After considering all the evidence, including the testimony at the hearing, the numerous medical and other depositions, the medical reports and records, the other exhibits, and after observing the appearances and demeanor of Claimant and the other witnesses who testified at the hearing, I find and believe that Claimant failed to prove that her husband's work as a Deputy Fire Chief for the City of Liberty, Missouri for approximately 14 months was a substantial factor in causing his long standing hypertension which resulted in an enlarged heart, severe left ventricular hypertrophy and arteriosclerosis which culminated in Mr. Riley's death while at home on October 6, 2004. She also failed to prove that her husband was a "firefighter" with the Liberty Fire Department. His job was administrative. She failed to prove that her husband was last exposed to any substances or conditions in his administrative job with the
Liberty Fire Department which could have caused or resulted in his severe and advanced hypertension and arteriosclerosis. Thus, she failed to prove Mr. Riley's employer's liability for death benefits.
Claimant had the burden of proving all material elements of her claim. Fischer v. Arch Diocese of St. Louis - Cardinal Richter Inst., 703 SW $2^{\text {nd }} 196$ (Mo .App. E.D. 1990); overruled on other grounds by Hampton vs. Big Boy Steel Erections, 121 SW $3^{\text {rd }} 220$ (Mo. Banc 2003); Griggs v. A.B. Chance Company, 503 S.W. 2d 697 (Mo. App. W.D. 1973); Hall v. Country Kitchen Restaurant, 935 S.W. 2d 917 (Mo. App. S.D. 1997); overruled on other grounds by Hampton. Claimant did not meet her burden of proving that her husband's work as a Deputy Fire Chief for the City of Liberty, Missouri was a substantial factor in causing his cardiovascular disease and death or that it resulted in an occupational disease.
The applicable statute in effect in October 2004 defined the word "accident" as follows:
- The word "accident" as used in this chapter shall, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, be construed to mean an unexpected or unforeseen identifiable event or series of events happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury. An injury is compensable if it is clearly work related. An injury is clearly work related if work was a substantial factor in the cause of the resulting medical condition or disability. An injury is not compensable merely because work was a triggering or precipitating factor.
- (1) In this chapter the term "injury" is hereby defined to be an injury which has arisen out of and in the course of employment. The injury must be incidental to and not independent of the relation of employer and employee. Ordinary, gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration of the body caused by aging shall not be compensable, except where the deterioration or degeneration follows as an incident of employment.
(2) An injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of the employment only if:
(a) It is reasonably apparent, upon consideration of all the circumstances, that the employment is a substantial factor in causing the injury; and
(b) It can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work; and
(c) It can be fairly traced to the employment as a natural incident of the work; and
(d) It does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal nonemployment life; and
(3) An injury resulting directly or indirectly from idiopathic causes is not compensable.
§ 287.020 RSMo. 1994.
The applicable statute in effect in October 2004 pertaining to occupational diseases provided as follows:
287.063. 1. An employee shall be conclusively deemed to have been exposed to the hazards of an occupational disease when for any length of time, however short, he is employed in an occupation or process in which the hazard of the disease exists, subject to the provisions relating to occupational disease due to repetitive motion, as is set forth in subsection 8 of section 287.067.
- The employer liable for the compensation in this section provided shall be the employer in whose employment the employee was last exposed to the hazard of the occupational disease prior to evidence of disability, regardless of the length of time of such last exposure, subject to the notice provision of section 287.420. . .
§ 287.063 RSMo. 1994.
In addition, the statute pertaining to occupational diseases provided as follows:
287.067. 1. In this chapter the term "occupational disease" is hereby defined to mean, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, an identifiable disease arising with or without human fault out of and in the course of the employment. Ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside of the employment shall not be compensable, except where the diseases follow as an incident of an occupational disease as defined in this section. The disease need not to have been foreseen or expected but after its contraction, it must appear to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence.
- An injury by occupational disease is compensable if it is clearly work related and meets the requirements of an injury which is compensable, as provided in subsections 2 and 3 of section 287.020. An occupational disease is not compensable merely because work was a triggering or precipitating factor . . .
