An'Tonique James vs. The School District of Kansas City 33, et al.

1

AN'TONIQUE JAMES, ) ) Appellant, ) WD87823 ) v. ) OPINION FILED: ) THE SCHOOL DISTRICT OF KANSAS ) December 16, 2025 CITY 33, ET AL., ) ) Respondents. ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri Honorable Sarah Anne Castle, Judge Before Division One: Janet Sutton, Presiding Judge, Gary D. Witt, Judge, and W. Douglas Thomson, Judge This case arises from the fatal shooting of a minor, A.W. (Victim), outside Central H igh School in Kansas City in 2019. Victim's mother, An'Tonique James, on behalf of Victim, sued individual Kansas City Public School (KCPS) officials, 1 the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners (BOPC) by and through its C ommissioners in their official capacity, 2 and two

1 The following, in their official capacities: Dr. Mark Bedell, KCPS Superintendent, Marcus Harris, KCPS Director of Safety and Security, Anthony Madry, Central High School Principal, Michael Robins, Central High School Vice Principal, and Jonathan Berry, KCPS Security Officer. These individuals are collectively referred to in this opinion as the KCPS I ndividuals. 2 The following members of the Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners, in their official capacities: Mark Tolbert, Cathy Dean, Don Wagner, Dawn Cramer, and Mayor Quinton Lucas. These individuals are collectively referred to in this opinion as the BOPC.

2

Kansas City Police Department (KCPD) officers. 3 The circuit court granted the BOPC's motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was converted to a motion for summary judgment, concluding that the BOPC was entitled to sovereign immunity. It also granted the KCPD Officers' motion for judgment on the pleadings, and the KCPS Individuals' motion to dismiss, which was converted to a motion for summary judgment, because it concluded that the KCPS Individuals and the KCPD Officers were entitled to official immunity. We affirm. Factual and Procedural Background On February 12, 2019, Victim was at a n evening basketball game at Central High School in Kansas City, Missouri. Victim was not a student at Central High School. The games were open to, and attended by, the public. The KCPD Officers w ere hired to work off-duty at the basketball game. While at the game, Victim and her friends were involved in a confrontation with another group of individuals, including Jamya Norfleet (Norfleet). 4 Both groups left the school building, with Norfleet's group leaving first. However, after exiting the school building, Norfleet remained on the school's property by entering a van that was parked on the school's parking lot. Victim and her friends were escorted to the school's front doors by at least one of the KCPD Officers, and the other KCPD officer stayed inside the school. Shortly after Victim and her friends left the school building, and while still on the school's property, Norfleet exited the van and s hot Victim in the chest, killing her. 5

3 KCPD Officers Philip Smith and Anthony Rogers. These individuals are collectively referred to in this opinion as the KCPD Officers. 4 We do not know what the confrontation entailed between the two groups. There was a surveillance video from the school, but this was not filed in the record on appeal for our review. 5 Norfleet subsequently pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and unlawful use of a weapon charges.

3

James filed a wrongful death case on behalf of her minor daughter, Victim, against the KCPS, 6 the KCPS Individuals, the BOPC, the KCPD Officers, and Norfleet. James filed a second amended petition alleging, among other causes of action, negligence, breach of ministerial duties, recklessness, and vicarious liability claims against KCPS itself,

the KCPS Individuals, the KCPD Officers, and the BOPC. The KCPS Individuals moved to dismiss the second amended petition, arguing that official immunity barred the claims because the petition failed to allege any ministerial duty or its breach. In support, the KCPS Individuals submitted a statement of uncontroverted material facts under Rule 74.04. 7 James, in opposition, responded and submitted a statement of additional uncontroverted material facts. The BOPC filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings with a statement of uncontroverted material facts. James, in opposition, responded to the motion and included her own statement of additional material facts. The KCPD Officers also filed their own motion for judgment on the pleadings. While those motions were pending, James requested and received leave to file a third amended petition. The third amended petition alleged that the KCPD Officers and the KCPS Individuals were not entitled to official immunity because they breached the following ministerial duties: (1) a general policy not to place individuals in "dangerous or potentially dangerous" situations; (2) a parental hold policy requiring students to be held inside the school until picked up by a parent; and (3) a policy to ensure "combating individuals" are not removed from school property at the same time.

6 In April 2024, James voluntarily dismissed the KCPS. 7 Rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2023).

4

At the hearing on James' motion for leave to file the third amended petition, t he parties agreed that the arguments in the KCPS I ndividuals' motion to dismiss, and the KCPD Officers' and the BOPC's motions for judgment on the pleadings should be carried over and applied to the third amended petition. On April 30, 2024, the circuit court entered an order (1) granting the KCPS Individuals' motion to dismiss, which had been converted to a motion for summary judgment, on the basis that the KCPS Individuals' actions were discretionary and so they were entitled to official immunity, and, (2) granting the KCPD Officers' motion for judgment on the pleadings because James failed to state a claim that was not barred by official immunity. On August 6, 2024, the circuit court entered an order granting the BOPC's motion for judgment on the pleadings, which had been converted to a motion for summary judgment. The circuit court concluded that the BOPC was entitled to sovereign immunity because James failed to prove the existence of an insurance policy covering the claims asserted against the BOPC that would have waived sovereign immunity, and therefore, the BOPC was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. That same day the circuit court also entered a judgment in which it (1) granted the KCPS Individuals' motion to dismiss; (2) granted the KCPD Officers' motion for judgment on the pleadings; and (3) granted the BOPC's motion for judgment on the pleadings. In the judgment, the circuit court stated that it had disposed of all claims in the lawsuit, and that "final judgment shall be entered." James appealed to this Court. The BOPC and the KCPD Officers filed a motion to dismiss James' appeal. They argued the judgment was not final as it did not dispose of all claims, as James' claim against Norfleet remained pending, and it did not include an "express determination that there is no just reason

