Bradley Hult vs. Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services
Decision date: November 18, 2025WD87540
Opinion
BRADLEY HULT, ) ) Appellant-Respondent, ) ) v. ) WD87540 ) (consolidated with WD87558) MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF ) HEALTH AND SENIOR ) Filed: November 18, 2025 SERVICES, ) ) Respondent-Appellant. )
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cole County The Honorable Cotton Walker, Judge
Before Division Three: Mark D. Pfeiffer, P.J., and Alok Ahuja and Thomas N. Chapman, JJ. In January 2021, Bradley Hult was working as a registered nurse at a psychiatric care hospital in St. Louis. The Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services determined that Hult had knowingly neglected a patient in his care, creating an imminent danger to the patient's health, safety and welfare. Following a formal contested-case hearing, the Department determined to permanently place Hult on its Employee Disqualification List. Hult's placement on the List substantially limits his ability to work as a nurse in Missouri. Hult filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court of Cole County. The circuit court sustained the Department's decision to place Hult on the Disqualification List. The court found, however, that the Department had acted
2 arbitrarily and capriciously by placing Hult on the List permanently. The circuit court instead ordered that Hult appear on the Disqualification List for only eighteen months. Both Hult and the Department appeal. We conclude that the Department acted lawfully in ordering that Hult be permanently placed on the Employee Disqualification List. We accordingly affirm the circuit court's judgment in part, and reverse in part. Factual Background Hult's placement on the Employee Disqualification List arises out of the care he provided to a 28-year-old male Patient, 1 who died while under Hult's care. On the night of January 8, 2021, Patient was admitted through the emergency department of Missouri Baptist Hospital in Sullivan as a result of suicidal ideations and severe alcohol intoxication. Blood testing reflected that Patient had a potentially toxic ethanol level of 505 milligrams per deciliter (or .505%). Hospital staff administered a drug abuse panel which tested for amphetamine, barbiturates, benzodiazepines, cannabinoids, cocaine, fentanyl, methadone, opiates, oxycodone, and phencyclidine. The drug panel was negative. The Sullivan hospital ordered an additional ethanol test on the morning of January 9; results reported at 7:43 a.m. reflected that Patient's ethanol level had dropped from 505 to 96 milligrams per deciliter (or .096%).
1 Pursuant to § 509.520.1, RSMo and Supreme Court Operating Rule 2.02(c), we do not provide the names of any victims, minors, or non-party witnesses in this opinion.
3 Patient was transferred to the Barnes Jewish Hospital Psychiatric Support Center in St. Louis in the early afternoon on January 9, 2021. During transit by ambulance, Patient appeared heavily intoxicated and stated that he was suicidal. Upon arrival at the Psychiatric Support Center, staff administered a drug abuse screening which was positive for fentanyl. Staff testified that Patient appeared alert, oriented, and in no acute distress. On the afternoon of January 9, a physician gave the following orders for Patient's care: Obtain initial [alcohol withdrawal assessment] score then assess and document score every 1 hour for 4 hours. Thereafter, continue monitoring as follows. If assessment score is equal to or greater than 13, re-assess every 1 hour. If assessment score is 6-12, re-assess every 2 hours. If assessment score is 0-5, re-assess every 4 hours. . . . Call provider if an assessment score changes by 3 or more points from previous score. Call provider for all assessment score[s] equal to or greater than 13, to communicate medication administration. If patient is sleeping at scheduled assessment time, awaken patient for assessment and administer medication if necessary. Hold all medication orders and call the provider for any status indicating over-sedation including the following: drifts off to sleep during conversation, minimal or no response to verbal or physical stimulation, or respiratory rate less than 10 breaths per minute. Alcohol withdrawal set will be discontinued after 6 days. If patient assessment is less than or equal to 2 for 48 hours at any time during the 6 days, discuss with physician for possible discontinuation of order set prior to 6 days. The hospital's instructions for performing alcohol withdrawal assessments required that the nurse converse with the patient to obtain necessary information, which would require that the patient be awake.
