We correct three clerical errors in the administrative law judge's award. Page one and two of the award pose multiple questions designed to elicit from the administrative law judge a summary of the award. Question 2 asks "Was the injury or occupational disease compensable under Chapter 287?" Question 3 asks "Was there an accident or incident of occupational disease under the Law?" The administrative law judge answered "yes" to Questions 2 and 3. The remainder of the award makes plain the administrative law judge found employee did not sustain a compensable accident or incident of occupational disease and the answer to Questions 2 and 3 should be "no." We modify the answers to Questions 2 and 3 to "No."
In the final paragraph of page seven of the award, the administrative law judge states "As such, I find [employee] did not sustain a compensable accident that arose out of and in the course of her employment on August 21, 2003. [Employee] appears to suffer from disability due to psychological issues, but I do find the conditions are causally related to work or a specific accident such as alleged on August 21, 2003. Other issues considered for the Court's consideration are moot and require no additional discussion." It is clear from the first and third sentences reprinted above that the second sentence should read "[Employee] appears to suffer from disability due to psychological issues, but I do not find
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[^0]: ${ }^{1}$ Statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri 2003 (effective as of August 28, 2003), unless otherwise indicated.
the conditions are causally related to work or a specific accident such as alleged on August 21, 2003" and we so modify the award.
The administrative law judge notes that employee alleges that she was the victim of an assault and battery with a door, which battery occurred "during normal business hours as the staff and attorneys within a large, urban prosecutor's office went about their business." The administrative law judge then expresses her view that "[w]hile a claimant's own testimony can be sufficient proof of accident, this claimant's allegations, if accurate, should be supported by an ample amount of corroborating evidence." The administrative law judge goes on to state, "In examining the records as a whole, therefore, this Court is mindful that a case of this nature should not stand on the single testimony of one witness given the complexity of the issues and theories alleged." We do not know what the administrative law judge meant when she referred to this matter as "a case of this nature."
Whatever the administrative law judge's meaning, we disavow what appears to us an overbroad suggestion that there exists any general rule that cases like the instant case cannot "stand on the single testimony of one witness." The law is well-settled that a claimant's testimony alone, if believed, constitutes substantial evidence to establish that a claimant sustained an injury arising by accident. ${ }^{2}$ Naturally, corroborating evidence may be necessary to support a claimant's testimony where the claimant's ability to objectively perceive or recall events is impaired by medical conditions but there is no universal rule of law that an accident cannot be proven by the testimony of a claimant.
Notwithstanding our disagreement with the administrative law judge's assertion discussed above, we agree with her overall assessment of the testimonial evidence. More specifically, after comparing the testimony of Mr. Hughes, Ms. Hamilton, Ms. Cervantes, and Ms. Cosby, against employee's testimony, we find employee's testimony lacking in persuasive force. Even if we gave weight to her testimony, at best employee's testimony might support a finding that employee sustained a very minor trauma at work. But there is no evidence of any significant physical injury or any reason to believe, from any objective standpoint, that employee was subject to or had reason to fear any violence or threat of harm.
We offer a final word about the expert opinions regarding the medical causation of employee's psychological condition. The medical causation opinions of Drs. Logan or Varanka appear to be based on assumptions not supported by the record. Specifically, Dr. Logan's opinion is founded upon employee's description that her co-worker raised his hands to employee, screamed at employee, grabbed employee, pushed employee, and shut a door on employee's arm and torso. Dr. Varanka's opinion is founded upon employee's description that employee was pushed and shoved into a door. We do not believe employee's co-worker pushed/shoved employee, grabbed employee, or closed a door on any part of employee's body. Consequently, the causation opinions of Drs. Logan and Varanka are insufficient to sustain employee's burden of proof that the work event caused employee's current psychological conditions.
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[^0]: ${ }^{2}$ See Parrott v. HQ, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 236, 245 (Mo. App. 1995).
Dr. Hughes also offered some psychiatric opinions we cannot endorse. But Dr. Hughes is the only of the three psychiatric experts to offer an opinion regarding whether a work altercation during which employee was not physically threatened (as we have found the altercation in this case to be) would cause employee's psychological conditions, including post-traumatic stress disorder. Dr. Hughes testified it would not and we accept his opinion in this regard.