Section 287.220.1 provides that the Second Injury Fund's liability is determined by first measuring the degree of disability from the last injury, then the degree or percentage of disability which existed prior to the last injury plus the disability resulting from the last injury, if any, considered alone, shall be deducted from the combined disability, and compensation for the balance, if any, shall be paid out of the special fund known as the second injury fund. As I have found, Claimant sustained a 20 percent permanent partial disability to the body from the last accident. Moreover, the evidence is quite clear that Claimant now is permanently and totally disabled. The issue remains whether Claimant was permanently and totally disabled prior to the last accident. The Second Injury Fund argues that unless Claimant was permanently and partially disabled prior to the last accident, it has no liability under § 287.220 RSMo.
As summarized in her own brief, Claimant has only worked sporadically in part-time positions since qualifying for Social Security Disability in 1997:
Prior to injuring her left shoulder, back and neck, Marlene Stewart was only marginally employable, at best. She hadn't worked more than 20 hours a week in the last 10 years and she drifted from part time job to part time job, in between periods of unemployment, often because she had trouble performing the job or because she was terminated due to her medical limitations. Even her ex-husband testified at the hearing that it took all she had for her to work 20 hours a week and when she did work, she paid the price at home by having to rest more. After work or on her days off she would lay down and take prescription pain medications and anti-depressants.
(Claimant's brief to Administrative Law Judge p. 41).
The test for permanent total disability is whether the worker is able to compete in the open labor market. The critical question is whether, in the ordinary course of business, any employer reasonably would be expected to hire the injured worker, given his present physical condition.
Treasurer v. Cook, 323 S.W.3d 105, 110 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). While "total disability" does not require Claimant to be completely inactive or inert, Sifferman v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 906 S.W.2d 823, 826 (Mo. App. S.D. 1996), overruled on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W. 2d 220 (Mo. banc 2003), it does require a finding that Claimant is unable to work in any employment in the open labor market, and not merely the inability to return to the employment in which the employee was engaged at the time of the accident. Sullivan v. Masters Jackson Paving CO., 35 S.W.3d 879, 884 (Mo. App. S.D. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.2d 220 (Mo. banc 2003).
The simple fact is that $\S 287.020$ RSMo, does not distinguish between full-time and part-time employment in the open labor market. A worker is not necessarily permanently and totally disabled within the context of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law simply because she must work 20 hours or less per week, take medication, and/or observe physician-imposed restrictions to return to work. See e.g., Rector v. Gary's Heating and Cooling, 293 S.W.3d 143, 148 (Mo. App. S.D. 2009) (finding that an injured employee was not permanently and totally disabled upon returning to part-time supervisory work with the aid of medication and diligent observation of the restrictions placed on him by his doctors).
Conversely, "the ability to perform some work is relevant to th[e] [total disability] determination, but it is not dispositive. To the contrary, a number of cases have recognized that a claimant can be totally disabled even if able to perform sporadic or light duty work." Cooper v. Med. Ctr. of Independence, 955 S.W.2d 570, 575 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997). For instance, in Pavia v. Smitty's Supermarket, 118 S.W.3d 228, 238 (Mo. App. S.D. 2003), the Court held that the Commission was not automatically precluded from determining a Claimant permanently and totally disabled merely because Claimant had a job performing a variety of small tasks at an auto dealership. Similarly, the Eastern District held that a claimant who was found by the Commission to be "only able to work very limited hours at rudimentary tasks" was a totally disabled worker." Grgic v. P \& G Const., 904 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Mo.App. E.D.1995). See also Molder v. Missouri State Treasurer, 342 S.W.3d 406 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011) (holding that light work, four hours per week, obtained through a friend, and which caused pain, was not work on the open labor market.)
In Pavia, Grgic, and Molder, the jobs in issue were not available on the open labor market. But the instant case is more akin to Rector, in which the employee had continued to work for the employer in a supervisory capacity on a part-time basis, with certain accommodations. In the instant case, Claimant demonstrated that she was physically capable of working about 20 hours per week as a telephone appointment setter for KIC, as a clerk for ALCO, and as a sandwich maker for Subway, even if she had to rest after work. Each of these jobs was obtained by conventional means. None were gratuitous positions obtained through a friend. I can only conclude that Claimant was capable of part-time employment in the open labor market.
Dr. Koprivica testified that the work injury had the effect of increasing Claimant's preexisting limitations to the point where she could not sustain gainful employment and was confined to a sedentary lifestyle. James England and Wilbur Swearingin agree. She has not worked but a day or two since the accident, and not at all since her surgery. Claimant is permanently and totally disabled as a result of her preexisting and work related disabilities.
The Second Injury Fund cites Mr. England's testimony that Claimant was permanently and totally disabled even prior to her injury of February 25, 2009. But, such testimony was in the context of full-time work. Mr. England clearly acknowledged that Claimant was capable of working part-time jobs in the open labor market prior to February 25, 2009.
Likewise, the Second Injury Fund highlights the report of Wilbur Swearingin wherein he indicated that Claimant's latest injuries were "additive and cumulative to Ms. Stewart's preexisting permanent total disability." It appears, however, that Mr. Swearingin's comment was in reference to "permanent total disability" as determined by the Social Security Administration, and not under the standards used for Missouri Workers' Compensation. Mr. Swearingin certainly does not suggest that Claimant's last part-time employment was an accommodated job or was unavailable in the open labor market. To the contrary, he specifically identified at least three of Claimant's part-time jobs as being within the DOT. Thus, I am not persuaded that Claimant was permanently and totally disabled prior to February 25, 2009, as that term is used within the context of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law.
Had Employer/Insurer not settled their liability, they would be responsible for the payment of 80 weeks of permanent partial disability beginning May 17, 2010, which is the date of maximum medical improvement. As the permanent total disability and permanent partial disability rates are identical, there is no differential due during the initial 80 weeks. The Second Injury Fund is liable for permanent total disability in the weekly amount of $\ 120.75 beginning November 28, 2011.
The Award is subject to modification and review as provided by law. Interest shall be paid as provided by law.
Claimant's attorney of record, Randy Alberhasky, shall have a lien of 25 percent on all compensation awarded as a reasonable fee for necessary legal services rendered.
Made by: $\qquad$
Victorine R. Mahon
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Workers' Compensation
Issued by Missouri Division of Workers' Compensation
Employee: Marlene Stewart