4 In addition to the physician's orders for Patient's care, a Psychiatric Support Center policy required that registered nurses perform hourly rounds of patients during the night, in addition to checks by other staff which were required four times per hour. Hult was working the night shift at the Psychiatric Support Center on January 9, 2021. A day-shift nurse gave Hult a report concerning Patient upon Hult's arrival to start the night shift. The day-shift nurse had given Patient an alcohol withdrawal assessment score of 4 at 5:38 p.m. Hult performed a further alcohol withdrawal assessment on Patient at 8:20 p.m., and gave Patient a score of 5. Hult made an additional entry in Patient's chart at 8:37 p.m., indicating that Patient "was calm, cooperative and med[ication] compliant," and "was on unit and having snacks and watching television." Hult made a further entries in Patient's chart at 1:35 and 1:37 a.m. on January 10, 2021. These entries indicated that Patient had refused to participate in an alcohol withdrawal assessment or allow Hult to take his vital signs, because Patient was sleeping. The hearing officer found that, according to a hallway video recording, Hult spent only approximately four minutes between entering and exiting Patient's room. The hearing officer determined that this "was presumably not enough time to attempt to awaken [Patient] and attempt to 'cajole' [Patient] to participate in the alcohol-withdrawal assessment." At approximately 6:30 a.m. on January 10, other members of the Psychiatric Support Center's staff found Patient unresponsive and without a pulse. Patient was pronounced dead at approximately 7:05 a.m.
5 The last entry Hult made in Patient's chart before Patient died was at 1:37 a.m. After Patient was found dead, Hult made a series of additional entries in Patient's chart. At 6:37 a.m., Hult made entries in Patient's chart indicating that he had made "Nursing Rounds" at 1:00 a.m., 2:00 a.m., 3:00 a.m., 4:00 a.m., 5:00 a.m., and 6:00 a.m. Hult made additional entries in Patient's chart at 6:36 and 7:13 a.m.; those postmortem entries reported that Patient had refused an alcohol withdrawal assessment and the checking of his vital signs at 5:00 a.m., because Patient was sleeping. The hallway video recording did not show Hult entering or exiting Patient's room at any of the times listed in Hult's belated entries in Patient's chart, indicating that those entries were false. On January 12, 2021, the Department received a "hotline" report from the Psychiatric Support Center. The report advised the Department that, during its investigation of Patient's death, the hospital found that Hult had falsified documents recording when he entered Patient's room. The Department opened an investigation into Hult's potential neglect of Patient. The Department's investigation indicated that neglect had occurred and that Hult acted knowingly in failing to properly monitor Patient's condition. On December 6, 2022, the Department mailed Hult a notice indicating that it had substantiated a complaint of neglect, and intended to place him on its Employee Disqualification List. Hult filed a timely written appeal with the Department's Appeals Unit. A hearing officer within the Department held a contested-case evidentiary hearing on Hult's appeal on March 24, 2023. At the hearing, the Manager of the Department's Employee Disqualification List Program testified about the Department's investigation, and her recommendation that Hult be placed on the
6 Disqualification List. When asked whether she found any mitigating circumstances, Program Manager stated that she "did not find any on [her] review of the case file." Program Manager was also asked how she had addressed § 192.2490.9(7), 2 which requires the Department to consider "[w]hether alternative sanctions resulting in conditions of continued employment are appropriate in lieu of placing a person's name on the employee disqualification list." She responded that, "[b]ased on the level of negligence and also the lies and deceit that I reviewed, I saw no reason to try and keep Mr. Hult employed in the industry." On July 5, 2023, the Department's hearing officer issued a Decision and Order adopting the recommendation to permanently place Hult's name on the Employee Disqualification List. The Decision found that Hult had made false entries in Patient's chart. Thus, the Decision found that Hult "charted that nursing rounds were performed at 6:00 AM, but video shows no nurse, including Hult, entering [Patient]'s room for rounds at this time." The Decision also found that, although Hult made chart entries after Patient's death indicating that Patient refused an alcohol withdrawal assessment and vital signs at 5:00 a.m., "[a] review of the video taken in [Patient]'s hallway from midnight through 0700 hours on January 10, 2021, does not show [Hult] enter [Patient]'s room at around 5:00 AM." The hearing officer also found that Hult had failed to provide Patient with the level of care required by hospital policy, and by the physician's orders.
2 Statutory citations refer to the 2016 edition of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, updated by the 2025 Cumulative Supplement.
