Distler Brothers Farm PTR, Betty Distler, Doug Distler, and Beau Distler, Personal Representative for the Estate of Philip J. Distler vs. Donald and Jill Distler

DISTLER BROTHERS FARM PTR, ) BETTY DISTLER, DOUG DISTLER, ) AND BEAU DISTLER, PERSONAL ) ) ) ) ) ) ) WD87741 ) REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE ESTATE OF PHILIP J. DISTLER Respondents, v. DONALD AND JILL DISTLER, ) Opinion filed: December 23, 2025 )

Appellants. ) APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COLE COUNTY, MISSOURI HONORABLE JON E. BEETEM, JUDGE Division Three: Mark D. Pfeiffer, Presiding Judge, Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judge and Thomas N. Chapman, Judge Donald Di stler and Jill Distler (collectively, "Appellants") appeal following the trial court's judgment dissolving a family partnership and dividing and distributing the partnership's assets. Appellants raise seven points on appeal, arguing the judgment is not supported by substantial evidence, is against the weight of the evidence, and misapplies the law. Finding no error, we affirm.

2 Factual and Procedural Background The Distler Brothers Farm partnership ("DBF") was formed in 1991, consisting of three groups of equal partners: Appellants Donald and Jill Distler; together with Doug Distler and Betty Distler, through their trust, the Douglas Wayne Distler and Betty Regina Distler Trust ("Douglas-Betty Trust") and Philip Distler individually 1 (collectively, "Respondents"). Respondents filed suit in 2018 2 , seeking a formal accounting of partnership affairs pursuant to section 358.220 and dissolution of the partnership pursuant to section 358.320. 3 At trial, the following evidence was adduced: The partnership was formed as a cattle operation, running partnership cattle and personal cattle of the individual partners. There was never a written partnership agreement for DBF. When the partnership began, the partners agreed to each contribute $300 per month to cover expenses. 4 From 1991 until 2013, Appellants maintained the financial records of the partnership. However, after mid-2013, Respondents Doug Distler and Betty Distler maintained the partnership's financial records. When Respondent Doug Distler took over the recordkeeping, it was discovered that Appellant Donald Distler had failed to keep accurate records of the partnership and had 1 Philip Distler died on November 3, 2025, while this appeal was pending. A motion to substitute the Estate of Philip J. Distler, through Personal Representative Beau Distler, for deceased Respondent Philip Distler was granted. 2 Appellants asserted counterclaims against Respondents also seeking a formal accounting and dissolution of the partnership. 3 All statutory references are to RSMo 2016 unless otherwise indicated. All Rules references are to the Missouri Court Rules (2025). 4 In 2002, the partners agreed to increase their contributions to $400 per month.

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used partnership funds and assets for his personal benefit. After that time, Appellant no longer participated in the farming or business activities of the partnership. Respondents, however, continued partnership activities to pay down the partnership's significant debt, including selling all of the partnership cattle, as well as Respondents' personal cattle. Pursuant to a stipulation, a certified public accountant ("CPA") performed an accounting detailing the partnership's activity from 1991 through April 9, 2021. Under the stipulation, the CPA agreed to: [D]etermine the equity of each partner, the amount of personal expenses and loans of partners that were paid by the partnership, the capital contributions of each partner, the total distribution of proceeds to each partner, the payment of liabilities and expenses of the partnership that were paid by individual partners directly and not by the partnership, and the valuation of personal contributions in the form of use of personal property or assets by partners.

From the documentation provided and interviews with the parties, the CPA created an accounting summary ("joint accounting") and supporting detailed schedules, which were admitted into evidence. The joint accounting revealed Appellants had engaged in extensive self-dealing while managing the partnership's finances. The CPA testified that Appellant Donald Distler had withdrawn significant amounts from the partnership for Appellants' personal benefit. The CPA explained that although the withdrawals included reimbursements taken for advances Appellant Donald Distler had made on behalf of the partnership, 5 the

5 The CPA testified that, although the partners had originally agreed to contribute $300 per month to the partnership, the partnership was running a cash deficit of $10,000 to $15,000 for the first 10 to 12 years of its existence.

4 withdrawals were also used to pay Appellants' personal expenditures. These withdrawals included payments for restaurants, magazine subscriptions, personal credit cards, personal medical bills, and personal electric and gas bills. 6 According to the joint accounting, after allocation of the net loss of the partnership and the net contributions of each partner, the equity position of each partner as of April 9, 2021 was: Appellants (negative) $94,059.97 7 ; Respondent Douglas-Betty Trust (positive) $69,280.09; and Respondent Philip Distler (positive) $55,457.03. The joint accounting also examined loans taken in the name of the partnership to determine the extent any were used for Appellants' personal benefit. Based on the records available, the CPA identified partnership loans connected to Appellants personally and attempted to calculate the percentage of each partnership loan that Appellants utilized for their own benefit. The joint accounting identified two operating lines of credit—in the amounts of $55,000 and $144,300—that the CPA concluded were fully attributable to the Appellants. According to the CPA, "had the partnership not incurred the more than $300,000 of what we would call personal dollars" from previous loans taken by Appellants in the name of the partnership, "then [the partnership] likely would have had a cash flow sufficient to not 6 The CPA testified that where there was evidence of expenses for partnership purposes, those were accounted for in the calculation of Appellants' equity account balance. However, where the CPA was not provided a sufficient explanation for an expense, it was not listed as a partnership expense and instead was shown as a withdrawal by Appellants. 7 According to the joint accounting, from the partnership's inception through April 9, 2021, Appellants had contributions of $664,987.09 to the partnership and withdrawals of $716,516.01.

