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Melvin Campbell v. Vantage Homes

Decision date: December 16, 201416 pages

Summary

The Missouri LIRC modified the administrative law judge's award, finding the Second Injury Fund liable for permanent total disability benefits rather than just permanent partial disability. The Commission determined that the employee, with an IQ of 63, a fourth-grade education, and a learning disability combined with a work injury from May 1, 2006, meets the criteria for permanent total disability despite the ALJ's reliance on the employee's brief employment history.

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Third-Party Injury Check

This workers' comp decision may point to a separate injury claim.

  • A driver, contractor, property owner, or equipment company may share fault.
  • The injury involved a vehicle, unsafe premises, defective equipment, or a non-employer vendor.
  • A serious injury or death may need both benefits review and civil-claim analysis.

Caption

FINAL AWARD ALLOWING COMPENSATION (Modifying Award and Decision of Administrative Law Judge)
Employee:Melvin Campbell
Employer:Vantage Homes (Settled)
Insurer:Cincinnati Insurance Company (Settled)
Additional Party:Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund
This workers’ compensation case is submitted to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) for review as provided by § 287.480 RSMo. We have reviewed the evidence, read the parties’ briefs, heard the parties’ arguments, and considered the whole record. Pursuant to § 286.090 RSMo, we modify the award and decision of the administrative law judge. We adopt the findings, conclusions, decision, and award of the administrative law judge to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the findings, conclusions, decision, and modifications set forth below.
Preliminaries
The parties asked the administrative law judge to determine the sole issue of Second Injury Fund liability.
The administrative law judge rendered the following determinations: (1) employee failed to prove by a reasonable certainty that he is permanently and totally disabled as a result of a combination of the work injury of May 1, 2006, and his preexisting conditions or disabilities; and (2) employee met his burden of proving Second Injury Fund liability for permanent partial disability in the amount of 43.18 weeks.
Employee filed a timely Application for Review with the Commission alleging the administrative law judge erred in finding the Second Injury Fund is not liable for permanent total disability benefits.For the reasons stated below, we modify the award of the administrative law judge referable to the issue of Second Injury Fund liability.
Discussion
Permanent total disability
The administrative law judge accurately recounted the facts pertinent to the primary injury, employee’s preexisting conditions of ill being, employee’s medical history, and the testimony provided by the evaluating experts. Accordingly, there is no need for us to supply additional findings, and instead we hereby adopt and incorporate the administrative law judge’s findings as to these matters. We also deem appropriate and reasonable, and hereby adopt as our own, the administrative law judge’s determinations with respect to the nature and extent of permanent partial disability referable to employee’s preexisting conditions of ill-being and the primary injury.Turning to the question of permanent total disability, we note that, in reaching his determination that employee is not permanently and totally disabled, the administrative

Iaw judge substantially relied on the opinions from the Second Injury Fund's vocational expert, James England, and on the fact that employee accepted a job offer from a friend and performed the job for about a year and a half after the primary injury. We wish to acknowledge that this is a close case, and that substantial and competent evidence exists on this record to support the administrative law judge's determinations with respect to this issue. Ultimately, however, we disagree for the following reasons.

Employee has a learning disability, a fourth grade education, and an IQ of 63. Mr. England admitted that most individuals with an IQ that low would be limited to working in sheltered workshops. Mr. England further admitted that he could not remember ever seeing someone with an IQ that low functioning in a regular job setting, and that employee's low IQ would present a "tremendous" obstacle to his learning new tasks. Mr. England did testify that employee is "competitively employable," but provided the caveat that this would only be in jobs involving repetitive types of work that can be learned through observation. Mr. England also admitted that he focused on the question of what jobs employee could physically and mentally perform, rather than the question whether any employer would be reasonably likely to hire employee to perform such jobs. The latter question is obviously more relevant for our purposes. Given these important concessions, and after careful consideration, we do not deem Mr. England's testimony to persuasively support a finding that employee is capable of competing for work in the open labor market.

With respect to employee's work for CMS Homes after the primary injury, we note that employee obtained this job from a friend and former supervisor, Jeff Sheets, who knew about employee's physical restrictions and disabilities, and who provided employee with full accommodations with regard to any heavy lifting, overhead work, or other duties employee was unable to perform. Before Mr. Sheets hired employee to work at CMS Homes, employee spent about a year and a half looking for jobs, but no employer would hire him because of his physical restrictions, age, and education. And, even though Mr. Sheets was a friend, he ultimately fired employee from CMS Homes because of employee's inability to keep up with the work. Employee looked for work continuously thereafter, but to date has not found any employer willing to hire him. Given all of these circumstances, we do not deem employee's work for CMS Homes to constitute persuasive evidence supporting a finding that employee is capable of competing for work in the open labor market.

The test for permanent total disability is whether the worker is able to compete in the open labor market. The critical question is whether, in the ordinary course of business, any employer reasonably would be expected to hire the injured worker, given his present physical condition.

Scott v. Treasurer of Missouri-Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, 417 S.W.3d 381, 387 (Mo. App. 2014).