- Disease of the lungs or respiratory tract, hypotension, hypertension, or disease of the heart or cardiovascular system, including carcinoma, may be recognized as occupational diseases for the purposes of this chapter and are defined to be disability due to exposure to smoke, gases, carcinogens, inadequate oxygen, or psychological stress of firefighters of a paid fire department if a direct causal relationship is established . . . ${ }^{3}$
§ 287.067 RSMo. 1994.
Mr. Riley's death was caused by severe and advanced hypertensive cardiovascular disease and arteriosclerosis caused by his hypertension and high cholesterol. He was survived by Claimant, his wife, and one minor child, Landon Riley, date of birth March 3, 1996. He had only worked for the Liberty Fire Department for 14 months at the time of his death on October 6, 2004.
Claimant's own experts agreed that it took 15 to 20 years for Mr. Riley to develop the severe hypertensive cardiovascular disease and the arteriosclerosis as found by his autopsy in October 2004. Thus, clearly his work with the Liberty Fire Department, beginning in August 2003, did not cause either condition.
Claimant, however, argued that Mr. Riley was exposed to smoke, toxins, fumes and other substances while he was a firefighter. She admitted that he was an actual firefighter while he worked for the KCFD. She admitted that he was a Deputy Fire Chief with the Liberty Fire Department and not a firefighter. His job with the Liberty Fire Department was administrative. He did not fight fires. In fact, Chief Birch testified that the Liberty Fire Department only fought two fires during Mr. Riley's tenure with the department.
In addition to the exposure to fires and other substances as set out above, Claimant argued that as a firefighter, her husband had to assist with accident scenes. Again, those duties were with the KCFD. She stated that while with the KCFD, her husband worked out of a station assigned to the old Grandview triangle where an inordinate number of traffic accidents occurred. She stated that her husband was particularly bothered by the accidents involving small children.
Claimant's experts argued that such firefighting duties as shift work, long hours, poor diets caused by their work situation, exposure to fires and other substances and the noise exposure from the loud alarms going off in the middle of the night could cause hypertension. Again, if
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[^0]: ${ }^{3}$ Mr. Riley was a Deputy Fire Chief for the Liberty Fire Department. He did primarily administrative work. He did not fight fires. Neither Claimant nor Mr. Riley's employer cited any cases or authority showing that the statute pertaining to firefighters of a paid fire department fighting fires applied to an employee of a paid fire department in an administrative position, such as Mr. Riley.
Mr. Riley were, in fact, exposed to those conditions, it was when he worked as an actual firefighter for the KCFD.
More specifically, however, no credible or objective evidence was offered showing that firefighting duties had anything to do with a poor diet. Chief Birch testified that he had lunch with Mr. Riley nearly every day and that Mr. Riley nearly always ate salads. Mr. Riley did not do shift work while employed as a Deputy Fire Chief for the Liberty Fire Department. He worked from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. with some overtime. There was no credible evidence showing that he was exposed to fires, smoke and fumes as a firefighter with the Liberty Fire Department. He was not exposed to loud alarms going off in the middle of the night. He was not working the 24 to 48 hours on shifts followed by the 24 to 48 hours off shifts with the Liberty Fire Department.
Under the last exposure rule in effect at the time of Mr. Riley's death, the employer who last exposed the employee to the hazards of the occupational disease was liable. See § 287.063.2 RSMo. 1994. Claimant did not file a claim against the KCFD alleging that Mr. Riley's death was caused by his exposure to the alleged hazards of the occupational disease as set out above. Therefore, benefits cannot be awarded against the KCFD. Benefits cannot be awarded against the Liberty Fire Department because Claimant did not prove that a job related accident caused Mr. Riley's death or that he was exposed to the alleged hazards of the occupational disease while he was working primarily in an administrative position with the Liberty Fire Department.
Nevertheless, Claimant argued that Mr. Riley's death was caused by stress in his job as a Deputy Fire Chief with the Liberty Fire Department resulting from his involvement in union negotiations, personnel matters and the long hours he worked, as well as by an argument with Jo Ann Fuller, a fire dispatcher, on the day prior to his death, an argument with Gary Birch, the Fire Chief, on the day before his death and the physical exertion he experienced on the day before his death when he and several firefighters and ambulance personnel had to lift and carry a heavy patient up some stairs to an ambulance. Claimant did not meet her burden of proof.
