Victoria Amrine vs. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company, Employer, and Division of Employment Security

VICTORIA AMRINE, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) WD88066 ) PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY ) Opinion filed: November 25, 2025 INSURANCE COMPANY, ) EMPLOYER, AND DIVISION ) OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, ) ) Respondent. )

APPEAL FROM THE LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

Before Division One: Janet Sutton, Presiding Judge, Gary D. Witt , Judge and W. Douglas Thomson, Judge Victoria Amrine ("Amrine") appeals from the decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission (the "Commission") denying her unemployment benefits. Amrine raises three points on appeal. Amrine first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that she was discharged for misconduct and therefore ineligible for benefits. Amrine also contends the Commission acted without or in excess of its powers in declining to review additional submitted

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evidence. Because Amrine fails to substantially comply with appellate court requirements under Rule 84.04, 1 we must dismiss the appeal. Factual and Procedural Background 2

Amrine began working as an insurance sales representative for Progressive Casualty Insurance Company ("Progressive") on March 20, 2023. Immediately following her hire, Amrine "viewed and acknowledged" Progressive's "Code of Conduct Acknowledgment and Felony Disclosure" (the "Code"). The Code included a provision that all employees of Progressive "must disclose to [their] manager or Human Resources representative any conviction or pending charge of a crime involving violence, dishonesty or breach of trust, whether a misdemeanor or felony." As a part of this requirement, the Code stated, "Failure to provide timely disclosure is a violation of this Code." Amrine did not disclose any such conviction or pending charge. The Code also contained a table demonstrating "examples of conduct warranting immediate disciplinary action." The table stated that the disciplinary action for "[f]alsification of records including . . . employment applications and other employment documents" was termination. In addition to the Code, Amrine

1 All rule references are to Missouri Court Rules, Volume I – State, 2024 unless otherwise noted. 2 "[I]n unemployment benefit cases, we do not view the facts in the light most favorable to the Commission's decision; instead, we view the evidence objectively. However, on matters of witness credibility, we will defer to the Commission's determinations." Piloski v. Div. of Emp. Sec., 503 S.W.3d 253, 256 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

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also acknowledged Progressive's "Core Values," which included "Integrity." The provision in support of the "Integrity" value stated, "We revere honesty." In March of 2024, Amrine was promoted into a specialist sales service position. In accordance with her new role, Progressive required that Amrine obtain a resident property and casualty license in Missouri and non-resident licenses in the other states where Progressive sells insurance. Amrine applied for a non-resident license in Florida, which required the applicant provide their criminal history. During the application's processing period, Progressive was notified that Amrine's Florida application revealed an outstanding warrant for Amrine's arrest in the state of Georgia. The charge underlying the warrant was forgery. Initially, Progressive's licensing department allowed Amrine time to correct any discrepancies in the licensing process due to historical clerical errors or other similar issues. During that time, Amrine maintained her employment. However, the time Amrine was allotted to rectify the matter was based on Progressive's assumption that the Florida licensing application revealed an offense that Amrine had disclosed in her employment application. When the licensing department discovered that Amrine had failed to disclose the pending Georgia criminal charge on her employment application, the matter was referred to the human resources department. Progressive's human resources department considered Amrine's failure to disclose to be a violation of their Code's disclosure of crimes policy because forgery

