Harold Crawford v. Sprint PCS
Decision date: June 18, 2015Injury #99-07111628 pages
Summary
The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission affirmed the administrative law judge's award of compensation for employee Harold Leon Crawford's workplace injury from February 5, 1999. The Commission adopted the ALJ's findings and conclusions while dismissing employer's evidentiary objections and determining that a subsequent motor vehicle accident resulted in no new compensable injury.
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Caption
| FINAL AWARD ALLOWING COMPENSATION (Affirming Award and Decision of Administrative Law Judge with Supplemental Opinion) | |
| Injury No. 99-071116 | |
| Employee: | Harold Leon Crawford |
| Employer: | Sprint PCS |
| Insurer: | Continental Casualty Company (CNA) |
| This workers' compensation case is submitted to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) for review as provided by § 287.480 RSMo. Having read the briefs, reviewed the evidence, and considered the whole record, we find that the award of the administrative law judge allowing compensation is supported by competent and substantial evidence and was made in accordance with the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law. Pursuant to § 286.090 RSMo, we affirm the award and decision of the administrative law judge with this supplemental opinion. | |
| Discussion | |
| Motor vehicle accident of June 4, 1999 | |
| Subsequent to the workplace injury of February 5, 1999, employee was involved in a motor vehicle accident when another motorist rear-ended his car in a parking lot. The administrative law judge suggested, in her conclusions of law, that the motor vehicle accident was a natural and probable consequence of a compensable injury, making employer liable for any injury resulting from this event, citing Lahue v. Missouri State Treasurer, 820 S.W.2d 561 (Mo. App. 1991). Employer, in its brief, takes issue with this conclusion by the administrative law judge. | |
| After careful consideration of employer’s arguments as well as the evidence regarding the motor vehicle accident of June 4, 1999, we ultimately discern no need to consider whether or not this incident was a natural and probable consequence of employee’s compensable injury, because we find that there is no persuasive evidence of any new injury (i.e. any identifiable medical condition with additional permanent disability) resulting from this event. Accordingly, we disclaim the administrative law judge’s legal conclusion that employer is liable for any injury resulting from the motor vehicle accident of June 4, 1999, because the issue is moot. | |
| Employer’s Exhibits 3 and 4 | |
| The administrative law judge ruled that employer’s Exhibits 3 and 4, consisting of various filings in divorce proceedings to which employee was a party, were not admissible by application of § 287.215 RSMo because employer did not furnish these documents to employee within thirty days after a written request by employee’s attorney. Employer challenges this evidentiary ruling in its brief. After careful consideration, we agree with employer’s argument. We hereby admit Exhibits 3 and 4 into the record.Having said that, Exhibits 3 and 4 do not persuade us to disturb the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth in the administrative law judge’s thorough and well- |
Injury No. 99-071116
Employee: Harold Leon Crawford
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reasoned award. We specifically defer to the administrative law judge's credibility findings and the weight she gave to the opinions from the various doctors and experts. For this reason, we affirm and adopt as our own the administrative law judge's findings and conclusions with respect to the disputed issues.
**Conclusion**
We affirm and adopt the award of the administrative law judge, as supplemented herein.
The award and decision of Administrative Law Judge Lisa Meiners, issued August 19, 2014, is attached and incorporated herein to the extent not inconsistent with this supplemental decision.
We approve and affirm the administrative law judge's allowance of attorney's fee herein as being fair and reasonable.
Any past due compensation shall bear interest as provided by law.
Given at Jefferson City, State of Missouri, this 18th day of June 2015.
LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
John J. Larsen, Jr., Chairman
DISSENTING OPINION FILED
James G. Avery, Jr., Member
Curtis E. Chick, Jr., Member
Attest:
Secretary
DISSENTING OPINION
Based on my review of the evidence as well as my consideration of the relevant provisions of the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, I believe the Commission should modify the award of the administrative law judge and award permanent partial rather than permanent total disability benefits to this employee.
On February 5, 1999, this highly educated and successful employee fell down one step while working for employer. The uncontested medical evidence reveals that, at worst, employee suffered very minor soft tissue injuries. Yet, employee never attempted to work again, despite a thorough and protracted course of medical treatment and numerous attempts by employer to accommodate his claimed limitations.
Employee has a remarkably accomplished educational and work history. Employee was in the Air Force from 1967 to 1969, where he received electronics training and taught missile electronics. In 1972, he received a bachelor's degree in electrical engineering; in 1975 he completed the coursework for a master's degree in the same subject. He has also completed nearly all of the coursework for a concurrent master's degree/PhD in business administration.
Employee worked for Alcoa from 1972 to 1979 as an electrical engineer computerizing various network processes for energy conservation. Employee then took a job with Armco Steel doing similar work. Employee left Armco Steel for a brief stint running his own microelectronics company. Employee then worked for Uninet from 1979 to 1981, and RCA from 1983 to 1988, where he served as a Director of Quality Assurance and Director of Network Operations, and eventually as Vice-President of Operations, in which role he supervised approximately 500 staff members.
