The issue before the Commission is whether the employee's claim for a work-related occupational disease injury to his left wrist is barred by the employee's prior settlement with the employer for disability to the employee's left upper extremity.
The administrative law judge (ALJ) denied compensation based on a finding that the employee's claim in this matter was resolved by a prior settlement in Injury No. 16064651. The employee's prior settlement consisted of a lump sum payment based on 12.5\% permanent partial disability of the employee's left shoulder. Employee's prior settlement was proper in form and legal effect. It bound the parties with no indication of any consideration being paid for a wrist injury. The settlement established that the parties only intended to settle the left shoulder injury.
Dr. Gerald McNamara's letter to the employer's insurance adjustor, dated August 19, 2019, is key to understanding the issues in this case. Dr. McNamara clearly stated from the initial appointment with the injured employee that the employee was complaining of left shoulder pain, as well as tingling and numbness in his left hand. The doctor decided to put off treatment for the employee's left hand until the employee recovered from left shoulder surgery. After the employee's shoulder surgery, at Dr. McNamara's request, the employer's insurance adjuster authorized EMB/NCS studies. The adjuster could have refused authorization for this objective medical test if she intended to deny any treatment for the employee's wrist. Dr. McNamara's statement that "Treatment for the left hand was put on hold while [the employee] recovered from shoulder surgery [emphasis added]"1 further indicated that Dr. McNamara understood and that the employer's insurer considered treatment for the employee's carpal tunnel condition as compensable. Subsequently, the adjuster declined payment for treatment to the employee's wrist. She attempted to justify this decision by requesting a medical opinion that the wrist injury was related to the employee's "origin[al] work injury of 08/25/2016."2 Dr. McNamara's opinion that the employee's wrist injury related to his original work injury was a legal opinion that he was not qualified to make.
The instant claim for injury to the employee's left wrist was not filed until June 26, 2018. It was not until after this second claim was filed that the adjuster decided to contact Dr. McNamara for his legal opinion that the last injury was not compensable.
The ALJ incorrectly relied on four cases to support his legal analysis and denial of compensation. An examination of those cases shows that they are not on point in this case.
Krysl v. Treasurer, 591 S.W.3d 13 (Mo. App. 2019) concerned the issue of attaching the date for compensability of an occupational disease claim. In this case, no party contested compensability of the previously settled shoulder injury. Here, the ALJ denied compensability of the carpal tunnel claim on the grounds that that injury was
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[^0]: ${ }^{1} Transcript, p. 557.
{ }^{2} \mathrm{Id}$.
barred by the settlement of the employee's shoulder injury. The date employee's wrist injury may have become compensable was not in issue and never reached.
The ALJ cited Miller v. U. S. Airways Group, Inc., 316 S.W.3d 462 (Mo. App. 2010) as similar to the case at bar. However, in Miller, the employee filed two claims involving the same body part, the wrist. Because the Commission found the 2007 wrist claim to be duplicative of the 2004 claim for the same wrist, the two claims were not allowed. The Commission's decision was sustained on appeal.
In Shockley v. Laclede Electric Cooperative, 825 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. App. 1992), the employee settled a case using the standard language that all issues were settled. He then filed a claim entitled "First Amended-Previously Closed File,"3 seeking more benefits after the settlement of the same injury. The court denied this theory and would not allow the second claim. The facts of Shockley bear no similarity to this case.
Finally, the ALJ cited Ritch v. Professional Transportation, Inc., 599 S.W.3d 492 (Mo. App. 2020). In that case, the employee tried to reopen a prior settlement on the grounds that his medical condition had worsened. The court denied that argument. The facts in the case at bar are not similar to Ritch.
The court expressed the clearest explanation of the legal effect of a settlement stipulation in State of Missouri-Custodian of the Second Injury Fund v. Steck, 341 S.W.3d 869 (Mo. App. 2011). Steck involved the impact of the employee's settlement with the employer on his still-open case against the Second Injury Fund. The court stated, " . . .such an agreement does not bind the Commission but does serve as relevant evidence of the nature and extent of the employee's permanent disability attributable to the primary injury."4
In conclusion, there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the ALJ's award because the Stipulation settling the employee's prior left shoulder claim did not mention a wrist injury, and the employer/insurer paid no consideration to settle the employee's left wrist injury. The employer paid for an EMG to the wrist, then canceled the surgery the day before it was scheduled without informing the employee. This conduct violates the spirit of The Workers' Compensation Law and should not be condoned.
Because the majority finds otherwise, I respectfully dissent.
Shalonn K. Curls, Member
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[^0]: ${ }^{3} Shockley v. Laclede Electric Cooperative, 825 S.W.2d 44 (Mo. App. 1992).
{ }^{4}$ State of Missouri-Custodian of the Second Injury Fund v. Steck, 341 S.W.3d 869, 873 (Mo. App. 2011).
Issued by DIVISION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
Employee: Ronald Lamy