First, Mr. Riley did not die while allegedly performing the heavy lifting with his co-workers. He did not die while allegedly engaged in a heated argument with Ms. Fuller or Mr. Birch. He died at home in bed between 4:00 a.m. and 4:30 a.m. on the day after the alleged heavy exertion or more than 14 hours later. One witness whom Claimant deposed even testified that the man lifted and carried to an ambulance on the day prior to Mr. Riley's death was a small man who weighed about 160 pounds.
Mr. Riley's death was also not caused by any alleged heated arguments with co-workers on the day prior to his death. The Liberty Fire Department offered into evidence Ms. Fuller's time records, which showed that she did not work on October 5, 2004, the day prior to Mr. Riley's death. The department also offered into evidence the dispatcher logs for that day which showed that Mr. Fuller did not make any dispatches on the day prior to Mr. Riley's death. Claimant did not prove that her husband had engaged in a heated argument with Ms. Fuller on
the day prior to his death or that any such alleged argument had caused or played any role in his death due to hypertensive cardiovascular disease.
Similarly, Claimant failed to prove that her husband and Fire Chief Birch had engaged in a heated argument on the day prior to Mr. Riley's death. Claimant did not offer the testimony of any witnesses to the alleged argument. Chief Birch denied any such argument. He testified that he and Mr. Riley were best friends. He was responsible for getting Mr. Riley the job as Deputy Fire Chief. He testified that on the day prior to Mr. Riley's death, as was their custom, they talked by telephone for 20 minutes during their drive home from work.
Chief Birch made a credible witness. He no longer works for the Liberty Fire Department. He had no incentive to lie for the Fire Department. After Mr. Riley's death, he aided Claimant in getting certain death benefits due to her husband's death. Claimant did not prove that her husband and Chief Birch had engaged in a heated argument on the day prior to his death or that any such alleged heated argument had caused or played any role in her husband's death.
Claimant argued that stress resulting from her husband's involvement in union negotiations contributed to his death. Again, Claimant failed in her burden of proof. Claimant offered the deposition testimony of Fire Captain Richie Cunningham to support her case. Fire Captain Cunningham testified that he had also participated in the union negotiations. He testified that the union negotiations and meetings were not "difficult."
Mr. Cunningham made a credible witness. Claimant offered no credible testimony or evidence which showed that the union meetings and negotiations were difficult or stressful. She offered no testimony from anyone who participated in the union meetings and negotiations other than Mr. Cunningham. She offered no evidence showing that the union meetings and negotiations involved extraordinary and unusual stress or that any alleged stress from the union meetings and negotiations had caused or played any role in her husband's cardiac event on October 6, 2004. ${ }^{4}$
In fact, Claimant did not even know when her husband had last participated in a union meeting or when he had last done any work involving union activities. There was no evidence as to what he did at the union meetings. There was no evidence as to whether he was involved in union negotiations. It would be pure speculation to conclude that some union meeting which may have occurred months prior to Mr. Riley's death and in which we do not know Mr. Riley's role had caused or played any role in his death.
Chief Birch did testify that Mr. Riley's job was stressful. There was no showing, however, that the stress was extraordinary and unusual. There was no evidence that Mr. Riley had ever
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[^0]: ${ }^{4}$ The statute provides that mental injury resulting from work-related stress does not arise out of and in the course of the employment, unless it is demonstrated that the stress is work related and was extraordinary and unusual. The amount of work stress shall be measured by objective standards and actual events. § 287.120 RSMo. 1994.
sought any treatment for the alleged work-related stress. Claimant did not testify that he had sought any treatment for the alleged stress. No physician, psychologist or health care provider had ever diagnosed Mr. Riley with any work-related stress problems prior to his death.
