DENNIS R. RYNO, Plaintiff-Appellant v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent-Respondent

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DENNIS R. RYNO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent-Respondent.

No. SD38734

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PULASKI COUNTY Honorable William E. Hickle, Judge AFFIRMED Dennis R. Ryno ("Appellant") appeals the trial court's denial of his request to expunge criminal records related to harassment and stalking charges. Appellant sought expungement of the records pursuant to §610.140. 1 On appeal, Appellant argues (1) the trial court erred by not giving Appellant the opportunity to exercise his constitutional and statutory right to cross-examine the victim ("Victim"), (2) the trial court erred by using information from closed records, and (3) the trial court's findings that Appellant was a

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to RSMo 2016, as amended through June 12, 2024.

In Division

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threat to public safety, that an expungement was not consistent with the public welfare and that the interests of justice did not warrant the expungement were not supported by substantial evidence. Finding no merit to these points, we affirm. Facts and Procedural History On November 12, 2013, Appellant was charged with one count of the class A misdemeanor of stalking (§565.225.2) and one count of the class A misdemeanor of harassment (§565.090). 2 Appellant had allegedly followed Victim, drove by her residence, sent unwanted text messages and emails, left her unwanted letters, and had others contact Victim on his behalf. Appellant told Victim in these messages that "things could get bad for her" if she did not withdraw complaints she made to their employer. 3

On March 24, 2014, Appellant pled guilty to the misdemeanor harassment charge and the State dismissed the stalking charge. Appellant was given a suspended imposition of sentence and was placed on two years of probation with a condition that he have no contact with Victim. On October 31, 2014, the Pulaski County Prosecutor's Office filed a Motion to Revoke Probation based on allegations that Appellant continued to contact and harass Victim. The new allegations included that on October 30, 2014, Appellant was taken into

2 References to §565.225.2 and §565.090 are to RSMo 2008, as amended through November 12,

3 At this time, Victim and Appellant were both employed at Fort Leonard Wood. Appellant was subsequently terminated from that employment partially due to the occurrences at issue in this case, as well as his previous disciplinary offenses including allegations of sexual harassment, assault and battery.

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custody while sitting in his vehicle parked next to Victim's. Upon searching Appellant's vehicle, officers found a man's wig, numerous hats, gloves, a camcorder and other recording devices, a pair of binoculars easily accessible to the driver, a scanner with police frequencies programmed, coveralls, surgical gloves, rolls of large black trash bags, a hatchet, a pickaxe, a shovel, a crow bar, extra shoes, clothes and personal hygiene items. 4 The Motion to Revoke was ultimately denied, and Appellant completed his probation in case number 13PU-CR01550 in 2016. An additional criminal case was filed against Appellant based upon these new allegations, case number 15PH-CR00083, and that case was subsequently dismissed. Since 2018, Appellant has filed a total of nine civil cases against various parties involved in his cases. These parties include: Victim, Victim's friends, the prosecuting attorney for Appellant's harassment cases, the City of Waynesville, the Waynesville Police Department, and Appellant's former employer. Appellant has also made several accusations of criminal and unethical misconduct against both judges and attorneys who have been involved in these proceedings. The record does not disclose that any of Appellant's suits or complaints have been found to be meritorious. Appellant has also filed a case in another state in an attempt to subpoena and depose Victim after she moved

4 These allegations were incorporated into the Initial Decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB") in ruling on the propriety of the termination of Appellant's federal employment. The Initial Decision was then affirmed by a Final Decision of the MSPB. Both of these decisions were admitted, without objection, as State's Exhibits 7 and 8 at the trial of Appellant's Petition for Expungement.

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out of Missouri. Appellant has deposed Victim on three separate occasions over the course of these civil cases, and attempted to depose her a fourth time. On February 15, 2024, Appellant filed a Petition for Expungement of case number 13PU-CR01550, which included the original charges of harassment and stalking against Victim. The Pulaski County Prosecutor, Kevin Hillman ("Hillman"), objected to the expungement on the basis it is "not consistent with the public welfare" and "against the interests of justice" because of Appellant's ongoing litigation. A bench trial was held on June 12, 2024. Victim submitted an affidavit describing Appellant's harassment as "ongoing," and stated that his behavior "forced me out of my home and job in Missouri where I had lived and worked for a decade." Victim further said that moving to a new state "did nothing to stop his unwanted and psychotic behavior and neither has the consequences for his actions against me done anything to deter him from continuing to harass me." At trial, Hillman submitted evidence of Appellant's various lawsuits. The record shows Appellant alleged Victim was stalking and harassing him in 2014 and an order of protection was issued against her in 2015. This was approximately a year after Appellant pled guilty to stalking Victim. Appellant filed two lawsuits against Hillman, alleging he unlawfully disclosed law enforcement records in violation of §610.120. The first case was dismissed by Appellant and the second case was dismissed by the trial court in 2020, with that dismissal being upheld by this Court in 2022. See Ryno v. Hillman, 641 S.W.3d 385, 396-97 (Mo. App. S.D. 2022). This Court held that "beyond the conclusory allegations ... Ryno did not plead any facts to establish, or support a reasonable inference

