David K. Kunzie, Appellant, v. Jack-In-The-Box, Inc., Respondent.

-----.---- 3Jntbefflissouri~ourtof~ppeaIs ~astern1JBistrict DIVISIONFOUR Respondent. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No.ED92974 DAVIDK.KUNZIE, Appellant,AppealfromtheCircuitCourt ofSt.LouisCounty v. JACK-IN-THE-BOX,INC., HonorableColleenDolan

Introduction DavidKunzie(Appellant)appealsfromthetrialcourt'sdenialofhismotiontosetaside arbitrationproceedingsonthebasisthatthetrialcourterredin findingthata validlyformed arbitrationagreementexistedbetweenAppellantandhisformeremployer,Jack-in-theBox,Inc. (Respondent).WefindthatAppellant'scontinuedemploymentalonedidnotobjectively manifesthisintenttobeboundtoRespondent'sproposedarbitrationpolicy.Thus,wereverse thejudgmentandremandforanevidentiaryhearingto determineif additionalfactsexistwhich, inconjunctionwithAppellant'scontinuedemployment,sufficientlydemonstratethatAppellant acceptedRespondent'sarbitrationpolicyto bea newconditionofhisemployment.! 1Respondent'sMotiontoDismissPlaintiffsAppealforFailingtoComplywithRule84.04(D)is denied.

Background Appellantwasanat-willemployeeofRespondentfromApril23,1987,untilhis terminationonNovember16,2005.OnJanuary16,2007,Appellantfileda petitionallegingthat Respondent,in violationoftheMissouriHumanRightsAct,2wrongfullyterminatedhimonthe basisofhisageandgender. OnMarch2,2007,Respondentfileda motiontodismissor,in thealternative,tocompel arbitration.Respondentarguedthat"asa conditionofhisemployment,[Appellant]signedan agreementwhereinheagreedthathewouldarbitrateanyandallclaimsordisputesthataroseout oforwererelatedto theterminationofhisemployment."BecauseRespondentfailedto attach theallegedarbitrationagreement(ArbitrationAgreement)to itsinitialmotion,Respondentfiled anothermotiononMarch14whichcontainedtheArbitrationAgreementandrequestedthatit be incorporatedasanexhibittoitsinitialmotiontocompelarbitration. Theseven-pageArbitrationAgreementwastitled"JackInTheBoxDisputeResolution Agreement."Thelastpageoftheagreementwastitled"ReceiptandAcknowledgement."A clauseonthispagestated,"I understandthatmyemploymentbyJackin theBoxanditsaffiliates is automaticallysubjecttothetermsofthisAgreementif I continuemyemployment.. . after1- 14-2004."Thesignatureandprintednameonthispagereads"DaveKunze."Appellantfileda memoranduminopposition,contendingthathe"signedthearbitrationprovisionunderduress andassuchthearbitrationprovisionshouldbedeemednullandvoid.,,3 OnJune6, 2007,thetrialcourtgrantedRespondent'smotion,findingthat"theparties enteredintoa validagreementcontaininganarbitrationprovision,thattheagreementis 2 Section213.055,RSMo2000. 3 Appellant'smemorandumfurtherexplainedthat"the[arbitration]agreementwassignedby[Appellant]under [Respondent's]threatofterminationif [he]didnotsigntheagreementonorabout,January14,2004." 2

supportedbyconsideration,that[Appellant's]claimsarewithinthescopeoftheagreement,and thattheagreementis notunconscionable." OnOctober29,2007,Appellantfileda motionforrehearingtosetasidearbitration proceedings.Upona "morerecentandcloserreviewofthedocument,"Appellantcontendedthat Respondenthadproduceda "shamArbitrationAgreement."Attachedto themotion,Appellant providedanaffidavitin whichAppellantstatedthathedidnotsigntheArbitrationAgreement. Appellantstatedthathissurname,Kunzie,wasmisspelledin thesignatureblockofthereceipt andacknowledgementpageoftheArbitrationAgreement;hisnamewasspelled"Kunze." Furthermore,AppellantstatedthatthereceiptandacknowledgementpageoftheArbitration Agreementincorrectlylistedhissocialsecuritynumber;thethirdandeighthnumeralswere incorrect. OnNovember21,2007,thetrialcourtenteredanorderprovidingforanevidentiary hearingtobeheldonFebruary1,2008to"determinethenatureandapplicationofthearbitration clause."OnJanuary17,2008,Respondentfileda motiontosetasidetheevidentiaryhearing basedupontheparties'RequestforAdmissions.InresponsetoRespondent'sRequestfor Admissions,Appellantstatedthatheattendeda January14,2004meetingin whichRespondent presentedtheArbitrationAgreement;thathedidnotsigntheArbitrationAgreement;andthathe thereaftercontinuedhisemploymentwithRespondent.OnJanuary29,2008,thetrialcourt grantedRespondent'smotiontosetasidetheevidentiaryhearingscheduledforFebruary1 and orderedthepartiestoproceedwitharbitration. Afteranarbitrationproceedingin whichthearbitratorfoundagainstAppellant,4 RespondentprayedthetrialcourttoenterfinaljudgmentdismissingeachofAppellant's 4 OnMarch6,2008,thearbitrator,fmding"thatunlawfuldiscrimination.. . wasnota 'contributingfactor'in connectionwiththedecisionsmadeby[Respondent],"deniedAppellant'sclaims. 3