7 [The Department] showed, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [Hult] knowingly neglected Patient . . . . [Hult] was the primary nurse in charge of [Patient]'s care . . . . [Hult] failed to perform the services reasonable and necessary to maintain the physical and mental health of [Patient]. Specifically, [Hult] failed to follow physician orders to monitor [Patient] by evaluating [Patient] with the alcohol-withdrawal assessment scale at the required times, even if [Patient] was sleeping. The physician orders clearly stated to awaken [Patient] to perform the alcohol-withdrawal assessments. . . . As a nurse, [Hult] was required to follow the physician's order to complete alcohol-withdrawal assessments on [Patient] and to follow the orders as to when to next assess the patient based on the patient's score. The hospital also required [Hult] to perform hourly rounds on his patients. [Hult] failed to perform the nursing assessments that were required to maintain [Patient]'s physical and mental health and to ensure the health, safety and welfare of [Patient]. [Hult]'s failure to perform these nursing assessments presented an imminent danger to the health, safety and welfare of [Patient]. The hearing officer's Decision noted that Hult had testified to various factors which purportedly mitigated the severity of his misconduct. The hearing officer found, however, that [Hult]'s testimony as to other staff participating in [Patient]'s care on January 9 and 10, 2021, or other factors as to why he did not perform the physician orders as ordered did not lessen the fact that [Hult] was [Patient]'s primary nurse and ultimately had the responsibility to perform the nursing assessment and nursing rounds on [Patient] properly according to physician orders and policy/protocols. On July 31, 2023, Hult filed a petition for judicial review in the circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the Department's decision to place Hult on the Employee Disqualification List. The court found, however, that the Department's "Decision did not appropriately consider mitigating factors including those delineated in RSMo § 192.2490.9." As a result, the court ordered that "the
8 existing Decision with respect to the length of discipline is reduced from permanent placement to a term of eighteen (18) months." Both Hult and the Department appealed the circuit court's judgment. Standard of Review "In proceedings for judicial review of administrative decisions in contested cases, this Court reviews the decision of the agency, not the circuit court." Stock v. Policemen's and Firemen's Retirement Fund, 712 S.W.3d 40, 46 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (citing TAP Pharm. Prods. v. State Bd. of Pharm., 238 S.W.3d 140, 141 (Mo. 2007)). However, "[w]hile the decision reviewed on appeal is that of the [agency] and not the circuit court, an appellate court reverses, affirms or otherwise acts upon the judgment of the trial court." Bird v. Mo. Bd. of Architects, 259 S.W.3d 516, 520 n.7 (Mo. 2008) (citation omitted). In reviewing an administrative agency's decision in a contested case, we ask whether the decision (1) Is in violation of constitutional provisions; (2) Is in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; (3) Is unsupported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record; (4) Is, for any other reason, unauthorized by law; (5) Is made upon unlawful procedure or without a fair trial; (6) Is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable; (7) Involves an abuse of discretion. § 536.140.2. A court reviewing factual findings by an administrative agency must consider all of the evidence that was before the agency and all of the
9 reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, including the evidence and inferences that the agency rejected in making its findings. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the administrative agency on factual matters, but we review any questions of law concerning an agency's decision de novo. Snethen v. Mo. State Bd. of Nursing, 707 S.W.3d 860, 867 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (cleaned up). Discussion Hult asserts two Points on appeal. First, he argues that the Department exceeded its statutory authority, and usurped the authority of the State Board of Nursing, by effectively prohibiting Hult from working as a nurse in the State. In his second Point, he contends that the Department abused its discretion by ordering his permanent placement on the Employee Disqualification List, without considering the evidence of mitigating circumstances which he presented to the Board. For its part, the Department argues that the Department acted within its discretion in choosing to place Hult on the Disqualification List permanently. Section 197.500.1 provides that the Department of Health and Senior Services shall maintain an employee disqualification list and place on the employee disqualification list the names of any persons who are or who have been employed by any entity licensed pursuant to this chapter and who have been finally determined by the department pursuant to section 192.2490 to have knowingly or recklessly abused or neglected a patient. The Department is required by § 192.2490.11 to provide the Employee Disqualification List to a wide variety of health-care-related institutions; § 192.2490.12 specifies that "[n]o person . . . [or] organization . . . who received