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is considered a crime of dishonesty. Additionally, the human resources department classified the offense as a falsification of records due to Amrine's lack of honesty on her Florida licensing application. Given that falsification of records was listed in the Code as an offense subject to automatic termination, Progressive terminated Amrine's employment on November 6, 2024. Amrine filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the Commission's Division of Employment Security ("Division"). Progressive filed a timely protest, indicating that Amrine was discharged for failing to "disclose her criminal history on both her Florida licensing application" and her application for employment. The protest also explained that Amrine violated the Code in a manner that was subject to termination on the first offense. A Division deputy determined that Amrine was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits because she was discharged "for misconduct connected with work" ("Deputy's Determination"). Amrine appealed the Deputy's Determination to the Appeals Tribunal. An appeals referee held a telephone hearing at which Amrine and Progressive participated. The Appeals Tribunal received documents regarding Amrine's claim for unemployment benefits, heard testimony on behalf of Progressive from Amrine's direct supervisor ("Supervisor"), and Amrine testified on her own behalf. The Appeals Tribunal issued its decision affirming the Deputy's Determination on November 21, 2024 ("Appeals Tribunal's Decision"). The Appeals Tribunal's Decision concluded that Progressive met its burden to prove that Amrine was discharged for misconduct connected with work, particularly that Amrine violated

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a "known policy" regarding the disclosure of criminal history. The Appeals Tribunal also opined that Amrine's "testimony concerning the nature of criminal charges was evasive." Additionally, the Appeals Tribunal opined that Progressive's evidence was "more credible" than Amrine's. Accordingly, the Appeals Tribunal affirmed the Deputy's Determination and found that Amrine was disqualified from earning unemployment benefits. Amrine appealed the Appeals Tribunal's Decision to the Commission. In her letter indicating her intent to appeal, Amrine asserted that the Appeals Tribunal's Decision was erroneous because she "received information that the [Georgia] warrant was recalled and the charge had been dismissed . . . ." 3 Amrine argued she had "consistently worked hard to meet all [of Progressive's] necessary [employment] requirements[.]" In its order announcing its decision, (the "Award") the Commission opined, "We do not find [Amrine's] testimony credible that she forgot an arrest and in- custody detention, with attendant criminal charges being filed in another state in 2011." The Commission also found that Amrine was aware of Progressive's "expectation of honesty and candor, as set forth in its values statement" and its "position on falsification of employment documents, as set forth in its policy on

3 To this end, included with Amrine's appeal were five pages of additional evidence, including a "Nolle Prosequi" of charges signed by the local prosecutor and the resulting recall of her warrant signed by a judge of the Superior Court of DeKalb County, Georgia, both dated May 7, 2024, as well as an email indicating she received these documents on January 27, 2025. The Commission denied Amrine's request to submit the additional evidence due to her failure to meet the Commission's requirements for doing so.

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Conduct Warranting Immediate Disciplinary Action." The Commission determined that Amrine was "in violation of a known standard of conduct in the workplace by failing to reveal negative information that could have an impact on her employment or eligibility for certain positions in the insurance industry." Thus, the Commission determined that Amrine committed "misconduct under subsections (a) and (b) of the definition of misconduct. Section 288.030.1(23)[.]" 4

Accordingly, the Commission affirmed the Appeals Tribunal's Decision, as supplemented by the Award. Amrine appeals. Analysis Amrine raises three points on appeal. We describe each point as best we can. In her first Point, Amrine argues the Commission erred in finding that Amrine was discharged for misconduct under section 288.050 "because the record does not support a finding that she willfully violated any policy or acted with dishonest intent[.]" In Point II, Amrine also argues the Commission erred in finding that Amrine's conduct constituted misconduct because "even if [Amrine's] omission breached [Progressive's] rules, the conduct was not intentional, harmful, or related to job performance" such that it could not satisfy the standard for proving misconduct. In her third Point, Amrine contends the Commission erred in denying her a "fair opportunity to present material, outcome-determinative evidence that

4 All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri (2016), as updated by supplement through the date of Amrine's discharge, unless otherwise noted.