---- ------- employmentclaimsonMarch23,2008.OnApril15,Appellantfileda secondmotionfor rehearingtosetasidearbitrationproceedings.Again,AppellantcontendedthatRespondent produceda "sham"agreementthatdidnotcorrectlyreflectAppellant'ssignatureorsocial securitynumber.Appellantalsocontendedthat,priorto thepresentlitigation,Respondenthad neverdisclosedsixofthesevenpagesoftheArbitrationAgreementtohim.OnApril21,the trialcourtentereda finalorderandjudgmentdenyingAppellant'ssecondmotionforrehearingto setasidearbitrationproceedingsanddismissingAppellant'spetitionwithprejudice.Relying solelyonAppellant'sadmissionsandwithoutmakinganyfactualdeterminationspursuanttoan evidentiaryhearing,thetrialcourtexplainedthat: [Appellant]hasadmittedhewasawareofthealternativedisputeresolution provisionandcontinuedhisemploymentwith[Respondent]afterhavingbeen madeawareoftheprovisions.Bycontinuingemployment,[Appellant]accepted thetermsoftheprovision.Berkleyv. Dillards,Inc.,450F.3d775(8thCir.2006). [Respondent's]motionforjudgmentbasedonthearbitrationdecisionandaward is granted. Appellantfileda noticeofappealonApril30,2008.Thisappealfollows. PointsonAppeal Appellantraisesthreepointsonappeal.Inhisfirstpoint,Appellantclaimsthatthetrial courterredin settingasidetheevidentiaryhearingit scheduledforFebruary1, 2008,to determinetheArbitrationAgreement'svaliditybecausetheagreementlackedmutualassent.In hissecondpoint,Appellantclaimsthatthetrialcourterredin grantingRespondent'smotionto compelarbitrationbecausetheArbitrationAgreementwasnotvalidlyformed.In histhirdpoint, Appellantre-iterateshisclaimthatthetrialcourterredin findingthattheArbitrationAgreement wasvalidlyformed.WhileAppellantformallypresentsthreepointsreliedon,ourdiscussionis limitedtohisfirstpoint,asit is dispositive. 4

--------_u StandardofReview "Whenfacedwitha motiontocompelarbitration,themotioncourtmustdetermine whetherthevalidarbitrationagreementexistsand,if so,whetherthespecificdisputefallswithin thescopeofthearbitrationagreement."ArrowheadContracting,Inc.v. M.H.Washington,LLC, 243S.W.3d532,535(Mo.App.W.D.2008)(emphasisadded)."Indeterminingwhetherornot a validarbitrationagreementexists,weapply'theusualrulesofstatecontractlawandcanonsof contractinterpretation.'"Id.(quotingNitroDistrib.,Inc.v. Dunn,194S.W.3d339,345(Mo. banc2006)).WhetherornotRespondent'smotiontocompelarbitrationshouldhavebeen grantedis a questionoflaw,andourreviewis denovo.NitroDistrib.,194S.W.3dat 345. However,becausetheMissouriUniformArbitrationAct(MUAA)specificallyauthorizes thetrialcourtsto "proceedsummarily"andconductevidentiaryhearings,if needed,toresolvean issueofwhetheranarbitrationagreementexistedornot,seeinfra,ourreviewofthetrialcourt's determinationastotheexistenceofanagreementitselfis analogoustothatina court-triedcase. SeeCreechv. MDNAAmericaBank,N.A.,250S.W.3d715,716(Mo.App.S.D.2008)(where a trialcourtconductedanevidentiaryhearingpursuantto theMUAAtodetermineif an agreementtoarbitrateexistedandsummarilyfoundin thenegative,theappellatecourtapplied the"court-triedcase"standardofreview);seeAbramsv. FourSeasonsLakesites/ChaseResorts, Inc.,925S.W.2d932,936(Mo.App.S.D.1996).Therefore,the"judgmentofthetrialcourtwill beaffirmedunlessthereis nosubstantialevidencetosupportit, unlessit is againsttheweightof theevidence,unlessit erroneouslydeclaresthelaw,orunlessit erroneouslyappliesthelaw." Abrams,925S.W.2dat 936(citingMurphvv. Carron,536S.W.2d30,32(Mo.banc1976)). 5

