| FINAL AWARD DENYING COMPENSATION (Affirming Award and Decision of Administrative Law Judge by Separate Opinion) |
| Employee: | Stephen Smith, deceased |
| Substituted Claimant: | Dorothy Smith |
| Employer: | Capital Region Medical Center |
| Insurer: | Self-Insured |
| This workers' compensation case is submitted to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) for review as provided by § 287.480 RSMo. We have read the briefs, heard the parties' arguments, reviewed the evidence, and considered the whole record. Pursuant to § 286.090 RSMo, we affirm the award and decision of the administrative law judge with this separate opinion. |
| Introduction |
| The parties stipulated the following issues for determination by the administrative law judge:(1) whether employee sustained an accident or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his employment with employer on or about April 20, 2005; (2) whether the accident or occupational disease was a substantial factor in the cause of employee’s death; (3) whether the claim for compensation is barred by § 287.430; (4) whether the claim for compensation is barred by § 287.420; (5) employer’s liability for employee’s past medical bills; (6) employee’s entitlement to temporary total disability benefits; (7) dependency under § 287.240; (8) employer’s liability for burial expenses; and (9) employer’s liability for death benefits.The administrative law judge denied the claim for compensation on a finding that employee did not sustain an accident or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his employment with employer.Claimant filed a timely Application for Review arguing the administrative law judge erred in failing to apply the law referable to occupational diseases as set forth in the case of Vickers v. Mo. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 283 S.W.3d 287 (Mo. App. 2009).Employer also filed a timely Application for Review arguing the administrative law judge erred: (1) in analyzing this case as an occupational disease instead of an accident; (2) in analyzing this case under the pre-2005 version of the Missouri Workers’ Compensation Law; and (3) in failing to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the issues of statute of limitations and notice.For the reasons set forth herein, we deny the claim for compensation. |
| Findings of Fact |
| From 1969 to 2006, employee worked in employer’s hospital as a lab technician and phlebotomist. Employee’s work involved handling blood and other bodily fluids and |
Improve: Stephen Smith, deceased
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performing various medical tests and procedures. Employee worked for employer for a number of years before the implementation of safety measures which are commonplace today. For example, lab technicians worked without gloves or safety goggles and pipetted blood samples using their mouths. The latter process involved the lab technician placing a graduated glass pipe into their mouth and sucking a blood sample into the lower portion of the pipe.
Some of employee's coworkers experienced "needle sticks" (the act of accidentally stabbing oneself with a needle contaminated with blood or body products while attempting to replace the cap on a syringe). Claimant, who also worked for employer as a nurse, once got blood in her mouth while pipetting blood. It was not mandatory to report needle sticks to the employer until sometime in the 1980s or 1990s, when new scientific awareness as to the dangers of blood-borne pathogens prompted changes in workplace safety protocols in the lab where employee worked. None of the witnesses who testified were able to pinpoint exactly when these changes occurred, but they included the requirement that lab technicians wear gloves, the use of a rubber pump to pipette blood, and a new approach to handling and disposing of syringes that obviated the need for a technician to attempt to replace the cap on a used syringe.
In 1970, employee received a 6-unit blood transfusion following a hunting accident in which he was shot in the leg.
Employee sought medical treatment in December 1991 with complaints of severe epigastric pain. Blood tests revealed elevated liver enzymes and marked diffuse hepatocellular dysfunction. At least one treating doctor diagnosed hepatitis during the course of employee's hospitalization in 1991; the infection was later confirmed as hepatitis type C (hereinafter "HCV"). On April 20, 2005, claimant brought employee to the emergency room after he suffered a cognitive breakdown caused by hepatic encephalopathy. Employee continued to try to work full-time for employer after this event. Ultimately, though, due to health problems associated with liver failure, employee was unable to work after March 2006. Employee died on February 27, 2007, of sepsis, HCV, and acute tubular necrosis.
There is no evidence that any patient with HCV received treatment with employer or provided a blood or body tissue sample while employee worked there.
**Expert medical testimony**
The parties have provided competing expert medical evidence on the issue of causation of employee's HCV. Employee presents the testimony of Dr. Allen Parmet, who believes employee's work for employer was the likely cause of his contracting HCV. Dr. Parmet pointed out that employee worked for employer for many years handling blood and body products before the health care industry began to pay attention to the safety risks posed by blood-borne pathogens in the mid-1980s. Dr. Parmet identified the risk of blood splashing into employee's eyes, nose, and mouth and opined that needle sticks are a very significant risk factor for all phlebotomists and laboratory personnel. Dr. Parmet testified that employee reported multiple needle sticks to him.