5 need those lines of credit in the subsequent years." In other words, due to the need to pay interest on previous loans benefitting Appellants, the partnership lacked sufficient operating cash and was required to establish lines of credit to pay for partnership activities. Accordingly, the "two subsequent lines of credit were considered personal or as a result of borrowings done in the partnership name for personal use [by Appellants]." The CPA also allocated the interest incurred on each partnership loan based on the percentage of the loan attributable to Appellants' personal use and determined the interest on such loans was $229,646.30. 8 Thus, according to the calculations in the joint accounting, Appellants' net equity in the partnership, after adjusting for the interest attributable to partnership loans for Appellants' personal benefit, was (negative) $323,706.27 as of April 9, 2021. 9

Both parties also presented evidence of adjustments that they argued should be made to the parties' equity balances. Respondents Doug Distler's and Betty Distler's daughter brought the joint accounting's calculations current to the date of trial and testified to the specific adjustments Respondents argued should be made to the joint accounting. 8 The CPA additionally testified as to the attribution of cattle to individual partners. Appellant Donald Distler came into the partnership with personal cattle, and the partnership had bought and sold cattle throughout the partnership's lifetime. However, there were insufficient records for the CPA to determine what cattle belonged to the partnership or were the descendants of cattle that were contributed by individual partners. As Appellants were responsible for the partnership's record-keeping for the first two decades of the partnership, this inability to account for the cattle among the individual partners inured no benefit to Appellants. See Adams v. Mason, 358 S.W.2d 7, 15 (Mo. 1962) (explaining because a partner had failed to keep proper books and records and failed to render an accurate accounting of the partnership, "all doubts and ambiguities connected with his purported partnership accounting should be resolved against him."). 9 (negative) $94,059.97 + (negative) $229,646.30 = (negative) $323,706.27.

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Appellants presented evidence of what they claimed was the partnership debt responsibility of each partner, asserting the CPA failed to account for the liabilities of the partnership. In its judgment, the trial court accepted Respondents' adjustments to the partners' equity balances and rejected Appellants' proposed adjustments, finding Appellants "did not present credible evidence that their suggested adjustments to the joint accounting were proper or warranted." 10 The trial court found, based on Respondents' adjustments, the partners' equity balances were: Appellants (negative) $565,702.48; Respondent Douglas- Betty Trust (positive) $103,290.43; and Respondent Philip Distler (positive) $73,765.44. Appellants additionally argued that they were entitled to interest pursuant to section 358.180(3) on their contributions to the partnership in excess of the agreed upon contribution amounts. The trial court rejected this claim finding there was "insufficient evidence" to establish Appellants were entitled to interest pursuant to section 358.180(3) "due to the amount of personal expenditures benefitting [Appellants]." The trial court observed Appellants could not "make additional contributions to the partnership to help pay for their own electric, gas, and medical bills and then claim they are owed interest on contributions that went to pay themselves." The trial court further found there was "insufficient evidence that any excess capital contributions were necessary absent the excessive personal expenditures of [Appellants]."

10 The trial court entered its initial judgment on October 18, 2024. Appellants moved to amend or modify the judgment. After the parties stipulated to an amended appraisal for the subject farm, the trial court entered its amended judgment on December 27, 2024, reflecting the updated valuation.

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The trial court dissolved the partnership and awarded $103,290.43 worth of partnership assets to Respondent, Douglas-Betty Trust, and $73,765.44 to Respondent Philip Distler based on their positive equity positions. The trial court also found that Appellants were "not entitled to any partnership assets due to their partnership equity being negative in the amount greater than their share of asset allocation." Thus, the trial court entered judgment against Appellants, jointly and severally, in favor of each Respondent in the amount of $35,814.70 to account for Appellants' negative equity status. 11 The trial court additionally found each party responsible for their own attorney's fees. 12

This appeal follows. Analysis Appellants raise seven points on appeal, arguing the trial court's judgment misapplied the law, is not supported by the evidence, and is against the weight of the evidence. For ease of analysis, we address some of Appellants' points out of order. Standard of Review "Our standard of review in any court-tried case is set forth in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976)." Nat'l Historic Soul Jazz Blues Walker Found. v.

11 Before considering the amount due the partnership from Appellants, the trial court allocated $305,505.58 in partnership asset value to each partner. However, because Appellants owed the partnership $565,702.48 for their personal debt and thus had negative equity, the trial court determined they owed two thirds ($377,134.99) to the Douglas-Betty Trust and Philip Distler, which was greater than the allocation of the asset value due them. Accordingly, Appellants were not entitled to any allocation of partnership assets and owed $35,814.70 to each Respondent for the shortfall (($377,134.99 - $305,505.59 = $71,629.40) ($71,629.40/2 = $35,814.70)).

