Lorrain Wibbenmeyer v. Citizens Electric Corporation

We believe that employer's argument fails because it asks us to subvert the plain language of Chapter 287 dealing with settlements. Section 287.390 RSMo requires the parties to obtain approval from an administrative law judge or this Commission before any agreement to settle workers' compensation benefits can be given effect:

1. Parties to claims hereunder may enter into voluntary agreements in settlement thereof, but no agreement by an employee or his or her dependents to waive his or her rights under this chapter shall be valid, nor shall any agreement of settlement or compromise of any dispute or claim for compensation under this chapter be valid until approved by an administrative law judge or the commission, nor shall an administrative law judge or the commission approve any settlement which is not in accordance with the rights of the parties as given in this chapter.

(emphasis added).

At oral argument in this matter, employer's counsel conceded that the general release has never been approved as required under the foregoing section. It follows that the general release cannot be considered a valid settlement of any dispute or claim for compensation under Chapter 287. Similarly, the plain language of the foregoing statute makes clear that employee cannot be deemed to have waived her rights under Chapter 287 by signing the document.

To the extent employer asks us, at this time, to approve the terms of the general release as a settlement of employee's workers' compensation claim, we deny that request, because there has been no showing that the terms of the agreement are in accordance with employee's rights under Chapter 287. We note that the rules of the Division of Workers' Compensation (Division) regarding compromise settlements require, among other things, that:

(A) The compromise settlement agreement shall set forth the workers' compensation issues compromised, the total amount of medical costs incurred and previously paid, the total amount of medical costs paid under the agreement, the total amount of temporary benefits previously paid, the total amount of temporary benefits paid under the agreement, the total amount of any permanency benefits previously paid, the total amount of permanency benefits paid under the agreement, the total amount of all benefits paid under the agreement, the total amount or the percentage of the employee's attorney's fees and expenses, and the total compensation paid in the case. A provision which prorates the amount of settlement over the life expectancy of the injured employee may be included.

The general release makes no mention whatsoever of the workers' compensation issues purportedly compromised, nor does it specify the amount of employee's medical costs, temporary benefits, permanency benefits, or the total compensation paid to employee. Instead, it appears to be merely a generalized severance agreement seeking a release of employer's civil liability in exchange for a monetary payment to the employee.

Enployee: Lorrain Wibbenmeyer

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For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the general release employee signed when employer laid her off has no effect whatsoever in this workers' compensation proceeding. Employer is referred to the above-cited and relevant Division rules, as well as the requirements of § 287.390 for guidance as to how to properly approach a settlement in the workers' compensation context.

We note that the administrative law judge found that employee credibly testified about her job duties. *Award*, page 8. We note also that employer's evaluating expert, Dr. David Brown, initially opined that employee's work was the likely prevailing factor causing her to suffer left carpal tunnel syndrome. Dr. Brown reached this opinion on the basis of a description of employee's work duties that, in all material respects, matched her hearing testimony. It was only after employer provided Dr. Brown with a modified description of employee's job duties that Dr. Brown changed his opinion and opined that employee's work was not the prevailing factor causing her to suffer carpal tunnel syndrome.

We adopt the finding of the administrative law judge that employee provided credible testimony about her work duties at the hearing. It follows that Dr. Brown's initial opinion, which was based on employee's description of her job duties, is the relevant opinion for purposes of our analysis. Faced with the essentially unanimous opinions from Drs. Brown and Poetz that employee's work for employer is the prevailing factor causing her to suffer left carpal tunnel syndrome, we are persuaded that employee prevails on the issue of medical causation of this injury.

We affirm and adopt the award of the administrative law judge, as supplemented, herein.

The award and decision of Administrative Law Judge Maureen Tilley, issued January 7, 2013 is attached and incorporated by this reference.

The Commission further approves and affirms the administrative law judge's allowance of attorney's fees herein as being fair and reasonable.

Any past due compensation shall bear interest as provided by law.

Given at Jefferson City, State of Missouri, this 12th day of August 2013.

John J. Larsen, Jr., Chairman

James G. Avery, Jr., Member

Curtis E. Chick, Jr., Member

Attest:

Secretary

Employee: Lorrain Wibbenmeyer

Injury No. 09-111705

Dependents: N/A

Employer: Citizens Electric Corp

Additional Party: N/A

Insurer: Missouri Electric Cooperatives c/o Cannon Cochran Management Services

Hearing Date: September 18, 2012

Checked by: MT/rmm

1. Are any benefits awarded herein? Yes.
2. Was the injury or occupational disease compensable under Chapter 287? Yes.
3. Was there an accident or incident of occupational disease under the Law? Yes.
4. Date of accident or onset of occupational disease? October 1, 2009.
5. State location where accident occurred or occupational disease contracted: Perry County, Missouri.
6. Was above employee in employ of above employer at time of alleged accident or occupational disease? Yes.
7. Did employer receive proper notice? Yes.
8. Did accident or occupational disease arise out of and in the course of the employment? Yes.
9. Was claim for compensation filed within time required by Law? Yes.
10. Was employer insured by above insurer? Yes.

On September 18, 2012, the employee, Lorrain Wibbenmeyer, appeared in person and by her attorney, Joseph Webb, for hearing for final award. The employer/insurer was represented at the hearing by their attorney, Joseph Page. At the time of the hearing, the parties agreed on certain undisputed facts and identified the issues that were in dispute. These undisputed fact stipulations and issues, together with a summary of the evidence and the findings of fact and rulings of law, are set forth below as follows:

The parties stipulated to the following:

1. Employer, Citizens Electric Corp., was operating under and subject to the provisions of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Act and liability was fully insured by Missouri Electric Cooperatives.
2. The employee's claim was filed within the time allowed by law.
3. The employer did not furnish any medical aid.
4. The employer did not pay any temporary total disability benefits.

1. Covered employee.
2. Accident or occupational disease.
3. Notice.
4. Average weekly wage and rate.
5. Medical causation.
6. Previously incurred medical aid.
7. Nature and extent of disability.
8. Disfigurement.

The following exhibits were offered and admitted into evidence:

Employee's Exhibits:

A. Email between Employee and Employer/Insurer (1/25/10).

B. Report of Injury (filed 1-29-10).

C. Med