Discussion I AgreementtoArbitrate "Arbitrationis a matterofcontract,anda partycannotberequiredtoarbitratea dispute thatit hasnotagreedtoarbitrate."DunnIndus.Group,Inc.v. CityofSugarCreek,112S.W.3d 421,435(Mo.banc2003)."Itis a firmlyestablishedprinciplethatpartiescanbecompelledto arbitrateagainsttheirwillonlypursuanttoanagreementwherebytheyhaveagreedtoarbitrate claims."Morrowv.HallmarkCards,Inc.,273S.W.3d15,21(Mo.App.W.D.2008)(emphasis inoriginal).Nothingprecludesthepossibilityofanemployeranditsemployeesfromentering intoanenforceableagreementtoarbitrateclaims,id.at 22,solongastheagreementexhibitsthe essentialelementsMissourirequiresofa validcontract.StateexreI.Vincentv. Schneider,194 S.W.3d853,856(Mo.banc2006)("Missouricontractlawappliestodeterminewhetherthe partieshaveentereda validagreementtoarbitrate.,,).5Suchelementsinclude"offer,acceptance, andbargainedforconsideration."Johnsonv. McDonnellDouglasCorp.,745S.W.2d661,662 (Mo.banc1988);Arrowhead,243S.W.3dat 535("Anobligationtoarbitrateis basedonassent andagreement.").Thus,in theabsenceofa validcontractbetweenthepartiestoarbitratecertain disputes,noactiontocompelarbitrationwilllie. II TrialCourtProcedureinDeterminingthe"Making"ofanArbitrationAgreement BoththeFederalArbitrationAct(FAA)andMUAAcontainprovisionsoutliningthe proceduretrialcourtsaretofollowwhendeterminingwhetherthepartieshaveformedan arbitrationagreement. 5"Underboththe[FederalArbitrationAct]and[theMUAA],a writtenagreementtosubmita presentorfuture disputetoarbitrationis valid,enforceableandirrevocable,saveuponsuchgroundsasexistat laworin equityfor therevocationofanycontract."McIntoshv.TenetHealthSvs.Hosp.Inc./LutheranMed.Ctr.,48S.W.3d85,89 (Mo.App.E.D.2001). 6

~---~~-~ The"FAAunambiguouslyprovidesfora jurytrialwhenfactualdisputesarisein federal courtsregardingthemakingofanarbitrationagreement."NitroDistrib.,194S.W.3dat 351 (citing9 D.S.C.Section4 (2000)).However,"theproceduralprovisionsoftheFAAdonotbind statecourtsunlessthestateproceduresin somewaydefeattherightsgrantedbyCongress."Id. "Thus,[Missouricourts]willlooktotheproceduressetoutin theMUAAratherthantheFAA." Id.;Reisv. PeabodyCoalCo.,935S.W.2d625,630(Mo.App.E.D.1996)("AlthoughtheFAA createssubstantiverightstobeenforcedinstatecourts,Missouricourtsarenotboundbythe proceduralprovisionsoftheFAA."). TheprocedureMissouritrialcourtsareto followis setforthinsection435.355(1)ofthe MDAA,whichstates: Onapplicationofa partyshowing[a writtenagreementtosubmitanyexisting controversytoarbitration],andtheopposingparty'srefusaltoarbitrate,thecourt shallorderthepartiestoproceedwitharbitration,but iftheopposingpartydenies theexistenceof theagreementto arbitrate,thecourtshallproceedsummarilyto thedeterminationoftheissuesoraisedandshallorderarbitrationif foundforthe movingparty;otherwise,theapplicationshallbedenied. Section435.355(1),RSMo2000(emphasisadded).6TheMissouriSupremeCourthasheldthat theterm''proceedsummarily"contemplatesproceedings"conductedwithouttheusual formalitiesandwithouta jury."NitroDistrib.,194S.W.3dat 351(emphasisadded).Evenso, wherethereare"disputedfactualissues[asto theagreement'sexistence],it is necessaryto conductanevidentiaryhearing."Id.7 6AllfurtherstatutoryreferencesaretoRSMo2000,unlessotherwiseindicated. 7 Inexplainingwhentheneedforanevidentiaryhearingexists"giventhesummarynatureoftheproceedings,"the MissouriSupremeCourtheldthata trialcourtdidnoterrorin "decIine[ing]toentertainlivewitnesses.. . [where] the[trial]courtwasprovidedwithmorethan3,700pagesofdocuments,affidavits,depositiontranscriptsandother materialswithwhichtoresolvethefactualdisputes."NitroDistrib.,194S.W.3dat 352. 7