5

for delay." See Rule 74.01(b). This C ourt entered an order dismissing the appeal due to the lack of a final judgment. James then moved unopposed for the circuit court to amend its judgment. On February 5, 2025, after James voluntarily dismissed Norfleet, the circuit court entered a final judgment in favor of the KCPS Individuals, the KCPD Officers, and the BOPC. James appeals. Additional facts relevant to the disposition of the appeal are included below as we discuss James' points on appeal. Standard of Review A circuit court's ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is reviewed de novo. Woods v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 595 S.W.3d 504, 505 (Mo. banc 2020); Riley v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 600 S.W.3d 866, 868 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020). A circuit court should grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings if, from the face of the pleadings, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Woods, 595 S.W.3d at 505. "The well-pleaded facts of the non-moving party's pleading are treated as admitted for purposes of the motion." State ex rel. Love v. Cunningham, 689 S.W.3d 489, 494 (Mo. banc 2024) (citation omitted). We, however, do not " blindly accept the legal conclusions drawn by the pleaders from the facts." Id. (citation omitted). " The position of a party moving for judgment on the pleadings is similar to that of a movant on a motion to dismiss; i.e., assuming the facts pleaded by the opposite party to be true, these facts are, nevertheless, insufficient as a matter of law." BBX Cap. Corp. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 713 S.W.3d 590, 601 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (quoting State ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Tobacco Co., Inc., 34 S.W.3d 122, 134 (Mo. banc 2000)). Judgment on the pleadings, as a matter of law, is not appropriate if the pleadings raise a question of material fact. Id. Under Rule 55.27(b), if matters outside the pleadings are presented

6

to and not excluded by the circuit court, the court shall treat the motion as one for summary judgment. Generally, on a motion to dismiss, our review of the circuit court's ruling is limited to the sufficiency of the pleadings on their face. ADP Dealer Servs. Grp. v. Carroll Motor Co, 195 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Mo. App. E.D. 2005); Wheeler v. Winters, 134 S.W.3d 774, 777 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004). Pursuant to Rule 55.27(a), when both parties submit matters outside the pleadings for the circuit court's consideration as part of a motion to dismiss, the motion is converted to a motion for summary judgment. Matter of Summers, 616 S.W.3d 512, 515 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021). Here, because matters outside of the pleadings were presented to the circuit court, the KCPS Individuals' motion to dismiss and the BOPC's motion for judgment on the pleadings were converted to motions for summary judgment, and we r eview the matter under the summary judgment standard of review. See ADP, 195 S.W.3d at 6. An appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo. Green v. Fotoohighiam, 606 S.W.3d 113, 115 (Mo. banc 2020); Summers, 616 S.W.3d at 515. Analysis Sovereign Immunity–Point One In her first point, James claims that the circuit court erred in granting the BOPC's motion for judgment on the pleadings. James argues that the BOPC is not entitled to sovereign immunity under section 537.610 8 because she proved that the BOPC had a duly adopted self- insurance plan to cover claims such as hers, and, therefore, sovereign immunity is waived.

8 Statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri (2016) as updated by supplement through February 12, 2019, unless otherwise indicated.

7

"[S]overeign immunity is a tort protection for government entities." Hendrix v. City of St. Louis, 636 S.W.3d 889, 900 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (quoting Southers v. City of Farmington, 263 S.W.3d 603, 610 (Mo. banc 2008)). Sovereign immunity has been codified in Missouri law in §§ 537.600–.650. Id. "The [ Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners] is a legal subdivision of the state and, as such, is protected by sovereign immunity in its operation and maintenance of a police force, as long as the immunity has not been waived by statute." Holmes v. Kansas City Mo. Bd. of Police Comm'rs ex rel. Its Members, 364 S.W.3d 615, 624 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012) (citing Gregg v. City of Kansas City, 272 S.W.3d 353, 358, 362 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008)). There are two exceptions to sovereign immunity, but neither of those is applicable under these facts. 9 See Hendricks v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 308 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) ( citing §§ 537.600.1(1), (2)). Besides the exceptions to sovereign immunity in section 537.600.1, section 537.610.1 allows a public entity to waive sovereign immunity for tort claims by purchasing liability insurance or by adopting a self-insurance plan. Id.; Hendrix, 636 S.W.3d at 900. "We will construe any such waiver narrowly; that is, the extent of the waiver is expressly dictated, and limited, by the terms of the insurance policy. The plaintiff shoulders the burden of proving the existence of an insurance policy and that the terms of the policy cover the plaintiff's claim." Hendrix, 636 S.W.3d at 900 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "Sovereign immunity is the rule, not the exception." Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist. v. City of Bellefontaine Neighbors, 476 S.W.3d 913, 914 (Mo. banc 2016). "Whether sovereign immunity applies is a question of law. And whether sovereign immunity has been waived

9 " The exceptions relate to injuries caused by a public employee's use of a motor vehicle and to injuries directly resulting from the dangerous condition of a public entity's property." Hendricks v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 308 S.W.3d 740, 743 n.3 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010).