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Dr. Parmet acknowledged that employee's receiving a blood transfusion in 1970 was a major risk factor, but ultimately opined that employee's work for employer and his daily exposure to blood and body products for many years was the largest risk factor and the most probable source causing employee to contract HCV, either through a needle stick or otherwise handling blood or body products.
Employer presents the testimony of Dr. Bruce Bacon, who believes the likely scenario is that employee contracted HCV when he got the 1970 blood transfusion and developed chronic liver disease by the time he was hospitalized in 1991. Dr. Bacon opined that it usually takes 20 or even 30 years after the initial infection with HCV to develop liver failure, and thus, the idea that employee contracted HCV from the 1970 blood transfusion fits well with the established timeline of employee's experiencing symptoms of chronic liver problems in 1991 and cirrhosis by 2004.
Dr. Bacon did not rule out employee's work as a risk factor, but opined that it is hard to implicate employee's work as a possible cause of his infection with HCV in the absence of documentation that he experienced any needle sticks.
**Conclusions of Law**
**Date of injury and 2005 amendments**
The appropriate date of injury is a threshold consideration in this matter, as it controls whether we apply the 2005 amendments to the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law to the facts of this case. See *Tillman v. Cam's Trucking, Inc.*, 20 S.W.3d 579, 585-86 (Mo. App. 2000). Employer argues that the 2005 amendments are applicable to this claim because employee was able to work up until March 2006. Claimant, on the other hand, argues the appropriate date of injury is April 20, 2005, the date she had to rush employee to the emergency room when he suffered a cognitive breakdown caused by hepatic encephalopathy.
A review of the relevant case law reveals that the courts have consistently linked the "date of injury" in occupational disease cases to the date the disease first becomes "compensable," which typically has been interpreted to mean the date an employee first experiences some disability or loss of earning capacity from the disease. See *Garrone v. Treasurer of State*, 157 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Mo. App. 2004) (holding that an employee's carpal tunnel syndrome did not become a "compensable injury" until the date he missed work for surgery, as he worked without restriction up until that date), and *Coloney v. Accurate Superior Scale Co.*, 952 S.W.2d 755, 759 (Mo. App. 1997) (noting that "Missouri courts have interpreted section 287.063 to provide that an employee with an occupational disease is 'injured' ... when the disease causes a 'compensable injury'").
Employer's argument asks us to focus on the last date employee worked for employer before health problems forced him to leave his position. But we are concerned here with determining the date employee first experienced some disability referable to the claimed injury, not the date that employee became unable to work at all. The claimed injury is liver failure resulting from employee's infection with HCV. The treatment note from
Improvee: Stephen Smith, deceased
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employee's visit to the emergency room on April 20, 2005, does reveal considerable cognitive disability (or encephalopathy) referable to liver failure, and also reveals that treating physicians hospitalized employee in the intensive care unit in order to provide further treatments and perform diagnostic tests. Ultimately, we are more persuaded by the argument advanced by claimant that employee experienced some disability related to the claimed injury when he suffered a cognitive breakdown on April 20, 2005, and was subsequently hospitalized.
Accordingly, we find the appropriate date of injury to be April 20, 2005. As a result, we will apply the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law as it existed on April 20, 2005.
Occupational disease
Claimant argues that employee's contracting HCV and suffering subsequent liver failure constituted an injury by occupational disease caused by his work for employer. Section 287.067.2 RSMo sets forth the standard for a compensable occupational disease and provides, as follows:
An occupational disease is compensable if it is clearly work related and meets the requirements of an injury which is compensable as provided in subsections 2 and 3 of section 287.020. An occupational disease is not compensable merely because work was a triggering or precipitating factor.
The foregoing refers us to the "requirements of an injury which is compensable" under subsections 2 and 3 of § 287.020, which provide, as follows:
- The word "accident" as used in this chapter shall, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, be construed to mean an unexpected or unforeseen identifiable event or series of events happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury. An injury is compensable if it is clearly work related. An injury is clearly work related if work was a substantial factor in the cause of the resulting medical condition or disability. An injury is not compensable merely because work was a triggering or precipitating factor.