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was unavailable at the time of the [Appeals Tribunal's] hearing, despite her diligent efforts[.]" Briefing Deficiencies We do not reach the merits of Amrine's points on appeal because Amrine's brief contains serious analytical and briefing deficiencies in violation of Rule 84.04. "Rule 84.04 plainly sets forth the required contents of briefs filed in all appellate courts. 'Rule 84.04's requirements are mandatory.'" Lexow v. Boeing Co., 643 S.W.3d 501, 505 (Mo. banc 2022) (quoting Fowler v. Mo. Sheriffs' Ret. Sys., 623 S.W.3d 578, 583 (Mo. banc 2021)). Rule 84.04's requirements are mandatory to "ensure that appellate courts do not become advocates by speculating on facts and on arguments that have not been made." Green v. Div. of Emp. Sec., 652 S.W.3d 370, 374 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022) (quoting Wallace v. Frazier, 546 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018)). "Enforcement of the briefing requirements reduces instances where the court is required to create precedent based upon incomplete and unsupported arguments." Green v. Shiverdecker, 514 S.W.3d 41, 45 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017) (quoting Lueker v. Mo. W. State Univ., 241 S.W.3d 865, 867 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008)). First, we note that Amrine's initial brief was stricken. Among other deficiencies, this Court notified Amrine that: she had no references to the legal file for the factual references made in her briefing (Rule 84.04(c)); her points relied on did not comply with the requirements of Rule 84.04(d); her points relied on did not include a list of cases or other authority upon which that party principally relies

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(Rule 84.04(d)(5)); and her argument section failed to explain how her arguments on appeal were preserved for appellate review as mandated by Rule 84.04(e). As we explain, infra, Amrine's amended brief did not correct these deficiencies. When an appellant is informed of deficiencies in their brief and chooses not to correct them, this Court is likely to dismiss the appeal for violations of Rule 84.04. See Acton v. Rahn, 611 S.W.3d 897, 903 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) ("Dismissal is particularly appropriate where appellant makes no effort to correct the deficient points in his amended brief, even after being put on notice that they were inadequate." (citation omitted)). Although Amrine appeals pro se, she "is held to the same standard as attorneys and [s]he is subject to Rule 84.04's mandatory appellate briefing requirements." R.M. v. King, 671 S.W.3d 394, 397 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (citation omitted). "Judicial impartiality, judicial economy, and fairness to all parties necessitates that we do not grant pro se litigants preferential treatment with regard to their compliance with those procedural rules." Id. (quoting Deere v. Deere, 627 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021)). "[A]s the Missouri Supreme Court has recently reminded us, [t]he appellate courts' continued reiteration of the importance of the briefing rules without enforcing any consequence implicitly condones continued violations and undermines the mandatory nature of the rules." Maxwell v. Div. of Emp. Sec., 671 S.W.3d 742, 747 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting State v. Minor, 648 S.W.3d 721, 728-29 (Mo. banc 2022)). Thus, the failure to "substantially comply with Rule 84.04 preserves nothing for our review and

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constitutes grounds for dismissal of the appeal." Green v. Div. of Emp. Sec., 652 S.W.3d at 374 (quoting Wallace, 546 S.W.3d at 626). Statement of Facts Rule 84.04(c) requires the statement of facts in an appellate brief to be "a fair and concise statement of the facts relevant to the questions presented for determination without argument." Further, "[a]ll statement of facts shall have specific page references to the relevant portion of the record on appeal, i.e., legal file, transcript, or exhibits." Rule 84.04(c). "The purpose of the statement of facts is to provide 'an immediate, accurate, complete[,] and unbiased understanding of the facts of the case.'" Phox v. Boes, 702 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Placke v. City of Sunset Hills Mo., 670 S.W.3d 228, 231 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023)). Amrine's statement of facts is deficient in several respects. First, Amrine's statement of facts is simply incomplete. In reviewing the facts as stated in Amrine's brief, we are left to wonder what has occurred, both substantively prior to her request for unemployment benefits and procedurally prior to the Commission's issuance of its decision. Substantively, we can discern that this is an unemployment matter, but we know nothing regarding the employment policies Amrine was alleged to have violated, nor Progressive's stated reason for Amrine's discharge. Procedurally, Amrine did not discuss the Deputy's Determination, the Appeals Tribunal's Decision, or the findings and conclusions of the Commission that supported its decision. Amrine also fails to describe, at any length, the