12 The trial court further ordered Appellants "to quitclaim their full right, title and interest in the real property" described in the judgment to Respondents.

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AltCap, 681 S.W.3d 202, 209 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023). "We will affirm the [trial] court's judgment unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence, is against the weight of the evidence, or erroneously declares or applies the law." Id. "In making these determinations, this Court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the judgment and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary." Blair v. Blair, 147 S.W.3d 882, 885 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004). "The party challenging the judgment has the burden of proving error." AltCap, 681 S.W.3d at 209. "We apply de novo review to questions of law and give no deference to the trial court's conclusions regarding such questions." Id. However, "[t]he trial judge has absolute discretion as to the credibility of witnesses and the weight of their testimony is a matter for the trial court, and its findings on witness credibility are never reviewable by the appellate court." Id. Point I and Point II In Point I and Point II, Appellants challenge the trial court's determination that they were not entitled to interest pursuant to section 358.180(3). Point I argues the trial court misapplied the law in finding section 358.180(3) was inapplicable to Appellants' partnership contributions made in excess of the agreed upon contribution amount, and Point II contends this finding was not supported by substantial evidence. Because there was no partnership agreement, the rights and duties of the partners are determined pursuant to section 358.180. Section 358.180(3) provides: "A partner, who in aid of the partnership makes any payment or advance beyond the amount of capital which the partner agreed to contribute, shall be paid interest from the date of the payment

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or advance[.]" The trial court, however, found section 358.180(3) was not triggered because "there [was] insufficient evidence that any excess capital contributions were necessary absent the excessive personal expenditures of [Appellants]." Thus, the trial court did not "fail to apply interest" required by section 358.180(3) but rather found Appellants were not entitled to interest under that provision based on the evidence presented. For the reasons set forth below, this determination was supported by substantial evidence and was not a misapplication of law. Point II Appellants contend in Point II that the trial court's refusal to apply interest to Appellants' excess contributions "was not supported by the evidence" because "the evidence regarding payments by Appellants above the agreed upon amount of individual partner contributions and Appellants['] personal payments of debts and liabilities of the partnership was undisputed." To raise a successful not-supported-by-substantial-evidence challenge, the appellant must: (1) identify a challenged factual proposition necessary to sustain the trial court's judgment; (2) identify all the favorable evidence in the record supporting that position; and (3) demonstrate why that supporting evidence, when considered with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is so lacking in probative value that the trier of fact could not reasonably believe the proposition.

Carpenter v. Carpenter, 689 S.W.3d 765, 773 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024). "[F]ailure to follow the applicable framework means the appellant's argument is analytically useless and provides no support for [their] challenge." Id. (alterations in original).

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The argument section of Point II challenges two distinct factual findings of the trial court. First, Appellants challenge the trial court's finding that "there [was] insufficient evidence that any excess capital contributions were necessary absent the excessive personal expenditures of [Appellants]." Second, Appellants allege the trial court "misstate[d] the evidence and testimony" by finding, "[Appellants] attempt to apply interest to all capital contributions and not net capital contributions that take into account payments [Appellants] made to themselves." However, neither of these factual findings are challenged in the point relied on. "Claims of error raised in the argument portion of a brief that are not raised in the point relied on are not preserved for our review." Davis v. Wieland, 557 S.W.3d 340, 352 n.10 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018). 13

Moreover, by challenging two distinct findings of the trial court, Appellants' claim of error is improperly multifarious. Putting the court and respondent on notice as to which specific ruling or action is being challenged "requires that an appellant challenge only one trial court ruling or action in a single point relied on." Hale, 638 S.W.3d at 60-61 (emphasis in original). "A multifarious point on appeal preserves nothing for appellate review." Crisp v. Mo. Sch. for Deaf, Dep't of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 681 S.W.3d 650, 659 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023). Nevertheless, "[t]his court has discretion to review noncompliant briefs

13 "The argument section of an appellant's brief serves as the vehicle by which an appellant demonstrates why the trial court ruling or action, as specifically identified in the point relied on, is erroneous because of the legal reasons, as concisely stated in the point relied on, in that the case context, as summarily asserted in the point relied on, supports the stated legal reasons for the claim of reversible error." Hale v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 638 S.W.3d 49, 61 (Mo. App. S.D. 2021). "This means that [t]he argument shall be limited to those errors included in the 'Points Relied On.'" Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted).

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gratuitously, overlooking technical deficiencies, when the deficiencies do not impede review on the merits." Murphy v. Steiner, 658 S.W.3d 588, 594 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022). This Court will attempt to resolve Appellants' Point II based on the challenge brought in the point relied on—the trial court erred in not applying interest because the evidence establishing that Appellants made contributions beyond the agreed upon amount and made personal payments toward the partnership's debts and liabilities was undisputed.