Mr. Riley did have stress in his personal life. The only treatment he ever sought for alleged stress was for the stress in his personal life. On one occasion, Mr. Riley was taken by ambulance to the emergency room of a hospital after experiencing what appeared to be a panic attack while driving with his wife from a family event. Hospital records showed that Mr. Riley complained of hyperventilating, shortness of breath and light headiness. The records noted that he had recently lost his grandmother. The records noted that he was having problems with his daughter's son.
Other medical records showed that Mr. Riley had stress in his personal life over his daughter's pregnancy. Records indicated that Mr. Riley was stressed over his and his wife's decision to adopt their daughter's son. Medical records in 1998 showed that Mr. Riley was stressed over his father's recent hospitalization with an aortic aneurysm. Medical records from 1999 noted that Mr. Riley "has a lot of problems going on with his wife recently."
There was no credible medical or psychological evidence showing that the stress in Mr. Riley's personal life or that allegedly due to his work had caused his enlarged heart, caused or aggravated his severe and advanced hypertensive cardiovascular disease or caused or aggravated his advanced arteriosclerosis, which resulted from the hypertension and high cholesterol. ${ }^{5}$ Claimant did not prove that the alleged work-related stress was a substantial factor in causing Mr. Riley's death or that a direct causal relationship existed between the alleged work-related stress and his hypertensive cardiovascular disease.
The medical evidence clearly showed that Mr. Riley's death was caused by his long standing untreated and advanced hypertension which led to a grossly enlarged heart and a 95 percent occlusion of his left descending coronary artery, which Claimant's own experts admitted was referred to in the medical field as the "widow maker." The other cause of Mr. Riley's death was arteriosclerosis which resulted from the advanced hypertension and Mr. Riley's high cholesterol.
Claimant's own experts admitted that it generally took 15 to 20 years for uncontrolled hypertension to result in severe ventricular hypertrophy, which was the immediate cause of Mr. Riley's death. There was no credible evidence showing that any work activity of Mr. Riley's during the last 14 months of his life as a Deputy Fire Chief with the Liberty Fire Department was a substantial factor in causing the ventricular hypertrophy. Dr. Gill, the pathologist who
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[^0]: ${ }^{5}$ Dr. Lee, who testified on Claimant's behalf, attempted to show that Mr. Riley's work had caused Mr. Riley's high cholesterol by arguing that, due to the nature of the work, firefighters tended to eat at fast food restaurants and to consume a lot of food high in cholesterol. There was no evidence to support that conclusory opinion. Also, Dr. Lee's opinion was contradicted by Chief Birch's testimony. Chief Birch indicated that he had lunch Mr. Riley nearly every day and that Mr. Riley usually ate salads for lunch.
performed the autopsy on Mr. Riley and who testified on Claimant's behalf, admitted that Mr. Riley could not have developed the long-term changes found in his cardiovascular system over a few years. He admitted that arteriosclerosis and hypertensive heart disease were slowdeveloping diseases.
Claimant's own experts admitted that Mr. Riley had severe personal risk factors for heart disease, including the severe and advanced hypertension, severe "bad" high cholesterol readings and low "good" cholesterol readings and his gender. He had sleep apnea. Claimant's own experts admitted that Mr. Riley's medical records showed that he had blood pressure readings of 180/100 and 170/90 during clinical evaluations. Despite the blood pressure readings, Claimant was not prescribed any blood pressure medication. Claimant was prescribed very low dosages of cholesterol medication and failed to follow-up with his family physician to properly monitor his cholesterol. Dr. Thompson, a board certified cardiologist, testified that the dosages prescribed for Mr. Riley's cholesterol were not sufficient to treat the severity of Mr. Riley's cholesterol problem. The evidence supported Dr. Thompson's opinion.
In addition, Mr. Riley had high triglycerides. His family doctor's records showed that he was 5 foot 7 inches tall and that he had weighed as much as $2221 / 2$ pounds. He weighed 207 pounds at the time of his death. Medical records noted that Mr. Riley's stomach was "rotund" and soft. Chief Birch and another fireman testified that Mr. Riley had a large 22-inch neck.
The World Health Organization has set standards for determining obesity. According to the standards a body mass index of 30 is considered obese. The evidence showed that Mr. Riley's body mass index was at best 29.7. Mr. Riley's weight was clearly a risk factor for heart disease. His family history showed that his mother died of congestive heart failure in her 40s. Mr. Riley died of heart disease in his 40s.
