Injury No. 13-064364: Medical causation (physical injuries). Nasal fracture: although Claimant was not treated for same, there is no question that Claimant sustained a nasal fracture in the September 4, 2013 accident. I find that the September 4, 2013 work accident is the prevailing factor in the cause of Claimant's nasal fracture.
Bilateral knees: all physicians agree that Claimant sustained traumatic contusions to both knees. There is no dispute that the September 4, 2013 accident caused a non-displaced tibial plateau fracture of the right knee which did not require surgery. Administrative Law Judge Hannelore Fischer conducted a hardship hearing in this case and found that the September 4, 2013 accident was the prevailing factor in the cause of a left knee meniscus tear, and ordered surgery. In so
finding, Judge Fischer accepted the opinion of Dr. Michael Snyder as to the cause of the meniscus tear. I agree that the greater weight of the evidence demonstrates that the September 4, 2013 accident was the prevailing factor in the cause of Claimant's left knee meniscus tear. I find that the September 4, 2013 work accident is the prevailing factor in the cause of Claimant's right knee tibial plateau fracture and the left knee meniscus tear.
Left upper extremity. On December 13, 2013, Dr. Bernard Randolph stated: "(Claimant) has some numbness which persists in the ulnar nerve distribution. Earlier diagnostics revealed findings consistent with an ulnar neuropathy likely caused by the contusion at the time of her accident." On March 7, 2014, Dr. Randolph discussed the continued symptoms in the left ulnar nerve distribution, and stated: "(g)iven the length of time since her injury, I recommend a second opinion from a hand surgeon." Claimant was referred to Dr. Mitchell Rotman, an upper extremity surgeon. After ruling out any cervical spine abnormalities as the cause of the symptoms, Dr. Rotman performed left ulnar nerve transposition surgery on November 26, 2014. (Dr. Rotman was apparently not asked to opine on causation of the left ulnar neuropathy.) Dr. Volarich was of the opinion that the September 4, 2013 accident was the prevailing factor in the cause of left elbow ulnar neuropathy. I find that the September 4, 2013 accident was the prevailing factor in the cause of left elbow ulnar neuropathy and need for ulnar nerve transposition surgery.
Low back/lumbar spine. Claimant has degenerative problems in her lumbar spine. She had at least two prior lumbar spine injuries (i.e., the October 10, 2011 injury and the November 27, 2011 injury). Dr. Wayne, Dr. Doll and Dr. Snyder all agree that Claimant sustained a sprain or strain to the low back in the September 4, 2013 accident; they also appear to agree that this sprain or strain aggravated or exacerbated the underlying degenerative problems. Dr. Volarich opined that the September 4, 2013 accident also caused an L4-5 disc bulge with left leg radiculopathy. The medical evidence would suggest that the L4-5 disc bulge is degenerative and not traumatically induced. Claimant has not had surgery on her low back and no one is recommending same. I find that the September 4, 2013 accident is the prevailing factor in the cause of a low back sprain with aggravation of preexisting degenerative spine condition.
Cervical spine. A CT of Claimant's cervical spine after the September 4, 2013 injury showed no acute findings but did show mild spondylosis. Claimant testified that she has shooting pain down her neck on the left side and into her left arm. Nerve conduction studies were negative for cervical radiculopathy. The cervical MRI evidenced a central disc protrusion at C4-5 and a right-sided protrusion at C5-6, but nothing on the left side. Dr. Volarich's opinion that the work accident of 9/4/2013 was the prevailing factor in the cause of "cervical left arm C5 radiculopathy" is quite simply not borne out by the extensive objective testing. I find that the work accident of 9/4/2013 was the prevailing factor in the cause of a cervical sprain only.
Right scapulothoracic bursitis. Dr. Volarich diagnosed Claimant with "right scapulothoracic bursitis." In the "CONCLUSIONS/CAUSATION" portion of his report, Dr. Volarich states that it is his opinion that the 9/4/2013 accident was the prevailing factor in the cause of all of the alleged injuries and/or conditions except the right scapulothoracic bursitis. The last sentence of the "CONCLUSIONS/CAUSATION" portion of Dr. Volarich's report, he simply states: "(s)he was also diagnosed and treated for scapulothoracic bursitis of the right shoulder blade." I find that there is insufficient evidence that the September 4, 2013 accident was the prevailing factor in the cause of right scapulothoracic bursitis.
