Missouri courts have routinely required that the permanent nature of an injury be shown to a reasonable certainty, and that such proof may not rest on surmise and speculation. Sanders v. St. Clair Corp., 943 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Mo.App. S.D. 1997). A disability is "permanent" if "shown to be of indefinite duration in recovery or substantial improvement is not expected." Tiller v. 166 Auto Auction, 941 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Mo.App. S.D. 1997). "Total disability" is defined as the inability to return to any employment and not merely the inability to return to the employment in which the employee was engaged at the time of the accident. Section 287.020.7, RSMo 2000. The test for permanent total disability is whether, given the claimant's situation and condition, he or she is competent to compete in the open labor market. Sutton v. Masters Jackson Paving Co., 35 S.W.3d 879, 884 Mo.App. 2001). The question is whether an employer in the usual course of business would reasonably be expected to hire the claimant in the claimant's present physical condition, reasonably expecting the claimant to perform the work for which he or she is hired. Id.
The great weight of the evidence compels a finding that the claimant in this case is unemployable in the open labor market. The claimant had significant restrictions on his employability before the 2004 accident and had more restrictions and limitations on his employability as a result of the 2004 accident. The claimant's two forensic experts opined that the claimant was unemployable in the labor market and therefore permanently and totally disabled. The claimant held his prior position with this employer for two years with significant accommodations, but lost the position due to an error in a report that went out with the claimant's initials. The claimant applied for and received Social Security Disability benefits, and therefore, did not pursue other positions. Dr. Poetz diagnosed (1) right femoral neck fracture and status post right total hip replacement with prosthesis, (2) right sciatica, and (3) depression as a result of the 2004 accident. He opined that the claimant suffered a 60 % permanent partial disability to the right hip, a 20 % permanent partial disability to the lumbar spine, and a 30 % permanent partial disability due to depression as a result of the 2004 accident. See Dr. Poetz deposition, pages 20-21, depo Ex 2, pages 5, 8. Dr. Poetz testified that the primary injury and pre-existing injuries combined to create a greater disability than the sum of the individual specific disabilities. He opined that the claimant was permanently and totally disabled due in part to the combination of the pre-existing disabilities and the primary injury and resultant disabilities from that injury. He also opined that considering the last injury alone and its residuals the claimant would be permanently and totally disabled disregarding all pre-existing disabilities and limitations. See Dr. Poetz deposition, pages 23, 24, depo Ex 2, p 7, 8.
Dr. Johnston rated the claimant's permanent partial disability at 20 % of the right hip for the femoral neck fracture and hip replacement. He testified that the claimant would not be expected to return to normal, meaning normal for the general population. He felt that this was due to the combination of the results of the fracture and the severe underlying diabetic neuropathy. Dr. Johnston testified that the combination of the results of the fracture and the underlying severe diabetic neuropathy combined to render Mr. Short significantly more disabled than if he had either one or the other. He noted that throughout this period claimant did not return to the use of crutches. See Dr. Johnston deposition, pages 24-28. Dr. Johnston testified that the claimant would have significant limitations on his physical ability to work as a result of the hip fracture as well as the pre-existing diabetic neuropathy. "He has certainly restrictions on getting in and out and doing things. ... He certainly has mobility limitations." Dr. Johnston testified that the claimant would have limits on lifting, bending, squatting, stooping, and these would be things he would not be able to do. He opined that he would be limited to light lifting. See Dr. Johnston deposition, pages 32-33.
Given the forensic medical evaluations, the vocational evaluation, and the claimant's presentation at the hearing, it is clear that the claimant is permanently totally disabled, given the lack of any contrary forensic evidence. The more difficult question is whether the limitations and restrictions from the last accident alone result in permanent and total disability when combined with the claimant's age, education, and past relevant work history. This is important, because Section 287.220, RSMo 2000, provides as follows:
....if the previous disability or disabilities, whether from compensable injury or otherwise, and the last injury together result in total and permanent disability, the minimum standards under this subsection for a body as a whole injury or major extremity shall not apply and the employer at the time of the last injury shall be liable only for the disability resulting from the last injury considered alone and of itself; except that if the compensation for which the employer at the time of the last injury is liable is less than the compensation provided in this chapter for permanent total disability, then in addition to the compensation for which the employer is liable and after the completion of payment of the compensation by the employer, the employee shall be paid the remainder of the compensation that would be due for permanent total disability under Section 287.200 out of a special fund known as the "Second Injury Fund"...