8

through a self-insurance or liability insurance plan is a question of law that the circuit court does not need to accept as true." Hendrix, 636 S.W.3d at 900 (internal citation omitted). Here, James does not argue that the BOPC has purchased liability insurance, but, rather, that the BOPC duly adopted a self-insurance plan to cover tort claims arising from the acts or omissions of the KCPD, and, therefore, sovereign immunity is waived as to her claims. In its statement of uncontroverted material facts, t he BOPC asserted that, " Neither the Kansas City Missouri Board of Police Commissioner's [sic] nor the Kansas City Police Department has procured or carries any type of liability insurance." In support, the BOPC attached an affidavit from the Secretary for the BOPC, who attested to the same. James responded that this was controverted, stating that the BOPC duly adopted a self-insurance plan to cover tort claims such as hers. In support of her denial, James relied on a portion of KCPD's website stating that the BOPC is " self-insured" with money budgeted from the City of Kansas City, Missouri, excerpts from the BOPC representative's (Representative) deposition, and a self- retention fund listed on KCPD's budget. We conclude James has not established that the BOPC has a duly adopted self-insurance plan that waives sovereign immunity. We first consider James' argument that the BOPC was self-insured because, for fiscal year 2018-2019, the KCPD Board maintained a fund known as the "Liability Self-Retention General Fund Subsidiary Account." (The Fund.). KCPD's 2018-2019 budget described the Fund: The Department uses a Liability Self-Retention Subsidiary Account to retain exposure to potential liability and torts related to vehicular accidents, slip and fall claims, and other liability claims. This program was instituted during fiscal year 1991-92 when bids for this coverage came in at over $1 million. In response, the City and Department agreed to establish a fund that would allow the Department to decrease its overall costs. Funding is provided mainly by transfers from the General Fund.

9

Section 105.726, RSMo, requires the State of Missouri to fund the first $1.0 million of the Department's annual liability costs, with the Department responsible for 100% of anything over this amount. General Fund transfers in excess of annual risk management expenses are retained by the Department to offset future costs should claims exceed amounts provided by the General Fund and/or covered by the State of Missouri. In the event all amounts are exhausted, the City acts as a backstop for risk management costs. Specifically, under revenues in the Fund is line item 6110, labeled "Transfer from General Fund 100" with an appropriated amount of $1,000,000. This is appropriated money transferred from the city of Kansas City to KCPD for payment of possible claims of the type described in the aforementioned budget description: vehicular accidents, slip and fall claims, and other liability claims. It also includes line item 6111, labeled "Self-Retention State of Mo Rev" in an appropriated amount of $1,000,000. Line item 6111 reflects the State of Missouri's possible reimbursement by statute from the State Legal Expense Fund (SLEF). 10

10 The SLEF is created by sections 105.711–105.726 and it: consists of sums appropriated by the General Assembly and any funds otherwise credited to the Fund by certain departments pursuant to section 105.716. The assets in the Fund are to be available for the payment of any claim, or any amount required by any final judgment against (1) the State, or any agency of the State (to the extent that the claim against the State is authorized pursuant to section 537.600, the sovereign immunity statute); and (2) against "any officer or employee of the State or any agency of the State," as provided and as limited in the statute. P.L.S. ex rel. Shelton v. Koster, 360 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011). Further: [u]nder the reimbursement and representation scheme, SLEF is obligated to reimburse the board of police commissioners for claims against the entities or individuals designated in section 105.726.3, including police officers, that are "otherwise eligible for payment under section 105.711" and paid by the board. Reimbursement for liability claims, however, is limited to a maximum of $1 million dollars per fiscal year.

10

Under expenditures, the Fund also includes line item 1845, labeled "Settlement of Claims." This line item is described as: "Torts and other payments related to employee conduct, as well as other adjudicated claims." The Fund shows that for fiscal year 2018-2019, $1,000,000 was appropriated for this expense. Representative testified in a deposition that KCPD requests an annual budget from the city of Kansas City, 11 and that while some of the budget goes toward potential judgments, there is no guarantee of funds for the purposes of tort claims. Representative testified that when there is a judgment for a tort claim, it gets paid from KCPD's annual budget that it requests from the city of Kansas City and, more specifically, from the Fund. Representative testified that the BOPC is not self-insured, and that there is no guarantee of funds for the purposes of tort claims. James has failed to establish that the Fund operates as a self-insurance program. Nowhere in the description of the Fund does it state that the BOPC set it up as a self-insurance program. The BOPC is mandated to create a written budget estimating the sum of money which will be necessary for the next fiscal year to enable the BOPC to discharge duties imposed on it and to meet the expenses of the police department. § 84.730. The budget must itemize the purposes of expenditures by organization units, activities, functions, and character classes. Id.