III TrialCourt'sDeterminationthatAppellantandRespondent"Agreed"toArbitration Inthiscase,thetrialcourthadbeforeit:(a)theseven-pageArbitrationAgreement purportedlysignedbyAppellant;(b)Appellant'saffidavitstatingthathistruesignatureand namewasnotreflectedin theArbitrationAgreement;(c)Appellant'saffidavitstatingthathis socialsecuritynumberwasnotaccuratelyreflectedin theArbitrationAgreement;(d)Appellant's responsetoa requestforadmissionsthatheattendeda January14,2004meetingin which Respondentproposedarbitrationasanalternativedisputeresolution,thatseveralemployees refusedtosigntheArbitrationAgreementat themeeting,andthatheneversignedthe ArbitrationAgreement. ThoughAppellant'sargumentastowhetherornothesignedtheArbitrationAgreement hasnotbeenentirelyconsistentthroughouthispleadings,8thetrialcourtfailedtoconductan evidentiaryhearingormakeanyfactualfindingsin thisregard.Rather,thetrialcourt's judgmentwaspremisedsolelyuponitsfindingthat,asa matteroflaw,Appellant'sknowledge andconductofcontinuinghisemploymentafterbeingpresentedwiththeArbitrationAgreement constitutedEmployee'sacceptanceofthecontract.Asmentionedabove,thetrialcourt explained: [Appellant]hasadmittedhewasawareofthealternativedisputeresolution provisionandcontinuedhisemploymentwith[Respondent]afterhavingbeen madeawareoftheprovisions.Bycontinuinghisemployment,[Appellant] acceptedthetermsoftheprovision.Berkleyv. Dillards.Inc.,450F.3d775(8th Cir.2006). Thus,thequestionbeforeusis whetherthetrialcourtwascorrectin holdingthat,under Missouricontractlaw,anemployee'scontinuedemploymentafterbeingpresentedwithan arbitrationagreementfromhisemployerstatingthatalternativedisputeresolutionis a condition 8First,AppellantcontendedhesignedtheArbitrationAgreementunderduress.Subsequently,hedeniedsigningthe agreementandsuggestedthesignaturewasa forgery. 8

