The findings of fact and stipulations of the parties were accurately recounted in the award of the ALJ and, to the extent they are not inconsistent with the findings listed below, they are adopted and incorporated by the Commission herein.
In evaluating cases involving preexisting disabilities, the employer's liability must first be considered in isolation before determining Second Injury Fund liability. Kizior v. Trans World Airlines, 5 S.W.3d 195 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999), overruled on other grounds, Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220 (Mo. banc 2003). In Kizior, the Court set out a step-by-step test for determining Second Injury Fund liability:
Section 287.220.1 contains four distinct steps in calculating the compensation due an employee, and from what source, in cases involving permanent disability: (1) the employer's liability is considered in isolation 'the employer at the time of the last injury shall be liable only for the degree or percentage of disability which would have resulted from the last injury had there been no preexisting disability'; (2) Next, the degree or percentage of the employee's disability attributable to all injuries existing
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[^0]: ${ }^{1}$ Statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri 2005 unless otherwise indicated.
Enployee: Ted Jackson
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at the time of the accident is considered; (3) The degree or percentage of disability existing prior to the last injury, combined with the disability resulting from the last injury, considered alone, is deducted from the combined disability; and (4) The balance becomes the responsibility of the Second Injury Fund.
Kizior, 5 S.W.3d at 200.
The Second Injury Fund argues that the ALJ skipped the first step in the aforementioned analysis before concluding that employee's PTD is a result of his primary injury synergistically combining with his preexisting disabilities. In support of its argument that employee is permanently and totally disabled solely as a result of the last injury, the Second Injury Fund points to vocational expert, Susan Shea's, testimony; specifically, Ms. Shea's response to the last question of her deposition. Ms. Shea was asked about employee's ability to work, considering only the effects of the last injury. Ms. Shea responded that she did not believe employee could do any work.
We do not find that Ms. Shea's response to the last question of her deposition overrides and supersedes the overwhelming weight of the evidence that employee is merely permanently and partially disabled as a result of the last injury.
Dr. Cohen clearly and unequivocally opined that employee is not permanently and totally disabled as a result of the last injury alone. Dr. Doll prescribed lifting and physical restrictions, but did not opine permanent total disability from the last injury alone. Similarly, Dr. Coyle, the treating surgeon, did not declare employee permanently totally disabled from the last injury alone, but rather imposed light duty restrictions from the same.
In addition to the aforementioned, employee himself testified that if the primary neck and back injuries were the only problems he had, he felt he would still be able to work in some capacity, such as driving a crane or forklift.
Based upon the aforementioned, we do not find that employee is permanently and totally disabled as a result of the last injury alone. We find, as did the ALJ, that as a result of the primary injury employee sustained 17.5% permanent partial disability of the body as a whole referable to the lumbar spine, and 12.5% permanent partial disability of the body as a whole referable to the cervical spine. We further find, in accordance with Dr. Cohen's uncontradicted medical opinion, that these primary injuries combined synergistically with employee's preexisting disabilities to render him permanently and totally disabled.
Award
We affirm the award of the ALJ as supplemented herein.
The award and decision of Administrative Law Judge Maureen Tilley, issued November 29, 2011, is attached hereto and incorporated herein to the extent it is not inconsistent with this decision and award.
The Commission further approves and affirms the ALJ's allowance of attorney's fee herein as being fair and reasonable.
Any past due compensation shall bear interest as provided by law.
Given at Jefferson City, State of Missouri, this $6^{\text {th }}$ day of June 2012.
LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
William F. Ringer, Chairman
James Avery, Member
Curtis E. Chick, Jr., Member
Attest:
Secretary