| FINAL AWARD DENYING COMPENSATION (Affirming Award and Decision of Administrative Law Judge with Supplemental Opinion) |
| Injury No.: 14-003644 |
| Employee: | Douglas Cosby |
| Employer: | Drake Carpentry, Inc. (Settled) |
| Insurer: | Acuity Mutual Insurance (Settled) |
| Additional Party: | Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of Second Injury Fund |
| This workers' compensation case is submitted to the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (Commission) for review as provided by § 287.480 RSMo. Having reviewed the evidence, read the briefs, and considered the whole record, we find that the award of the administrative law judge denying compensation is supported by competent and substantial evidence and was made in accordance with the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law. Pursuant to § 286.090 RSMo, we affirm the award and decision of the administrative law judge with this supplemental opinion. |
| Discussion |
| Second Injury Fund liability |
| The administrative law judge denied employee’s claim for permanent partial disability benefits from the Second Injury Fund, because § 287.220.3(2), as amended in 2013, provides that “[n]o claims for permanent partial disability occurring after January 1, 2014, shall be filed against the second injury fund,” and because employee’s claim for permanent partial disability benefits against the Second Injury Fund arises from a primary injury that occurred on January 22, 2014. After careful consideration, we agree. However, we provide this supplemental opinion to address the decision inGattenby v. Treasurer of Mo.-Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, 516 S.W.3d 859 (Mo. App. 2017), which was published subsequent to issuance of the administrative law judge’s award in this case.In Gattenby, the court held, in a claim for permanent total disability benefits against the Second Injury Fund, that “subsection 287.220.3 applies only where both the preexisting and primary injuries occur after January 1, 2014.” 516 S.W.3d at 862. The court so held by engaging in statutory interpretation to determine the meaning of the first sentence of § 287.220.3, which states:All claims against the second injury fund for injuries occurring after January 1, 2014, and all claims against the second injury fund involving a subsequent compensable injury which is an occupational disease filed after January 1, 2014,shall be compensated as provided in this subsection. |
| (emphasis added). |
The court reasoned that the foregoing language meant that the new (and more rigorous) standards for proving a compensable claim of permanent total disability against the Second Injury Fund, now set forth under § 287.220.3(2), apply only where the employee's primary and preexisting injuries occur after January 1, 2014.
By contrast, the present claim is one for permanent partial disability benefits from the Second Injury Fund. In this regard, the legislature has provided very clear direction:
No claims for permanent partial disability occurring after January 1, 2014, shall be filed against the second injury fund.
§ 287.220.3(2) RSMo.
The foregoing language does not address how claims against the Second Injury Fund "shall be compensated," as described in § 287.220.3. Instead, it plainly states that no claim shall be filed against the Second Injury Fund for permanent partial disability occurring after January 1, 2014. The present claim is, without question, a claim for permanent partial disability against the Second Injury Fund occurring as of and after January 22, 2014. ${ }^{1}$ For this reason, and because we must strictly construe the language of Chapter 287 pursuant to § 287.800.1 RSMo, we find the Gattenby decision distinguishable.
As correctly noted by the administrative law judge in his award, the Division of Workers' Compensation and this Commission do not possess statutory authority to resolve employee's argument that the 2013 amendments to § 287.220 RSMo are unconstitutional. However, we do hereby recognize that these arguments have been timely raised and properly preserved for any appellate purposes.
Additionally, we deem it appropriate at this time to express our view that the 2013 amendments are not unconstitutional, in that no rights were extinguished. This is because, "in the absence of an apportionment statute or second injury fund legislation, the employer is liable for the entire disability resulting from a compensable injury[.]" Fed. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 371 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Mo. 1963). In our view, the 2013 amendments to $\S 287.220$ work the effect that employers and their insurers are now liable for any enhanced permanent partial disability that results from the synergistic combination of preexisting disabilities and primary injuries occurring after January 1, 2014, as the legislature has clearly removed from employers the prior protections of the Second Injury Fund for these kind of synergistic injuries. By the same token, we believe an employer is liable for any claim of permanent total disability resulting from the combination of preexisting disability with a subsequent compensable primary injury, where the facts and circumstances of the claim do not satisfy the new and more rigorous standards set forth under $\S 287.220 .3(2)$ for proving a compensable claim of
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[^0]: ${ }^{1}$ Claims against the Second Injury Fund for permanent partial disability benefits are premised on a synergistic interaction between the primary injury and preexisting disability, which results in greater disability than the simple sum of disabilities referable to the primary injury and preexisting conditions. See § 287.220.2 RSMo. Logically, then, employee did not have a "claim for permanent partial disability" against the Second Injury Fund until the occurrence of his primary injury on January 22, 2014.