Maria White v. Anderssen Mobile X-Ray Service

only refers to the way we read the words of the statute and doesn't necessarily mean the statute should be applied in a "narrow or stingy manner" after 2005. See *Allcorn* at 828.

At the same time that we must strictly construe its provisions, we are also required to read Chapter 287 with an eye toward what the legislature intended. "All canons of statutory construction are subordinate to the requirement that the court ascertain and apply a statute in a manner consistent with the legislative intent." *Meyers v. Wildcat, Inc.*, 258 S.W.3d 77, 82 (Mo. App. 2008). When we read the entire subsection, we find that the subjects the legislature designed the language of § 287.020.5 to address were (1) commuting employees and (2) the extension of premises doctrine.

As for the subject of commuting employees, the legislature was looking at the problem of employees who commute to work in employer-owned or subsidized vehicles. Although the legislature did not name it, it appears this language was a response to the judicially recognized "*Reneau* doctrine," an exception to the general "going and coming rule" that injuries sustained while going to and coming from work are not compensable; previous cases have suggested the *Reneau* doctrine implicates employer liability "where the employer, because of the distance to the job site or for the convenience of the employer, furnishes the employee's transportation, compensates the employee for use of his own vehicle, or pays the employee for travel time." *Garrett v. Industrial Com.*, 600 S.W.2d 516, 519 (Mo. App. 1980), citing *Reneau v. Bales Electric Company*, 303 S.W.2d 75, 79 (Mo. 1957). The legislature plainly rejected the notion that an employer's providing a company car creates an exception to the going and coming rule, when it crafted language making clear that injuries sustained by commuting employees, even where the employer owns or subsidizes the vehicle, are not compensable.

As for the extension of premises doctrine, we can see that the legislature wished to abrogate this doctrine to the extent it provided for employer liability for accidents occurring on property that is not owned or controlled by employer. The extension of premises doctrine, like the *Reneau* doctrine, is a judicially recognized exception to the general going and coming rule, which the courts have sometimes applied to find employer liability where an employee was injured off-premises but on a customary route used by employees to get to work. For example, see *Gaston v. Steadley Co.*, 69 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Mo. App. 2002) (holding an employee was entitled to workers' compensation benefits where he was hit by a truck while crossing a street from where he usually parked to employer's premises, on the rationale that "if [the employee] had not been going to work, he would not have been crossing the street").

After carefully considering the facts of this case in light of the legislature's clear purposes to limit employer liability for employees commuting in employer-owned or subsidized vehicles and to abrogate certain aspects of the extension of premises doctrine, we do not believe the legislature could have intended this case to be excluded from the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law when it crafted the 2005 amendments to § 287.020.5. This is because the uncontested facts of this case do not fit neatly within the plain and unambiguous terms of that section.

First, this case does not involve facts implicating the extension of premises doctrine (or whatever may be left of it after the abrogating language added in 2005). Second, this

case does not involve a commuting employee, but rather an employee that was unquestionably "at work" when she was injured. This employee was not injured while traveling from her home to the employer's principal place of business, but instead while traveling from her "call-in" or "check-in" point (where she was required, while driving, to call employer to find out if there were any assignments) and the office. In our view, employee was not traveling between "work and home" but rather between "work and work" when the accident happened. "[T]he exclusionary clause in § 287.020.5 can be given no broader application than is warranted by its plain and unambiguous terms." Harness v. Southern Copyroll, Inc., 291 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Mo. App. 2009). We are convinced that to construe the language "from the employee's home to the employer's principal place of business" to include this employee, who was traveling from a mandatory call-in point and employer's principal place of business, would require our unduly enlarging the scope of the exclusion under $\S 287.020 .5$ beyond the plain and unambiguous terms of that section.

Ultimately, we conclude that the language of $\S 287.020 .5$, strictly construed, does not work the effect that this employee's injuries are not compensable. Accordingly, we affirm the award of the administrative law judge concluding that employee's injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment.

We conclude that § 287.020.5 RSMo, as amended in 2005, does not have the effect that employee's injuries in this case are not compensable. The award and decision of Administrative Law Judge Kathleen M. Hart, issued August 23, 2011, is affirmed and is hereby attached and incorporated to the extent it is not inconsistent with this supplemental opinion.

This award is only temporary or partial. It is subject to further order, and the proceedings are hereby continued and kept open until a final award can be made. All parties should be aware of the provisions of $\S 287.510$ RSMo.

Any past due compensation shall bear interest as provided by law.

Given at Jefferson City, State of Missouri, this $16^{\text {th }}$ day of February 2012.

LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

William F. Ringer, Chairman

DISSENTING OPINION FILED

James Avery, Member

Curtis E. Chick, Jr., Member

Attest:

I have reviewed and considered all of the competent and substantial evidence on the whole record. Based on my review of the evidence as well as my consideration of the relevant provisions of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, I disagree with the majority's analysis. I believe the law requires that the decision of the administrative law judge be reversed.

The majority discusses strict construction in its opinion, but I am convinced the majority has failed to actually apply it in this case. The language of $\S 287.020 .5$ RSMo is quite clear and unquestionably applies to the facts before us. The section states that injuries sustained in company-owned or subsidized automobiles in accidents that occur while traveling from the employee's home to the employer's principal place of business are not compensable. This employee sustained her injuries in a company-owned or subsidized vehicle: it is uncontested that employer provided the minivan employee was driving to work on March 2, 2010. Employee's injuries were sustained in an accident that occurred while she was traveling from her home to employer's place of business: it is uncontested that employee left from her home on March 2, 2010, and that she was traveling to employer's office, when the motor vehicle accident occurred. There is no evidence that employee made any stop, changed course, or otherwise interrupted her travels, and thus she was unquestionably "traveling from [her] home to the employer's principal place of business," as provided in the plain and unambiguous language of $\S 287.020 .5$.

Because the factual circumstances involved in the instant case are squarely on point with the statutory language, the analysis must end there. This is because "[a] strict construction of a statute presumes nothing that is not expressed." Sell v. Ozarks Med. Ctr., 333 S.W.3d 498, 507 (Mo. App. 2011) (citation omitted). But the majority goes a step further and inappropriately extends the analysis, when it construes the fact employee was required to call-in every morning as somehow interrupting the course of her "travels" from her home to employer's office on March 2, 2010. There is no evidence that such is the case. Employee was still "traveling" when she made that phone call at about 2:30 p.m. She did not stop to make that call. Nothing about the call constituted an interruption of her travels-to the contrary, the dispatcher told employee to continue on to employer's offices, because there were no assignments that might otherwise have interrupted her commute. The majority appears to equate employee's phone call with the start of her work day and goes so far as to state that she was "unquestionably at work" at the time of the accident. I disagree with the majority's choice to accord more significance to employee's phone call to employer than is warranted by the uncontested evidence before us in this case.

But more importantly, there is no language within § 287.020.5