Based on my review of the evidence as well as my consideration of the relevant provisions of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, I am convinced that the decision of the administrative law judge is in error, and should be reversed.
Employee worked for employer as a billing specialist. Her duties included posting payments, receiving payments, filing insurance claims, making deposits, and collecting mail. Employee made deposits and picked up mail once per day, typically near the end of her shift.
On January 13, 2012, employee was walking down a hallway after picking up the office mail from the mailbox area located on the lobby floor of the building where she worked. Employee was on her way to the elevator which would take her to the second floor where her office was located. As employee walked toward the elevator area, she looked up and saw a doctor from her office walking toward the elevators. Employee picked up her pace in order to catch up to the doctor. Employee offered no explanation at the hearing as to why she wanted to catch up with the doctor.
When employee reached the end of the hallway, she slowed her pace to turn a corner to the elevator area. As employee was walking toward the elevators, her feet stuck to the linoleum floor, and she fell forward and landed on her right shoulder. Employee suffered a right proximal humerus fracture as a result of her fall.
Employee was unable to provide any explanation as to why her feet stuck to the floor. Employee testified there was nothing on her shoes that caused her feet to stick to the floor, and that there was nothing about the floor itself that caused her to fall. Employee agreed that there was no sticky substance on the floor, and that there were no defects or uneven spots on the floor that caused her to fall. Employee explained that the shoes she was wearing at the time of her accident were shoes she chose to wear; they were not required by employer.
Employee agreed that she walks on linoleum floor outside of work, and that she also carries items with both of her hands. Employee only walks at work when she is making deposits, picking up mail, or retrieving files. Employee typically picked up the mail only once per shift. Employee did not provide any evidence to show she walks more at work than outside of work, nor that she carries mail at work more often than she does at home.
William Stogner, a security officer who responded to the incident, testified that he inspected the area where employee fell, and did not find any foreign substances, liquids, or defects in the floor.
Given the foregoing facts, I am convinced that employee has failed to demonstrate that her injuries arose out of and in the course of employment. The courts have interpreted § 287.020.3(2)(b) RSMo to involve a "causal connection" test. Johme v. St. John's Mercy Healthcare, 366 S.W.3d 504, 510-11 (Mo. 2012). In specifically contrasting a "work-related risk" versus a "risk to which the employee was equally exposed" outside
Injury No.: 12-001723
Employee: Barbara Simmons
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of work, the Johme court made clear that our analysis under § 287.020.3(2)(b) should begin with an identification of the risk or hazard that resulted in the employee's injuries, followed by a quantitative comparison whether this employee was equally exposed to that risk in normal nonemployment life. Id. at 512. Following the court's reasoning, the result of this quantitative comparison should reveal whether employee's injuries resulted from a risk unrelated to the employment.
Here, I find that the risk or hazard that resulted in employee's injuries is that of employee's shoe sticking to a linoleum floor. The next question is whether employee was equally exposed to that risk or hazard in her normal nonemployment life. I am convinced that employee was so exposed. Employee agreed that she walks outside of work, and that she walks on linoleum floors. Employee also agreed that her job does not involve a lot of walking, and that she typically only does so if she is getting the mail or making a deposit, events that happen once per shift, at most. Nothing about employee's work as a billing specialist caused employee to fall down on January 13, 2012. As the Missouri Supreme Court has made unmistakably clear:
An injury will not be deemed to arise out of employment if it merely happened to occur while working but work was not a prevailing factor and the risk involved ... is one to which the worker would have been exposed equally in normal non-employment life.
Johme v. St. John's Mercy Healthcare, 366 S.W.3d 504, 511 (Mo. 2012), quoting Miller v. Mo. Highway \& Transp. Comm'n, 287 S.W.3d 671, 674 (Mo. 2009).
I believe the majority's reasoning imputes liability to employer merely because employee was injured at work, and fails to address the relevant question whether her injuries resulted because of work. I am convinced that employee's injuries came from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal nonemployment life.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the award of the administrative law judge and enter a final award denying employee's claim. Because the majority has determined otherwise, I respectfully dissent.
James G. Avery, Jr., Member