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evidence presented by the parties during the hearing before the Appeals Tribunal and reviewed by the Commission. Instead, we are presented with a brief statement of what has occurred that o nly skims the surface of the case. Thus, we do not have a "concise statement of the facts relevant to the questions presented for determination" as required. See Rule 84.04(c). Moreover, Amrine's statement of facts is devoid of any references to the record on appeal. In striking Amrine's brief, we stated that her statement of facts failed to comply with Rule 84.04(c)'s requirement to include page references. Yet, Amrine's amended brief failed to correct this deficiency. See Acton, 611 S.W.3d at

1. In short, "[i]t is not the function of the appellate court to search the record to

discover the facts that substantiate a point on appeal." Maxwell, 671 S.W.3d at 747 (citation omitted); see also Adams v. Div. of Emp. Sec., 459 S.W.3d 918, 920 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) ("Adams failed to provide all relevant page references to the legal file or transcript in her statement of facts and in her argument section, as required under Rule 84.04(c) and (e). This requirement is mandatory and essential for the effective functioning of appellate courts, which cannot spend time searching the record to determine if factual assertions stated in the brief are supported by the record." (citation omitted)). To do so would be to act impermissibly "as an advocate by scouring the record for facts to support" Amrine's contentions. See Murphy v. Steiner, 658 S.W.3d 588, 594 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022) (citation omitted). Given these deficiencies, this Court was not presented with an accurate, complete, or unbiased understanding of the facts of the case. "The failure to

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provide a fair and concise statement of facts with references to the record on appeal preserves nothing for review and is a sufficient basis to dismiss an appeal." Long v. Long, 704 S.W.3d 729, 739 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (citation omitted). Points on Appeal Rule 84.04(d)(1) requires that each point challenging the trial court's decision shall: "(A) Identify the trial court ruling or action that the appellant challenges; (B) State concisely the legal reasons for the appellant's claim of reversible error; and (C) Explain in summary fashion why, in the context of the case, those legal reasons support the claim of reversible error." Rule 84.04(d)(1) continues, stating, "The point shall be in substantially the following form: 'The trial court erred in [identify the challenged ruling or action], because [state the legal reasons for the claim of reversible error], in that [explain why the legal reasons, in the context of the case, support the claim of reversible error].'" These requirements are mandatory as they are intended to provide both this Court and the opposing party with proper notice of the appellant's contentions: "The function of [points relied on] is to give notice to the opposing party of the precise matters which must be contended with and to inform the court of the issues presented for review." Wilkerson v. Prelutsky, 943 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Mo. banc 1997). A deficient point relied on requires the respondent and appellate court to search the remainder of the brief to discern the appellant's assertion and, beyond causing a waste of resources, risks the appellant's argument being understood or framed in an unintended manner. Scott v. King, 510 S.W.3d 887, 892 (Mo. App. [E.D.] 2017). "A point relied on which does not state 'wherein and why' the trial court [or administrative agency] erred does not comply with Rule 84.04(d) and preserves nothing for appellate review." Storey v. State, 175 S.W.3d 116, 126 (Mo. banc 2005).