Closed head trauma, concussion, post-concussion syndrome. Dr. Volarich opined that the September 4, 2013 accident was the prevailing factor in the cause of "closed head trauma, nasal fracture and concussion with post-concussion syndrome." Claimant testified that she has memory loss, confusion, and problems with concentration. She also testified that she has headaches which she did not have before the 9/4/2013 accident. Regarding the alleged memory loss, confusion, and concentration problems, it is certainly possible that same could be caused by postconcussion syndrome, or by psychiatric problems (or both). Despite extensive testing for neurological problems due to post-concussion syndrome or traumatic brain injury, there is no objective evidence of same. Therefore, while I find that the September 4, 2013 accident was the prevailing factor in the cause of closed head trauma and concussion, resulting in headaches, I find that the September 4, 2013 accident was not the prevailing factor in the cause of postconcussion syndrome or traumatic brain injury.
Injury No. 13-064364: Medical causation (psychiatric conditions). Employer initially refused to provide Claimant with psychiatric evaluation or treatment. After Claimant obtained her own psychiatric evaluation from Dr. Daniel, Employer eventually provided evaluation and treatment with Dr. Brockman, Dr. Browning, and Marta Fliss. It is abundantly and indisputably clear that Claimant has significant psychiatric deficits. There is no credible evidence that Claimant had any psychiatric problems prior to the September 4, 2013 accident. Dr. Brockman's final conclusions regarding causation (which appear to be diametrically opposed to her initial assessment) simply are at odds with the remaining evidence. There simply seems to be no logical reason for her reversal of opinion. Dr. Daniel's opinions regarding the cause of Claimant's psychiatric conditions are clearly in line with the evidence in the case, and I find them to be persuasive. I find that the September 4, 2013 accident was the prevailing factor in the cause of depression, anxiety and symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD").
Injury No. 13-064364: Disability Issues. Claimant alleges that she is permanently and totally disabled since the September 4, 2013 accident, and is seeking permanent total disability benefits from Employer or from the Second Injury Fund.
Under section 287.020.7, "total disability" is defined as the inability to return to any employment and not merely the inability to return to the employment in which the employee was
engaged at the time of the accident. Fletcher v. Second Injury Fund, 922 S.W.2d 402, 404 (Mo.App. W.D.1996). The test for permanent and total disability is the worker's ability to compete in the open labor market in that it measures the worker's potential for returning to employment. Knisley v. Charleswood Corp., 211 S.W.3d 629, 635 (Mo.App. E.D. 2007). The primary inquiry is whether an employer can reasonably be expected to hire the claimant, given his present physical condition, and reasonably expect the claimant to successfully perform the work. Id.
Second Injury Fund liability exists only if Employee suffers from a pre-existing permanent partial disability that constitutes a hindrance or obstacle to employment or reemployment, that combines with a compensable injury to create a disability greater than the simple sums of disabilities. § 287.220.1 RSMo 2000; Anderson v. Emerson Elec. Co., 698 S.W.2d 574, 576, (Mo.App.E.D. 1985). When such proof is made, the Second Injury Fund is liable only for the difference between the combined disability and the simple sum of the disabilities. Brown v. Treasurer of Missouri, 795 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Mo.App. 1990). In order to find permanent total disability against the Second Injury Fund, it is necessary that Employee suffer from a permanent partial disability as a result of the last compensable injury, and that disability has combined with prior permanent partial disability(ies) to result in total disability. 287.220.1 RSMo 1994, Brown v. Treasurer of Missouri, 795 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Mo.App. 1990), Anderson v. Emerson Elec. Co., 698 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Mo.App. 1985). Where preexisting permanent partial disability combines with a work-related permanent partial disability to cause permanent total disability, the Second Injury Fund is liable for compensation due the employee for the permanent total disability after the employer has paid the compensation due the employee for the disability resulting from the work related injury. Reiner v. Treasurer of State of Mo., 837 S.W.2d 363, 366 (Mo.App. 1992) (emphasis added). In determining the extent of disability attributable to the employer and the Second Injury Fund, an Administrative Law Judge must determine the extent of the compensable injury first. Roller v. Treasurer of the State of Mo., 935 S.W.2d 739, 742-43 (Mo.App. 1996). If the compensable injury results in permanent total disability, no further inquiry into Second Injury Fund liability is made. Id. It is, therefore, necessary that the Employee's last injury be closely evaluated and scrutinized to determine if it alone results in permanent total disability and not permanent partial disability, thereby alleviating any Second Injury Fund liability.