Holmes v. Steelman, 624 S.W.3d 144, 150-51 (Mo. banc 2021). Section 105.726 was amended in 2025 and the amount is now limited to a maximum of $2 million dollars per fiscal year. § 105.726.3. 11 Section 84.730, the version in effect at the time, provided, in pertinent part: The governing body of the cities is hereby required to appropriate the total amount so certified . . . except that in no event shall the governing body of the cities be required to appropriate for the use of the police board in any fiscal year an amount in excess of one-fifth of the general revenue fund of such year. Section 84.730 has since been amended to impose a one-fourth of the general revenue cap.

11

This would include an itemization for amounts of judgments held against it that are not otherwise barred by sovereign immunity. To leave out such a potential expense from KCPD's budget would be an oversight of any governing board. The Fund simply provides for appropriated funds including those that could potentially be available under the SLEF, and "SLEF does not constitute insurance." Holmes v. Steelman, 624 S.W.3d 144, 154 (Mo. banc 2021); Casady v. Bd. of Governors of Ne. Mo. State Univ., 875 S.W.2d 909, 914 n.8 (Mo. App. W.D. 1994). Further, under the statutes that create the SLEF, section 105.726 expressly states that "[s]ections 105.711 to 105.726 do not waive the sovereign immunity of the state of Missouri." Under section 537.610.1, the scope of any waiver of sovereign immunity is limited to "such amount and for such purposes provided in any self-insurance plan duly adopted by the governing body[.] " § 537.610.1 (emphasis added). The words "duly" or "adopted" are not defined by s ection 537.610. When a word is not defined by a statute, we give it its ordinary meaning pursuant to the dictionary. Gross v. Parson, 624 S.W.3d 877, 884 (Mo. banc 2021). Webster's Third New International Dictionary (3d ed. 2002) defines "duly" as "in a due manner, time, or degree." And under the dictionary definition of "adopt," when used "of a deliberative body," it means "to endorse and assume official responsibility for." See Gross, 624 S.W.3d at 885 ("The context in which a word is used determines which of the word's ordinary meanings the legislature intended."). Thus, if something is "duly adopted" by a governing body, the governing body has endorsed or assumed responsibility for it in due manner. James presented no evidence that the city of Kansas City passed an ordinance duly adopting a plan of self-insurance for KCPD. See Hendrix, 636 S.W.3d at 901. James only cites to the adoption of the statutorily-required budget. The existence of the Fund under the generally adopted larger

12

KCPD budget does not conclusively establish that the BOPC endorsed or assumed responsibility for a self-insurance plan that would cover James' claims. The term "self-insurance" has no single, specific legal meaning; in one sense, any entity which is uninsured against a particular risk could be considered to be "self-insured" against that risk. However, as explained in a leading treatise, "self-insurance" generally connotes the adoption of specific procedures similar to the underwriting practices of commercial insurers: The term "self-insurance" is somewhat ambiguous. In a sense, all risks not otherwise insured are "self-insured." However, many formal procedures exist whereby an entity can become recognized as a self-insurer. This is most commonly accomplished by filing a bond or furnishing another form of proof of the ability to pay amounts for which the self-insurer may become liable. To meet the conceptual definition of self-insurance, an entity would have to engage in the same sorts of underwriting procedures that insurance companies employ. These underwriting procedures include: (1) estimating likely losses during the period; (2) setting up a mechanism to create sufficient reserves to meet those losses as they occur; and (3) arranging for commercial insurance for losses that are beyond a preset amount. 1A J.R. Plitt, S. Plitt, D. Maldonado & J.D. Rogers, Couch on Insurance § 10:1 (3d ed. 2025) (footnotes omitted). Reading section 537.610.1 to require that the government entity adopt specific procedures for managing and satisfying its liability exposures is supported by the fact that the statutory immunity waiver does not merely require that the entity be "self-insured" – instead, the statute requires that the entity have adopted a self-insurance "plan." A "plan" is defined in the relevant sense as "a method for achieving an end," "an often customary method of doing something: procedure," or "a detailed formulation of a program of action." Plan, Merriam- Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/plan.

13

Construing the waiver of sovereign immunity in section 537.610.1 narrowly, as we must, 12 we conclude that adoption of a "self-insurance plan" requires something more than merely establishing budgetary reserves for anticipated liabilities. Next, James points to the following statement that appeared on KCPD's website, as of March 31, 2022, under the heading, "Hire an Off-Duty Officer": The Board of Police Commissioners, as the governing body of the Police Department, is self-insured with money budgeted from the City of Kansas City, Missouri. The money budgeted covers general liability for acts and omissions by members of the Kansas City Missouri Police Department that occur under color of law. The statement was deleted from the website in 2022, because, as Representative testified in a deposition, KCPD was not self-insured. James contends that this website statement is an admission that the BOPC is self-insured. The BOPC does not dispute that this statement appeared on KCPD's website. Instead, the BOPC contends that the website's language does not create a self-insurance plan and does not otherwise establish that the BOPC had a dopted a self- insurance plan. James also cites to Representative's deposition testimony in which, when describing the Fund, Representative stated: "So that account is set up for potential judgments, with regard to whether it's vehicular accidents or larger liability claims[.]" Representative was also asked what "other liability claims," as set forth in the Fund's description meant, and he explained, "Anything that's—you know, the—the general category of a claim against the police department where the police department is believed to be liable."