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Lexow, 643 S.W.3d at 505. Amrine's points do not exactly follow the "roadmap" established by Rule 84.04(d). Yet, regarding Point I and Point II, this Court and Progressive were able to discern that Amrine contends the Commission lacked sufficient and competent evidence to support its Award. Regarding Point III, this Court and Progressive were able to discern that Amrine contends the Commission acted without or in excess of its powers. Thus, Amrine's failure to comply with Rule 84.04(d)'s formula for crafting points on appeal, standing alone, would not be grounds for dismissal, as we prefer to dispose of a case on the merits, where possible, rather than dismissing the appeal for briefing deficiencies. Mussa v. Div. of Emp. Sec., 649 S.W.3d 316, 320 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022). However, Amrine's points on appeal contain further violations of Rule 84.04(d). Rule 84.04(d)(5) requires that "[i]mmediately following each 'Point Relied On,' the appellant . . . shall include a list of cases, not to exceed four, and the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions or other authority upon which that party principally relies." In support of her points, Amrine cites only two cases to support her arguments. We have been unable to locate either of the cases with the citations provided, nor are we able to locate any case styled with the same party names; the cases cannot be found. Thus, Amrine does not direct us to a single case that supports any of her allegations of error. "A point is considered abandoned when appellant fails to include relevant authorities or explain the lack thereof." Phox, 702 S.W.3d at 504 (citing Auman v.

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Richard, 672 S.W.3d 277, 283 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023)). In light of this deficiency, "we would need to engage in speculation and independent legal research to address [Amrine's] claims of reversible error. It is not our role to do so." See id. (citations omitted). A violation of Rule 84.04(d) is grounds for dismissal of Amrine's appeal. Acton, 611 S.W.3d at 902. While this Court prefers to address even deficient points relied on when the argument section of the brief cures the defects, as we discuss in the next section, this problem permeates the argument portion of Amrine's brief, as well. See Gan v. Schrock, 652 S.W.3d 703, 709 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022) (declining to review appellant's claims ex gratia when the argument portion of the brief fails to clarify the issues the appellant intended to raise in his defective point relied on). Argument The argument section of an appellant's brief must "explain why, in the context of the case, the law supports the claim of reversible error. It should advise the appellate court how principles of law and the facts of the case interact." Marvin v. Kensinger, 682 S.W.3d 788, 798 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023) (quoting In re Marriage of Fritz, 243 S.W.3d 484, 487 (Mo. App. E.D. 2007)). "'It is not our duty or responsibility to spend judicial time searching through the argument portions of briefs in an attempt to interpret the thrust of [Appellants'] contentions.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Sharp v. All-N-One Plumbing, 612 S.W.3d 240, 245 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020)). "Mere conclusions and the failure to develop an argument with support from legal authority preserves nothing for review." Acton,

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611 S.W.3d at 902 (quoting Frazier v. City of Kan. City, 467 S.W.3d 327, 346 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015)).

Given Amrine's failure to direct us to any existing legal authority in her amended brief, she is unable to demonstrate how or why the law supports her claims of reversible error. In particular, in Points I and II, Amrine urges this Court to reverse the Commission's decision because the Commission lacked sufficient evidence to enter the Award. However, the argument is devoid of any references to legal authority which supports Amrine's claims. Thus, Amrine's argument fails to develop the assertion that the Commission lacked sufficient evidence to support the Award. The same defect is present in Point III. "[A]n appellant is required to provide relevant and available legal authority in the argument or explain why such authority is not available." WCT & D, LLC v. City of Kan. City, 476 S.W.3d 336, 343 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Moseley v. Grundy Cnty. Dist. R-V Sch., 319 S.W.3d 510, 513 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010)). "Without more, this Court cannot provide meaningful appellate review." Green v. Lebanon R-III Sch. Dist., 13 S.W.3d 278, 285 (Mo. banc 2000). "Furthermore, '[a]ll factual assertions in the argument shall have specific page references to the relevant portion of the record on appeal, i.e., legal file, transcript, or exhibits.'" Phox, 702 S.W.3d at 505 (quoting Rule 84.04(e)). As in the Statement of Facts, t he argument section of Amrine's brief does not direct this Court to relevant portions of the record on appeal at all. As discussed, this Court advised Amrine to correct deficiencies, including providing page references in the

