The administrative law judge rendered the following conclusion with regard to future medical care: "Employer is hereby ordered to provide such medical treatment as Dr. Brockman or any physician to whom the Claimant is referred by Dr. Brockman which is medically reasonable in order to cure and relieve the effects of the injury Claimant suffered on January 18, 2009." Award, page 16. Crucially, the foregoing statement does not make clear whether the administrative law judge intended merely to award treatment "as recommended by" Dr. Brockman, or if the administrative law judge meant to order treatment "as directed or provided by" Dr. Brockman. The reference to doctors to whom Dr. Brockman might refer employee seems to indicate that the administrative law judge intended to order that employee's treatment be provided or directed by Dr. Brockman. We believe that such an award would be in contravention of $\S 287.140 .10$ RSMo, which provides, in relevant part, as follows:
The employer shall have the right to select the licensed treating physician, surgeon, chiropractic physician, or other health care provider; provided, however, that such physicians, surgeons or other health care providers shall offer only those services authorized within the scope of their licenses. For the purpose of this subsection, subsection 2 of section 287.030 shall not apply.
The parties asked the administrative law judge to consider the issue "whether [employee] has sustained injuries that will require future medical care in order to cure and relieve [employee] of the effects of the injuries." Transcript, page 4. The parties did not identify any specific future medical procedure, such as a disputed surgery, that is the subject of the dispute over future medical treatment. Compare Conrad v. Jack Cooper Transp. Co., 273 S.W.3d 49, 54 (Mo. App. 2008). Instead, employee is claiming that she has a generalized need for future treatment to cure and relieve the effects of her work injury. The issue thus turns on whether employee has established a reasonable probability that, as a result of the work injury, she is in need of future medical care. Pennewell v. Hannibal Reg'l Hosp., 390 S.W.3d 919, 926 (Mo. App. 2013).
We agree with the administrative law judge's implied finding that Dr. Brockman's credible testimony on the topic of future medical care establishes a reasonable probability that employee will need future psychiatric treatment as a result of the work injury. But we are not permitted to order future medical care to be directed or provided by a specific physician, unless an issue is presented under $\S 287.140 .2$ RSMo as to whether employee's life, health, or recovery is endangered such that an administrative law judge or this Commission may order a change in the physician, surgeon, hospital, etc. See, e.g., Noel v. ABB Combustion Eng'g, 383 S.W.3d 480, 485 (Mo. App. 2012). Because the parties have not presented any issue implicating $\S 287.140 .2$, an award of future medical care "as directed by" or "as provided by" Dr. Brockman would be inappropriate, as it would contravene employer's statutory right to direct treatment.
Accordingly, we modify the administrative law judge's award of future medical treatment as follows. We conclude that employer is obligated to provide future medical treatment that may reasonably be required to cure and relieve the effects of the work injury, to include, but not to be limited to, those psychiatric treatments recommended by Dr. Brockman. We conclude that employer has the right to direct such future medical treatment.