Thus, Mr. Riley clearly had numerous personal risk factors for heart disease. There was no direct causal link or relationship between his administrative job as a Deputy Fire Chief for 14 months with the City of Liberty and his longstanding and advanced hypertension and high cholesterol, as required by the statute, assuming that the statute even applied to Mr. Riley who did not work as a firefighter for the Liberty Fire Department. ${ }^{6}$
Claimant did offer the opinions of Drs. Lee, Gill and Schulman in support of her claim. None of their opinions, however, combined with the other evidence was sufficient to show a direct causal relationship between Mr. Riley's duties as a Deputy Fire Chief and any alleged accident and/or occupational disease which allegedly caused his death.
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[^0]: ${ }^{6}$ The statute requires a direct causal relationship between the firefighters' duties and the hypertension. See § 287.067 (5) RSMo. 1994. Mr. Riley was a Deputy Fire Chief during his tenure with the Liberty Fire Department. He did not fight any fires during that tenure. There was no credible evidence that he experienced any psychological stress from rescuing victims from fires or traffic or other accidents during his 14 month tenure.
Dr. Lee is 79 years old and he has been retired for numerous years from the active practice of cardiology. He admitted that he had not done any scholarly research and writing in the field of cardiology since the late 1960s or early 1970s. On cross-examination, he admitted that a federal court in Arizona had excluded his opinions in a case on the basis that they were not supported by medical literature or valid medical principles.
Dr. Lee's opinions in Claimant's case were clearly entitled to little weight. The evidence did not support his opinions. He offered no objective evidence to support his opinion that Mr. Riley's work had somehow caused his hypertension and arteriosclerosis and high cholesterol. He offered no medical literature to support his opinion. His opinions were not entitled to as much weight as those rendered by Dr. Thompson, who concluded that Mr. Riley's work had not caused the severe and advanced hypertension and severe arteriosclerosis which resulted in Mr. Riley's death. Dr. Thompson, in contrast to Dr. Lee, is still actively practicing in the field of cardiology and he is still actively engaged in scholarly research and writing in the field.
Dr. Gill, who testified on Claimant's behalf, admitted that when he did the autopsy and wrote his findings that he did not conclude that Mr. Riley's death was work related. He admitted that he did not render any such opinion until four years after the autopsy and until after he was hired by Claimant to testify in the case.
Dr. Gill admitted that he was not a cardiologist. He admitted that he did not subscribe to any medical journals pertaining to cardiology. He admitted that he found nothing in his independent medical research to support the conclusion that Mr. Riley's death from arteriosclerotic and hypertensive heart disease was work related. He admitted that without Mr. Riley's underlying heart disease, no stressors in Mr. Riley's life could have "precipitated this kind of event." He stated that "I would feel uncomfortable with just purely these stress factors, you know, standing alone as the basis for a - - a cause of death."
Dr. Gill further admitted that he corresponded with Claimant's attorney by e-mail. He admitted that he wrote three drafts of his opinion before signing off on the final opinion. He admitted that Claimant's attorney contacted him by telephone after she received the draft opinion and asked him to change the wording in the opinion. He admitted that he changed the wording in his opinion at the request of Claimant's attorney. By changing the wording in his opinion, he was changing his opinion as to the liability of the City of Liberty for Mr. Riley's death.
Dr. Gill admitted that in his initial opinion, after he had been retained by Claimant, he had concluded that Mr. Riley's work had "precipitated" or significantly contributed to Mr. Riley's death. The statute in effect in October 2004 provided that an injury was not compensable merely because work was a triggering or precipitating factor. § 287.020 (2) RSMo. 1994. Dr. Gill admitted that Claimant's attorney wanted the phrase "precipitated and substantially contributed" removed from the opinion and replaced by "stress he \{Mr. Riley\} experienced in his work situation" had "substantially caused" Mr. Riley's death. Dr. Gill admitted that he
complied with the request made by Claimant's attorney and that he used her wording in his final report.