Appellants argue that the trial court "ignore[d] that it was undisputed and confirmed by [the CPA] that during the first ten to thirteen years of the partnership, the agreed upon capital contributions were not enough to cover the liabilities and expenses of the partnership and that it was the Appellants who were covering those expenses above and beyond the agreed upon contributions." Appellants, however, make no attempt to identify the favorable evidence in the record that supports the trial court's determination that section 358.180(3) interest did not apply. Indeed, Appellants' effort to characterize their contributions as qualifying for interest under section 358.180(3) must fail as their position cannot overcome the substantial evidence that the relevant "contributions" were, largely, reimbursements to the partnership for partnership funds used by Appellants for personal expenditures and not, as required to implicate section 358.180(3), contributions made "in aid of the partnership." At trial, evidence was presented of Appellants' substantial misuse of partnership assets for their personal benefit. The joint accounting found that from the partnership's beginning through April 9, 2021, Appellants had contributed $664,987.09 to the partnership but had withdrawn $716,516.01. The evidence established that a large portion

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of these withdrawals were used for Appellants' personal benefit. Indeed, the joint accounting "show[ed] significant payments by [Appellant] Don Distler for the personal benefit of [Appellants], including payments to restaurants, magazine subscriptions, personal credit card payments, personal medical bills, personal electric bill payments, personal gas bill payments, and significant other personal payments that were admitted by [Appellants]." In fact, Appellant Donald Distler acknowledged during his testimony that he had made personal expenditures from the partnership's bank accounts at a time when the partnership was losing money. Appellants' self-dealing was further evidenced by the joint accounting's review of partnership loans that benefitted Appellants personally. The trial court noted the "joint accounting found that several partnership loans were attributable to the personal benefit of [Appellants]" and Appellants "wrapped personal loans into partnership refinanced loans[.]" Appellants' personal spending and borrowing ultimately aggravated the partnership's debt, as the joint accounting concluded the partnership could have avoided taking out two lines of credit "if not for the substantial borrowings" in previous years. As the trial court aptly observed, Appellants cannot "make additional contributions to the partnership to help pay for their own electric, gas, and medical bills and then claim they are owed interest on contributions that went to pay themselves." Appellants fail to demonstrate why this evidence favorable to the judgment, along with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is so lacking in probative value that the trial court could not have reasonably found, based on Appellants' self-dealing, that Appellants' contributions were not "in aid of the partnership" and, therefore, not eligible for interest under section

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358.180(3). "Instead, in direct contravention of the distinct analytical framework expressly required for the type of challenges they assert, the [Appellants] rely on incomplete evidence and inferences contrary to the judgment to support their arguments." McElvain v. Stokes, 623 S.W.3d 769, 774 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) (emphasis in original). Reference to evidence and inferences contrary to the judgment are "irrelevant and immaterial to an appellant's point challenging a factual proposition necessary to sustain the judgment as being not supported by substantial evidence." Id. at 774-75. Consequently, by failing to identify favorable evidence in the record and explaining why that evidence and its reasonable inferences could not reasonably permit the trial court to reach the conclusion it did, Appellants' argument "is analytically useless." Carpenter, 689 S.W.3d at 773. For the foregoing reasons, we find sufficient evidence supported the trial court's determination that Appellants were not entitled to interest on what they characterize as excess contributions. Point II is denied. Point I In Point I, Appellants argue the trial court misapplied the law by failing to apply interest to monies contributed by Appellants beyond the contributions of the other partners. 14 This point relied on, while framed as a claim alleging a misapplication of law,

14 Appellants claim that they contributed monies to the partnership "above and beyond the agreed upon amount, utilized by Appellants to pay partnership expenses and debt liabilities." They contend the trial court should have used the calculation Appellants provided of Appellants' equity account balance, taken from the joint accounting but revised to include statutory interest, in its judgment dissolving the partnership.

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brings largely the same argument as Point II. Accordingly, Appellants' Point I turns on whether Appellants' contributions were "in aid of the partnership" as required by section 358.180(3). Rhea v. Sapp, 463 S.W.3d 370, 375 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) ("[W]hen presented with an issue of mixed questions of law and fact, a [reviewing court] will defer to the factual findings made by the trial court so long as they are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but will review de novo the application of the law to those facts.") (alteration in original). For the same reasons set forth in Point II, Appellants fail to establish the trial court erred in concluding the additional contributions of Appellants were not made "in aid of the partnership." Based on the evidence of Appellants' self-dealing as summarized in our analysis of Point II, it was not a misapplication of law for the trial court to conclude "[t]here [was] insufficient evidence to establish [Appellants] [were] entitled to any interest under Section 358.180.3 RSMo due to the amount of personal expenditures benefitting [Appellants]." Appellants again largely ignore the evidentiary support for this finding and consequently cannot establish their allegedly excess contributions were "in aid of the partnership" and not reimbursements for the personal use of partnership assets and fail to cite any case that requires interest be paid on contributions made to a partnership for a partner's personal expenses. 15 Accordingly, the trial court did not misapply the law by finding section 358.180(3) did not apply to Appellants' contributions at issue.