10 the employee disqualification list . . . shall knowingly employ any person who is on the employee disqualification list." Section 192.2490.9 provides in relevant part that [t]he length of time the person's name shall appear on the employee disqualification list shall be determined by the director of the department of health and senior services or the director's designee, based upon the following: (1) Whether the person acted recklessly or knowingly, as defined in chapter 562; (2) The degree of the physical, sexual, or emotional injury or harm; or the degree of the imminent danger to the health, safety or welfare of a resident or in-home services client; (3) The degree of misappropriation of the property or funds, or falsification of any documents for service delivery of an in- home services client; (4) Whether the person has previously been listed on the employee disqualification list; (5) Any mitigating circumstances; (6) Any aggravating circumstances; and (7) Whether alternative sanctions resulting in conditions of continued employment are appropriate in lieu of placing a person's name on the employee disqualification list. Such conditions of employment may include, but are not limited to, additional training and employee counseling. I. Hult's first Point emphasizes that the Manager of the Department's Employee Disqualification List Program testified that she "saw no reason to try and keep Mr. Hult employed in the industry." According to Hult, the Program Manager's testimony reflects "a usurpation of the statutory authority vested in
11 the Missouri State Board of Nursing, which is empowered with the determination to revoke a nursing license pursuant to RSMo 335.066." Hult's first Point fails for multiple reasons. First, the Manager of the Department's Employee Disqualification List Program is not the individual who ultimately decided to place Hult on the Disqualification List – that decision was made by a hearing officer based on the record developed during a formal evidentiary hearing. Under § 192.2490.2, the initial determination that an individual should be placed on the Employee Disqualification List only becomes effective if the affected individual does not request a hearing concerning the listing decision. If the affected individual requests a hearing, that hearing is conducted according to contested-case procedures. § 192.2490.5. Following the hearing, "the director of the department or the director's designee . . . shall determine whether the person shall be listed on the employee disqualification list," based upon the record created at the hearing; the Director or their designee "shall clearly state the reasons for his or her decision and shall include a statement of findings of fact and conclusions of law pertinent to the questions in issue." § 192.2490.6. It is the decision of the Director or their designee, after hearing, which is subject to judicial review. § 192.2490.7. Because the Program Manager did not make the decision under review, her reasons for recommending Hult's permanent placement on the Disqualification List cannot serve as a basis for overturning the Department's decision, without some indication that the hearing officer adopted the Program Manager's rationale. Even if the Program Manager's testimony could provide a basis to impugn the Department's final decision, Hult takes that testimony out of context. When deciding the length of time an individual should remain on the Disqualification
12 List, § 192.2490.9(7) requires that the Department consider "[w]hether alternative sanctions resulting in conditions of continued employment are appropriate in lieu of placing a person's name on the employee disqualification list." Thus, § 192.2490.9(7) expressly directs the Department to consider whether an individual's "continued employment" in the health-care industry is warranted, despite the individual's abuse or neglect of a patient. The Program Manager was asked whether she considered that factor in making her recommendation that Hult be permanently listed. It was only in response to that question that the Program Manager testified that she "saw no reason to try and keep Mr. Hult employed in the industry." Program Manager was merely testifying to her assessment of a factor the Department was statutorily required to consider. Considering whether it was appropriate for Hult to continue to be employed in the health-care industry was not improper – such consideration was mandated by statute. Finally, the Department's obligation to place Hult on the Employee Disqualification List, and the effect of that listing on Hult's employability, are expressly dictated by statute. Section 197.500.1 requires the Department to maintain a listing of those persons it determines "have knowingly or recklessly abused or neglected a patient"; §§ 192.2490.11 and .12 then specify the consequences such a listing has on an individual's future employment in the health-care industry. Hult cites no authority to support his argument that the Department's express statutory authority to maintain the Employee Disqualification List, and the statutory provisions specifying the consequences of such a listing, are limited, preempted, or impliedly repealed by the Board of Nursing's regulatory authority over the nursing profession. Absent citation of