Dr. Gill's opinion was not credible. A physician who changes his opinion at the request of an attorney who hires and pays him to testify in a case is not a credible witness. ${ }^{7}$ Dr. Gill further admitted that his medical license had been suspended in the past. He admitted that he was asked to resign from his job as a pathologist in the State of Indiana because the findings he had made in several autopsies were disputed.
Dr. Gill admitted that, although he had performed thousands of autopsies, he had never found that a decedent's heart disease and/or heart attack was caused by work as a firefighter until he was asked to do so in Mr. Riley's case, four years after he had done the autopsy and failed to make such a conclusion in the autopsy report. Dr. Gill's opinion and the other evidence did not meet Claimant's burden of proving that Mr. Riley's work with the Liberty Fire Department was a substantial factor in causing his death.
Claimant also offered the opinion of Dr. Schulman, a board certified internist and cardiologist. Dr. Schulman concluded that the immediate cause of Mr. Riley's death was the physical exertion Mr. Riley experienced from lifting and packaging a patient at work on the day before his death and from the emotional stress caused by Mr. Riley's argument with a dispatcher at work on the day before his death. Claimant argued that the dispatcher was Ms. Fuller.
As noted earlier, Claimant failed to prove that her deceased husband had an argument with Ms. Fuller at work on the day prior to his death. Thus, Dr. Schulman's opinion was based on unproven and unsubstantiated facts. Also, there was no credible evidence showing that Mr. Riley's death, 14 hours after he and several other workers had lifted and packaged a patient, was caused by that exertion. Dr. Schulman did not know how much the patient weighed. He did not know how many firefighters and ambulance personnel assisted with the lifting of the patient. He did not know how many steps or how steep the steps were that the patient was carried up to get to the ambulance. As Dr. Thompson testified, death following physical exertion generally occurs within an hour of the exertion. Dr. Thompson was credible in his opinion.
In addition, Dr. Schulman's credentials were not as impressive as those of Dr. Thompson. Dr. Schulman admitted that he had never published any articles in the field of cardiology. He admitted that he had never done any peer-reviewed research in the field of cardiology. Dr. Thompson has authored or co-authored 73 abstracts and letters to the editors of various medical journals. He has authored 38 peer-reviewed articles in medical journals and 17 other peer reviewed articles. He has written chapters in 10 books on cardiology.
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[^0]: ${ }^{7}$ Dr. Lee also testified that he sent his draft reports to Claimant's attorney before he signed off on his final report.
Dr. Schulman's opinion that Mr. Riley's blood pressure was elevated only while Mr. Riley was at work and that the elevated blood pressure only while he was at work had caused the severe damage to his heart and the left anterior coronary artery disease was based purely on speculation. He did not explain why, if that were true, Mr. Riley had blood pressure readings of 180/100 and 170/90 at doctors' examinations. Mr. Riley was not at work when those blood pressure readings were taken. There was no evidence to support Dr. Schulman's theory. There were not even any blood pressure readings specifically showing that the measurements were taken while Mr. Riley was at work. Such an outlandish unsupported theory offered by Dr. Schulman clearly showed bias and detracted from the credibility of every other opinion he rendered in the case.
The most credible and supported medical opinions in the case were rendered by Dr. Thompson of Cardiovascular Consultants. Dr. Thompson is board certified in cardiology. He has worked as a professor of medicine at the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Medicine. His numerous and impressive list of publications were as listed above. There was no evidence that any of his medical opinions had ever been excluded by any court on the basis that they were not supported by medical literature or based on valid medical principles. There was no evidence that his medical license had ever been suspended or that he had been asked to resign from a medical position due to the quality of his work. He did not render outlandish and unsupported medical opinions.
Dr. Thompson concluded that Mr. Riley had, in fact, engaged in heavy work-related exertion on the afternoon prior to his death. He stated, however, that medical studies had not found any increased risk of a myocardial infarction after more than one hour after strenuous exertion. He cited a medical study as support for his opinion. He noted that Mr. Riley did not die until 14 hours after the exertion. Dr. Thompson's opinion that Mr. Riley's death was not caused by some physical exertion 14 hours earlier was credible and supported by the evidence. Mr. Riley was at rest and in bed when he died of the cardiac event.