ofcontinuedemployment,decisivelyevidencestheemployee'sintentiontobeboundbythe arbitrationagreement. ThisquestionhasnotyetbeenaddressedbyMissouricourts,althoughseveralfederal circuitcourtsofappealshavesplitontheissue.Attheoutset,weacknowledgethatdecisionsof thefederalcourtsmeritourrespectbutdonotbindus,Statev. Storey,901S.W.2d886,900 (Mo.banc1995),especiallywhenourdeterminationrestsuponaninterpretationofstatecontract law. A. FederalCircuitOpinionsHoldingContinuedEmploymentConstitutesAcceptance toanArbitrationAgreement InBerkleyv. Dillard'sInc.,anemployerimplementedanarbitrationprogramand distributeddocumentssummarizingitsnewpolicyin)une2001.450F.3dat 776.Oneofthe documentsspecifiedthatby"continuingemploymentwith[theemployer],[theemployeehas] agreedtoaccept[thearbitrationprogram]."Id.Severaldayslater,anemployee,whohadbeen workingfortheemployersinceAugust2000,refusedtosigna formentitled"Acknowledgement ofReceiptofRulesforArbitration."Id.Theemployerthenadvisedthisemployeethather refusaltosignthedocumenthadnoeffectbecausethearbitrationprogramappliedautomatically toallemployeeswhocontinuedtheiremployment.Id.TheEighthCircuitagreed,holdingthat ."[b]ycontinuingheremployment,[theemployee]acceptedthetermsofthearbitrationprogram." Id.at 777.9 9 InBerkley,theEighthCircuitpurportedtoapplyMissouricontractlaw.Tosupportthisstatementoflaw,it providedcitationstoCookv.ColdwellBanker,967S.W.2d654,657(Mo.App.E.D.1998)andEasyReturns MidwestInc.v.Schultz,964S.W.2d450,454(Mo.App.E.D.1998). ThepertinentprovisionofCookstates:"[a]noffertomakea unilateralcontractis acceptedwhenthe requestedperformanceis rendered.. ..A promisetopaya bonusin returnforanat-willemployee'scontinued employmentis anofferfora unilateralcontractwhichbecomesenforceablewhenacceptedbytheemployee's performance."Cook,967S.W.2dat 657. ThepertinentprovisionofSchultzstates:"[a]nemployee'scontinuanceinemploymentwithemployer, wherethereis noobligationtoremain,andanemployer'scontinuanceofemployment,wherecontinuanceis not required,suppliesadequateconsiderationfora noncompetitionagreement."Schultz,964S.W.2dat 454. 9

InHightowerv.GMRLInc.,anemployee,whohadbeenworkingforanemployerfor severalmonths,attendeda meetingin whichhisemployerpresentedtheimplementationof arbitrationastheexclusivemeansofresolvingemploymentdisputes.272F.3d239,241-42(4th Cir.2001).Theemployeesignedanattendancesheetacknowledginghisreceiptofdocuments distributedat themeeting.Id.at 242.Theemployeecontinuedworkingfortheemployerfor threemonths.Id.at 242.ApplyingNorthCarolinacontractlaw,theFourthCircuitheldthat "[b]ycontinuingemploymentwith[theemployer]forthreemonthsafterheknewthattheterms ofthe[employer'snewdisputeresolutionprocedure]wouldapplytohim,[theemployee] demonstratedacceptanceofthe[disputeresolutionprocedure]."Id.at 243. B. FederalCircuitOpinionHoldingContinuedEmploymentDoesNotConstitute AcceptancetoanArbitrationAgreement InBaileyv.Fed.NanMortgageAss'n,anemployersoughttocompelarbitration pursuantto anarbitrationpolicythatit unilaterallypromulgatedaftertheemployeewashired. 209F.3d740,741(D.C.Cif.2000).Theemployercontendedthat,becausethepolicyitselfwas proclaimedto bea conditionofemployment,theemployeeimplicitlyagreedtoarbitrate statutoryclaimsofemploymentdiscriminationwhenhecontinuedto workfortheemployerafter theissuanceofthearbitrationpolicy.Id.Theemployeearguedthathenevergavehisassentto beboundbytheemployer'snewarbitrationpolicy.Id. Thedistrictcourtfoundthat"becausetherewasnomeetingofmindsbetweentheparties, therewasnoarbitrationagreementto enforce."Id.TheD.C.Circuitaffirmed,holdingthatthe employee"didnothingwhatsoevertoembracetheemployer'sproposal."Id.at 746."[The employee's]continuedemploymentwith[theemployer]surelywasnotanindicationthathe intendedto beboundbythearbitrationpolicy."Id.at 747. 10