At the request of her attorney, Claimant was evaluated by Kristine Skahan, a vocational consultant, on October 21, 2015. Ms. Skahan's pertinent conclusions are as follows:
In conclusion, when considering all of the restrictions, as well as Ms. Deardorff's worker profile, it is my opinion that she has a total loss to the open competitive labor market. I would opine that due to the severity of her physical restrictions, Ms. Deardorff would be unable to perform any of her past work which was rated as Light to Heavy in terms of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. Therefore,
she would be unable to perform the usual duties of any job for which she is qualified for, and would not be hired by and employer in the open competitive labor market in the normal course of business.
When considering Mr. Deardorff's age, sedentary capacity, testing scores, and restrictions, she would not qualify for funds for a retraining plan for sedentary work for a Missouri Vocational Rehabilitation plan. I have based these opinions on my firsthand knowledge of this worker obtained through this vocational assessment and evaluation, the medical opinions provided, and through my professional experience in the field of vocational rehabilitation.
It appears that the total vocational disability and loss of access to the open competitive labor market is due to a combination of her injuries on October 10, 2011, to her low back, left hip, left leg, left knee; November 27, 2011 injuries to her low back, both legs, groin, left arm, left hand; and September 4, 2013 injuries to her head, face, nose, left ear, right and left knees, right and left shoulders, back, neck, body as a whole. All of these injuries occurred while she was working as a Security Aide for the Fulton State Hospital.
At the request of Employer, Claimant was evaluated by Benjamin Hughes, a vocational rehabilitation counselor, on January 7, 2016. Mr. Hughes' pertinent conclusions are as follows:
When observing the restrictions given by doctors Johnson, Gross, Randolph, Snyder, Doll, and Rotman, I see Ms. Deardorff being able to return to her previous work as a Security Aide. The same can be said regarding the lack of restrictions provided by doctors Brockman and Oliveri.
Considering Dr. Daniel and his second psychiatric evaluation, I conclude that Ms. Deardorff would be unemployable in the open labor market.
Assuming restrictions provided by Dr. Volarich, I see sedentary types of positions matching, according to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). Matching vocations would be Security Alarm Monitor and Parking Lot Attendant.
During my evaluation of Ms. Deardorff, she stood on two occasions and held herself up using her hands and arms on the table-each lasted a few minutes and seemed to relieve her back pain. I also noted her walking with a slight limp after both meeting and ending our time. I found her complaints to be honest. With this in mind, I find Ms. Deardorff being employable in her previous position or at the Sedentary level. I believe in a case such as this, the trier of the fact will need to make a decision regarding the different physicians' restrictions. Provided that she
is found to be disabled, it is my opinion this would clearly be to multiple injuries involving various body parts and not due to the last injury in isolation.
As noted above, Dr. Daniel opined that Claimant was not capable of being employed in the open labor market and that she was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the last injury.
Also as noted above, Dr. Volarich opined that Claimant was unable to engage in any substantial gainful employment and that she was permanently and totally disabled as a result of all three of her work injuries in combination with her preexisting medical conditions.
I find that Claimant is permanently and totally disabled. Claimant is 54 years of age, has an eleventh grade education with no GED or training, has two terrible knees, significant degeneration of the lumbar and cervical spine, is status post left ulnar nerve transposition surgery, has a history of closed head trauma with headaches, and has significant depression, anxiety and PTSD symptoms. Claimant has no ability to compete in the open labor market.
The next question that must be answered is whether Claimant's injuries and conditions resulting from the September 4, 2013 accident are sufficient to render Claimant permanently and totally disabled. Looking only at Claimant's physical injuries from the September 4, 2013 accident, the answer is clearly "no". When the psychiatric conditions caused by the September 4, 2013 accident are added into the mix, however, it is a much closer question. Dr. Daniel opined in his report that Claimant is permanently and totally disabled from the September 4, 2013 accident alone. However, in his deposition testimony, he clarified that opinion, as follows:
Q. But you do say that you found Ms. Deardorff to be permanently and totally disabled due to her last injury and in combination with her prior injury (sic). What do you mean by that?
A. Well, what I mean by that is that the last injury was the main factor or major injury which caused her to be totally disabled, but you have to view that in context of a prior injury which resulted in physical limitations or physical conditions. So even though the first injury did not cause any psychiatric symptoms, the impact of the physical injury of the first time in combination with the second time, which caused psychiatric symptoms, cause her to be totally and permanently disabled. (Exhibit 3, page 40.)