12 See Allen v. 32nd Jud. Cir., 638 S.W.3d 880, 891 (Mo. banc 2022) ("Statutory provisions waiving sovereign immunity are strictly construed."); A.F. v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 491 S.W.3d 628, 635 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (stating that we "construe any such waiver narrowly").

14

We find Hendrix v City of St. Louis instructive. In Hendrix, a mong other claims, a plaintiff brought an action against the city of St. Louis (the City) for negligent training and supervision. 636 S.W.3d at 895. The City moved for summary judgment, asserting sovereign immunity as a defense. Id. The plaintiff responded that the City had waived sovereign immunity under section 537.610 by purchasing liability insurance or by adopting a self-insurance plan through the Public Facilities Protection Corporation (the PFPC), which the City denied. Id. Along with its motion for summary judgment, the City attached affidavits from the D eputy C ity Counselor and the City's Register. Id. at 900. The affidavits stated the City had not purchased liability insurance to cover torts, personal injuries, or any other claims that did not arise from either dangerous property conditions or from the operation of motor vehicles, nor did it have record of any contract entered between the City and the PFPC or an ordinance duly enacted by the Board of Alderman adopting a self-insurance plan providing liability coverage for the plaintiff's claims. Id. at 900-901. In response, the plaintiff attached the PFPC's articles of incorporation, its bylaws, a document titled "City of St. Louis Risk Management Program," a screenshot from the City's website referring to the PFPC as "the city's self-insurance program," and a letter from a city counselor to a c ity a lderwoman, stating that the PFPC's purpose was to "insure the City against all claims" and that it could "be properly thought to be self-insurance." Id. at 901. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. Id. at 896. On appeal, the grant of summary judgment was affirmed. Id. at 901. The Court stated: [N]either a letter from the City Counselor, nor the screenshot, constitute admissible evidence of self-insurance or liability insurance for negligent supervision and training claims. The City Counselor is not the governing body of St. Louis and the letter is not evidence that a self-insurance plan was duly adopted by the City's governing body—it merely reflects the City Counselor's opinion.

15

Id. at 901. The Court further stated that the PFPC's articles of incorporation, its bylaws, and the "City of St. Louis Risk Management Program" letter also failed to establish that the City either had liability insurance or was self-insured for negligent supervision and training claims, even when all inferences resulting from those documents were granted in favor of the plaintiff. Id. The Court concluded that none of that evidence overcame the City's evidence supporting summary judgment. Id. As in Hendrix, KCPD's website statement does not constitute evidence of self-insurance. Representative's deposition testimony only reflects his opinion about what the Fund might cover and does not establish a duly adopted self-insurance plan. James failed to prove the existence of a self-insurance plan covering the claims she asserted against the BOPC, and therefore, sovereign immunity is applicable. Point one is denied. Official Immunity–Points Two and Three In her second point, James argues that the circuit court erred in granting the KCPS Individuals' motion to dismiss, which was converted to a motion for summary judgment, because she contends genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the KCPS Individuals are entitled to official immunity. In her third point, James argues that the circuit court erred in granting the KCPD Officers' motion for judgment on the pleadings because she contends that she pleaded sufficient facts to state claims against the KCPD Officers not barred by official immunity. J ames argues that both the KCPD Officers and KCPS Individuals failed to perform and breached ministerial, departmentally-mandated duties, or, alternatively, that they carried out their duties in bad faith or with malice. The KCPS Individuals and the KCPD Officers contend that the duties created by the policies J ames cites are not ministerial, but discretionary.

16

"As with the doctrine of sovereign immunity, Missouri has long-applied the doctrine of official immunity." Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 610; Throneberry v. Mo. State Highway Patrol, 526 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017) (citation omitted). Official immunity "protects a public official from liability if that official acts within the course of his [or her] official duties and without malice." Laughlin v. Perry, 604 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Mo. banc 2020) (citation omitted). "Courts and legal commentators have long agreed that society's compelling interest in vigorous and effective administration of public affairs requires that the law protect those individuals who, in the face of imperfect information and limited resources, must daily exercise their best judgment in conducting the public's business." Id. (citation omitted). "Courts applying the doctrine of official immunity must be cautious not to construe it 'too narrowly lest they frustrate the need for relieving public servants of the threat of burdensome litigation.'" Id. at 625-626 (quoting State ex rel. Alsup v. Kanatzar, 588 S.W.3d 187, 191 (Mo. banc 2019)). Official immunity does not apply and a public official may be held personally liable for the damages they caused "in two narrow exceptions: (1) when a public official fails to perform a ministerial duty required of the official by law, or (2) when a public official acts in bad faith or with malice." Love, 689 S.W.3d at 495; Metcalf v. Beard, 717 S.W.3d 579, 587 (Mo. App. S.D. 2025). We first consider the exception for the failure to perform a ministerial duty. A narrow exception to the official immunity doctrine applies when a public officer does not perform a ministerial duty required by law. Alsup, 588 S.W.3d at 191. See also Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 610 (citation omitted) (stating that public employees, however, are not afforded immunity under the official immunity doctrine "for torts committed when acting in a ministerial capacity"). This narrow exception focuses on the nature of the ministerial act. Alsup, 588 S.W.3d at 191. The relevant inquiry in deciding whether a duty is ministerial is not whether a