13 relevant legal authority, we reject without further discussion Hult's argument that the Department has "usurp[ed]" the Board of Nursing's regulatory authority. See, e.g., Murphy v. Steiner, 658 S.W.3d 588, 593 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022) ("When an appellant fails to cite relevant law and explain how it applies to the applicable facts, we deem the point abandoned." (cleaned up)). II. Section 192.2490.9(5) expressly requires that, in determining the length of time an individual will be placed on the Disqualification List, the Department must consider "[a]ny mitigating circumstances." In his second Point, Hult argues that the Department abused its discretion in placing him on the Employee Disqualification List permanently, because it failed to consider evidence of mitigating circumstances. In his Argument under Point II, Hult emphasizes that the Manager of the Employee Disqualification List Program testified that the degree of harm caused by Hult's conduct "was the patient's death," although the Department failed to present competent evidence that Hult's actions or inaction caused Patient's death. Hult also emphasizes that, when asked if she had found any mitigating circumstances, Program Manager testified that "I did not find any on my review of the case file." According to Hult, Program Manager's testimony reflects that she failed to consider evidence which purportedly mitigated the severity of Hult's neglect. Hult argues that numerous factors mitigate the severity of his neglect of Patient, including: o that he had only been practicing as a nurse for two-and-a-half years at the time of Patient's death; o that he had not previously been disciplined;
14 o that other staff had checked on Patient during the early morning of January 10, 2021, even if Hult had not; o that Patient was not in acute alcohol withdrawal, and his last assessment by Hult reflected limited signs of alcohol withdrawal; o that deaths on a psychiatric unit are rare; o and that Hult was reluctant to awaken Patient to do the alcohol withdrawal assessments, because he had been assaulted by a psychiatric patient more than two years earlier. Like his first Point, Hult's second Point fails to acknowledge that the Program Manager did not make the Decision under review. It was a hearing officer, not the Program Manager, who made the determination to permanently place Hult on the Employee Disqualification List following a formal evidentiary hearing. Therefore, the factors which the Program Manager did, or did not, consider cannot themselves establish a basis for reversal. In her Decision, the hearing officer expressly addressed the mitigating factors to which Hult points, and concluded that those purportedly mitigating factors did not diminish Hult's personal responsibility to follow physician orders and hospital protocols in providing care to Patient: [Hult]'s testimony as to other staff participating in [Patient]'s care on January 9 and 10, 2021, or other factors as to why he did not perform the physician orders as ordered did not lessen the fact that [Hult] was [Patient]'s primary nurse and ultimately had the responsibility to perform the nursing assessment and nursing rounds on [Patient] properly according to physician orders and policy/protocols. Moreover, the hearing officer's Decision does not find that Hult's failure to perform required rounds and alcohol withdrawal assessments caused Patient's death. Instead, the hearing officer found that Hult's "failure to perform these nursing assessments presented an imminent danger to the health, safety and
15 welfare of [Patient]." Section 192.2490.9(2) specifies that the imminent danger to Patient created by Hult's actions (or inaction) is an appropriate factor for the Department to consider in determining the length of an individual's placement on the Employee Disqualification List. Hult does not challenge the manner in which the hearing officer addressed his evidence of mitigating circumstances; nor does he challenge the hearing officer's conclusion that his conduct created an imminent danger to Patient's health, safety, and welfare. We also note that, even if the Program Manager's testimony provided the basis for the decision under review, her testimony can be read merely to state that she did not find any circumstances which mitigated (or diminished) the severity of Hult's knowing neglect of Patient – not that she had failed to consider, or was unaware of, the purportedly mitigating circumstances. On cross-examination, Program Manager was asked by Hult's counsel about several of the purportedly mitigating circumstances. She testified that she was aware of those factors, but had determined that they did not lessen the seriousness of Hult's failure to perform necessary monitoring of Patient, and his falsificiation of entries in Patient's medical record to conceal his misconduct. Hult's second Point is denied. III. In its cross-appeal, the Department challenges the circuit court's decision to shorten the length of Hult's placement on the Employee Disqualification List to eighteen months. Section 192.2490.9 provides that "[t]he length of time the person's name shall appear on the employee disqualification list shall be determined by the