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of, an absence of or insufficient justification for Hillman's disclosure of the closed law enforcement records." Id. at 396. Appellant then filed suit against the City of Waynesville, the Waynesville Police Department, the police chief, Hillman, and two officers involved in the week-long investigation into Appellant's alleged violation of Victim's order of protection in 2014. The case was removed to federal court, after which Appellant filed an amended petition including claims for: "unreasonable seizure, conspiracy to cause false arrest, unreasonable search, fabrication of evidence, excessive bail, abuse of process, and negligent hiring, training, and supervision." See Ryno v. City of Waynesville, 58 F.4 th

995, 1003 (8th Cir. 2023). Following discovery, Appellant's claims were either dismissed or ruled summarily by the Western District of Missouri, and those decisions were affirmed by the 8th Circuit. Id. at 999-1000. Appellant also filed four different lawsuits against Victim and her acquaintances. One was filed in Missouri and dismissed by Appellant in 2022. One was filed in Texas for the purpose of deposing the Victim. The third was consolidated with another case against Victim and two of Victim's acquaintances who testified against Appellant in a previous matter. That matter was dismissed because the trial court found the lawsuits were filed with the purpose of "harassing said defendants" and were not brought in good faith. 5

5 In its docket entry dismissing Pulaski County case number 23PU-CV00991 on May 10, 2024, that court specifically stated:

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After considering all of the evidence, the trial court denied Appellant's request for an expungement, finding that Appellant is still a threat to the public safety, that an expungement would not be consistent with the public welfare, and that the interests of justice do not warrant an expungement. This appeal followed. 6

Standard of Review Our standard of review for court-tried cases is governed by Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). The trial court's judgment will be affirmed "unless there is no evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares the law." W.S. v. Jackson County Prosecutor, 593 S.W.3d 94, 96 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (citing Murphy, 536 S.W.2d at 32; S.Y. v. Askren, 581 S.W.3d 721, 722 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019)). "The trial court's application of statutory requirements is a question of law rather than fact; therefore, we review the trial court's application of statutory requirements de novo." R.G. v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 580 S.W.3d 38,

Motion to dismiss is granted because, reviewing the suit, as well as the other suits ... the court is convinced [Appellant] is engaging with the assistance of Attorney Wayne Gifford, in multiple lawsuits for the purpose of harassing said defendants because they testified against [Appellant] in the matter of Ryno v. Department of Army #CH-0752-14-0500-I-5 before the MSPD, or provided information to Law Enforcement or Pulaski County Prosecutor that resulted in the filing of criminal charges. The court finds the suits are not brought in good faith.

6 Respondent alleges Appellant's Brief violates Rule 84.04 due to his use of lettered paragraphs and bullet points in his Statement of Facts, a multifarious Point I, and conclusory statements in Points II-V. "While not condoning noncompliance with the rules, a court will generally, as a matter of discretion, review on the merits where disposition is not hampered by the rule violations." Smith v. Capital Region Medical Center, 412 S.W.3d 252, 258 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013) (citing Lewis v. Biegel, 204 S.W.3d 354, 364 n.10 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006)). While we agree that Appellant's Statement of Facts and points relied on arguably do not meet the qualifications of Rule 84.04, the deficiencies do not hinder our analysis.

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40 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (citing Doe v. St. Louis County Police Dep't, 505 S.W.3d 450, 453 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016)). "All evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence are viewed in the light most favorable to the circuit court's judgment." Smith v. MSHP Criminal Records Repository, 691 S.W.3d 311, 314 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024) (quoting Singleton v. Singleton, 659 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Mo. banc 2023)). "[T]he trial court is free to believe or disbelieve all, part or none of the evidence, including disbelieving evidence that is uncontroverted." D.B. v. Missouri State Highway Patrol Criminal Justice Information Services, 697 S.W.3d 58, 71-72 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (quoting Exch. Bank of Mo. v. Gerlt, 367 S.W.3d 132, 136 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012)). Analysis Point 1 In his first point on appeal, Appellant alleges his constitutional and statutory rights were violated because he was not allowed to cross-examine Victim at the hearing on his request for expungement. Victim did not appear at the hearing and was not called as a witness. Victim's input was received by the trial court through an affidavit offered by the prosecutor. Under §610.140.5, "[a] victim of an offense, violation, or infraction listed in the petition shall have an opportunity to be heard at any hearing held under this section, and the court may make a determination based solely on such victim's testimony." Ordinarily, discussions about the right to confront witnesses under the Missouri Constitution are focused around article I, section 18(a), which states:

