer. Sell, 333 S.W.3d at 510. Because employee provided actual notice to employer, the burden shifts to employer to demonstrate it was prejudiced by employee's failure to provide statutory notice. See Sell at 511: "[T]he burden of proving Employer's lack of prejudice in not receiving written notice rested on the Claimant. Once Claimant presented substantial evidence that Employer had actual notice of the relevant injury, however, the burden of showing prejudice then shifted to Employer." Thus, we see that under an appropriate § 287.420 analysis, employer is not "prohibited" from raising notice as a defense, but employer does have the burden of proving that it was prejudiced where it has actual notice of employee's injuries.
We find no evidence on the record to prove-let alone suggest-that employer was prejudiced by employee's failure to provide notice in the form required by statute. Mr. Schenk (and thus, employer) was aware of employee's injury the same day it occurred. Employer has failed to explain why, having received such notice, it was nevertheless disadvantaged by the lack of written notice meeting the requirements of $\S 287.420$ in its ability to either investigate the circumstances of the injury or to minimize its effects.
We note that each of employer's arguments are premised on the assumption that it did not have actual notice of employee's injury the same day it occurred. Because we have found otherwise, employer's arguments are unavailing. For example, employer argues that it was prejudiced because employee worked for months after his injury emptying trash cans and that this arguably made his shoulder worse-but employer ignores that this effectively occurred with its consent. After all, employer (through Mr. Schenk) knew about employee's untreated right shoulder injury when it sent him out to work his full duties after May 22, 2009. Employer also argues it was unable to investigate the injury,