Employer filed an application for review alleging the administrative law judge erred in failing to reach the issue whether the claim is barred by the statute of limitations pursuant to $\S 287.430$ RSMo and/or because employee failed to provide employer with the notice required under $\S 287.420$ RSMo. Obviously, these issues are moot in light of our above findings and conclusions, but we will briefly address them for the benefit of the parties.
With regard to the statute of limitations, we note the following exchange at the outset of the hearing before the administrative law judge:
The Court: A claim for compensation was timely filed. ... It's my understanding that the issues to be resolved as the result of today's hearing are the occurrence of an accident; whether an injury occurred; the causation of the injuries alleged; whether appropriate notice was given; the liability of the employer for unpaid temporary disability benefits beginning on February 25, 2004, and going forward into the present; the nature and extent of permanent disability; the liability of employer/insurer for future medical treatment; and then finally, the issue of Second Injury Fund liability. ... Mr. Roussin, ${ }^{1}$ do you concur with what l've dictated for the record?
Mr. Roussin:I do, your Honor.
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[^0]: ${ }^{1}$ Employee's counsel.
Improve: Cathy Ridenhour
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The Court: Mr. Montgomery? ${ }^{2}
Mr. Montgomery: Yes, I do.
The Court: And, Ms. Neuner? { }^{3}$
Ms. Neuner: Yes, I do, your Honor.
As can be seen above, the parties stipulated that employee's claim for compensation was timely filed, and did not ask the administrative law judge to address any issue regarding the statute of limitations. "Stipulations are controlling and conclusive, and the courts are bound to enforce them." Boyer v. Nat'l Express Co., 49 S.W.3d 700, 705 (Mo. App. 2001). We conclude that employer waived any defense under $\S 287.430$ RSMo by stipulating that employee's claim for compensation was timely filed.
We turn now to the issue of notice. The version of $\S 287.420$ RSMo applicable to this claim provides, as follows:
No proceedings for compensation under this chapter shall be maintained unless written notice of the time, place and nature of the injury, and the name and address of the person injured, have been given to the employer as soon as practicable after the happening thereof but not later than thirty days after the accident, unless the division or the commission finds that there was good cause for failure to give the notice, or that the employer was not prejudiced by failure to receive the notice. No defect or inaccuracy in the notice shall invalidate it unless the commission finds that the employer was in fact misled and prejudiced thereby.
In her last amended claim for compensation filed with the Division of Workers' Compensation prior to the hearing before the administrative law judge in this matter, employee claimed two alternative dates of accident: January 14, 2003, or February 25, 2003. ${ }^{4}$ Employee's testimony is vague, uncertain, and contradictory with regard to dates, and her brief is wholly unenlightening as to the significance of her claimed dates of injury. ${ }^{5}$ After a careful review of the transcript, however, it appears to us that the first alleged date of January 14, 2003, relates to an argument that employee had with Mike Shirts about her schedule. This is because employee described a request to be taken to the hospital following an argument with Mr. Shirts, and Mr. Shirts provided credible testimony in his deposition that this argument occurred in January 2004. It appears, therefore, that employee's claim for
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[^0]: ${ }^{2} Employer's counsel.
{ }^{3} Counsel for the Second Injury Fund.
{ }^{4}$ Given our ultimate conclusion that employee did not suffer any compensable injuries, we need not (and will not) address the question whether an employee may pursue a claim alleging in the alternative two entirely different events as the accident causing the claimed injuries.
${ }^{5}$ We note that employee's counsel suggested in a number of leading questions that January 14, 2003, was the date employee reported the claimed incidents of harassment to employer, but employee never provided an affirmative response acknowledging this was the actual significance of that date, nor did she explain the circumstances surrounding any such reporting or how that event could be deemed an "accident" for purposes of Chapter 287.
Compensation simply contains a typographical error, and that she meant instead to allege an accident occurring on or about January 14, 2004.
During the course of this argument, employee complained of chest pain and Mr. Shirts offered to call an ambulance for her. Employer had actual notice of this event via Mr. Shirts, so the burden shifts to employer to advance evidence to demonstrate that it was prejudiced by employee's failure to provide the written notice described in the statute. Willis v. Jewish Hosp., 854 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Mo. App. 1993). Employer, in its brief, does not cite any such evidence, and we were unable to locate any such evidence in the transcript. It follows that $\S 287.420$ is not a bar to employee's claim alleging an accident resulting from her argument with Mike Shirts.
We were unable to determine any significance for the alternative accident date of February 25, 2003, on this record. Once again, however, it is obvious to us from employee's testimony that her claim for compensation simply contains a typographical error, and that she meant instead to allege an accident occurring on February 26, 2004, the day employer discharged her from employment. Transcript, page 28. Again, this is an event of which employer unquestionably had actual notice. Finding no evidence that employer was prejudiced by employee's failure to provide written notice of this event, we conclude that employee's claim alleging an accident resulting from her discharge from employment is not barred by $\S 287.420$.