- (1) In this chapter the term "injury" is hereby defined to be an injury which has arisen out of and in the course of employment. The injury must be incidental to and not independent of the relation of employer and employee. Ordinary, gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration of the body caused by aging shall not be compensable, except where the deterioration or degeneration follows as an incident of employment.
(2) An injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of the employment only if:
(a) It is reasonably apparent, upon consideration of all the circumstances,
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that the employment is a substantial factor in causing the injury; and
(b) It can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work; and
(c) It can be fairly traced to the employment as a proximate cause; and
(d) It does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal nonemployment life;
(3) The terms "injury" and "personal injuries" shall mean violence to the physical structure of the body and to the personal property which is used to make up the physical structure of the body, such as artificial dentures, artificial limbs, glass eyes, eyeglasses, and other prostheses which are placed in or on the body to replace the physical structure and such disease or infection as naturally results therefrom. These terms shall in no case except as specifically provided in this chapter be construed to include occupational disease in any form, nor shall they be construed to include any contagious or infectious disease contracted during the course of the employment, nor shall they include death due to natural causes occurring while the worker is at work.
The courts have provided guidance as to how we are to analyze the question of causation in an occupational disease case:
In order to support a finding of occupational disease, employee must provide substantial and competent evidence that he/she has contracted an occupationally induced disease rather than an ordinary disease of life. The inquiry involves two considerations: (1) whether there was an exposure to the disease which was greater than or different from that which affects the public generally, and (2) whether there was a recognizable link between the disease and some distinctive feature of the employee's job which is common to all jobs of that sort.
Claimant must also establish, generally through expert testimony, the probability that the claimed occupational disease was caused by conditions in the work place. Claimant must prove "a direct causal connection between the conditions under which the work is performed and the occupational disease." However, such conditions need not be the sole cause of the occupational disease, so long as they are a major contributing factor to the disease. A single medical opinion will support a finding of compensability even where the causes of the disease are indeterminate...
Kelley v. Banta \& Stude Constr. Co., 1 S.W.3d 43, 48-9 (Mo. App. 1999).
The administrative law judge declined to apply the foregoing test and instead characterized this case as presenting a choice between two possible risk factors: (1) employee's work and (2) his receipt of a blood transfusion in 1970, and asked whether employee's work was "more likely than not" to have caused his HCV in light of the evidence regarding the blood transfusion. But the question is not which of two possible causative factors we believe was more likely to have caused employee to contract HCV, but rather whether claimant met her burden of proving the elements identified by the court in the foregoing quote from Kelley.
When we apply the Kelley test for proving causation of an occupational disease, we are convinced the claimant failed to meet her burden. Our analysis is informed by the recent and factually similar case of Vickers v. Mo. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 283 S.W.3d 287 (Mo. App. 2009). In Vickers, the employee claimed to have been injured by an exposure to clostridium difficile (or "C diff," a contagious bacterium passed via a fecal to oral route) through her work handling soiled laundry in employer's nursing home. Id. at 289. The court noted the employee proved, by undisputed evidence that she worked for employer while patients who were carrying C diff resided in the home. Id. at 292. She also proved, by undisputed evidence, that she handled soiled laundry and that the laundry from the patients with C diff was not segregated from the other laundry. Id. at 293. The court found that when such undisputed evidence was combined with a doctor's opinion that employee more likely than not contracted C diff while working for employer, employee met her burden. Id. at 295-6.
This case involves a fundamental distinction when compared to the factual situation in Vickers. Here, there is no evidence that any person with HCV resided or treated in employer's facility while employee worked there. Nor is there evidence that any person with HCV provided a blood or tissue sample that was handled in the lab where employee worked. Claimant adduced testimony from Susan Hill (a coworker of employee), Dorsey Shackelford (employee's supervisor), and also provided her own testimony about her time working for employer. None of these witnesses testified that any patient with HCV resided in the hospital or received treatment from employer while employee worked there, or that any such patient provided a blood or tissue sample that was handled in the lab where employee worked.
Employee did work for employer for many years (from 1969 until 2006) and so it would certainly seem that one or more patients with HCV must have, at some point, treated at the hospital. But we cannot speculate as to these pivotal facts, nor can we fill in the gaps in the evidence with our own conjecture. As it stands, we are faced with a claim for occupational disease where there is no evidence that the disease was ever present in the workplace. We conclude that, absent such evidence, the case for exposure fails.