--- -UU c. DeterminationofMissouriContractLaw InMissouri,theessentialelementsofacontractare:(1)competencyofthepartiesto contract;(2)subjectmatter;(3)legalconsideration;(4)mutualityofagreement;and(5) mutualityofobligation.Barisv.Layton,43S.W.3d390,396(Mo.App.E.D.2001).A mutual agreementis reachedwhen"themindsofthecontractingparties[ ] meetuponandassentto the samethingin thesamesenseat thesametime."ViacomOutdoor,Inc.v.Taouil,254S.W.3d 234,238(Mo.App.E.D.2008);Arrowhead,243S.W.3dat 535(holdingthatthe"existenceofa contractnecessarilyimpliesthattherehasbeena 'meetingoftheminds'betweentheparties whichthecourtcandeterminebylookingto theintentionsofthepartiesasexpressedor manifestedin theirwordsoracts")."Ameetingofthemindsoccurswhenthereis a definite offerandanunequivocalacceptance."Guidryv. CharterCommc'n,269S.W.3d520,528(Mo. App.E.D.2008)(emphasisadded). Asa generalcommonlawprinciple,in orderforanacceptancetobeeffective,it "mustbe positiveandunambiguous."2 WILLISTONONCONTRACTS§ 6.10(4thed.2007)."Silence generallycannotbetranslatedintoacceptance."Guidrv,269S.W.3dat 528.10Thecritical questionwhenmeasuringif a party'swordsorconductconstituteacceptance"iswhetherthe signalssentbytheoffereeto theofferorobjectivelymanifesttheformer'sintenttobepresently bound."2 WILLISTONONCONTRACTS§ 6.10(4thed.2007). IOSilenceandinactionwilloperatetobindtheoffereetoa contractinonlyfourcategoriesofcases: First,whentheofferee,witha reasonableopportunitytorejectofferedgoodsorservices,takesthe benefitofthemundercircumstanceswhichwouldindicatetoa reasonablepersonthattheywere offeredwiththeexpectationofcompensation.Second,whentheofferorhasstatedorgiventhe offereereasontounderstandthatassentmaybemanifestedbysilenceorinaction,andtheofferee inremainingsilentandinactiveintendstoaccepttheoffer.Third,when,becauseofprevious dealingsorotherwise,theoffereehasreasonablyledtheofferortounderstandthatthesilenceor inactionisintendedtomanifestanacceptanceandtheofferorunderstandsthesilenceinthis manner.Fourth,whentheoffereetakesorretainspossessionofofferedproperty,orotherwiseacts inconsistentlywiththeofferor'sownershiprights,it willoperateasanacceptanceoftheoffered termsabsentothercircumstancessuggestinga contraryintent. 2 WILLISTONONCONTRACTS§ 6.50(4thed.2007). 11

Inthiscase,thetrialcourt,relyingonBerkley'sinterpretationofMissourilaw,concluded thatAppellant'sdecisiontocontinuein Respondent'semployafterobtainingknowledgeofits proposedArbitrationAgreementasa newconditionofemploymentrosetothelevelofan unequivocalacceptance.Wedisagree.Appellant'sconduct,byitself,onlyevincedhisintentto maintainthestatusquo.SeeBailey,209F.3dat 747(holdingthattheemployee"signaled nothingwhenheremainedin theemployof[hisemployer]followingtheissuanceofthe arbitrationpolicy").Withoutmore,wedonotfindthatthemerecontinuationofemployment manifeststhenecessaryassenttoRespondent'stermsofarbitration.InBerkley,theEighth CircuitsupporteditsdecisionwithcitationstotwoMissouricontractcases:Cookv. Coldwell BankerandEasyReturnsMidwestInc.v. Schultz.Bothcasesaredistinguishableto thecaseat bar. First,inCook,weaffirmeda juryverdictwhichawardedanemployeemoneydamages forheremployer'sbreachofa bonusagreement.967S.W.2dat 655.Theemployeeproduced evidencethatheremployerofferedto payhera bonusif hersalesearningsreachedspecified targetlevels.Id.at 656.Afterreachingtheemployer'sspecifiedtargetearnings,theemployee accepteda positionwithanothercompany.Id.at 656.Theemployerrefusedto paythe employeethebonus.Id.at 656.Because"[a]promiseto paya bonusin returnforanat-will employee'scontinuedemploymentis anofferfora unilateralcontractwhichbecomes enforceablewhenacceptedbytheemployee'sperformance,"wefoundthattheemployer breachedthebonusagreement.Id.at 657-58.Inthecaseat bar,unilateralcontractprinciples, i.e.,promiseforanact,donotapply.Respondent'sproposedArbitrationAgreementspecifically 12