While imperfectly stated, Dr. Daniel's deposition testimony stands for the proposition that the 9-4-2013 accident, alone and of itself, did NOT cause Claimant's total disability, but, rather that it is the combination of the 9-4-2013 accident, and all of the prior physical disabilities, that render Claimant permanently and totally disabled. I thus find that Dr. Daniel's opinion on the cause of
Claimant's total disability is really no different than that of Dr. Volarich, Ms. Skahan or Mr. Hughes.
I find, therefore, that the September 4, 2013 accident was not, in and of itself, the cause of Claimant's total disability. I find that the September 4, 2013 accident resulted in permanent partial disability only. In that regard, I find that the September 4, 2013 accident resulted in the following disability:
- A 10 % permanent partial disability of the right knee, due to tibial plateau fracture (16 weeks);
- A 15 % permanent partial disability of the left knee, due to meniscus tear, surgically repaired ( 24 weeks);
- A 10 % permanent partial disability of the left elbow, due to ulnar neuropathy (cubital tunnel syndrome), surgically repaired ( 21 weeks);
- A 10 % permanent partial disability of the body as a whole at the lumbar spine, due to lumbar sprain ( 40 weeks);
- A 5 % permanent partial disability of the body as a whole at the cervical spine, due to cervical sprain ( 20 weeks);
- A 7.5 % permanent partial disability of the body as a whole at the head, due to closed head trauma, concussion and nasal fracture resulting in headaches ( 30 weeks);
- A 30 % permanent partial disability of the body as a whole due to depression, anxiety and symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder ( 120 weeks).
Employer's liability for payment of permanent partial disability benefits is $\ 99,896.02 (271 weeks at the stipulated rate of $\ 368.62 ).
I further find that Claimant's condition of permanent and total disability is caused by the injuries and condition due to the September 4, 2013 accident in combination with her physical disabilities that pre-existed the September 4, 2013 accident. Thus, the Second Injury Fund is liable for payment of permanent total disability benefits of $\ 368.62 per week. As the parties have stipulated to a maximum medical improvement date of January 18, 2015, the Second Injury Fund's liability begins on January 19, 2015, subject to a credit for Employer's liability for permanent partial disability benefits. As the permanent partial disability benefit rate and the permanent total disability benefit rate are identical, the credit extends for a full 271 weeks, i.e., through March 29, 2020. The Second Injury Fund's liability for weekly benefit payments shall begin on March 30, 2020.
Disfigurement. Section 287.190.4, RSMo, states (in part): "If an employee is seriously and permanently disfigured about the head, neck, hands or arms, the division or commission may allow such additional sum for the compensation on account thereof as it may deem just, but the sum shall not exceed forty weeks of compensation."
Claimant is seriously and permanently disfigured about the left arm due to the surgical scar for her ulnar nerve transposition. Claimant is also seriously and permanently disfigured about the face due to scarring under her chin and crooked nose due to fracture. On behalf of the division, I am allowing 15 weeks of additional compensation for the disfigurement. At the stipulated rate of $\ 368.62, Employer's liability for disfigurement is $\ 5,529.30.
Future medical treatment. Another issue to be decided is whether Employer-Insurer shall be ordered to provide Claimant with ongoing and future medical treatment pursuant to Section 287.140. In Dean v. St. Luke's Hospital, 936 S.W.2d 601 (Mo.App. W.D. 1997), the Western District Court of Appeals stated (at 603):
The standard for proof of entitlement to an allowance for future medical treatment cannot be met simply by offering testimony that it is "possible" that the claimant will need future medical treatment. (Citation omitted.) Neither is it necessary, however, that the claimant present conclusive evidence of the need for future medical treatment. (Citation omitted.) To the contrary, numerous workers' compensation cases have made clear that in order to meet their burden claimants such as Ms. Dean are required to show by a "reasonable probability" that they will need future medical treatment.
Claimant has shown to a reasonable probability that she requires continuing, ongoing and future medical treatment for both knees, for headaches, and for her psychiatric conditions. Employer shall, therefore, be ordered to provide such medical, surgical, chiropractic, and hospital treatment, including nursing, custodial, ambulance, and medicines, as may reasonably be required to cure and relieve Claimant from the effects of the injury to both knees, head and psyche.