In the Interest of: S.K.J., A.L.L., A.L.L., and A.L., Juveniles; and Juvenile Officer vs. A.L.

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.K.J., ) A.L.L., A.L.L., AND A.L., JUVENILES; ) AND JUVENILE OFFICER, ) ) Respondent, ) WD87944 consolidated with ) WD88052, WD88053, WD88054 ) v. ) OPINION FILED: ) DECEMBER 30, 2025 J.B. DEFENDANT, AND A.L., ) ) Appellant. )

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri The Honorable Jennifer Marie Phillips, Judge

Before Division Two: Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Presiding Judge, Karen King Mitchell, Judge and Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

In these consolidated appeals, A.L. ("Father") appeals from the judgment of the trial court terminating his parental rights to A.L.L., A.L.L., and A.L (collectively "Children"). 1 Father challenges the statutory bases relied on by the trial court in terminating his parental rights, and asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in

1 The Children's mother is J.B. ("Mother"). The trial court also terminated Mother's parental rights to the Children and to S.K.J., who is not Father's biological child. Mother is not a party to this appeal.

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finding that termination was in the best interests of the Children. Finding no error, we affirm. Factual and Procedural Background 2

Father is the biological parent of A.L.L. (who was born in 2015), and A.L.L. (who was born in 2017 and tested positive for cocaine at birth). On July 3, 2017, A.L.L. and A.L.L. were placed under the trial court's jurisdiction and into foster care. On August 24, 2017, Father waived his right to an evidentiary hearing and entered into a written stipulation that the Jackson County Juvenile Officer ("Juvenile Officer") could prove the following by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence: The children [A.L.L.] and [A.L.L.] are without proper care[,] custody and support necessary for their well-being and are subject to the jurisdiction of [the trial court] pursuant to Section 211.031 RSMO., in that the [F]ather neglects the children. 3

The [F]ather also has a substance abuse problem and has admitted to using marijuana and cocaine. Further the [F]ather agreed to do drug treatment, but has not been consistent in his treatment. Due to the [F]ather's drug use, which impairs his ability to provide care, the safety of the children cannot be ensure[d] while in the care of the [F]ather. This [F]ather's actions place the children at risk of harm or neglect absent the intervention of [the trial court.]

Father is also the biological parent of A.L. (who was born in 2020). A.L. was promptly placed under the trial court's jurisdiction and into foster care after A.L. tested positive for cocaine at birth. On October 26, 2020, Father waived his right to an

2 "When reviewing a judgment terminating parental rights, we view the facts and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the judgment." Interest of E.R., 687 S.W.3d 174, 175 n.2 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (citing In re D.L.S., 606 S.W.3d 217, 220 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020)). 3 References to section 231.011.1 are to RSMo 2016 as supplemented to the dates of Father's written stipulations in 2017 and 2020. All other statutory references are to RSMo 2016 as supplemented to March 12, 2025, the date the trial court terminated Father's parental rights as to the Children, unless otherwise indicated.

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evidentiary hearing and entered into a written stipulation that the Juvenile Officer could prove the following by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence: The child [A.L.] is without proper care[,] custody and support necessary for her well-being and is subject to the jurisdiction of the [trial] court pursuant to [section] 211.031.1 RSMo. In that the [F]ather has two other children, [A.L.L.] and [A.L.L.] under [the trial court's] jurisdiction due in part to the [F]ather's substance use. . . . During the pendency of the [siblings'] cases[, F]ather did not fully engage in services including individual therapy and substance abuse treatment such that the permanency goals for the children are Termination of Parental Rights/Adoption. The [F]ather continued to be in need of services such that this child is at risk of harm and neglect without [the trial court's] intervention.

The Children remained under the continuous jurisdiction of the trial court at all times after jurisdiction was first assumed. On February 19, 2024, the Juvenile Officer petitioned to terminate Father's parental rights to the Children. 4 The trial court held a hearing on the petition on October 7, 8, and 15, 2024 ("termination hearing"). The trial court heard evidence from eight witnesses, including Father, Mother, two case managers, two parent aides, a counselor, and a psychologist. On the first and second days of the termination hearing, the former foster care case manager ("former case manager") 5 who handled the Children's case from April 2021 to May 2024 testified. She stated that although Father was "very involved" with his visitations with the Children, he "did not work on any of the other issues that needed to be addressed of why the [C]hildren were in care: Substance abuse, stable housing,

4 An earlier petition for termination of parental rights involving Father was denied. 5 All witnesses and others who are not parties are referred to by their initials or by other non-identifying references in accordance with the redaction requirements of section 509.520 and Supreme Court Operating Rule 2.02(c) to not provide the names of any non- party witnesses.