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That in criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend, in person and by counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation; to meet the witnesses against him face to face; to have process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; and a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county.

This section is interpreted in conjunction with the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Missouri courts have held that both article I, section 18(a) of the Missouri Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution protect the same rights. State v. Hester, 801 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. banc 1991). Appellant instead argues that he had a constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him under article I, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution, and thus he should have been permitted to cross-examine Victim at trial. Article I, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution states "[t]hat no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Appellant cites no case law in support of his argument that article I, section 10 creates a separate right to confront witnesses independent of article I, section 18(a). Regardless of the constitutional provision at issue, however, Missouri courts have long held the right to confrontation only applies in criminal proceedings and not civil proceedings. Krieg v. Director of Revenue, 39 S.W.3d 574, 576 (Mo. App. E.D. 2001). It is not disputed that an expungement hearing is a civil proceeding. Thus, Appellant had no constitutional right to cross-examine Victim in this matter. 7

7 In the argument discussing Appellant's Point 1, Appellant generally asserts that he has a "liberty interest" in being granted an expungement and thus should have had the right to cross-examine Victim. We agree with Respondents that to the extent Appellant may be asserting this as a separate argument for relief, it is not preserved for our review. Appellant's Point 1 makes no

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Appellant further argues he had a statutory right to cross-examine Victim under §491.070, which states: "A party to a cause, civil or criminal, against whom a witness has been called and given some evidence, shall be entitled to cross-examine said witness (except where a defendant in a criminal case is testifying in his own behalf) on the entire case[.]" "Interpretation of a statute is a question of law." D.K.R. v. Missouri State Highway Patrol Criminal Justice Information Services, 694 S.W.3d 621, 623 (Mo. App. S.D. 2024) (citing Li Lin v. Ellis, 594 S.W.3d 238, 241 (Mo. banc 2020)). "The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute at issue." Id. (quoting Ivie v. Smith, 439 S.W.3d 189, 202 (Mo. banc 2014)) (internal quotations omitted). "When the plain language of a statute is clear, we do not resort to other rules of statutory interpretation." Id. Under the plain language of §491.070, Victim was not "called" to testify in this case. She was not present for the hearing and was not questioned by any party. Instead, Victim submitted an affidavit as her input under §610.140.5. Appellant's Point 1 does not challenge either the admissibility of Victim's affidavit or the trial court's reliance on such evidence in reaching its decision. Appellant challenges only that by using an affidavit, he was denied an opportunity to "cross examine" Victim, even as he concedes in his brief that Victim "was not made available to testify" at trial.

mention of this argument, and "[c]laims of error raised in the argument portion of a brief that are not raised in a point relied on are not preserved for our review." Hale v. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co., 638 S.W.3d 49, 61 (Mo. App. S.D. 2021).

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As Victim was not "called" to testify, the provisions of §491.070 are not triggered. A plain reading of this statute is not ambiguous and does not "lead to an illogical result that defeats the purpose of the legislation," D.K.R., 694 S.W.3d at 623. (quoting Ben Hur Steel Worx, LLC v. Dir. of Revenue, 452 S.W.3d 624, 626 (Mo. banc 2015)). The language of §491.070 is clear and unambiguous that Victim must have been "called" to give Appellant a statutory right to cross-examine her, and that did not occur here. Point I is denied. Point 2 In his second point on appeal, Appellant alleges: The trial court erred by using closed official records from Ryno's case number 15PH-CR00083, as evidence in the Judgment, in violation of RSMo 610.120, thereby erroneously applying the law and resulting in an incorrect ruling against the expungement.

