We modify the award of the administrative law judge as to the issue of Second Injury Fund liability.
Employee's dependents Pamela Michele Wooley, Zachary Wooley, and Sara Wooley are entitled to, and the Second Injury Fund is hereby ordered to pay, weekly payments of permanent total disability benefits beginning October 20, 2003, for 60 weeks at the
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differential rate of 315.50, and thereafter in the weekly amount of 662.55, payable to the dependents in equal shares, for their lifetimes.
The award and decision of Administrative Law Judge Joseph E. Denigan, issued May 3, 2013, is attached and incorporated by this reference to the extent not inconsistent with our award and decision herein.
The Commission approves and affirms the administrative law judge's allowance of an attorney's fee herein as being fair and reasonable.
Any past due compensation shall bear interest as provided by law.
Given at Jefferson City, State of Missouri, this 18th day of April 2014.
LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
John J. Larsen, Jr., Chairman
CONCURRING OPINION FILED
James G. Avery, Jr., Member
Curtis E. Chick, Jr., Member
Attest:
Secretary
I write separately to once again voice my agreement with the views expressed by Presiding Judge Gary W. Lynch in the Spradling case. Writing separately, Judge Lynch drew attention to the absurdity of providing lifetime benefits under the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law to the family of an employee whose death has nothing to do with work, where the same family would receive far less compensation if the employee had died as a result of the work injury:
One of the two rationales stated in Schoemehl ... was to prevent the "unreasonable result" of allowing surviving dependents to receive permanent partial disability benefits but not permanent total disability benefits. Schoemehl v. Treasurer of State, 217 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Mo. banc 2007). I write separately to lament that our constitutional obligation to follow Schoemehl, MO. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1945), now requires this Court to affirm what I consider to be the unreasonable result of awarding lifetime benefits to surviving dependents where the employee's death was unrelated to the work injury, when the surviving dependents would have only received benefits during the time of their dependency if the employee's death had been caused by the work injury.
Spradling v. Treasurer of State, 415 S.W.3d 126, 135 (Mo. App. 2013)(Lynch, P.J., concurring)(emphasis in original).
In light of the holding in Spradling, which I agree is dispositive of the issue whether the divestment provisions under § 287.240(4) are applicable to an award of Schoemehl benefits, I must reluctantly join in the decision to affirm the administrative law judge's award of lifetime permanent total disability benefits to employee's dependents.
I must also concur in the majority's determination that under the plain language of $\S 287.240$ RSMo, the issue of dependency must be determined at the time of the employee's work injury, rather than at the time of death. While this makes good sense to me in the context of an award of death benefits, I must note that a host of absurdities results when applying the Schoemehl court's theory that an employee's dependents are entitled to step into the employee's shoes for purposes of an award of permanent total disability benefits. For example, consider an employee who is married and who sustains a work injury before the closing of the Schoemehl window. Let us imagine this employee lives twenty more years, during which time she remarries, and thereafter dies of a cause unrelated to the work injury. Under the Schoemehl analysis, the employee's ex-husband, rather than her current spouse, would be entitled to a lifetime award of permanent total disability benefits. Or consider the scenario in which an injured employee whose claim qualifies for application of the Schoemehl decision has a child who is born on the day of the work injury. This child can expect benefits for her entire lifetime when the employee dies. I simply cannot imagine that these results were contemplated by our legislature in drafting the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law.
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Finally, I wish to note that the Commission retains jurisdiction under § 287.470 RSMo to consider a "change in condition" as grounds for an order ending any compensation previously awarded. See, e.g., Pavia v. Smitty's Supermarket, 366 S.W.3d 542, 548 (Mo. App. 2012), and Bunker v. Rural Elec. Coop., 46 S.W.3d 641 (Mo. App. 2001). It appears to me that nothing would prevent any party paying an award of Schoemehl benefits to an employee's dependent from filing an application for review with the Commission pursuant to $\S 287.470$ and presenting evidence showing a change in the condition of the "employee" (e.g. pointing out that the substituted employee is not permanently and totally disabled) such that an award of permanent total disability benefits is no longer appropriate. In my view, the Commission would be authorized in such circumstances to terminate permanent total disability benefits to any non-disabled dependent receiving Schoemehl benefits.
James G. Avery, Jr., Member