15 Appellants cite a Michigan case interpreting a statute similar to section 358.180 to argue interest should be applied to "capital or advances made by a partner in excess of the agreed-upon amount."

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Point I is denied. 16

Point III In Point III, Appellants argue the trial court misapplied the law "in failing to attribute and account for the [partnership's] debt liability equally to each partner" pursuant to section 358.150 and section 358.180(1). Appellants contend the trial court "ignore[d] the statutory requirement of §358.180(1) which requires that each partner contribute toward the losses, whether of capital or otherwise, according to each partner's share in the profits." Section 358.180(1) provides: Each partner shall be repaid the partner's contributions, whether by way of capital or advances to the partnership property and share equally in the profits and surplus remaining after all liabilities, including those to partners, are satisfied; and except as provided in subsection 2 of section 358.150, each

Nogueras v. Maisel & Associates, 369 N.W.2d 492 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985). In Nogueras, the Michigan appellate court found a partner, who contributed land on which the partnership constructed a shopping center, was entitled to interest from that contribution. Id. at 497. Not only is Nogueras not binding on this Court, it is also inapplicable as, here, evidence was presented that Appellants' contributions were not for the benefit of the partnership.

16 Appellants raise additional issues in the argument of Point I that do not appear in the point relied on. Rule 84.04(e) ("The argument shall be limited to those errors included in the 'Points Relied On.'"). First, Appellants contend the CPA's calculation of the equity accounts was incorrect because the calculation failed to apply statutory interest to Appellants' equity account and failed to hold "Respondents accountable for the debt liabilities they failed to pay[.]" This argument, that the CPA erred in his calculation, is a different claim of error than the argument raised in the point relied on—that the trial court erred in failing to apply statutory interest. "Arguments advanced in the brief but not raised in the point relied on are not preserved, and will not be addressed by this court." Ziade v. Quality Bus. Sols., Inc., 618 S.W.3d 537, 544 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021).

Additionally, Appellants argue the trial court improperly ignored the debt liability attributable to each partner as required by section 358.150(1) and failed to follow section 358.180(1), requiring each partner be repaid his partner contributions and share equally in the profits after liabilities. These arguments, too, do not appear in the point relied on and will not be considered by this Court. We note, however, that Appellants raise an argument regarding each partner's debt liability in Point III. To the extent these issues arise in Point III, such arguments will be addressed in our review of Point III.

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partner must contribute toward the losses, whether of capital or otherwise, sustained by the partnership according to the partner's share in the profits[.]

At trial, the CPA testified that he did not account for debt liability as the joint stipulation under which he operated did not direct him to do so. Appellants argue they presented evidence showing the debt liability of each partner and "[t]here was no evidence that contradicted the calculation of individual partner debt liability as shown in [an exhibit Appellants presented.]" According to Appellants, the evidence established that at least one of the partnership loans identified in the joint accounting was not of "any personal benefit" to Appellants and should not be attributable to them personally. Appellants further assert that Respondents "acknowledged they did not contribute their portion of the debt and liabilities to DBF in 1992." Appellants again ignore the overwhelming evidence supporting the finding that the partnership's debt was largely the result of Appellants' excessive personal use of partnership funds. Indeed, the trial court found "several partnership loans were attributable to the personal benefit of [Appellants]." 17 As of April 9, 2021, the partnership had incurred a total of $229,646.30 in interest on loans for the personal benefit of Appellants. The evidence also showed that Appellants' personal expenditures exacerbated the partnership's debt, as the trial court found "the partnership would not have needed to take additional

17 Four of the five loans identified in the joint accounting were at least partially attributable to Appellants, but the joint accounting attributed zero percent of a loan taken in 2002 personally to Appellants. However, Respondents presented evidence that a portion of the 2002 loan was personal in nature for the benefit of Appellants.

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loans if it were not for the excessive personal expenditures of [Appellants] in 2008 and excessive borrowing by [Appellants]..." The trial court observed that "[Appellant] Don Distler had not kept accurate records of the partnership and had used the partnership funds and assets for his personal benefit." To the extent Appellant Donald Distler failed to discharge his duty to maintain accurate partnership records, "it [fell] within the trial court's discretion to resolve any doubts or ambiguities as to the partnership accounting against [Appellants]." King v. Bullard, 257 S.W.3d 175, 184 (Mo. App. E.D. 2008). It was appropriate for the trial court to not hold Respondents responsible for the partnership's debt as it found: (1) Appellant Donald Distler failed to keep accurate records of the partnership's finances; and (2) Appellants had used partnership funds for their personal benefit and partnership loans were attributable to the personal benefit of Appellants. Appellants provide no authority requiring that all partners be responsible for the debts a partnership incurred for the personal benefit of another partner. 18

Additionally, the trial court was free to disbelieve Appellants' calculation of each partners' debt liability. The witness who testified on behalf of Appellants regarding her calculation of each partner's debt stated that her calculations assumed Appellants' expenditures were "in aid of the partnership" and not Appellants' personal expenditures.