- ----- contemplatesreciprocalpromises,i.e.,a bilateralcontract,andnota promiseinexchangeforan actII Secondly,inSchultz,wefoundthata trialcourterredin enforcinga noncompetition agreementagainsta formeremployeebecausethefactsofthecasewereinsufficienttoshowthat it hada protectableinterestin customercontactsin thegeographicareaclaimed.964S.W.2dat 452.Afterdisposingofthecaseonthisbasis,wefurtherexplainedthat"[a]nemployee's continuanceinemployment.. . suppliesadequateconsiderationfora noncompetition agreement"Id.at 454(emphasisadded).Inthecaseat bar,thedispositiveissueis notoneof consideration,butoftheseparateandnecessaryelementsofmutualagreementandacceptance. Theadequacyofconsiderationdoesnotfulfilltherequirementofunequivocalacceptance. Thus,infindingthattheMissouricasesuponwhichtheEighthCircuitreliesto be inapplicabletothecaseat bar,wefindBerkley'sinterpretationofMissourilawasit pertainsto anexistingemployee'sacceptanceofproposedarbitrationagreementtobeunpersuasive. DespiteBerkley'sholdingthattheemployeeacceptedthearbitrationagreementbycontinuing heremploymentwithDillard's,Berkleyincludeda factualfindingthat,aftertheemployee refusedtosignthearbitrationagreement,Dillard'sthenspecificallyinformedherthatherrefusal didnotaffectthearbitrationagreement,whichappliedautomaticallytoallemployeeswho continuedtheiremploymentBerkleyv. Dillard'sInc.,450F.3dat 777. liOnthefIrstpageoftheArbitrationAgreement,thethirdparagraphis entitled"MutualPromisetoResolveClaims byBindingArbitration."Thisparagraphenvisionsanexchangeofpromisestosubmitclaimstoarbitration;it states: InsigningtheAcknowledgementandReceipt,boththeCompanyandtheEmployeeagreethatall claimsordisputescoveredbythisAgreementmustbesubmittedtobindingarbitration,andthat thisbindingarbitrationwillbethesoleandexclusiveremedyforresolvinganysuchclaimor dispute.Thispromisetoresolveclaimsbyarbitrationis equallybindingupontheCompanyand theEmployee. 13

Asanemployer,Respondenthada rightto imposeanarbitrationpolicyasa new conditionofemployment.AppellantthenhadtherighttoeitheracceptorrejectRespondent's policy.If Appellantdeclinedtoaccepttheagreement,thenthereis norighttoarbitrationasa partycannotberequiredtoarbitratea disputethatit hasnotagreedtoarbitrate.DunnIndus. Group,Inc.,112S.W.3dat 421.Absenta violationofstateorfederalstatutesaddressingthe employmentrelationshiporpublicpolicyexceptionstotheemploymentat willdoctrine,the Respondent,asanat-willemployer,thenhadtherighttoimmediatelyterminateAppellant.In thiscase,therecordindicatesthatthereis anapparentdisputeasto whetherAppellantin fact signed,andtherebyaccepted,Respondent'sArbitrationAgreement.12It is notdisputed, however,thatAppellantknewofRespondent'sarbitrationpolicyand,nonetheless,continued working.ThetrialcourtconcludedthatthesefactsaloneevidencedAppellant'sacceptanceof thearbitrationagreement.\3Usingthesamelogic,wecouldpositthatanemployee'scontinued employmentwithoutsigninga profferedarbitrationagreementreasonablysupportsa findingthat AppellantrejectedEmployer'sconditionofarbitration.Appellant'srejectionandcontinued employment,underbasiccontractprinciples,reasonablycouldbeviewedasAppellant'scounter- offertoRespondentthatAppellantwouldcontinuehisemploymentwithoutbeingsubjectto Respondent'sarbitrationpolicy.Respondent'sfailureto thenterminateAppellant'semployment couldbedeemedtoconstituteanacceptanceofsuchcounter-offer.Withouttheascertainmentof additionalfacts,a trialcourtis unableto determinetheintentoftheparties.Moreover,without a findingthatAppellantandRespondentagreedtosubmittoarbitration,Appellantcannotbe requiredtoarbitratehisdisputewithRespondent.Id. 12Respondentmaintainsthatit "hasa plethoraofevidencetosupportitsposition.. . includingcompletedeposition transcripts"thatAppellantexecutedtheentireArbitrationAgreement.Respondent'sclaimsnotwithstanding,no suchevidenceis containedintherecordpresentedonappeal,asthetrialcourtproceededwithoutconductingan evidentiaryhearing. 13WhetherornotEmployeesignedthearbitrationagreementwasofnoconsequencetothetrialcourt'sfinding. 14

