Claimant seeks an Award of permanent total disability against the Second Injury Fund. Under Missouri Workers' Compensation law, the claimant bears the burden of proving all essential elements of his or her workers' compensation claim. ${ }^{12}$ Proof is made only by competent and substantial evidence, and may not rest on speculation. ${ }^{13}$ Medical causation not within lay understanding or experience requires expert medical evidence. ${ }^{14}$ When medical theories conflict, deciding which to accept is an issue reserved for the determination of the fact finder. ${ }^{15}$
In addition, the fact finder may accept only part of the testimony of a medical expert and reject the remainder of it. ${ }^{16}$ Where there are conflicting medical opinions, the fact finder may reject all or part of one party's expert testimony that it does not consider credible and accept as true the contrary testimony given by the other litigant's expert. ${ }^{17}$
Section 287.020.7, RSMo, provides that "total disability" is the inability to return to any employment and not merely the inability to return to the employment in which the employee was engaged at the time of the accident. ${ }^{18}$ The main factor in this determination is whether, in the ordinary course of business, any employer would reasonably be expected to employ the employee in this present physical condition and reasonably expect him to perform the duties of the work for which he was hired. ${ }^{19}$ The test for permanent and total disability is whether the claimant would be able to compete in the open labor market. ${ }^{20}$ When the claimant is disabled by a combination of the work-related event and pre-existing disabilities, the responsibility for benefits lies with the Second Injury Fund. ${ }^{21}$ If the last injury in and of itself renders a claimant
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[^0]: ${ }^{11} SIF Exh. 1, p. 17.
{ }^{12}$ Fischer v. Archdiocese of St. Louis, 793 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Mo. App. W.D. 1990); Grime v. Altec Indus., 83 S.W.3d 581, 583 (Mo. App. 2002).
${ }^{13} Griggs v. A.B. Chance Company, 503 S.W.2d 697, 703 (Mo. App. W.D. 1974).
{ }^{14} Wright v. Sports Associated, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 596, 600 (Mo. banc 1994).
{ }^{15} Hawkins v. Emerson Elec. Co., 676 S.W.2d 872, 977 (Mo. App. 1984).
{ }^{16} Cole v. Best Motor Lines, 303 S.W.2d 170, 174 (Mo. App. 1957).
{ }^{17}$ Webber v. Chrysler Corp., 826 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Mo. App. 1992); Hutchinson v. Tri State Motor Transit Co., 721 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Mo. App. 1986).
${ }^{18}$ See also Houston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 133 S.W.3d 173, 178 (Mo.App. S.D. 2004).
${ }^{19}$ Reiner v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri, 837 S.W.2d 363, 367 (Mo.App. 1992).
${ }^{20} \mathrm{Id}.
{ }^{21}$ Section 287.200.1, RSMo.
permanently and totally disabled, the Second Injury Fund has no liability and the employer is responsible for the entire compensation. ${ }^{22}$
That is, Second Injury Fund liability exists only if the employee suffers from a preexisting permanent partial disability that combines with a compensable injury to create a disability greater than the simple sum of disabilities. ${ }^{23}$ When such proof is made, the Second Injury Fund is liable only for the difference between the combined disability and the simple sum of the disabilities. ${ }^{24}$ In order to find permanent total disability against the Second Injury Fund, it is necessary that the employee suffer from a permanent partial disability as the result of the last compensable injury, and that the disability has combined with a prior permanent partial disability to result in total disability. ${ }^{25}$
Where a pre-existing permanent partial disability combines with a work-related permanent partial disability to cause permanent total disability, the Second Injury Fund is liable for compensation due the employee for the permanent total disability after the employer has paid the compensation due the employee for the disability resulting from the work-related injury. ${ }^{26}$ In determining the extent of disability attributable to the employer and the Second Injury Fund, an administrative law judge must determine the extent of the compensable injury first. ${ }^{27}$ If the compensable injury results in permanent total disability, no further inquiry into Second Injury Fund liability is made. ${ }^{28}$ Therefore, it is necessary that the employee's last injury be closely evaluated and scrutinized to determine if it alone results in permanent total disability and not permanent partial disability.
Various factors have been considered by courts attempting to determine whether or not an employee is permanently totally disabled. It is not necessary that an injured employee be rendered, or remain, wholly or completely inactive, inert or helpless in order to be entitled to receive compensation for permanent total disability. ${ }^{29}$ An employee's ability or inability to perform simple physical tasks such as sitting, ${ }^{30} bending, twisting, { }^{31} and walking { }^{32}$ may prove that the employee is permanently totally disabled. An employee's age may also be taken into consideration. ${ }^{33}$
On September 17, 2007, claimant sustained a compensable injury to his left upper
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[^0]: ${ }^{22} Nance v. Treasurer of Missouri, 85 S.W.3d 767 (Mo.App.W.D. 2003).
{ }^{23}$ Section 287.220.1, RSMo.; Anderson v. Emerson Elec. Co., 698 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Mo. App. 1985).
