To be entitled to workers' compensation benefits, claimant has the burden of proving that the alleged injury was directly caused by the accident, that there is a causal connection between the accident and the compensable injury, and that the injury resulted in the disability claimed. ${ }^{12}$ The word "accident" as used by the Missouri workers' compensation law means "an unexpected traumatic event or unusual strain identifiable by time and place of occurrence and producing at the time objective symptoms of injury caused by a specific event during a single work shift. An injury is not compensable because work was a triggering or precipitating factor." ${ }^{13}$
An "injury" is defined to be "an injury which has arisen out of an in the course of employment. An injury by accident is compensable only if the accident was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability. The "prevailing factor" is defined to be the primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing both the resulting medical condition and disability." ${ }^{14}$ An injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of employment only if it is readily apparent, upon consideration of all the circumstances, that the accident is the prevailing factor in causing the injury; and it does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal non-employment life. ${ }^{15}
The fact finder is encumbered with determining the credibility of witnesses. { }^{16} It is free to disregard that testimony which it does not hold credible. { }^{17}$
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[^0]: ${ }^{7}$ Fischer v. Archdiocese of St. Louis, 793 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Mo. App. W.D. 1990); Grime v. Altec Indus., 83 S.W.3d 581, 583 (Mo. App. 2002).
${ }^{8} Griggs v. A.B. Chance Company, 503 S.W.2d 697, 703 (Mo. App. W.D. 1974).
{ }^{9} Wright v. Sports Associated, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 596, 600 (Mo. banc 1994).
{ }^{10} Hawkins v. Emerson Elec. Co., 676 S.W.2d 872, 977 (Mo. App. 1984).
{ }^{11} Cole v. Best Motor Lines, 303 S.W.2d 170, 174 (Mo. App. 1957).
{ }^{12}$ Kerns v. Midwest Conveyor, 126 S.W.3d 445, 453 (Mo.App. W.D. 2004), Rana v. Landstar TLC, 46 S.W.3d 614, 622 (Mo.App. W.D. 2001).
${ }^{13}$ Section 287.020.3(1), RSMo. All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri (RSMo), 2005, unless otherwise noted.
${ }^{14} Section 287.020.3(1).
{ }^{15} Section 287.020.3(c).
{ }^{16}$ Cardwell v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri, 249 S.W.3d 902 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008).
The determination of the specific amount or percentage of disability to be awarded to an injured employee is a finding of fact within the unique province of the ALJ. ${ }^{18}$ The ALJ has discretion as to the amount of the permanent partial disability to be awarded and how it is to be calculated. ${ }^{19}$ A determination of the percentage of disability arising from a work-related injury is to be made from the evidence as a whole. ${ }^{20}$ It is the duty of the ALJ to weigh the medical evidence, as well as all other testimony and evidence, in reaching his or her own conclusion as to the percentage of disability sustained. ${ }^{21}$
Section 287.020.7, RSMo, provides that "total disability" is the inability to return to any employment and not merely the inability to return to the employment in which the employee was engaged at the time of the accident. ${ }^{22}$ The main factor in this determination is whether, in the ordinary course of business, any employer would reasonably be expected to employ the employee in this present physical condition and reasonably expect him to perform the duties of the work for which he was hired. ${ }^{23}$ The test for permanent and total disability is whether the claimant would be able to compete in the open labor market. ${ }^{24}$ When the claimant is disabled by a combination of the work-related event and pre-existing disabilities, the responsibility for benefits lies with the Second Injury Fund. ${ }^{25}$ If the last injury in and of itself renders a claimant permanently and totally disabled, the Second Injury Fund has no liability and the employer is responsible for the entire compensation. ${ }^{26}$
That is, Second Injury Fund liability exists only if the employee suffers from a preexisting permanent partial disability that combines with a compensable injury to create a disability greater than the simple sum of disabilities. ${ }^{27}$ When such proof is made, the Second Injury Fund is liable only for the difference between the combined disability and the simple sum of the disabilities. ${ }^{28}$ In order to find permanent total disability against the Second Injury Fund, it is necessary that the employee suffer from a permanent partial disability as the result of the last compensable injury, and that the disability has combined with a prior permanent partial disability to result in total disability. ${ }^{29}$ Where a pre-existing permanent partial disability combines with a work-related permanent partial disability to cause permanent total disability, the Second Injury Fund is liable for compensation due the employee for the permanent total disability after the employer has paid the compensation due the employee for the disability resulting from the workrelated injury. ${ }^{30}$ In determining the extent of disability attributable to the employer and the
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[^0]: ${ }^{17} Id. at 908 .