Dr. Thompson noted that it was medically impossible to conclude that Mr. Riley's alleged emotional stress due to job pressure or personnel problems or budgetary difficulties had precipitated Mr. Riley's "heart attack." He concluded that the cause of Mr. Riley's "heart attack" was the underlying premature atherosclerosis, noting that Mr. Riley had severe left ventricular hypertrophy and hypertensive cardiovascular disease. He concluded that Mr. Riley's heart attack most likely occurred when an atherosclerotic lesion in Mr. Riley's left anterior descending coronary artery developed a plaque rupture and a totally occlusive or nearby totally occlusive coronary thrombosis.
Dr. Thompson's opinion was credible. The evidence supported his opinion. He also indicated that he disagreed with the conclusions reached in the two articles Claimant furnished to her experts on firefighting and cardiovascular disease. Dr. Thompson noted that studies had not generally shown an increased rate of cardiovascular disease in firefighters or emergency responders as compared to men in other occupations. Dr. Lee, who testified for Claimant, also
admitted that there were studies which had concluded that there was no scientific or objective or statistically significant link between firefighting and heart disease.
The two studies relied on by Claimant and her experts were not persuasive. Both studies had the same lead author. Neither showed who paid for the research and the conclusions. It was impossible to determine whether an interested party, such as a union representing firefighters or a similar interest group, had commissioned the research and the studies.
Both studies were lacking in objective evidence as support for the conclusory opinions. While both argued that firefighting duties led to an increased rate of cardiovascular disease and hypertension, neither addressed any such risks for non firefighting employees of a fire department, such as Mr. Riley. Statements in the studies were vague and uncertain. The methodology used to arrive at the conclusions in the studies was not based on sound, scientific research or objective evidence.
Neither study made an attempt to evaluate the significance of personal risk factors for hypertension and cardiovascular disease in the firefighter studied. Neither study analyzed personal risk factors such as age, race, smoking, diet, alcohol consumption, high cholesterol, diabetes, family history, exercise history, or general health history. Neither study addressed how long the firefighters had been employed in the field. It could not be determined from the studies whether the firefighters had worked for 30 days as a firefighter or for 20 years.
Neither study addressed the differences in firefighting duties in major metropolitan areas as opposed to those in smaller communities, such as Liberty, Missouri where there were only two fires in 14 months. Neither addressed the differences in the stress level of firefighters in large metropolitan areas as opposed to those in smaller communities.
There was no way to determine whether any of the firefighters in the studies had hypertension and cardiovascular disease due to their work as opposed to their personal risk factors for hypertension and heart disease. If no controls for personal risk factors for hypertension and heart disease are included in any study, any occupation could be found to include a high percentage of workers with those conditions, and ergo that their work had caused the conditions, when in reality the workers may have been predisposed to the conditions and their work may not have caused or played any role in their developing the conditions.
The studies also made a lot of unproven assumptions and conclusions. In the study entitled, "Blood Pressure in Firefighters, Police Officers and other Emergency Responders" the authors admitted when discussing firefighters, that "evidence for a definitive increase in lifetime risk of cardiovascular disease is lacking." (emphasis added). That statement clearly showed that there was insufficient evidence to support the conclusions reached in the study.
Similarly, there was no credible evidence to support the suggestion in the study that firefighters were obese due to their jobs or that firefighting duties resulted in irregular physical exercise and unhealthy diets. There was no credible or objective evidence showing that shift work or the noise exposure experienced by some firefighters caused hypertension. In fact, assuming that those conclusions were true, they would not be applicable to Mr. Riley who as noted earlier ate salads for lunch, exercised daily at the fire station, worked regular hours as a Deputy Fire Chief and he was not exposed to the loud alarms going off in the middle of the night.
In the second study, "Firefighters and on-duty deaths from coronary heart disease: a case control study," the same lead author as in the previous study admitted that "definitive scientific evidence of increased cardiovascular mortality rates among firefighters remains elusive." (emphasis added). Again, that clearly showed that the conclusions were vague and uncertain. The authors admitted that "it remains unclear whether on-duty CHD (coronary heart disease) deaths are work related and which occupational and personal risk factors increase the risks of on-duty CHD deaths."