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argument section of her brief. Yet, Amrine did not correct this deficiency. See Acton, 611 S.W.3d at 903. "We cannot comb the legal file for facts to better understand [Amrine's] argument, 'nor can we do so and remain steadfast to our role as the neutral arbiter of the case.'" Marvin, 682 S.W.3d at 798 (quoting Sharp, 612 S.W.3d at 245-46). In addition, Rule 84.04(e) provides that "[f]or each claim of error, the argument shall also include a concise statement describing whether the error was preserved for appellate review; if so, how it was preserved; and the applicable standard of review." None of Amrine's arguments contain a statement describing how or whether the respective error was preserved for review. "This statement is 'essential to this Court's review of the case.'" Marvin, 682 S.W.3d at 799 (quoting Murphree v. Lakeshore Ests., LLC, 636 S.W.3d 622, 625 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021)). And, none of Amrine's points include a statement of the applicable standard of review to be applied to her respective claims. "Rule 84.04(e) 'anticipates and requires reliance upon the applicable standard of review in its application' so that 'the construction of an appellant's brief in compliance with Rule 84.04 is necessarily dependent upon and interwoven with that standard of review.'" Long, 704 S.W.3d at 740 (quoting In re R.R.S., 573 S.W.3d 717, 731 (Mo. App. S.D. 2019)). Standing alone, these violations of Rule 84.04(e) are sufficient to support dismissal of her appeal. See In re S.R.W., 715 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025). Again, Amrine was made aware of the deficiencies in the argument section of her brief but did nothing to correct them. See Acton, 611 S.W.3d at 903.

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In short, addressing the merits of Amrine's appeal would require us to comb the record for support for her factual assertions, decipher the appropriate standard of review, and locate legal authority to support her arguments. See R.M., 671 S.W.3d at 400 (quoting Aydin v. Boles, 658 S.W.3d 223, 227 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022)). In doing so, we would become Amrine's advocate. This, we cannot do. 5

5 Ex gratia, we note that in Point I and Point II, Amrine appears to argue that there was not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of its Award. In support, she points to her testimony. However, we defer to the Commission's assessments of credibility. See Piloski, 503 S.W.3d at 256 n.1 ("[I]n unemployment benefit cases, . . . we view the evidence objectively. However, on matters of witness credibility, we will defer to the Commission's determinations." (first alteration in original) (quoting Lucido v. Div. of Emp. Sec., 441 S.W.3d 172, 174 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014)). Here, the Commission expressly stated that Amrine's testimony regarding the Georgia warrant was not credible. And, the Commission found Progressive's testimony that Amrine was terminated for her violation of a known employment policy to be credible. These credibility determinations combined with the evidence, viewed objectively, support the Commission's Award. In Point III, Amrine appears to argue that the Commission acted in excess of its powers by declining to address the additional evidence she provided. For the Commission to review additional evidence, the party offering the additional evidence must comply with 8 C.S.R. 20-4.010(5) (2019), which permits the Commission to review additional evidence when the party offering the evidence sets out in detail "the nature and substance" of the newly discovered evidence. Here, Amrine failed to set out the nature and substance of the evidence she was offering to the Commission. Instead, Amrine merely submitted five pages of additional evidence and a one-sentence request for the Commission to consider it. This was insufficient to comply with 8 C.S.R. 20-4.010(5) such that it was proper for the Commission to reject Amrine's additional evidence. Notwithstanding her non-compliance with 8 C.S.R. 20-4.010(5), we note her additional evidence consisted of the nolle prosequi of the Georgia forgery charges and the resulting withdrawal of the pending warrant. These documents, however, were dated well after both her initial application for employment and her application for a Florida insurance agent license. Thus, at the time such applications were made—when Amrine asserted she did not have such charges—those assertions were false and thereby actionable by Progressive.

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Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Amrine's appeal is dismissed. 6

______________________________ W. DOUGLAS THOMSON, JUDGE All concur.

6 Progressive made a motion to dismiss Amrine's appeal. That motion was taken with the case and remains pending. Here, we have dismissed the appeal on our own motion, and thus Progressive's pending motion is moot.