${ }^{24} Brown v. Treasurer of Missouri, 795 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Mo. App. 1990).
{ }^{25} Section 287.220.1, RSMo.; Brown at 482; Anderson at 576.
{ }^{26} Reiner v. Treasurer of State of Mo., 837 S.W.2d 363, 366 (Mo. App. 1992).
{ }^{27}$ Roller v. Treasurer of the State of Mo., 935 S.W.2d 739, 742-743 (Mo. App. 1996).
${ }^{28} \mathrm{Id}.
{ }^{29}$ Maddux v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 100 S.W.2d 535 (Mo. 1936); Grgic v. P \& G. Const., 904 S.W.2d 464 (Mo.App. E.D. 1995); Julian v. Consumers Markets, Inc., 882 S.W.2d 274 (Mo.App. S.D. 1994); Groce v. Pyle, 315 S.W.2d 482 (Mo.App. 1958).
${ }^{30} Brown v. Treasurer of Missouri, 795 S.W.2d 479 (Mo.App. E.D. 1990).
{ }^{31} Sprung v. Interior Const. Service, 752 S.W.2d 354 (Mo.App. E.D. 1988).
{ }^{32} Keener v. Wilcox Elec. Inc., 884 S.W.2d 744 (Mo.App. W.D. 1994).
{ }^{33}$ Tiller v. 166 Auto Auction, 941 S.W.2d 863 (Mo.App.S.D. 1997); Reves v. Kindell's Mercantile Co., Inc. 793 S.W.2d 917 (Mo.App. S.D. 1990). See also Kowalski v. M-G Metals and Sales, Inc., 631 S.W.2d 919 (Mo.App. S.D. 1982).
extremity/shoulder; this injury occurred during the course and scope of his employment with the employer. I find that as a result of this September 2007 injury, claimant sustained a permanent partial disability of 10 % of the left shoulder.
I also find that prior to the September 2007 work injury, claimant sustained an injury to his left shoulder. That injury occurred in March 2006. As a result of the 2006 injury, claimant sustained a permanent partial disability of 17.5 % of the left shoulder.
On July 31, 2007, less than two months before the primary injury, claimant underwent surgery for the insertion of a pacemaker. Dr. Steven Rowe performed the surgery and diagnosed claimant with sick sinus syndrome. I find that claimant sustained a permanent partial disability of 5 % as a result of this injury/illness.
After considering all of the evidence, I find that claimant has not met his burden that he is permanently and totally disabled. In making this determination, I find that the opinion of Dr. Koprivica is more credible and persuasive than those of Dr. Volarich and Mr. Weimholt. Dr. Volarich's final set of restrictions are excessive and not credible. As Mr. Weimholt relied on the opinion and restrictions of Dr. Volarich, his opinion is also flawed.
Claimant sustained two injuries to his left upper extremity; one resulted in permanent partial disability (PPD) of 17.5 % and the other of PPD of 10 %. Claimant also suffered a PPD of 5 % of the body as a whole referable to his heart condition. Nevertheless, the only restrictions on claimant's physical abilities are to his left upper extremity. Claimant has no limitations on sitting, standing, or on his right upper extremity. Although he cannot work on certain machinery/welding equipment due to his pacemaker, this imposes very a minimal limitation. Claimant's testimony as to his activity level, especially on his farm, and his pain level is not entirely credible. Although claimant testified that he has a high level of pain, one that average 7 out of 10 but sometimes goes higher, he chooses not to take any pain medication.
Neither claimant's injuries nor his presentation fit the criteria of someone who is permanently and totally disabled. Claimant sat throughout the hearing without any discernible difficulty or discomfort. Although it is true that claimant cannot return to the physically demanding work he was doing for the employer, his own vocational expert, Mr. Weimholt, acknowledges that considering Dr. Volarich's restrictions and claimant's background, claimant is capable of certain jobs. More importantly, Mr. Weimholt's opinion is based on the excessive restrictions imposed by Dr. Volarich and is therefore flawed.
Claimant appears to have chosen a life of relative seclusion. He rarely leaves his 10-acre property. At trial, he testified that he had not left the property since July 2011, three or four months prior. Claimant has chosen to not use landline telephones or cell phones. He allowed his driver's license to lapse. These choices do not entitle claimant to Second Injury Fund benefits.
As claimant settled his last injury with the employer for only 10 % permanent partial disability of the left shoulder, he is not entitled under the statute for any Second Injury Fund benefits for permanent partial disability. Section 287.220 .1 requires that the primary injury result in at least a 15 % permanent partial disability to a major extremity (or 12.5 % to the body as a whole). Claimant's last injury was to a major extremity - his left upper extremity - however,
Employee: Ronald Porter
Injury No. 07-089590
he has failed to prove that the disability from that injury rises to the level of 15 %. Therefore, claimant's claim fails.
Any pending objections not expressly ruled on in this award are overruled.