| FINAL AWARD DENYING COMPENSATION (Affirming Award and Decision of Administrative Law Judge with Supplemental Opinion) |
| Injury No.: 10-039435 |
| Employee: | Ronald Armstrong |
| Employer: | Tetra Pak, Inc. |
| Insurer: | Travelers Indemnity Company of America |
| Additional Party: | Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund |
| The above-entitled workers' compensation case is submitted to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) for review as provided by § 287.480 RSMo. Having reviewed the evidence, read the briefs, and considered the whole record, the Commission finds that the award of the administrative law judge is supported by competent and substantial evidence and was made in accordance with the Missouri Workers’ Compensation Act. Pursuant to § 286.090 RSMo, the Commission affirms the award and decision of Chief Administrative Law Judge Lawrence C. Kasten dated June 29, 2011, as supplemented herein.The award and decision of the administrative law judge is attached hereto and incorporated by reference. We adopt the findings, conclusions, award and decision of the administrative law judge to the extent that they are not inconsistent with what is set forth below. |
| INTRODUCTIONChief Administrative Law Judge Kasten found the testimony of Drs. Cooper, Straubinger, and Lehman to be more credible and persuasive than the opinion of Dr. Woiteshek. Based on this finding, the administrative law judge then held that employee had not met his burden of proving that he sustained a compensable accident or that the alleged accident was the prevailing factor in causing employee’s right shoulder problems. Lastly, the administrative law judge denied employee’s claim for compensation against the Second Injury Fund. Employee filed an Application for Review with the Commission. |
| DISCUSSIONWe first note that the administrative law judge inaccurately referenced a “February 22, 2001,” visit to Dr. Rodriguez. The date connected with this visit was actually February 22, 2011. This error was inadvertent and had no affect on the ultimate award.Section 287.120.1 RSMo provides, in pertinent part, as follows:Every employer subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be liable, irrespective of negligence, to furnish compensation under the provisions of this chapter for personal injury or death of the employee by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee’s employment, and shall be released from all other liability therefor whatsoever, whether to the employee or any other person. |
The definition of "accident" was significantly changed in 2005. Section 287.020.2 RSMo and related subsections read, as follows:
- The word "accident" as used in this chapter shall mean an unexpected traumatic event or unusual strain identifiable by time and place of occurrence and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury caused by a specific event during a single work shift. An injury is not compensable because work was a triggering or precipitating factor. 3. (1) In this chapter the term "injury" is hereby defined to be an injury which has arisen out of and in the course of employment. An injury by accident is compensable only if the accident was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability. "The prevailing factor" is defined to be the primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing both the resulting medical condition and disability.
Since legislative changes in 2005, we must also consider the following interpretative guides contained in § 287.020.10 RSMo:
In applying the provisions of this chapter, it is the intent of the legislature to reject and abrogate earlier case law interpretations on the meaning of or definition of "accident", "occupational disease", arising out of", and in the course of the employment" to include, but not be limited to, holdings in: Bennett v. Columbia Health Care and Rehabilitation, 80 S.W.3d 524 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002); Kasl v. Bristol Care, Inc., 984 S.W.2d 852 (Mo.banc 1999); and Drewes v. TWA, 984 S.W.2d 512 (Mo.banc 1999) and all cases citing, interpreting, applying, or following those cases.
Lastly, §§ 287.800.1 RSMo and 287.800.2 RSMo, respectively, provide, as follows:
287.800. 1. Administrative law judges, associate administrative law judges, legal advisors, the labor and industrial relations commission, the division of workers' compensation, and any reviewing courts shall construe the provisions of this chapter strictly.
- Administrative law judges, associate administrative law judges, legal advisors, the labor and industrial relations commission, and the division of workers' compensation shall weigh the evidence impartially without giving the benefit of the doubt to any party when weighing evidence and resolving factual conflicts.
Pursuant to these statutes, in order for employee to establish a compensable case, he must have proven he sustained an injury due to an accident. Accordingly, we look first to see if employee met his burden of proving that he suffered an unexpected traumatic event or unusual strain identifiable by time and place of occurrence and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury caused by a specific event during a single work shift.
Employee testified regarding numerous medical problems that pre-existed May 12, 2010. But employee testified that as of May 12, he was not suffering from any pain in his shoulder or right upper extremity. He further testified credibly that during the course of performing a rush job at work on that date, he reached and stretched above shoulder level and felt a sharp, deep pain in his right shoulder. Employee believed the pain would go away; but, when it had not gone away by the following day and he was unable to work, employee reported it to his supervisor, Brian Fowler. Mr. Fowler confirmed that employee had reported this incident approximately the day after it occurred. Consequently, based on these facts, we conclude that employee did suffer an accident at work.
Employee also established that he suffered from an injury to his right shoulder. To show that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment, though, § 287.020.3(1) required employee to prove that the "accident was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability." That same statute defines "the prevailing factor" as "the primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing both the resulting medical condition and disability." And, as indicated in the administrative law judge's award, the more credible evidence shows that employee's shoulder complaints are predominately degenerative in nature and not primarily due to the May 12, 2010, accident.