The study admitted that firefighting was not likely to cause underlying atherosclerosis. Nothing in either study showed or supported a finding that a direct causal relationship existed between Mr. Riley's duties as a Deputy Fire Chief for 14 months with the Liberty Fire Department and his longstanding severe and advanced hypertensive cardiovascular disease and his longstanding and advanced arteriosclerosis which was caused by his high cholesterol and hypertension. ${ }^{8}$
Finally, Claimant argued that the City of Liberty was estopped from asserting that Mr. Riley's death was not job related based on the findings made in an administrative proceeding involving her entitlement to benefits from the Missouri Local Government Employees' Retirement System (LAGERS). Claimant's argument was without merit.
Different statutes are involved in the two cases. The Missouri Division of Workers' Compensation has exclusive jurisdiction over determining whether a work-related accident or occupational disease occurred. Claimant cited no cases showing that any party was estopped from pursuing their rights under the workers' compensation statutes based on some findings in some administrative tribunal where the issue involved retirement benefits. Also, in LAGERS proceedings, there is a presumption that a death is work related, which is not present in the workers' compensation statutes. ${ }^{9}$
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[^0]: ${ }^{8}$ The statute provides that the firefighter must show a direct causal relationship between his firefighting duties and the hypertension and diseases of the heart or cardiovascular system. § 287.067 (5) RSMo. 1994.
${ }^{9}$ The LAGERS board did not apply the presumption in Mrs. Riley's case because her husband had not passed a physical examination within five years of the date of the filing of the claim.
The parties were not identical in the two cases. The City of Liberty and the Liberty Fire Department were not involved in the LAGERS case. The City of Liberty and the Liberty Fire Department were not privy with the defense in the LAGERS case. The City of Liberty and the Liberty Fire Department argued that they were not even served with notice of the LAGERS hearing. They were not allowed to participate in the LAGERS case. Money awarded in a LAGERS case comes from an employees' retirement fund and not from a city or municipality.
The issues were not identical in the two cases. The standards of proof were not identical in the two cases. The LAGERS decision stated on a crucial issue that "However, as to this very close issue, the Board gives Petitioner the benefit of the doubt and finds that Mr. Riley's fatal heart attack was an injury and was directly caused by the events at work on October 5, 2004, and in the days and weeks leading up to that date." (emphasis added). The statutes governing workers' compensation do not give the benefit of the doubt to either party. The employee or the employee's dependants have the burden of proof. Id.
Later, the LAGERS board stated "However on a very close call based upon the admissible evidence in this case, it is the decision of the Board that Petitioner qualifies for retirement benefits under $\S 70.661 .3$ for the reason that Mr. Riley's fatal cardiac arrhythmia resulted "naturally, directly, reasonably, and immediately from \{Mr. Riley's\} actual performance of duty as an employee \{of the LFD\}." Fist, there was no showing that the same standard for the admissibility of evidence applied in both cases. Also, again, the standard the LAGERS board used to find in favor of Claimant was different than the standard applicable in a workers' compensation case.
The Missouri Workers' Compensation Act provides that an injury must be clearly work related. § 287.020 RSMo. 1994. That is a different standard than "reasonably," as the LAGERS board used in its decision. In the Missouri Workers' Compensation Act, work must be a substantial factor in causing the resulting medical condition or disability. Again, that is a different standard than the one used by the LAGERS board.
Claimant cited no authority showing that the Liberty Fire Department was estopped from defending itself in a workers' compensation case based on some decision issued by a board allowing retirement benefits based on different statutes and criteria. Claimant's argument was without merit.
In conclusion, Claimant failed to prove that Mr. Riley's work was a substantial factor in causing his death by way of an accident and/or an occupational disease. She also failed to show a direct causal relationship between his death which resulted from severe and advance hypertensive cardiovascular disease and arteriosclerosis and his 14 month administrative job as a Deputy Fire Chief with the Liberty Fire Department.
Made by: $\qquad$
Kenneth J. Cain
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Workers' Compensation