Employee started working for employer in April 1989 as a senior network planner. He received positive performance reviews each year, and employer gave employee regular promotions and raises until he became Director of Research and Development in 1996.
On February 5, 1999, employee slipped and fell down one step in employer's stairwell. Although he testified that he experienced terrible pain in his low back migrating down to his left leg and shooting out of his toes, the emergency room records suggest that employee denied radiating pain, and all diagnostic tests were deemed unremarkable. Emergency room personnel diagnosed blunt head trauma and a contusion to the back and left hip. A shot of Toradol mixed with Benadryl and Compazine provided marked improvement, and employee was sent home.
Employee next saw his personal care physician, Dr. Greg Chambon, falsely informing him that he fell down two flights of stairs. Dr. Chambon, in his notes, made no mention of radicular or neurological pain, and prescribed a course of physical therapy.
Employee complained that he was unable to tolerate physical therapy owing to severe pain, so Dr. Chambon referred him to the orthopedic surgeon Dr. Robert Worsing, who also found no evidence of radiculopathy. Dr. Worsing ordered a trigger point injection
(mm)
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(which employee reported as providing no relief) and recommended employee continue physical therapy.
Employer then sent employee to Dr. Daniel Downs, who ordered thoracic and lumbar MRIs, as well as a bone scan, all of which were negative for signs of acute injury. On April 8, 1999, Dr. Downs reached the opinion that employee's pain problem was more owing to inactivity than the injury of February 1999, and suggested it would be beneficial for employee to return to work as soon as he felt able to do so. Instead of following Dr. Downs's recommendation to get back to work, employee started walking with a cane and went to a personal physician, Dr. Kettler, with sudden complaints of altered speech, difficulty forming words, and tremor. These complaints, when reported to Dr. Downs, triggered a referral to neurologist Dr. Moreng, who found that employee's speech was normal during an interview, that he could spell words backwards and forwards without hesitancy, and that his physical exam was normal. Dr. Moreng noted that employee didn't take his cane when asked to walk down a hallway, and that employee was able to accomplish this task without difficulty. To be safe, Dr. Moreng prescribed and performed a lumbosacral plexus MRI, an EMG-NCV, and an EEG; all of these tests were negative for signs of acute neurological injury.
On May 24, 1999, Dr. Downs again recommended employee get back to work, and referred him to the Lemons Center for Behavioral Health and Wellness for psychological counseling and therapy. Employer complied with all of the recommendations from its authorized providers at the Lemons Center aimed at getting employee back to work, including installing a modified seatbelt in employee's car, ordering an ergonomic chair, and permitting employee the freedom to limit his sitting and standing as he saw fit. Yet, employee resisted all of these efforts, complaining of subjective increases in pain whenever his providers recommended he try working.
Employee's own expert, Dr. P. Brent Koprivica, issued restrictions that would permit employee to return to his basically sedentary job with employer, but employee refused to consider returning even though employer was willing to accommodate even his subjective restrictions and complaints. When employee complained that he would be unable to tolerate the commute to work unless he was permitted to recline, employer's representative Teresa Maloney offered to provide employee with a taxi service to and from work, which would allow him to recline in the backseat. When employee complained he would be unable to walk from the car to his office, Ms. Maloney informed employee that he could park near the entrance and that employer would send a security guard down with a moving chair to fetch him and maneuver him to wherever he needed to go. When employee complained that the roads were too rough and that the commute would hurt his back, Ms. Maloney offered to arrange for employee to ride to and from work in a Lincoln Town Car which would provide employee a smoother ride and more room in the backseat to recline. When employee complained that the ride would be unsafe because the Town Car did not have a seatbelt that would permit him to recline while buckled in, Ms. Maloney told employee that employer would have a special harness installed in the backseat for him. Employee's response was that he simply would not be returning to work.
It is undisputed that at the same time these negotiations were taking place, employee's wife was driving him to his numerous doctor appointments in their Toyota Previa. There is no evidence that this vehicle was ever equipped with a specialized harness to permit employee to lie down in the backseat. Nor, for that matter, is there any evidence that employee was unable to tolerate walking from the car to the doctors' offices, or that rough roads ever prevented him from making these trips. It thus appears that employee only raised such complaints and objections when the question was whether he would return to work. Notably, the same individual who believed that he would be unable to walk from his employer-provided Lincoln Town Car to his desk purchased a new bass boat in 2003, and in 2009 was admittedly going fishing up to twice a week.
There is no need to detail the remainder of this employee's 15-year medicolegal journey, as it closely follows the recurring pattern identified above: the providers are unable to find objective physical evidence of acute injury to explain employee's complaints; numerous diagnostic tests are performed and deemed unremarkable; yet, employee continues to allege extremely disabling pain with unusual features (e.g., radiating from the back to the front of his chest) and steadfastly resists any effort at getting him back to work. All told, employer has spent approximately $\ 170,000.00 for medical care aimed at providing cure and relief fro
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