| FINAL AWARD DENYING COMPENSATION (Affirming Award and Decision of Administrative Law Judge with Supplemental Opinion) |
| Injury No. 01-169053 |
| Employee: | Cheryl E. Tauvar |
| Employer: | City of Gladstone |
| Insurer: | Midwest Public Risk of Missouri |
| This workers' compensation case is submitted to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) for review as provided by § 287.480 RSMo. Having read the briefs, reviewed the evidence, and considered the whole record, we find that the award of the administrative law judge denying compensation is supported by competent and substantial evidence and was made in accordance with the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law. Pursuant to § 286.090 RSMo, we affirm the award and decision of the administrative law judge with this supplemental opinion. |
| Discussion Employee claims herein that she suffered compensable injuries by occupational disease, and the parties asked the administrative law judge to resolve the issue of occupational disease.Transcript, page 2. Yet, the administrative law judge states throughout his award that the issue in this matter is whether employee sustained an injury by accident, and renders his findings and conclusions in the context of an analysis of the question whether employee sustained an injury by accident. Accordingly, even though we ultimately agree with the administrative law judge that employee’s medical causation evidence does not persuasively support her claim, we must write this decision in order to provide the proper analysis. |
| Medical causation of an injury by occupational disease The version of § 287.067.2 RSMo applicable to this claim sets forth the standard for causation in an occupational disease case and provides, as follows:An occupational disease is compensable if it is clearly work related and meets the requirements of an injury which is compensable as provided in subsections 2 and 3 of section 287.020. An occupational disease is not compensable merely because work was a triggering or precipitating factor. The foregoing section refers us to the “requirements of an injury which is compensable” under subsections 2 and 3 of § 287.020, which provide, in relevant part, as follows: |
| 2. ... An injury is compensable if it is clearly work related. An injury is clearly work related if work was a substantial factor in the cause of the resulting medical condition or disability. An injury is not compensable merely because work was a triggering or precipitating factor. |
| 3. (1) In this chapter the term "injury" is hereby defined to be an injury which has arisen out of and in the course of employment. The injury must be incidental to and not independent of the relation of employer and employee. Ordinary, gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration of the body caused by aging shall not be compensable, except where the deterioration or degeneration follows as an incident of employment. |
(2) An injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of the employment only if:
(a) It is reasonably apparent, upon consideration of all the circumstances, that the employment is a substantial factor in causing the injury; and
(b) It can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work; and
(c) It can be fairly traced to the employment as a proximate cause; and
(d) It does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal nonemployment life;
(3) The terms "injury" and "personal injuries" shall mean violence to the physical structure of the body and to the personal property which is used to make up the physical structure of the body, such as artificial dentures, artificial limbs, glass eyes, eyeglasses, and other prostheses which are placed in or on the body to replace the physical structure and such disease or infection as naturally results therefrom. These terms shall in no case except as specifically provided in this chapter be construed to include occupational disease in any form, nor shall they be construed to include any contagious or infectious disease contracted during the course of the employment, nor shall they include death due to natural causes occurring while the worker is at work.
The courts have provided some guidance as to how we are to analyze the question of causation in an occupational disease case:
In order to support a finding of occupational disease, employee must provide substantial and competent evidence that he/she has contracted an occupationally induced disease rather than an ordinary disease of life. The inquiry involves two considerations: (1) whether there was an exposure to the disease which was greater than or different from that which affects the public generally, and (2) whether there was a recognizable link between the disease and some distinctive feature of the employee's job which is common to all jobs of that sort.
Claimant must also establish, generally through expert testimony, the probability that the claimed occupational disease was caused by conditions in the work place. Claimant must prove "a direct causal connection between the conditions under which the work is performed and the occupational disease." However, such conditions need not be the sole cause of the occupational disease, so long as they are a major contributing factor to the disease. A single medical opinion will support a finding of compensability even where the causes of the disease are indeterminate...
Kelley v. Banta \& Stude Constr. Co., 1 S.W.3d 43, 49 (Mo. App. 1999).
More recently, the courts have clarified that employee is not required to prove by "medical certainty" that work caused an occupational disease, but rather must show "a probability" that working conditions caused the disease. Vickers v. Mo. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 283 S.W.3d 287, 292 (Mo. App. 2009)(citations omitted).
Employee provides expert medical opinions from Drs. Edward Prostic and Daniel Zimmerman. We have carefully reviewed their reports. As detailed in the administrative law judge's award, both of these doctors lacked (or appear to have overlooked) significant information regarding employee's preexisting medical history, as well as the timing and onset of her symptoms. We additionally note that each rendered their findings in purely conclusory fashion, and failed to persuasively explain any purported causal connection between the conditions under which employee performed her work and the claimed injuries by occupational disease. They do not discuss whether employee's work for employer involved an exposure to the claimed injuries which was greater than or different from that which affects the public generally, or whether there was a recognizable link between the claimed injuries and some distinctive feature of the employee's job which is common to all jobs of that sort. Nor do they identify a probability that employee's working conditions caused her claimed injuries. Rather, both merely recite employee's history of developing pain and discomfort while performing her work, and then leap to the conclusion that employee's work caused her injuries.
For the foregoing reasons, we find the opinions from Drs. Prostic and Zimmerman in this matter lacking persuasive force. We conclude that employee's work for employer was not a substantial factor causing her to suffer the claimed injuries by occupational disease.
Because employee has failed to meet her burden of proof on the issue of medical causation of her claimed injuries by occupational disease, the other issues are moot, and the claim is denied.