{ }^{18}$ Hawthorne v. Lester E. Cox Medical Center, 165 S.W.2d 587, 594-595 (Mo.App. S.D. 2005); Sifferman v. Sears \& Robuck, 906 S.W.2d 823, 826 (Mo.App. S.D. 1999).
${ }^{19} Rana v. Land Star TLC, 46 S.W.3d 614626 (Mo.App. W.D. 2001).
{ }^{20} Landers v. Chrysler, 963 S.W.2d 275, 284 (Mo.App. E.D. 1998).
{ }^{21} Rana at 626 .
{ }^{22}$ See also Houston v. Roadway Express, Inc., 133 S.W.3d 173, 178 (Mo.App. S.D. 2004).
${ }^{23}$ Reiner v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri, 837 S.W.2d 363, 367 (Mo.App. 1992).
${ }^{24} Id.
{ }^{25} Section 287.200.1, RSMo.
{ }^{26} Nance v. Treasurer of Missouri, 85 S.W.3d 767 (Mo.App. W.D. 2003).
{ }^{27}$ Section 287.220.1, RSMo.; Anderson v. Emerson Elec. Co., 698 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Mo. App. 1985).
${ }^{28} Brown v. Treasurer of Missouri, 795 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Mo. App. 1990).
{ }^{29} Section 287.220.1, RSMo.; Brown at 482; Anderson at 576.
{ }^{30}$ Reiner v. Treasurer of State of Mo., 837 S.W.2d 363, 366 (Mo. App. 1992).
Second Injury Fund, an administrative law judge must determine the extent of the compensable injury first. ${ }^{31}$ If the compensable injury results in permanent total disability, no further inquiry into Second Injury Fund liability is made. ${ }^{32}$ Therefore, it is necessary that the employee's last injury be closely evaluated and scrutinized to determine if it alone results in permanent total disability and not permanent partial disability.
I find that claimant was credible and persuasive. His appearance, attitude, and demeanor at the hearing were appropriate and he testified forthrightly and candidly, although he did have some difficulty remembering dates and details.
I find that as a result of the 2008 work injury, claimant sustained a permanent partial disability of 12.5 % of the body as a whole referable to the lumbar spine ( 50 weeks). I also find that the claimant has the following pre-existing permanent partial disabilities: 25 % of the body as a whole (cervical spine) and 30 % of the right shoulder ( 5 % from 2007 plus 25 % from 2003). These pre-existing disabilities were each a hindrance or obstacle to claimant's employment or obtaining re-employment.
Taking into consideration the evidence as a whole, I find that the claimant is unable to compete for any employment on the open labor market and is permanently and totally disabled. I also find that claimant is permanently and totally disabled as a result of the primary injury combined with his pre-existing disabilities; therefore, the Second Injury Fund is liable for permanent and total disability benefits. In making this determination, I find the opinions of Dr. Berkin and Mr. Lalk to be credible and persuasive.
In addition, I find that claimant last worked on March 26, 2009, and that claimant's permanent total disability benefits should begin the following day, March 27, 2009, subject to an offset for the permanent partial disability benefits due from the employer/insurer. That is, the Fund is liable for a differential of $\$ 94.87 / week for 50 weeks (a sum of \ 4,743.50 ) beginning March 27, 2009. At the conclusion of that 50-week period (i.e. beginning on March 13, 2010) and thereafter, the Fund is liable for permanent total disability benefits of $\$ 499.53 /$ week for claimant's lifetime pursuant to statute.