Section 287.020.2 RSMo, ${ }^{1}$ provides, in relevant part:
The word "accident" as used in this chapter shall mean an unexpected traumatic event or unusual strain identifiable by time and place of occurrence and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury caused by a specific event during a single work shift. An injury is not compensable because work was a triggering or precipitating factor.
Section 287.020.3 RSMo provides, in relevant part:
(1) In this chapter the term "injury" is hereby defined to be an injury which has arisen out of and in the course of employment. An injury by accident is compensable only if the accident was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting medical condition and disability. "The prevailing factor" is defined to be the primary factor, in relation to any other factor, causing both the resulting medical condition and disability.
(2) An injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of the employment only if:
(a) It is reasonably apparent, upon consideration of all the circumstances, that the accident is the prevailing factor in causing the injury; and
(b) It does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal nonemployment life.
"An injury will not be deemed to arise out of employment if it merely happened to occur while working but work was not a prevailing factor and the risk involved ... is one to which the worker
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[^0]: ${ }^{1}$ All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri, as amended.
would have been exposed equally in normal non-employment life."2 "For an injury to be deemed to arise out of and in the course of the employment under section 287.020.3(2)(b), the claimant employee must show a causal connection between the injury at issue and the employee's work activity."3 "[A]n injury is compensable only when the claimant demonstrates the injury has arisen out of and in the course of employment."4
We reverse the ALJ's award in its entirety. Based on the ALJ's factual findings alone, we do not believe that employee's alleged 2015 injury arose out of her employment at employer. Employee's testimony, at the very least, indicates that she may have been careless in performing her job duties at the time of her alleged 2015 injury. Employee testified that she tried to complete her job quickly. Ms. Toelupe testified that there was no time limit for passing ice, but noted that it was preferred that it be done within the first two hours of an employee's shift. Ms. Toelupe further testified that closed toed, non-skid shoes were recommended for employee's job, but were not required. Twisting and turning does not appear to be a condition of employee's employment or for the performance of her job duties, and even if they were, employee, like every other human being, would have been exposed equally in normal nonemployment life to twisting and turning during normal daily activities. We do not see a causal connection between employee's work duties, and her alleged 2015 injury. Therefore, we reverse the ALJ's award and find that employee is entitled to no compensation from employer because her March 5, 2015 accident was not a compensable injury.