Accordingly,weholdthatthemanifestationofanexistingemployee'sunequivocal intentionto beboundbyanemployer'sproposedarbitrationagreementasa newconditionof employmentnecessitatesmorethantheemployee'smerecontinuedworktosatisfyMissouri's meetingofthemindsrequirement.Here,thetrialcourt'srulingwasbasedsolelyupon Appellant'scontinuedemployment.Noevidentiaryhearingwasconducted.Giventherecord beforeus,weholdthetrialcourt'srelianceonBerkleywasmisplaced,andfindthatthetrial courterredingrantingRespondent'smotionforjudgmentbasedonthearbitrationdecisionand awardanddenyingAppellant'smotiontosetasidethearbitrationaward.14 Conclusion Basedontheforegoing,wereverseandremandthiscaseto thetrialcourtforan evidentiaryhearingtorenderfactualdeterminationsasto whetherAppellantthroughhiswords and/orconduct,unequivocallyandobjectivelysignaledanintentionto beboundtothe ArbitrationAgreementpresentedbyRespondenttoitsemployees. LA()~ KurtS. Odenwald,PresidingJudge GeorgeW,DraperIII,J " Concurs GaryM.Gaertner,Jr.,J.,Concursinseparateopinion 14DespiteitspronouncementofMissourilaw,it appearsthattheBerkleycourtindeedmayhavereliedupon evidenceof"somethingmore"thantheemployee'smerecontinuationofemploymentfollowingDillard's presentationofthearbitrationagreementtoitsemployees. 15

3Jntbe;fffili550uri<!Courtof~ppeaI5 ~a5tern1JBi5trict DIVISIONFOUR Appellant, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) No.ED92974 DAVIDK.KUNZIE, AppealfromtheCircuit CourtofSt.LouisCounty v. JACK-IN-THE-BOX,INC., HonorableColleenDolan Respondent.

refusaltosignanarbitrationagreementis a "counter-offer"tobeacceptedorrejectedby theemployer.Rather,if Appellantdidnotconsenttoarbitration,thentheagreementis unenforceable,andweneednotaddresstheissueofcounter-offers.SeeDunnIndus. Group,Inc.v. CityofSugarCreek,112S.W.3d421,435(Mo.banc2003)("[a]rbitration is a matterofcontract,anda partycannotberequiredto arbitratea disputethatit hasnot agreedtoarbitrate");seealsoGuidryv. CharterCommunications,Inc.,269S.W.3d520, 528(Mo.App.E.D.2008)(whenpartiesmodifyexistingcontract,it is onlyenforceable if thereis mutualassent,i.e.,meetingofminds;"meetingofthemindsoccurswhenthere is a definiteofferandanunequivocalacceptance"). Second,it is myopinionthattheerrorbelowoccurrednotin relyingonBerkleyv. Dillard'sInc.,450F.3d775(8thCir.2006),butin failingtoadduceevidencesufficientto

-----.."-.. determinewhetherAppellanthadacceptedRespondent'soffertobeboundbythe ArbitrationAgreement.I donotholdtheviewthatBerkleystandsfortheproposition thatanemployee'sdecisiontocontinueworkingaftertheemployerpresentsan arbitrationagreement-withoutmore--decisivelyindicatesthattheemployeeintendsto beboundbythearbitrationagreement.Rather,Berkleypresenteda strongfactualrecord oftheemployee'sunderstandingthatbycontinuingto workshewasagreeingto abideby thearbitrationpolicy.Id.at 776-77(employerspecificallydiscussedwithemployeethat refusaltosignarbitrationagreementdidnotconstituterejectionofarbitrationpolicy,and arbitrationagreementitselfstatedthatcontinuingemploymentactedasacceptance). Sucha factualrecordwasmissingin thecaseat bar. I wouldremandthiscasetothetrialcourtforanevidentiaryhearing.Thetrial courtshoulddetermine,first,whetherAppellantin factsignedtheReceiptand AcknowledgementoftheArbitrationAgreement.If thecourtfindsthathedidnotsign theReceiptandAcknowledgement,thenthecourtmustdetermineat thathearingwhether thefactsestablishAppellant'sacceptance.If theevidenceadduceduponremandshows thattheArbitrationAgreementcontractuallyandautomaticallyappliedtoallemployees whocontinuedtheiremployment,andthatAppellantwasawarethata refusaltosigndid notconstitutea rejectionoftheoffer,thenI believethatthetrialcourt'srelianceonthe rationalein Berkleywouldnotbemisplaced. 2