17

rule, policy, procedure, statute, or regulation may create a mandatory duty to act. Love, 689 S.W.3d at 496. "The central question is whether there is any room whatsoever for variation in when and how a particular task can be done. If so, that task – by definition – is not ministerial." Alsup, 588 S.W.3d at 191. "[W]hether an act can be characterized as discretionary depends on the degree of reason and judgment required." Laughlin, 604 S.W.3d at 628 (citation omitted). Whether an act is discretionary or ministerial is determined on a case-by-case basis, looking at : " (1) the nature of the public employee's duties; (2) the extent to which the act involves policymaking or exercise of professional judgment; and (3) the consequences of not applying official immunity." Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 610. "A discretionary act requires the exercise of reason in the adaption of means to an end and discretion in determining how or whether an act should be done or course pursued." Id. On the other hand, a ministerial act has long been defined as merely "clerical." Alsup, 588 S.W.3d at 191. The Missouri Supreme Court has noted: [A] ministerial duty compels a task of such a routine and mundane nature that it is likely to be delegated to subordinate officials. For more than a century, this Court has held that a ministerial or clerical duty is one in which a certain act is to be performed upon a given state of facts in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, and without regard to [the public official's] judgment or opinion concerning the propriety or impropriety of the act to be performed. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also Love, 689 S.W.3d at 495. [T]he test for whether a task is " ministerial" for purposes of a writ of mandamus is precisely the same as the test for whether that task is " ministerial" such that official immunity will not apply. [I]f a writ of mandamus would not have been proper to compel an official to perform an act, it should follow that official immunity protects an official from liability for injuries arising from the performance of that act. Id. at 496 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The duty is not ministerial when even slight discretion exists. Id.

18

The KCPD Officers and the KCPS Individuals are governmental officers acting within the scope of their official authority, and, absent an exception, they are entitled to official immunity. See A.S. v. Willard Pub. Schs., 702 S.W.3d 276, 282 (Mo. App. S.D. 2024); Fonseca v. Collins, 884 S.W.2d 63, 66 (Mo. App. W.D. 1994). James claims that the ministerial act exception to official immunity applies to both the KCPD Officers and the KCPS Individuals because they failed to perform and breached ministerial, departmentally-mandated duties. James claims that there are three ministerial duties the KCPD Officers and the KCPS Individuals 13 breached: (1) a general policy not to place individuals in "dangerous or potentially dangerous" situations; (2) a "parental hold policy" requiring students to be held inside the school until a parent picked them up; and (3) a policy to ensure "combating individuals" are separated while on KCPS premises. The KCPD Officers and the KCPS Individuals contend that none of these create a duty which meets the narrow ministerial duty exception. We conclude that none of the policies cited by James fall under the narrow exception for ministerial acts. We consider each duty separately. Duty to Not P lace Yourself or O thers in a Dangerous or P otentially D angerous S ituation First, James claims the KCPS Individuals and the KCPD Officers owed a ministerial duty to not place citizens using C entral High School facilities in " a dangerous or potentially dangerous situation." James claims that this duty is ministerial because the KCPS Individuals

13 James' brief repeatedly treats all five KCPS Individuals as a single unit, without identifying what each did or did not do, with citations that often refer only to some of these individuals while attributing actions to all. James' additional facts admitted that "Plaintiffs made no allegation that either Defendants Bedell or Harris participated in escorting the two groups from the building." James' grouping of all five school officials and alleging collective conduct could potentially leave this Court without a clear path to assess whether each named individual violated a ministerial duty. But, we can overlook this deficiency because none of the duties James identifies are ministerial.

19

and the KCPD Officers had no discretion related to this policy. James claims that the duty was violated when the KCPS Individuals and the KCPD Officers knowingly placed Victim in a dangerous situation when they ejected her from the school building. In the third amended petition, James alleged that a KCPS policy directed the KCPS Individuals and the KCPD Officers to: " [N]ot place yourself or others in a dangerous or potentially dangerous situation." This duty, however, is not ministerial. The duty "to not place yourself or others in a dangerous or potentially dangerous situation" cannot be described as merely clerical and cannot be accomplished without regard to judgment or opinion. There is plainly a large amount of " room . . . for variation" in how the policy is implemented. See Forester v. May, 671 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Mo. banc 2023). The policy's broad directive depends on the judgment of the KCPS Individuals and the KCPD Officers as to what is a "dangerous or potentially dangerous situation," how not to "place" others in that type of situation, and it requires the individual to use reason and discretion. James faults five KCPS officials—the superintendent, security director, principal, vice principal, and a security officer—for breaching the same duty. But, the KCPS Individuals have different roles and could implement the policy in different ways. Similarly, the two KCPD Officers could carry out the policy in varied ways, using their own experience and judgment to determine the best way to act in any given situation, including this incident. The KCPD Officers and the KCPS Individuals have to consider various circumstances when deciding what actions are necessary, and these "decisions involve the exercise of judgment or discretion rather than the mere performance of a prescribed task." A.S., 702 S.W.3d at 283 (citation omitted). This policy, therefore, imposes a discretionary duty on the KCPS Individuals and the KCPD Officers, and their exercise of that discretion is protected by official immunity. See

