| FINAL AWARD ALLOWING COMPENSATION (Affirming Award and Decision of Administrative Law Judge with Supplemental Opinion) |
| Injury No.: 08-118155 |
| Employee: | Ivan Fall |
| Employer: | Matt Miller Co., Inc. d/b/a Red Door Construction |
| Insurer: | Carolina Casualty Insurance Co. |
| This workers' compensation case is submitted to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) for review as provided by § 287.480 RSMo. Having read the briefs, reviewed the evidence, heard the parties’ arguments, and considered the whole record, we find that the award of the administrative law judge allowing compensation is supported by competent and substantial evidence and was made in accordance with the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law. Pursuant to § 286.090 RSMo, we affirm the award and decision of the administrative law judge with this supplemental opinion. |
| Discussion |
| Employee’s motion for costs |
| The parties asked the administrative law judge to resolve the following issues:(1) whether employee sustained an accident or incident of occupational disease on or about April 11, 2008, and if so whether this accident or incident of occupational disease arose out of and in the course of employment; (2) whether the employee gave employer proper notice of the injury pursuant to § 287.420 RSMo; (3) whether the alleged accident or incident of occupational disease caused the injuries and disabilities for which benefits are claimed; (4) whether the employer is obligated to pay for certain past medical care and expenses; (5) whether the employee has sustained injuries that will require additional or future medical care to cure and relieve the employee from the effects of the injuries; (6) whether the employee sustained any permanent disability as a consequence of the claimed accident or incident of occupational disease, and if so, what is the nature and extent of any disability; and (7) whether employee is entitled to costs, including attorney’s fees, under § 287.560 RSMo.The administrative law judge rendered the following findings and conclusions: (1) on or about April 11, 2008, employee sustained an incident of occupational disease which arose out of and in the course of employment; (2) employee provided timely notice pursuant to § 287.420 RSMo; (3) employee met his burden of proof with respect to the issue of medical causation; (4) employer is obligated to pay employee $4,997.97 in past medical expenses; (5) employer is obligated to provide future medical treatment as may be reasonable, necessary, and causally related to his injury; (6) employee sustained a 15% permanent partial disability of the body as a whole as a result of his injury; and (7) employee failed to meet his burden of proving entitlement to costs under § 287.560 RSMo.Employer filed a timely Application for Review challenging the administrative law judge’s findings and conclusions with respect to the issues of: (1) whether employee sustained an occupational disease; (2) medical causation; and (3) notice. |
On November 13, 2013, employee filed a Motion For Costs arguing the employer's Application For Review does not raise an argument premised on any evidence in the record or supported by any legal authority. In the Motion, employee argues that employer ignores controlling case law authority as to the issue of notice and relies upon substantive amendments to Chapter 287 that did not take effect until January 2014. Employee suggests employer's arguments are not tendered to this Commission in good faith. Employee alleges that his costs in responding to employer's Application for Review amount to $\ 1,200.00, representing 6 hours of work on the part of his attorney at an hourly rate of $\ 200.00.
The Commission has not received any response from the employer to employee's Motion For Costs.
Section 287.560 RSMo provides, in relevant part, as follows:
[I]f the division or the commission determines that any proceedings have been brought, prosecuted or defended without reasonable ground, it may assess the whole cost of the proceedings upon the party who so brought, prosecuted or defended them.
The Commission is authorized under the foregoing section to award the attorney's fees incurred by a party in responding to proceedings that are brought, prosecuted, or defended without reasonable grounds: "[t]he 'whole cost of the proceedings' includes all amounts the innocent party expended throughout the proceeding brought, prosecuted, or defended without reasonable grounds, including attorney's fees." DeLong v. Hampton Envelope Co., 149 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Mo. App. 2004)(citation omitted).
The courts have cautioned the Commission to limit an award of costs under § 287.560 to those cases where "the issue is clear and the offense egregious." Landman v. Ice Cream Specialties, Inc., 107 S.W.3d 240, 250 (Mo. 2003). Here, we are convinced that the issue is clear, because employer's position quite simply finds no evidentiary support whatsoever in the record. Rather, the uncontested lay testimony and expert medical opinion evidence overwhelmingly supports the administrative law judge's conclusion that employee suffered an occupational disease and is entitled to benefits. Employee is also correct in pointing out that employer, having appealed the issue of notice, wholly ignores the relevant and controlling precedent of Allcorn v. Tap Enters., 277 S.W.3d 823 (Mo. App. 2009), the holding of which is inarguably dispositive.
We are further convinced that the offense is egregious. In its brief and at oral argument in this matter, employer failed to advance a single colorable argument that would support our disturbing the administrative law judge's award in any way. Employer's counsel conceded that employer did not provide any expert medical testimony to rebut that advanced by employee, but argued that the issue in this case is whether the Commission can rely on "pure opinion" evidence in resolving issues of medical causation. We are perplexed by this statement, as it seems to ignore fifty years of Missouri case law cautioning that "the question of causation [is] one for medical testimony, without which a finding for claimant would be based on mere conjecture and speculation and not on
Substantial evidence." Welker v. MFA Cent. Co-operative, 380 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Mo. App. 1964). Employer's citation to recent and substantive amendments to Chapter 287 that are in no way applicable to this claim, and its failure to direct us to relevant and controlling legal authority with respect to the issue of notice are further suggestive of the lack of good faith with which employer approaches this Commission. Accordingly, we find that employer's conduct before the Commission is egregious.
In light of the foregoing considerations, we conclude that employer's appeal to the Commission is without reasonable grounds. We conclude that the whole cost of these proceedings should be assessed against employer. We find that $1,200.00 represents a fair and reasonable charge for services rendered by employee's attorney in responding to employer's Application for Review. We conclude that employer is liable to employee for $1,200.00 in attorney's fees as the whole cost expended by employee in responding to employer's appeal herein.
**Conclusion**
We affirm and adopt the award of the administrative law judge with this supplemental opinion.
Employee is entitled to, and employer is hereby ordered to pay, $1,200.00 in attorney's fees representing employee's costs in responding to employer's appeal herein.
The award and decision of Administrative Law Judge L. Timothy Wilson, issued July 19, 2013, is attached and incorporated by this reference.
The Commission approves and affirms as fair and reasonable the administrative law judge's allowance of a 25% lien in favor of employee's attorney on compensation awarded herein.
Any past due compensation shall bear interest as provided by law.
Given at Jefferson City, State of Missouri, this 17th day of March 2014.
LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
John J. Larsen, Jr., Chairman
James G. Avery, Jr., Member
Curtis E. Chick, Jr., Member
Attest:
Secretary