18 Appellants cite Sebring Assocs. v. Coyle, 867 A.2d 1213 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005), for the proposition that partners must be held liable for their failure to contribute necessary funds to the partnership. In Sebring, a partner failed to contribute to cash calls while other partners contributed additional funds above the cash call, and the offending partner's lack of contributions were added to his capital contribution as a negative entry. Id. at 1219-20. Here, there was no cash call, and, as explained, the partnership's liquidity issues were the result of Appellants' misuse of partnership assets for personal use.

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Given the numerous findings to the contrary, the trial court was free to find the witness and the calculations presented not credible. Tadych v. Horner, 336 S.W.3d 174, 177 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011). ("As the trier of fact, the trial court determines the credibility of witnesses and is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of the witnesses' testimony. This is the case even where the testimony of a witness is not contradicted by other testimony as it is well settled that the trial court is free to believe or disbelieve all, part or none of the evidence, including disbelieving evidence that is uncontroverted.") (internal citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted). The trial court did not misapply the law by not attributing the partnership's debt and liabilities equally to each partner. Point III is denied. Point IV and Point VII In Point IV and Point VII, Appellants argue findings of the trial court were against the weight of the evidence. To bring a successful against-the-weight-of-the-evidence challenge, an appellant must follow the following analytical framework: (1) identify the trial court's finding he [or she] seeks to challenge as against the weight of the evidence; (2) identify all favorable evidence submitted during trial that would support that finding; (3) identify evidence contrary to the trial court's finding; and (4) explain why, in light of the whole record, the supporting evidence is so lacking in probative value that the trier of fact should have reached a different conclusion.

Ebert v. Ebert, 627 S.W.3d 571, 590 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (alteration in original). "Appellate courts act with caution in exercising the power to set aside a decree or judgment on the ground that it is against the weight of the evidence." Ivie v. Smith, 439 S.W.3d 189,

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205 (Mo. banc 2014). "[A] claim that the judgment is against the weight of the evidence presupposes that there is sufficient evidence to support the judgment." Id. (alteration in original). "In other words, 'weight of the evidence' denotes an appellate test of how much persuasive value evidence has, not just whether sufficient evidence exists that tends to prove a necessary fact. Id. at 206. "When reviewing the record in an against-the-weight- of-the-evidence challenge, this Court defers to the circuit court's findings of fact when the factual issues are contested and when the facts as found by the circuit court depend on credibility determinations." Id. "A circuit court's judgment is against the weight of the evidence only if the circuit court could not have reasonably found, from the record at trial, the existence of a fact that is necessary to sustain the judgment." Id. Point IV In Point IV, Appellants contend the trial court's calculations of Appellants' equity balance was "against the weight of the evidence" because the trial court's calculations were "based on misstated amounts, and assumptions that had already been accounted for or determined to be insufficient by [the CPA]." We disagree. The trial court calculated Appellants' equity balance based on adjustments to the joint accounting proposed by Respondents. The trial court adopted adjustments to the joint accounting related to the interest attributable to Appellants and for additional contributions to the partnership made by the parties since April 9, 2021, the date through which the joint accounting detailed partnership activity. The trial court also accepted other adjustments Respondents argued should have been made to the equity balance of Appellants.

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Appellants fail to follow the necessary framework for bringing an against-the- weight-of-the-evidence challenge. Appellants argue that, according to the joint accounting, Appellants' partnership contributions as of April 9, 2021, were negative $94,059.97 not negative $323,706.27 as the trial court found. Appellants, however, disregard the favorable evidence that led the trial court to reach this conclusion. The evidence presented showed Appellants had significant personal loans in the name of the partnership for which the partnership had paid $229,646.30 in interest. The CPA testified that this interest was attributable to Appellants (and not the partnership) and that value was "not captured in the equity account numbers"—the negative $94,059.97—that Appellants cite. Indeed, the joint accounting itself acknowledged that the personal interest attributable to Appellants was "not reflected in the partner equity account of [Appellant] Don Distler[.]" Thus, the trial court took the value of the interest attributable to Appellants' personal loans and added it to the equity account figures provided by the CPA to reach the negative $323,706.27 equity balance for Appellants. In addition to ignoring this favorable evidence, Appellants fail to explain why, in light of the whole record, this evidence is so lacking in probative value that the trial court was compelled to reach an alternative conclusion. Appellants further challenge specific adjustments the trial court made to Appellants' equity account based on suggestions provided by Respondents. 19 These arguments suffer

19 Specifically, Appellants argue the trial court erred by: (1) making a negative $23,050.30 adjustment to Appellants' equity account for cattle checks; (2) making a negative $1,500 adjustment to Appellants' equity account for a deposit Donald Distler allegedly made to the partnership; (3) removing credit for six pieces of farm equipment Appellants had purchased; (4) finding a negative $11,190 adjustment in favor of Respondents for the purchase of bulls as the joint accounting included both the purchase of bulls and later repayment to Appellants for the

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the same defects as above. 20 The adjustments at issue were made based on evidence adduced at trial, but Appellants fail to identify this favorable evidence and make no effort to explain why, in light of the whole record, the supporting evidence is so lacking in probative value that the adoption of those adjustments was erroneous. Instead, Appellants ask this Court to reweigh the evidence, an exercise that we will not engage in. Carpenter,

purchase, and thus, the trial court's inclusion of that adjustment amounted to a double counting; (5) adjusting Appellants' equity account by $5,000 based on Respondents' claim that there was a $5,000 payment from Appellants to another individual that was never made; and (6) finding funds utilized by the partnership to pay for unleaded gas should be attributable to Appellants as a personal expenditure. For each of these claims of error, Appellants provide no reference to favorable evidence supporting the trial court's determinations.