16 director of the department of health and senior services or the director's designee, based upon" consideration of seven factors. Those factors include the individual's state of mind; the degree of harm or danger presented by the person's conduct; the individual's past disciplinary history; the availability of less restrictive sanctions; "[a]ny mitigating circumstances"; and "[a]ny aggravating circumstances." §§ 192.2490.9(1) to (7). Section 192.2490.9 vests substantial discretion in the Department to determine the appropriate length of an individual's placement on the Employee Disqualification List, based on consideration of multiple factors; those factors include the open-ended directives to consider "mitigating" and "aggravating" circumstances. In analogous circumstances, we have held that the degree of discipline imposed by an administrative agency, within the range of the agency's statutory authority, is generally a matter left within the agency's discretion. The court on appeal rarely interferes with sanctions imposed by an administrative [board] which are within the statutory authority of the [board]. A part of the expertise of the members of the [Board] consists of the ability, drawn from their knowledge of the industry practices and standards, to assess the gravity of the licensee's infractions, and to fit the sanction to the offense. Kerwin v. Mo. Dental Bd., 375 S.W.3d 219, 231–32 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012) (quoting Andrews v. Mo. Real Estate Comm'n, 849 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Mo. App. W.D. 1993)); see also, e.g., Williston v. Mo. State Bd. of Nursing, 610 S.W.3d 703, 719-20 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020); Jefferson City Apothecary, LLC v. Mo. Bd. of Pharmacy, 499 S.W.3d 321, 330 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016). Our deference to an agency's choice of the amount of discipline to impose is consistent with § 536.140.5, which specifies that a reviewing court "shall not substitute its
17 discretion for discretion legally vested in the agency, unless the court determines that the agency decision was arbitrary or capricious." The Department did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in choosing to place Hult's name on the Employee Disqualification List permanently. Hult failed to provide the level of monitoring required by a physician's orders, and by hospital policy. Hult's failure to provide the appropriate level of care presented a significant risk of imminent harm to Patient, given that Patient had expressed suicidal ideations; presented to the hospital with a severe – and potentially toxic – level of alcohol intoxication; and was undergoing alcohol withdrawal. While Patient may not have been in the most acute stage of alcohol withdrawal on the night of January 9-10, 2021, a nurse-investigator testified that a patient experiencing alcohol withdrawal is in a "high risk timeframe for severe outcome and adverse effects," including potential seizures, for 48 to 72 hours. The nurse- investigator also testified that Patient's seizure risk was elevated based on his previous history of seizures. The nurse-investigator testified that patients experiencing alcohol withdrawal "can be looking good one minute and crashing the next." Because of the risks associated with alcohol withdrawal, and the volatility of a patient's condition, the nurse-investigator testified that "frequent monitoring is very, very important." Moreover, after Patient's death, Hult falsified multiple entries in Patient's medical chart with the obvious purpose of concealing his own misconduct, and obstructing the hospital's investigation into Patient's death. Hult's intentional falsification of Patient's medical record is arguably more serious than the misconduct he sought to conceal (his failure to properly monitor Patient's condition). In a similar context we have observed that an individual's "failure to
18 acknowledge mistakes, and to accept responsibility for those mistakes, gives important insight into the [individual]'s attitude toward the regulatory process, and can serve as a powerful predictor of how the [individual] will conduct themselves" in their chosen profession. Furman v. Bd. of Nursing Home Administrators, 608 S.W.3d 742, 749 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020). The Department could also reasonably conclude that Hult's misconduct was not mitigated by his relative inexperience or lack of prior misconduct, or by the fact that other less-well-trained staff members had conducted cursory checks on Patient. To the extent that Hult claimed that a prior assault made him hesitant to awaken a sleeping psychiatric patient, the Department could reasonably determine that this did not absolve Hult from his responsibility to fulfill a physician's explicit orders – or to at least advise other staff members of his inability to comply with those orders. We also note that, although the Department chose to place Hult's name on the Employee Disqualification List permanently, he is entitled to request to be removed from the List once every twelve months, if he can make a "clear showing" that he "will not commit additional acts of abuse [or] neglect." § 192.2490.14. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Department did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in ordering that Hult's name be permanently placed on the Employee Disqualification List. We reverse the circuit court's decision to the extent that it reduced the time period for which Hult's name would be listed. Conclusion The Department acted lawfully when it placed Hult permanently on the Employee Disqualification List. We affirm the judgment of the circuit court to
19 the extent that it affirmed the Department's finding that Hult met the criteria for listing; we reverse the circuit court's judgment to the extent that it found that Hult's permanent listing was arbitrary and capricious.
_________________________ Alok Ahuja, Judge All concur.
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