Employee alleges the administrative law judge erred in denying permanent total disability against the Second Injury Fund (SIF) by giving more weight to subjective medical opinions over objective medical evidence, in contravention of § 287.190.6(2). This section states, in pertinent part, "In determining compensability and disability, where inconsistent or conflicting medical opinions exist, objective medical findings shall prevail over subjective medical findings. Objective medical findings are those findings demonstrable on physical examination or by appropriate tests or diagnostic procedures."
In finding that the employee suffered no permanent disability related to her November 27, 2014, trip and fall at work, administrative law judge relied on the expert opinions of orthopedic physicians David C. Hicks and Brent Koprivica.
Dr. Hicks conducted an independent medical examination of employee and later personally reviewed employee's August 30, 2016, MRI. On August 4, 2016, after examining employee and reviewing her past radiographic history, Dr. Hicks concluded, "Based on the information that I have at this point I do not feel that her work related injury was the prevailing factor resulting in the arthritic changes she has throughout her midfoot and forefoot." On September 19, 2016, after reviewing the employee's August 30, 2016, MRI, Dr. Hicks concluded, "[T]he MRI shows chronic degenerative changes and no acute pathology as a result of the work related injury that Ms. Gustin sustained on November 27, 2014 [emphasis added]."
1 Transcript, 4135.
2 Id., 4136.
Injury No.: 14-102494
Employee: Judith Gustin
- 2 -
In his June 23, 2019, report Dr. Brent Koprivica opined, based on his independent medical evaluation of employee and her past treatment records:
> In my opinion, Ms. Gustin's injury on November 27, 2014, is not felt to represent a condition that resulted in permanent disability.
>
> I would characterize Ms. Gustin as having suffered a contusion to her dorsal left midfoot and anterior ankle based on the injury.
>
> The nature of this type of injury from a structural standpoint is not one which produces new permanent structural injury, in my opinion.
>
> My opinion regarding the lack of disability would be consistent with the objective imaging on the MRI scan [emphasis added].
We find that Drs. Hicks and Koprivica's opinions constituted objective medical evidence as defined by § 287.190.6(2), in that both physicians based their conclusions regarding disability attributable to employee's primary injury based on a physical examination of the employee as well as review of the employee's August 30, 2016, MRI.
Case law construing § 287.190.6(2) suggests that the courts do not interpret § 287.190.6(2) as usurping the Commission's authority as fact finder. See *Ballard v. Woods Supermarkets*, 422 S.W.3d 473 (Mo. App. 2014); *Johnson v. Ind. Western Express, Inc.*, 281 S.W.3d 885 (Mo. App. 2009); and *Hall v. Mo. State Treasurer*, 500 S.W.3d 282 (Mo. App. 2016). Based in the above analysis of evidence in the record we are not persuaded that § 287.190.6(2) requires the Commission, as a matter of law, to reverse the administrative law judge's award in this case.
Employee alternatively argues that § 287.220.3 does not require proof of any degree of permanent partial disability as result of a primary injury in order to establish permanent and total disability against the SIF, but rather only requires that an employee's preexisting disability "aggravate or accelerate the work related injury." This argument overlooks the definition of "injury" included in Section 287.020.3 of the act. This section states, in pertinent part, "An injury by accident is compensable only if the accident was the prevailing factor causing both the resulting medical condition and disability [emphasis added]."
Finally, we regard administrative law judge's findings regarding employee's lack of motivation to return to work extraneous to her denial of compensation based on employee's failure to meet her threshold burden of establishing any degree of permanent disability attributable to her November 27, 2014, primary injury.
The above clarifications of the administrative law judge's award do not detract from her correct analysis of the evidence in the record or her ultimate legal conclusions.
3 *Id.*, 4017-4018.
4 *Application for Review*, p. 3.