Respondents presented evidence supporting each of these adjustments: Respondents showed that the cattle checks were not properly accounted for in the joint accounting; Respondents' witness testified that the $1,500 deposit was never actually deposited into the account; Appellants contend the joint accounting gave Appellants' equity account credit for various pieces of farm equipment they purchased, so the trial court's removal of that credit was in error, but the joint accounting only references three pieces of unidentified farm equipment purchased whereas the trial court specifically identified six pieces of farm equipment that Respondents argued were purchases not incurred by Appellants; Appellant Donald Distler admitted in a deposition that the adjustment in the joint accounting for the purchase of bulls was proper, and there was no evidence adduced that the entry in the joint accounting incorporates the bull purchase into a personal loan attributable to Appellants, resulting in a double counting; Appellants' citations to the record regarding the $5,000 payment were inaccurate; and evidence was adduced that the partnership had limited use of gas vehicles. In an against-the-weight-of-the-evidence challenge, we presume that the trial court's judgment is valid "and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate its incorrectness." Pearson v. AVO Gen. Servs., LLC, 520 S.W.3d 496, 506 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017). Here, Appellants fail to carry that burden.

20 In the argument section of Point IV, Appellants contend these specific adjustments were "not supported by the evidence." "[A]gainst-the-weight-of-the-evidence challenges are not the same as not-supported-by-substantial-evidence challenges; hence, pursuant to Rule 84.04, these separate and distinct challenges should have been separated into two distinct points relied on." Hopkins v. Hopkins, 449 S.W.3d 793, 802 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014) (internal quotations omitted). An against- the-weight-of-the-evidence challenge "assumes the existence of substantial evidence supporting a proposition necessary to sustain a judgment[.]" Id. (internal quotations omitted). As Appellants' point relied on brings an against-the-weight-of-the-evidence challenge, we will review the arguments based on that framework.

22

689 S.W.3d at 777 ("We presume that all evidence was considered by the trial court and we will not reweigh that evidence, even if doing so could yield a different conclusion."). Because Appellants failed to carry their burden to demonstrate the incorrectness of the trial court's judgment, their against-the-weight-of-the-evidence challenge fails. Pearson, 520 S.W.3d at 506. Point IV is denied. Point VII In Point VII, Appellants argue the trial court's finding that the partnership had no remaining cattle was against the weight of the evidence. Appellants again fail to follow the framework for bringing an against-the-weight-of-the-evidence challenge. The trial court found that: As for the cattle, the evidence adduced at trial was that [Respondents] Doug and Phil Distler have sold all partnership cattle to pay down the debts accrued by [Appellants]. The only remaining cattle are personal herds maintained by each partner individually. [Appellants] presented no credible evidence of the existence, number, or value of any cattle they claimed to be existing partnership cattle. Thus, there are no partnership cattle to be considered as assets of the partnership.

Appellants contend they had a personal herd of cattle before the creation of the partnership and "the partnership benefited from the use of Appellants['] personal herd including receiving income from the sale of Appellants['] personal herd." 21 Appellants allege "there

21 In the argument section of Point VII, Appellants further assert that even if the remaining cattle were the personal herd of the individual Respondents—an argument that presumes the trial court's judgment was correct—"the partnership utilized partnership funds to pay for the maintenance of said cattle," and accordingly, "[t]he partnership is either owed reimbursement from the individual partners for the expenses paid on behalf of the maintenance and care of said partner's personal herd or the cattle should be deemed partnership cattle."

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was no supporting evidence or testimony as to how many DBF cattle were sold, how many personal cattle of the individual partners remain, or how the expenses of the individual partner herds were being paid." Despite Appellants' protests, the weight of the evidence supports the trial court's finding that there were no partnership-owned cattle at the time of the dissolution. The joint accounting stated: "We were not provided reliable records of the size of the partnership herd and how much was attributable to individual parties for much of the partnership life ... Given the lack of records on the partnership herd and the cows/bulls of the individual partners and family members, we are not able to determine any attribution of the herd to the individual partners" beyond estimates provided by Respondents Doug Distler and Philip Distler. This finding was buttressed by the CPA's testimony that there was no accurate accounting of current partnership or personal cattle and tracking the cost and revenue attributable to each individual's cattle was not possible. Appellants were responsible for the partnership's record keeping for the initial two decades of its existence, and, after extensive self-dealing with partnership assets, cannot now benefit from their incomplete documentation of partnership activities. Adams, 358 S.W.2d at 15 (finding a partner's failure to keep proper books and records of a farm partnership necessitated "all

This contention does not follow the argument raised in the point relied on. "[C]laimed errors that are raised only in the argument portion of the brief but not contained in a point relied on are not preserved for our review." Lamy v. Stahl Speciality Co., 649 S.W.3d 330, 336 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022). Thus, our analysis is limited to the specific issue Appellants raised in their seventh point—whether the trial court erred in failing to attribute cattle to the partnership.

