Was Marty Warren an "employee" under the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law? Section 287.020.1 RSMo provides, in relevant part, as follows:
The word "employee" as used in this chapter shall be construed to mean every person in the service of any employer, as defined in this chapter, under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, or under any appointment or election ...
Here, there is no credible ${ }^{1}$ evidence of any employment contract between Marty Warren and David Warren, nor any credible evidence that Marty Warren actually earned, or stood to earn, any wages for the services he performed for David Warren on August 3, 2002. But these are not prerequisites to a finding of an employment relationship in Missouri:
An uncompensated volunteer can be covered by workers' compensation as an employee by "appointment." Stegeman v. St. Francis Xavier Parish, 611 S.W.2d 204, 206 (Mo. banc 1981); Orphant v. St. Louis State Hosp., 441 S.W.2d 355, 360 (Mo. 1969); and Fielder v. Production Credit Assoc.,
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[^0]: ${ }^{1}$ We acknowledge Penny Warren's testimony that Marty Warren told her, on the night before the accident, that he would be working a job with his father for which he expected to earn $\ 600 to $\ 1000. We note that the administrative law judge found Ms. Warren's testimony lacking credibility. While we believe it is entirely possible that Marty Warren did tell Penny Warren that he was going to work for his father for pay, this statement from Marty Warren still amounts to hearsay from an individual not shown to be particularly credible.
429 S.W.2d 307, 314 (Mo. App. 1968); See also, Yaffe v. St. Louis Children's Hosp., 648 S.W.2d 549, 550 n. 1 (Mo. App. 1982). However, a volunteer is not necessarily an employee within the meaning of $\S 287.020$. To determine whether a volunteer is an employee by appointment requires examination of two factors: (1) whether the volunteer is in the service of the employer; and (2) whether the employer exercises control, or has the right of control, over the volunteer. Stegeman, 611 S.W.2d at 206; Howard v. Winebrenner, 499 S.W.2d 389, 394-95 (Mo. 1973).
Talir v. Mid-West Area Agency on Aging, 848 S.W.2d 517, 518 (Mo. App. 1993).
"In short, it is said that only two facts are necessary to an employer-employee relationship under the Compensation Law, namely, one, that the claimant was in the service of the alleged employer, and, two, that said services were controllable by the latter." Lawson v. Lawson, 415 S.W.2d 313, 319 (Mo. App. 1967)(citation omitted). It is uncontested that Marty Warren was in the act of assisting David Warren in affixing a piece of siding to a customer's house at the time of the accident that caused his death; we must conclude, therefore, that Marty Warren was in the service of David Warren at the time of the accident. Accordingly, the determinative inquiry herein is whether David Warren exercised, or retained the right to exercise, control over the manner and means whereby Marty Warren performed his services. We conclude that claimants are unable to satisfy their burden on this point, even under the required liberal construction ${ }^{2}$ of the meaning of "employee."
Although the record suggests that Marty Warren had performed some services for David Warren in past years, there is no evidence to suggest that there was any ongoing or regular expectation as of August 3, 2002, that Marty Warren would be subject to David Warren's supervision or control simply by virtue of his presence at a job site. We defer to (and adopt) the administrative law judge's determination that David Warren provided credible testimony at the hearing. We find that David Warren had no intention that Marty Warren would provide any services on August 3, 2002, and that Marty Warren was on the job site for the sole purpose that day of David Warren providing supervision in connection with Marty Warren's history of alcohol abuse. In Talir v. Mid-West Area Agency on Aging, 848 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. App. 1993), the court held that a volunteer worker was unable to prove she was an employee where she undertook, of her own accord, to perform certain duties on a day she was not normally scheduled. Similarly, Marty Warren voluntarily undertook to perform services for David Warren of his own accord, absent any expectation from David Warren that Marty Warren would do so. Just moments before, Marty Warren had been casually conversing with a customer; there is no evidence on this record that Marty Warren would not have been permitted to continue in this idle activity for as long as he chose.
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[^0]: ${ }^{2}$ We acknowledge that under the law in effect on the date of the accident, the provisions of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law were to be "liberally construed as to the persons to be benefited," Lawson, 415 S.W.2d at 318, with the aim of "extend[ing] benefits to the largest possible class and resolv[ing] any doubts as to the right of compensation in the employee's favor." Sage v. Talbot Indus., 427 S.W.3d 906, 912 (Mo. App. 2014).
Claimants understandably place much emphasis on the fact that David Warren told Marty Warren to remove a nail in the moments immediately preceding the accident. But after careful consideration, we are not persuaded that this fact, standing alone, is sufficient to support an inference that David Warren enjoyed the right to control Marty Warren on August 3, 2002. We note the absence of any evidence as to what would have occurred if Marty Warren had disregarded David Warren's instruction to remove the nail. Given the circumstances, we view David Warren's telling Marty Warren to remove the nail as more in the nature of a suggestion or recommendation, designed to aid Marty Warren in his voluntary performance of a service he was not expected nor asked to perform.
In light of the foregoing considerations, we find that David Warren did not exercise, nor did he retain the right to exercise, any control over Marty Warren on August 3, 2002. It follows that claimants have failed to prove that Marty Warren was an "employee" as that term is defined under § 287.020.1 RSMo.