20

Woods v. Ware, 471 S.W.3d 385, 395 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (stating that "[b]ecause a discretionary duty was involved, [the public official's] exercise of that discretion is protected by the doctrine of official immunity"). The Parental Hold Policy Next, James claims that the KCPS Individuals and the KCPD Officers had a ministerial duty pursuant to a policy which required them to hold Victim and her friends inside the school until a parent or guardian came to pick them up. (The Parental Hold Policy.) In the third amended petition, James alleged that KCPS had, before the shooting incident, "established a protocol required to be followed by KCPS personnel and security that was applicable to these circumstances and to [Victim] and [Victim's friends], and that required [Victim] and [Victim's friends] to be held inside the school until a parent or guardian came to pick them up." The KCPS Individuals claim that no Parental H old Policy applied to the basketball game, which took place at night and was open to the public, including nonstudents like Victim. Alternatively, the KCPS Individuals argue that even if there was an applicable Parental Hold Policy, it imposed discretionary and not ministerial duties. The circuit court properly granted the KCPD Officers' motion for judgment on the pleadings, as well as the KCPS Individuals' motion to dismiss as James failed to show any clear and unequivocal duty for the KCPD Officers or the KCPS Individuals to apply a Parental Hold Policy to Victim or Victim's friends during the basketball game. Based on allegations in the third amended petition, James acknowledges that Victim was not a student at Central High School, and when citing to the policy, James also acknowledges that the policy was "to hold students."

21

Additionally, the summary judgment record established the following relating to the Parental Hold Policy. E.D., a KCPS security employee, testified in a deposition describing the purported Parental Hold Policy. 14 E.D. was a " site-based" security officer, not assigned to Central High School, but was working off-duty overtime there on the night of the shooting. E.D. testified that: What had happened in the past was parents would come pick up students. You know, they would come pick up their child. And that's what we did during the day. We were always told when the students are on grounds, they're our responsibility. And so if that's daytime hours, we would hold the student. And we would only release the student if an administrator had made contact with a parent or if the child had done something bad enough that [they] did get transported, you know, because an SRO, a school resource officer got involved. E.D. reiterated "that's how we operated during the day," that she assumed this daytime practice applied to the nighttime basketball game, but she admitted that no one told her that it did apply. E.D. could not identify a written policy requiring this action. E.D. testified that Marcus Harris, KCPS's Director of Safety and Security, was responsible for approving the practice and protocols applicable to KCPS security personnel, but that he never approved any policy or protocol requiring KCPS security personnel to hold students or visitors in the school until a parent or guardian came to pick them up. James also cited Jonathan Berry's—one of the KCPD Officers—deposition testimony in which he stated: School day protocol would be they would take them to the administration office, talk to the administrators, parents would be called, and we would have enough time to actually find the other individuals, take them to a different administrator's office, and their parents would be called, and they w[ould] leave at separate times or be picked up by their parents at that time.

14 E.D. was not a party to the lawsuit. Pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Operating Rule 2.02(c)(3), we do not list the names of individuals other than parties.

22

The summary judgment record established that the Parental Hold Policy was only a daytime practice which applied to students, and James did not establish a clear duty related to evening events with visitors including nonstudents like Victim or Victim's group. Further, E.D.'s belief, that a purported Parental Hold Policy would apply to nonstudents at nighttime activities, is based only on her assumption and not an established policy for the KCPS Individuals or the KCPD Officers to follow. The KCPD Officer's deposition testimony also did not establish that the Parental Hold Policy was applicable to the nighttime basketball game, as his testimony describing such policy was described as "[s]chool day protocol." James has not established a Parental Hold Policy that was applicable to nighttime events with nonstudents. Even assuming that a Parental Hold Policy existed and that it somehow applied to Victim or Victim's friends, the policy does not impose a ministerial duty on the KCPS Individuals or the KCPD Officers. Determining who to detain and under what conditions cannot be classified a s a clerical act. Instead, it requires the use of discretion and judgment. Whether the KCPS Individuals or the KCPD Officers would choose to detain Victim—a nonstudent—and contact Victim's parent or guardian involves the examination and consideration of facts such as timing, severity, and the individuals involved. Complying with a Parental Hold Policy cannot be described as a duty that "is to be performed upon a given state of facts in a prescribed manner" with no "room whatsoever for variation in when and how" it must be performed. Conway v. Caldwell, 645 S.W.3d 550, 558 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022) (quoting Alsup, 588 S.W.3d at 191). Even E.D. acknowledged that whether to hold someone would have been up to an administrator, who would have to evaluate the circumstances and make a judgment call. Further, James also failed to establish what authority the officers would have had to hold a person that was not a student and who was not being placed under arrest.