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employment, transportation, means of taking care of the [C]hildren," and compliance with court orders. To address these issues, the former case manager testified that she had offered Father substance abuse treatment, weekly drug screenings, a parent aide at visits with the Children, parent aide parenting education, individual therapy, and a psychological evaluation. She stated that despite these offerings, Father had not regularly participated in substance abuse treatment, had not consistently submitted to drug screenings, and had not followed through with individual therapy. She testified that it was hard to follow up with Father about these services because he frequently had different phone numbers and email addresses. The former case manager testified that she did not know Father's housing situation, except that he occasionally lived with his mother. She testified that Father once claimed that he lived in an apartment. When the former case manager visited to see if the apartment was appropriate for the Children, she learned that it was not Father's apartment, but instead belonged to a friend. The former case manager testified that Father had given the Children some birthday presents but did not financially support the Children. She stated that Father exercised about fifty percent of his family time with the Children due to issues with transportation and the location of visits in relation to public transportation. The former case manager stated that the parent aide stopped some of Father's visits with the Children early because Father did not adhere to rules about visitation expectations, such as providing food or items needed for visits. She testified that A.L.L. and A.L.L. sometimes chose not to visit with Father and that A.L. was too young to exercise her choice.

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The former case manager testified that a prior petition to terminate Mother and Father's parental rights to the Children had been denied in 2022. She explained that following the denial of that petition, she ordered all new services with new service providers for the parents. The former case manager testified that after the denial, she continued to be concerned about Father's substance abuse. She also stated that the parents failed to comply with the trial court's order to have separate visitations with the Children. She testified that there were multiple incidents in which Father and Mother showed up to each other's visits. She stated that their failure to comply with a court order made the Children feel "uneasy" and "unsafe" since the Children knew their parents were not adhering to the rules. The former case manager testified that she had not observed progress in the Children's bond with the parents while she was on the case. She recommended termination of parental rights because she "ha[d] not seen the growth that [wa]s needed to ensure that all the positive, healthy, parenting capacities and competencies [we]re there to ensure that [the Children] [were] going to be able to go back to a safe, loving environment that c[ould] wrap around the trauma and the exposure that they'[d] had for the length of time that they'[d] been in care." The current foster care case manager ("current case manager") who took over the Children's case in May 2024 testified on the second and third day of the termination hearing. On the second day, she testified that there was no evidence of Father's consistent sobriety since he did not regularly submit to drug screenings. She stated that "parenting under the influence" would impact his ability to be fully coherent and thereby

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to parent safely. She also noted that Father had not been able to expand to unsupervised time with the Children since he had not proven his sobriety. The current case manager testified that she did not expect reunification to occur anytime soon and recommended termination of parental rights. On the third day of the termination hearing, the current case manager testified that she had arranged Father's weekly drug screening to take place on the second day of the termination hearing at the courthouse. She explained that Father submitted to the hair test but not to the urinalysis test after leaving to grab water and never returning. The current case manager stated that the hair test came back positive for amphetamines, methamphetamine, and phencyclidine ("PCP"). She testified that drugs had been a barrier to Father's reunification with the Children since the beginning of the case, and she continued to be concerned about drugs since Father had tested positive for illicit drugs so recently. On the last day of the termination hearing, Father testified that the Children were placed into foster care due to drug use. He stated that in the preceding two years, he had taken steps to overcome his substance abuse issues by participating in a detoxification program and taking outpatient classes as recently as the month before the hearing. He testified that he was not currently involved in any substance abuse treatment due to a death in his family, but was willing to engage in a program again. Father denied the accuracy of the hair test from the second day of the termination hearing because he had not used illicit drugs in over a year, as he was "freshly clean" and "over" drugs. Father explained that he had not refused to submit to the urinalysis because he simply could not