This is not the only problem with employee's case, however. Employee's expert, Dr. Allen Parmet, offered a causation opinion that depends, for the most part, upon what he considers to be a likely timeline of events from employee's exposure to HCV to his developing liver damage. Dr. Parmet testified that he didn't believe the 1970 blood transfusion was likely to be the cause of employee's HCV because employee did not develop cirrhosis until 2002 or 2004. This was more than 30 years after the transfusion;
Imprv No.: 05-140833
Employee: Stephen Smith, deceased
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Dr. Parmet believes that 15 years is the average time that most people, after contracting HCV, develop liver damage and related symptoms.
On cross-examination, counsel for employer asked Dr. Parmet about the medical records from employee's hospitalization in 1991. Dr. Parmet characterized these records as showing the onset of an "acute phase" of HCV infection, which he described as involving flu-like symptoms. Dr. Parmet opined this acute phase usually occurs six weeks after the initial HCV infection, and reasoned that employee was probably exposed to HCV about six weeks before the 1991 hospitalization. But the records do not suggest flu-like symptoms at all but instead reveal that employee sought treatment due to complaints of severe epigastric pain. And the records unmistakably reveal evidence of liver damage in that the treating physicians identify and diagnose marked diffuse hepatocellular dysfunction. Dr. Parmet failed to address these findings.
Counsel for employer also asked Dr. Parmet about lab tests during that same hospitalization that demonstrated that employee had elevated liver enzymes. Dr. Parmet appeared to be unable to explain why this was not evidence of liver damage in 1991. Instead, Dr. Parmet noted that if a person drinks about six beers, they will have elevated liver enzymes. This odd testimony suggests one of two possibilities: either Dr. Parmet asks us to assume that employee drank a lot of alcohol before he went to the hospital in 1991, or Dr. Parmet was essentially admitting that his timeline neither conforms to the evidence nor provides a reason to discount the 1970 blood transfusion. The medical records, at least, do not contain any suggestion that employee was drinking excessive amounts of alcohol at the time of his 1991 hospitalization.
Dr. Bruce Bacon, on the other hand, did not ignore or downplay the evidence of elevated liver enzymes in the medical records from employee's 1991 hospitalization. Rather, Dr. Bacon noted that employee was showing signs of chronic liver failure at that time, and reasoned that the typical 20-year latency period for HCV corresponds to the 1970 blood transfusion. Dr. Bacon also noted that there was no actual evidence of employee having been exposed to HCV in his work, as there is no documentation of employee ever having been stuck with a needle-contaminated or otherwise.
Ultimately, we find Dr. Bacon's opinion that employee demonstrated signs of chronic liver failure in 1991 to be more credible than Dr. Parmet's view that employee was suffering the effects of an acute reaction to HCV. Because Dr. Parmet evidently misinterpreted or disregarded the medical record, we find his causation opinion lacking credibility. In light of the failure to provide evidence that employee was exposed to HCV in the workplace, and because Dr. Parmet's causation opinion depends on a timeline that turns a blind eye to the medical records, we conclude that claimant failed to meet her burden of proof.
We conclude that employee's HCV was not an occupational disease for purposes of § 287.067 RSMo. We affirm the award of the administrative law judge denying compensation with this separate opinion.
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**Conclusion**
Based on the foregoing, the Commission concludes and determines that claimant failed to demonstrate that employee's work for employer exposed him to HCV or that there was a direct causal connection between HCV and the conditions in which he performed his work. Accordingly, claimant has failed to demonstrate employee sustained a compensable injury by occupational disease.
The claim for compensation is denied.
The award and decision of Chief Administrative Law Judge Robert J. Dierkes, issued February 18, 2011, is attached solely for reference.
Given at Jefferson City, State of Missouri, this 16th day of March 2012.
LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
William F. Ringer, Chairman
James Avery, Member
DISSENTING OPINION FILED
Curtis E. Chick, Jr., Member
Attest:
Secretary
I have reviewed and considered all of the competent and substantial evidence on the whole record. Based on my review of the evidence as well as my consideration of the relevant provisions of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, I believe the decision of the administrative law judge should be reversed.
I am convinced the majority misreads Vickers v. Mo. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 283 S.W.3d 287 (Mo. App. 2009). In that case, the court reversed a credibility determination by this Commission and found that employee met her burden of proving she sustained an occupational disease when she provided "medical evidence establishing a probability that working conditions caused the disease." Id. at 295 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). After carefully and thoroughly considering the meaning of the court's holding in Vickers, I am convinced the testimony from Dr. Parmet establishes a probability that employee's working conditions caused his HCV. I am further persuaded that the testimony from Dr. Bacon does not, as a matter of law, provide any basis for denying compensation, and that as a result, claimant ultimately met her burden of proof.