Appellant's Point 2 does not identify which "closed official records" from case no. 15PH- CR00083 that the trial court improperly used, but he appears to be referring to the trial court's discussion of information from a probable cause statement that was filed as an attachment to a Motion to Revoke Appellant's probation in case number 13PU-CR01550, the underlying case he seeks to expunge, which is not even referenced in the language of Point 2. Appellant argues that this probable cause statement was also contained in the files of case number 15PH-CR00083, a separate matter which he alleges is a closed file. We need not spend additional time sorting out these issues, however, because all of the information that Appellant objects to was submitted to the trial court, without objection, in State's Exhibit 7, the Initial Decision of the MSPB. "A party cannot be

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prejudiced by the admission of allegedly inadmissible evidence if the challenged evidence is merely cumulative to other evidence admitted without objection." Sherrer v. Boston Scientific Corp., 609 S.W.3d 697, 714 (Mo. banc 2020) (citing Swartz v. Gale Webb Transp. Co., 215 S.W.3d 127, 134 (Mo. banc 2007)). As the complained of evidence was cumulative to evidence that was properly before the trial court without objection, Point 2 is not supported by the record and is denied. Points 3-5 In Appellant's final three points, he challenges the trial court's findings that he is a threat to public safety, the expungement is not consistent with the public welfare, and the interests of justice do not warrant the expungement because he claims these findings are not supported by substantial evidence. "The purpose of expungement is to provide a second chance to persons who have had prior criminal offenses but have shown by their more recent conduct that they have rehabilitated themselves and deserve the second chance provided for in the statute." M.T.M. v. St. Louis City Circuit Court, 717 S.W.3d 844, 847 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) (citing R.G., 580 S.W.3d at 41-42). Section 610.140.5 states, in relevant part: At any hearing, the court may accept evidence and hear testimony on, and may consider, the following criteria for each of the offenses, violations, or infractions listed in the petition for expungement:

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(5) The petitioner's habits and conduct demonstrate that the petitioner is not a threat to the public safety of the state; and

(6) The expungement is consistent with the public welfare and the interests of justice warrant the expungement.

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Under §610.140, there is a rebuttable presumption that expungement is warranted after the petitioner pleads he has met the requirements under §§610.140.5(5) and (6). Id. The burden then shifts to the prosecuting attorney, circuit attorney, or municipal prosecuting attorney to rebut that presumption. Id. In this case, the trial court heard evidence that could support a finding either in favor of expungement or against it. The trial court, as the finder of fact, was free to believe all, some, or none of the evidence, and we defer to those factual findings so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. M.T.M., 717 S.W.3d at 848. Though Appellant denied any ill intent, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment there was sufficient evidence from which the trial court could find that Appellant's numerous complaints, suits and other actions over the last many years were driven by an intent to harass Victim and other persons involved in cases related to Victim. Smith, 691 S.W.3d at 314; see also D.B., 697 S.W.3d at 71-72. Appellant has pursued at least nine cases or administrative actions related to his relationship with Victim and the previous harassment and stalking charges. Many of these cases have been dismissed or ruled summarily against Appellant. Shortly after Appellant filed his Petition for Expungement, the Pulaski County circuit court dismissed one of his lawsuits against an acquaintance of Victim, Kevin Phillips, and determined the reason Appellant filed it, along with the others, was to harass Victim and other related parties. Two of his cases have been dismissed and upheld on appeal by both this Court and the Eighth Circuit. See Ryno, 641 S.W.3d at 396; see also Ryno, 58 F.4 th at 999-

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1. Appellant has not been successful in any of his lawsuits involving his cases or in

any of the professional complaints he has filed against those involved in such cases. The record shows that Appellant has gone out of his way to depose Victim multiple times and for lengthy periods, even attempting to subpoena her in her new home state. Victim's affidavit states that despite moving, Appellant's harassment is ongoing and continues to affect her. Based on this evidence, the trial court's findings that the presumption under §610.140 had been rebutted are supported by substantial evidence. The trial court could reasonably find, based on the record presented, that the habits and conduct of the Appellant that led to his initial criminal charges of harassment and stalking against Victim have not changed, which would support a finding that Appellant remains a threat to the public safety of the state, and that expungement of his charges would neither be consistent with the public welfare nor in the interests of justice. The offenses of both harassment and stalking focus on the purpose or intent of the perpetrator to disturb the victim, not just the acts themselves. Appellant argues to this Court, as he has in many other venues over the last several years, that he had no ill intent and had the "right" to take the actions he took. The trial court was free to disbelieve Appellant's assertions, view the totality of Appellant's conduct demonstrated by the record and reach the conclusion that it did. We are bound by that factual determination. Points 3, 4 and 5 are denied.

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Conclusion The trial court's Judgment is affirmed. MATTHEW P. HAMNER, J. – OPINION AUTHOR DON E. BURRELL, J. – CONCURS BECKY J. WEST, J. – CONCURS