23

Because this policy, if even applicable to Victim under the facts of the case, imposes a discretionary duty on the KCPS Individuals and the KCPD Officers, their exercise of that discretion is protected by official immunity. See Woods, 471 S.W.3d at 395. Combating Individuals Policy Finally, James claims that the KCPS Individuals and the KCPD Officers breached a ministerial duty to keep "combating" individuals and groups separated while on KCPS premises and a directive that "combating" individuals would not be asked to leave the property at the same time. (The Combating Individuals Policy.) James contends that on the date of the shooting incident, the Combating Individuals Policy existed, that the KCPD Officers and the KCPS Individuals had no discretion under this policy, and that it imposed ministerial duties. In the third amended petition, James alleged that KCPS had established a policy that was in effect on the date of the shooting that required KCPS personnel and security to not allow combating individuals to leave the property at the same time, and that they had no discretion in carrying out the policy. James further alleged that after the shooting, this policy was set forth in writing under a policy titled, "Removal of Visitor from Gymnasium," and stated that: " Note: combating individuals/groups will not be asked to leave property at the same time." Assuming that the Combating Individuals Policy existed at the time of the shooting incident, we conclude that it did not create a ministerial duty. Applying the policy requires discretion and the use of judgment as the official would need to determine what is a "combating individual" or "combating groups" and when to step in to separate them. The policy could have been implemented "in various ways by various people." Love, 689 S.W.3d at 496 (citation omitted). And because even "slight discretion" negates a ministerial duty, the duties imposed under any Combating Individuals Policy were discretionary, not ministerial. See id.

24

None of the above described duties are so routine or mundane that they compel the KCPS Individuals or the KCPD Officers to act "upon a given state of facts in a prescribed manner," leaving no room for judgment. Id. at 495. Each policy and the nature of the actions required by the policies requires the use of discretion. James, therefore, has not established that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the KCPS Individuals breached any ministerial duties. Additionally, the KCPD Officers were entitled to judgment on the pleadings because James did not plead sufficient facts establishing the breach of any ministerial duties. Bad Faith or Malice Next, James contends that even if we conclude that the above policies involve discretionary acts, that the official immunity doctrine is not applicable because the KCPS Individuals and the KCPD Officers acted in bad faith or with malice. Specifically, James argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the KCPS Individuals acted with bad faith or malice. As to the KCPD Officers, James points out that the third amended petition included an allegation that the KCPD Officers acted " in bad faith and/or with malice." James argues that the KCPS Individuals and the KCPD Officers acted with " reckless indifference to the rights of others" and/or with " conscious wrongdoing." If conduct is willfully wrong or done with malice or corruption, even a discretionary act will not be protected by official immunity. Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 610. In this context: the relevant definition of bad faith or malice ordinarily contains a requirement of actual intent to cause injury. A defendant acts with malice when he wantonly does that which a man of reasonable intelligence would know to be contrary to his duty and which he intends to be prejudicial or injurious to another. Love, 689 S.W.3d at 496-97 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The test for malice "requires both an act contrary to duty and done with a wicked purpose or in reckless disregard of others' rights (i.e., 'wantonly') and an actual intent to injure or prejudice another." Carlton v.

25

Means, 688 S.W.3d 625, 630 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024). Reckless conduct alone does not amount to malice. Id. at 631. There must also be evidence demonstrating that the official's actual intent was to injure or prejudice the plaintiff. Id. James' third amended petition is devoid of any specific factual allegations that the KCPD Officers or the KCPS Individuals actually intended for Victim to be injured. Although James alleged that the KCPS Individuals and the KCPD Officers' conduct was done in "bad faith and/or with malice," and with "reckless indifference to the rights of others," this is insufficient. See id. ("It is abundantly clear . . . reckless conduct alone does not amount to malice; there must also be evidence that the official had the intent to injure or prejudice the plaintiff."); Gray-Ross v. St. Louis Pub. Schs., 643 S.W.3d 665, 670 n.1 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022) (finding an allegation that a public official "acted willfully and recklessly" with "a reckless indifference to and conscious disregard for the safety of others" did not sufficiently plead the malice exception because it did not include an allegation that the official "intended her action to be prejudicial or injurious"). The circuit court properly granted the KCPD Officers' motion for judgment on the pleadings because the pleadings, with all reasonable inferences therefrom, demonstrate that the KCPD Officers are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their affirmative defense of official immunity. The facts James alleged, together with the reasonable inferences therefrom, do not establish that either narrow exception to official immunity applies. As to the first exception, the policies alleged involve discretionary acts rather than ministerial duties. As to the second exception, James pleaded no facts about the KCPD Officers' intent to cause injury to Victim, and her conclusory allegations of malice, without more, are insufficient to withstand judgment on the pleadings.

26

Similarly, genuine issues of material fact do not exist as to whether the KCPS Individuals are entitled to official immunity. First, there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the KCPS Individuals failed to perform required ministerial duties. Second, no genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether the KCPS Individuals had the requisite intent to injure or prejudice Victim. " [N]one of the controverted or uncontroverted facts framed by the summary judgment pleadings permit an inference of bad faith or malice" on the KCPS Individuals' part. See Throneberry, 526 S.W.3d at 204-05. "Simply put, there are no facts alleged 'from which it could reasonably be inferred that [ the KCPS Individuals] acted in bad faith or from an improper or wrongful motive.'" Id. at 205 (quoting State ex rel. Twiehaus v. Adolf, 706 S.W.2d 443, 447- 48 (Mo. banc 1986)). From the summary judgment record, it is clear that the KCPS Individuals are entitled to official immunity. The KCPD Officers are entitled to judgment on the pleadings because James' claims against them are also barred by official immunity. Points two and three are denied. Conclusion The circuit court's judgment is affirmed. _____________________________ Janet Sutton, Presiding Judge

Gary D. Witt, J., and W. Douglas Thomson, J. concur.