The medical evidence presently before us is strikingly similar to that provided by the parties in the Vickers case. In Vickers, the employee provided testimony from a doctor who opined that her work duties of handling laundry soiled with human fecal matter on a daily basis put her at a higher risk of C diff exposure and that she more likely than not contracted C diff at employer's facility. Id. at 293. The employer, on the other hand, provided a doctor who opined that, because there was no specific documentation that employee was exposed to or came into contact with feces from a C diff infected patient, he could not say with certainty when the employee acquired C diff or whether it was acquired from her work environment. Id. at 294. The court reversed this Commission's determination crediting the employer's doctor and finding the employee's doctor lacking credibility. Id. at 295. The court stated unequivocally that the employee in Vickers had met her burden, and pointed out that "Chapter 287 does not require a claimant to establish, by a medical certainty, that his or her injury was caused by an occupational disease in order to be eligible for compensation." Id. at 295 (emphasis in original).
Here, Dr. Parmet provided testimony on behalf of employee that established (1) that employee's work involving more than 30 years of daily exposure to blood and body products put him at a higher risk of contracting HCV than that faced by the general public, and (2) that there is a recognizable link between HCV and needle sticks or blood splashes which are distinctive features of employee's job that are common to all jobs of that type. Finally, Dr. Parmet provided his expert opinion that employee's work for employer was the largest risk factor and the most probable source for his contracting HCV-thus establishing the probability that the claimed occupational disease was caused by conditions in the workplace. In this way, claimant met each of the elements of the test (quoted in the majority's opinion) for causation set forth in Kelley v. Banta \& Stude Constr. Co., 1 S.W.3d 43, 48-9 (Mo. App. 1999). I turn now to the opinion provided by Dr. Bacon.
Injury No.: 05-140833
Employee: Stephen Smith, deceased
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Dr. Bacon, like the employer's doctor in *Vickers*, does not purport to rule out employee's work as a risk factor, but instead rests his opinion on the fact that "it is hard to implicate" employee's work as a possible cause of his infection with HCV, because "there is no documentation that there ever were any needle sticks or blood exposures." *Transcript*, page 974. Dr. Bacon thus appears to believe that documentation of a specific exposing event is necessary before we can implicate employee's work as a causative factor. Based on this testimony from Dr. Bacon, employer argues that claimant needed to show evidence of a specific needle stick or otherwise identifiable event wherein employee was exposed to HCV.
Employer's argument ignores the holding of the *Vickers* court rejecting such a proposition. The *Vickers* court made clear that such evidence is not necessary in the context of occupational disease—and in fact, specifically identified and reversed a finding by this Commission holding that the employee "needed to prove that she was in fact exposed to C diff while working for employer and not merely show that she potentially had a greater risk of exposure." *Id.* at 290. I am convinced that if the decision is properly read, the *Vickers* holding has the effect that Dr. Bacon's opinion is insufficient, as a matter of law, to rebut the evidence from Dr. Parmet that establishes each of the elements of causation.
Nor do I find the "timeline" argument—that employee demonstrated symptoms of liver failure about 20 years after the 1970 transfusion—persuasive. This is yet another attempt to draw the discussion away from the established analysis for occupational disease and into an inappropriate attempt to identify the "actual" cause of employee's HCV. This argument does not even provide a reason to credit Dr. Bacon over Dr. Parmet because employee was working for employer as early as 1969, and if he contracted HCV at work at that time, he would demonstrate the same "timeline" as employer argues supports its theory.
Ultimately, when I apply the well-established law relating to the elements of proving causation in the context of occupational disease, and when I consider the meaning of the holding in *Vickers*, I find the testimony from Dr. Bacon unhelpful and ultimately ineffectual in rebutting the evidence from Dr. Parmet. I credit Dr. Parmet's testimony establishing each of the elements of the claim.
I conclude that employee's HCV constituted an injury by occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his work for employer. Because I am convinced that claimant prevailed on the other disputed issues, I am convinced she met her burden of demonstrating her entitlement to compensation from employer for employee's past medical expenses, temporary total disability benefits, and burial and death benefits. I would reverse the award of the administrative law judge and enter an award of benefits.
Because the majority of the Commission has determined otherwise, I respectfully dissent.
Curtis E. Chick, Jr., Member