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doubts and ambiguities connected with his purported partnership accounting should be resolved against him."). Moreover, both Respondents Philip Distler and Doug Distler testified that, as of the date of trial, there were no cattle remaining in the partnership. Respondent Doug Distler explained that once Respondents discovered the partnership's dire financial condition due to Appellants' conduct, the remaining cattle was sold to address the partnership's debt. Appellants fail to explain how the trial court could not have reasonably found, from the record at trial, that the partnership no longer owned any cattle. "This Court defers to the circuit court's determinations that [Respondents'] witnesses and evidence were persuasive and that [Appellants'] witnesses and evidence were not." Ivie, 439 S.W.3d at

1. The circuit court's determination that there were no partnership cattle to be considered

as assets of the partnership was not against the weight of the evidence. Point VII is denied. Point V In Point V, Appellants argue the trial court misapplied the law in its calculation of Appellants' equity balance by giving credit to Respondents for their labor to the partnership in violation of section 358.180(6). Section 358.180(6) provides: "No partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the partnership business, except that a surviving partner is entitled to reasonable compensation for the partner's services in winding up the partnership affairs[.]" The trial court's judgment made a negative adjustment to Appellants' partnership equity balance in the amount of $33,718.09 for "Reallocation of partnership earnings from 2013 to 2021."

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The joint accounting had attributed the partnership's income and loss equally to all partners for each year of the partnership's existence. Respondents, however, argued for an adjustment that reallocated the partnership's earnings after 2013—when Appellant Donald Distler stepped away from the partnership—between the two active partners, Respondents. Appellants contend these earnings were "supposed to be Appellants['] portion of the profits" and the trial court's reallocation of earnings was an attempt to improperly compensate Respondents for their labor. The trial court found that "[a]fter [Respondent] Doug Distler took over the recordkeeping of the partnership, [Appellant] Don Distler no longer participated in the farming/business activities of the partnership." Respondent Doug Distler testified that, after 2013, Appellant Donald Distler participated in farming activities "[v]ery, very little," did not help with baling hay, the auction house, purchasing cattle, or cattle sales. Appellant Donald Distler did not dispute that he did not significantly participate in the efforts of the partnership after 2013. In fact, Appellants' point relied on concedes that these adjustments were based on Respondents' labor "during a period of time when Appellants were not contributing labor to [the partnership.]" Respondents, however, continued the partnership business after Appellant Donald Distler stepped away and were able to "pay down significant debt of the partnership." See Schoeller v. Schoeller, 497 S.W.2d 860, 869 (Mo. App. 1973) (finding section 358.180(6) was inapplicable when a partner retired while the other partners continued partnership business and the partnership was not in the process of "winding up" but instead was "being continued as a going concern."). The efforts of Respondents from 2013 to 2024 were highly

26

beneficial to Appellants as the debt Respondents paid off included Appellants' personal debt that Appellants had refinanced into partnership loans. Moreover, the trial court found that throughout the lifetime of the partnership, Appellants had withdrawn significant funds from the partnership, made personal expenditures, and failed to keep sufficient records of their transactions. In contrast, Respondents had not made any withdrawals from the partnership and kept accurate records since taking over those duties in 2013. Given the record in this case, we find the trial court did not err in crediting Respondents for their efforts on behalf of the partnership post-2013. Point V is denied. Point VI Appellants argue the trial court abused its discretion "in its award of attorney fees" by "ordering each party be responsible for their own attorney fees" because the evidence established Respondents paid their attorney's fees with partnership funds. "The trial court's award of reasonable attorney's fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Soto v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 502 S.W.3d 38, 55 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016). "Judicial discretion is abused when the court's ruling is against the logic of the circumstances and is so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks the sense of justice." Ostermeier v. Prime Props. Invs. Inc., 589 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019). Appellants contend that while Respondents paid their attorney's fees from the partnership business account, Appellants "personally paid their attorney fees and did not

27

utilize the partnership account to pay for any legal expenses." Appellants argue the effect of the trial court's order is that Appellants are paying one-third of Respondents' attorney's fees as those fees will come out of the partnership's account. Appellants' true complaint appears to be founded on the proposition that Respondents' attorney's fees were not a partnership expense attributable to its liquidation. Appellants, however, fail to develop an argument on the impropriety of using partnership funds to pay attorney's fees incurred in the dissolution of the partnership. "We cannot become advocates for an appellant by speculating about facts and arguments that have not been made." Pearson v. Keystone Temp. Assignment Grp., Inc., 588 S.W.3d 546, 552 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019). Point VI is denied. Conclusion The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

__________________________________ EDWARD R. ARDINI, JR., JUDGE

All concur.