We deem it appropriate to infer that employee will not be the only candidate applying for any jobs available in today's open labor market, and that in order to secure competitive employment, employee will need to demonstrate his suitability for the work at a level at least equal to that of a competing applicant. When we apply the appropriate standard for permanent total disability, we find it exceedingly difficult to imagine that any reasonably prudent employer will choose employee over virtually any other candidate, given that

employee cannot read or write or follow even moderately complex directions, has no transferable skills, can only perform repetitive job tasks, and can only learn such tasks through direct observation. Even if we were able to imagine employee securing a job, we find it even less likely that an employer would keep employee once his limitations were fully apparent, especially given the uncontested evidence that employee was not able to keep a job even where he was working for a friend.

In light of the above considerations, we find most persuasive the opinion from the vocational expert Jeffrey Magrowski (and we so find) that employee is unable to compete for any type of employment in the open labor market as a result of the combination of the effects of his preexisting cognitive limitations and disabilities and his physical restrictions and disability resulting from the primary injury.

Second Injury Fund liability

Section 287.220 RSMo creates the Second Injury Fund and provides when and what compensation shall be paid in "all cases of permanent disability where there has been previous disability." As a preliminary matter, the employee must show that he suffers from "a preexisting permanent partial disability whether from compensable injury or otherwise, of such seriousness as to constitute a hindrance or obstacle to employment or to obtaining reemployment if the employee becomes unemployed..." Id. The Missouri courts have articulated the following test for determining whether a preexisting disability constitutes a "hindrance or obstacle to employment":

[T]he proper focus of the inquiry is not on the extent to which the condition has caused difficulty in the past; it is on the potential that the condition may combine with a work-related injury in the future so as to cause a greater degree of disability than would have resulted in the absence of the condition.

Knisley v. Charleswood Corp., 211 S.W.3d 629, 637 (Mo. App. 2007)(citation omitted).

We have adopted the administrative law judge's findings that employee suffered from preexisting permanent partially disabling conditions referable to a learning disability and a partial right index finger amputation at the time employee sustained the primary work injury. We are convinced these conditions were serious enough to constitute hindrances or obstacles to employment. This is because we are convinced employee's preexisting conditions had the potential to combine with a future work injury to result in worse disability than would have resulted in the absence of these preexisting conditions. See Wuebbeling v. West County Drywall, 898 S.W.2d 615, 620 (Mo. App. 1995).

Fund liability for PTD under Section 287.220.1 occurs when [the employee] establishes that he is permanently and totally disabled due to the combination of his present compensable injury and his preexisting partial disability. For [the employee] to demonstrate Fund liability for PTD, he must establish (1) the extent or percentage of the PPD resulting from the last injury only, and (2) prove that the combination of the last injury and the preexisting disabilities resulted in PTD.

Lewis v. Treasurer of Mo., 435 S.W.3d 144, 157 (Mo. App. 2014).

Section 287.220.1 requires us to first determine the compensation liability of the employer for the last injury, considered alone. Landman v. Ice Cream Specialties, Inc., 107 S.W.3d 240, 248 (Mo. 2003). If employee is permanently and totally disabled due to the last injury considered in isolation, the employer, not the Second Injury Fund, is responsible for the entire amount of compensation. Id.

We have adopted the administrative law judge's finding that, as a result of the accident on May 1, 2006, employee sustained a 45 % permanent partial disability of the right shoulder. We conclude that employee is not permanently and totally disabled as a result of the last injury considered in isolation.

We conclude employee is permanently and totally disabled owing to a combination of his preexisting disabling conditions in combination with the effects of the work injury. The Second Injury Fund is liable for permanent total disability benefits.

Conclusion

We modify the award of the administrative law judge as to the issue of Second Injury Fund liability.

The Second Injury Fund is liable for weekly permanent total disability benefits beginning June 3, 2008, at the differential rate of $\ 93.51 for 104.4 weeks, and thereafter at the stipulated weekly permanent total disability rate of $\ 458.59. The weekly payments shall continue for employee's lifetime, or until modified by law.

The award and decision of Chief Administrative Law Judge Grant C. Gorman, issued May 7, 2014, is attached hereto and incorporated herein to the extent not inconsistent with this decision and award.

The Commission approves and affirms the administrative law judge's allowance of an attorney's fee herein as being fair and reasonable.

Any past due compensation shall bear interest as provided by law.

Given at Jefferson City, State of Missouri, this $15^{\text {th }}$ day of December 2014.

LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

John J. Larsen, Jr., Chairman

James G. Avery, Jr., Member

Curtis E. Chick, Jr., Member

Attest:

AWARD

Employee:Melvin CampbellInjury No. 06-042563
Dependents:NoneBefore the
Employer:Vantage Homes (settled)DIVISION OF WORKERS'
Additional Party:Second Injury FundCOMPENSATION <br> Department of Labor and Industrial
Insurer:Cincinnati Ins, Co. (settled)Relations of Missouri
Jefferson City, Missouri
Hearing Date:April 30, 2013Ch

Full decision text continues in the plain-text archive copy.

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