"Section 287.220 creates the Second Injury Fund and sets forth when and in what amounts compensation shall be paid from the [F]und in '[a]ll cases of permanent disability where there has been previous disability." For the Fund to be liable for permanent, total disability benefits, the claimant must establish that: (1) he suffered from a permanent partial disability as a result of the last compensable injury, and (2) that disability has combined with a prior permanent partial disability to result in total permanent disability. Section 287.220.1. The Fund is liable for the permanent total disability only after the employer has paid the compensation due for the disability resulting from the later work-related injury. Section 287.220.1 ("After the compensation liability of the employer for the last injury, considered alone, has been determined ..., the degree or percentage of ... disability that is attributable to all injuries or conditions existing at the time the last injury was sustained shall then be determined...."). Thus, in deciding whether the Fund is liable, the first assessment is the degree of disability from the last injury considered alone. Any prior partial disabilities are irrelevant until the employer's liability for the last injury is determined. If the last injury in and of itself resulted in the employee's permanent, total disability, then the Fund has no liability, and the employer is responsible for the entire amount of compensation. ABB Power T \& D Company v. William Kempker and Treasurer of the State of Missouri, 263 S.W.3d 43, 50 (Mo.App. W.D. 2007).
In the present case, the claimant testified at hearing that the pain in his right hip has never completely gone away. He continues to take Vicodin for pain and then lies down and stretches out the right leg, 3 or 4 times a week. He has problems sleeping at night and has decreased concentration during the daytime. He lays down for about an hour a day to control his hip pain.
Dr. Poetz testified that, even absent the claimant's preexisting injuries and medical conditions, the disabilities from the claimant's 2004 work-related accident alone permanently and totally disabled him. See Dr. Poetz deposition, page 23. These disabilities include the claimant's right hip, low back, and depression.
The defense challenged Dr. Poetz' conclusion that the claimant suffered depression from the 2004 accident. There is some issue as to when and why the claimant developed depression. There is an indication in the records that the claimant was taking Zoloft at the time of the primary injury. Claimant testified at hearing that he was treating for depression at the time of the primary injury. However in his deposition he stated he had stopped treating for depression years before
the primary injury, and he testified that his depression did not interfere with his work before February 2004. See claimant deposition, page 58.
No forensic medical expert offered an opinion that the claimant had any pre-existing permanent partial disability due to depression. Dr. Poetz, the sole expert to offer any opinion as to the claimant's depression, testified that the 2004 work injury caused depression, and he did not necessarily make the assumption that claimant didn't have depression before his February 2004 work injury. See Dr. Poetz deposition, pages 44, 45. The defense argues that Dr. Poetz is not qualified to evaluate the claimant's depression, however the defense offered no contrary forensic opinion evidence and did not state exactly why Dr. Poetz lacks medical qualifications in this area of medicine based on his curriculum vitae attached to his deposition. Certainly, a different evaluation would have been welcome, but lay tribunals cannot disregard forensic medical evidence based on lay experience or lay opinions. The defense argument that Dr. Poetz lacks foundation or credentials in this area is not persuasive. The evidentiary record reveals no basis, expert or lay, to find that the claimant suffered any permanent partial disability due to his prior depression treatment.
The defense also challenged Dr. Poetz' conclusion that the claimant suffered sciatica from the 2004 accident. The defense points to Dr. Johnston's testimony relating to sciatica, "He really had two episodes of sciatica. He had one in September of '05 and I think he got better from that, and then he had a slip and fall and that flared up again ..." See Dr. Johnston deposition, page 31. On the other hand, Dr. Johnston never opined whether the accident was the prevailing factor causing the sciatica or whether it was a pre-existing condition, or whether it is a permanent condition that is episodic.
Further, in regard to his alleged pre-existing permanent partial disability due to his heart and his neck, the claimant testified in his deposition that he did not have any physical problems performing his job duties due to either his neck or his heart. See claimant deposition, page 43, 44 .
Mr. Weimholt testified that the work-related 2004 accident in and of itself rendered the claimant totally disabled from a vocational point of view. See Weimholt deposition, pages 12, 13. He agreed that based on the claimant's subjective complaints from the February 2004 work injury, including interrupted sleep, the need to lie down periodically, problems with concentration and the need to take Vicodin, along with the claimant's age, education and transferable skills and work experience, the claimant would be unemployable in the open labor market. See Weimholt deposition, pages 53-55. He also opined that based on Dr. Poetz' restrictions from the 2004 work injury alone would render the claimant unemployable in the open labor market regardless of any of his pre-existing disabilities. See Weimholt deposition, pages 56,57 .
The claimant's two experts, Dr. Poetz and Mr. Weimholt, while acknowledging the existence and extent of his pre-existing disabilities, both opined that the claimant would still be unemployable in the open labor market based on the primary injury alone. Therefore, the claimant's employer and its insurer bear liability for the claimant's permanent total disability, and the Second Injury Fund has no liability. In addition, the claimant and his spouse, Martha R. Short (Date of Birth June 7, 1948), have been continuously married since December 30, 1972.
They were married at the time of the accident and at the time of the hearing. The claimant's spouse qualifies as a dependent as that term is defined in Section 287.240, RSMo 2000.