We affirm the award of the administrative law judge as supplemented herein.
We approve and affirm the administrative law judge's allowance of attorney's fees herein as being fair and reasonable.
Any past due compensation shall bear interest as provided by law.
The July 13, 2011, award and decision of Administrative Law Judge Maureen Tilley is attached and incorporated by this reference.
Given at Jefferson City, State of Missouri, this $26^{\text {th }}$ day of June 2013.
LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
John J. Larsen, Jr., Chairman
DISSENTING OPINION FILED
James Avery, Member
Curtis E. Chick, Jr., Member
Attest:
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[^0]: ${ }^{7}$ In determining questions of fact the administrative law judge and commission have the right and the duty to draw such reasonable inferences as are warranted by the evidence taken as a whole and the circumstances disclosed by it. See Davies v. Carter Carburetor, 429 S.W.2d 738 (Mo. 1968); Taylor v. Labor Pros L.L.C., 392 S.W.3d 39, 45 (Mo. App. 2013).
Employee: Linda Dorris
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Secretary
I have reviewed and considered all of the competent and substantial evidence on the whole record. Based on my review of the evidence as well as my consideration of the relevant provisions of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, I believe the decision of the administrative law judge should be reversed.
I do not believe employee's injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. ${ }^{8}$ Employee is unable to identify what caused her to trip. Before we can conclude that an injury arose out of and in the course of employment, it is incumbent upon us to identify the hazard giving rise to employee's injury. It is only by weighing employee's work exposure to the hazard against her non-work exposure to that hazard that we can determine if there is the necessary causal connection between her fall and her work. Here, employee has not proven what hazard caused her fall so I cannot perform the quantitative comparison required by the Workers' Compensation Law. Employee bears the burden of proving all elements of her claim for compensation. Employee has failed to prove her injury arose out of and in the course of employment.
For the foregoing reasons, I would deny the claim for compensation. I respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority of the Commission to award compensation for this claim.
James G. Avery, Jr., Member
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[^0]: ${ }^{8} \S 287.020 .3(2)$ RSMo.