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find the tester after drinking water. He also denied that he tested positive for amphetamines, ecstasy, methamphetamine, PCP, and marijuana on September 12, 2024, a month before the termination hearing. Despite testing positive for methamphetamine in the drug screenings from September and October 2024, Father refuted using methamphetamine and stated that a different drug that he had used contained methamphetamine. Father also testified that over the seven years of the case, he had engaged in individual therapy for two months, but it was "not [his] fault" that it was so limited. In addition to this testimony, the trial court received 38 exhibits, including Father's records from the weekly drug screenings and a substance abuse treatment program. The weekly drug screenings revealed that from April 2020 to August 2024, Father tested positive for illicit substances three times. Two of these positive tests were hair tests taken during months in which he had passed urinalysis screenings. This record did not include the two additional positive tests from September and October 2024 that were discussed at the termination hearing. Overall, the drug screening record revealed that Father tested only 16 of the 52 months in the record, refusing to submit to drug tests in the remaining 36 months and sometimes declining to submit to hair tests even when submitting to urinalysis screenings. The records from the substance abuse treatment program disclosed Father's participation from May 2017 through September 2024. The record showed that Father engaged in the substance use programming in spurts during 27 of the 88 months in the record.

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At the close of the termination hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. On March 12, 2025, the trial court entered its written judgment ("Judgment") terminating Father's parental rights as to the Children on four grounds: abuse or neglect pursuant to section 211.447.5(2), failure to provide pursuant to section 211.447.5(2)(d), failure to rectify pursuant to section 211.447.5(3), and parental unfitness pursuant to section 211.447.5(5)(a). The trial court also found that it was in the Children's best interests to terminate Father's parental rights pursuant to section 211.447.7. Father timely appealed the Judgment, and the appeals relating to each child were consolidated by this Court. Additional facts will be provided as relevant in the analysis below. Standard of Review "A trial court's authority to terminate parental rights is purely statutory." In re S.M.F., 393 S.W.3d 635, 643 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013). Section 211.447.6 requires the trial court to make two findings before terminating parental rights. Id. First, the trial court must find that clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supports at least one of the grounds of termination outlined in section 211.447. Id. "Evidence is clear, cogent and convincing, if it 'instantly tilts the scales in favor of termination when weighed against the evidence in opposition and the finder of fact is left with the abiding conviction that the evidence is true.'" Id. (quoting In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Mo. banc 2004)). On appeal, we will affirm the trial court's judgment finding a statutory basis for terminating parental rights unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, is inconsistent with the

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weight of the evidence, or erroneously declares or applies the law. Id. at 643-44. "The judgment will be reversed 'only if we are left with a firm belief that the order [was] wrong.'" In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d 793, 815 (Mo. banc 2011) (abrogated on other grounds) (quoting In re S.M.H., 160 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Mo. banc 2005)). Additionally, we must defer to the trial court on witness credibility, and we "review conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment of the trial court." In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 11-12 (citing In re M.E.W., 729 S.W.2d 194, 195-96 (Mo. banc 1987)). Second, if the trial court finds a statutory basis for terminating parental rights, it assesses whether terminating parental rights is in the best interests of the child. In re S.M.F., 393 S.W.3d at 644; section 211.447.6. "At the trial level, the standard of proof for this best interest inquiry is a preponderance of the evidence; on appeal, the standard of review is abuse of discretion." In re K.S., 561 S.W.3d 399, 406 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (quoting In re J.P.B, 509 S.W.3d 84, 90 (Mo. banc 2017)). "An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court's ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances and [is] so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful, deliberate consideration." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re A.C.G., 499 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016)). "When the trial court finds multiple statutory grounds for termination of parental rights, we will affirm the judgment if any one of those grounds was proven and termination was in the child's best interests." In re A.C.G., 499 S.W.3d at 347 (citing In re J.S. v. Juvenile Officer, 477 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015)).

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Analysis Father presents five points on appeal. His first, second, third, and fourth points challenge each statutory ground upon which the trial court terminated his parental rights, and his fifth point challenges the trial court's finding that it was in the Children's best interests to terminate his parental rights. For his first point, Father contends that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights on the abuse or neglect ground because "chemical dependency" was not established as no one opined that Father had an untreatable addiction and no harmful impact on the Children was shown. His second point argues that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights on the failure to provide ground because Father's minimal contributions "militate against severance in that such contributions demonstrate Father's intent to continue the parent-child relationship." In his third point, Father asserts that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights on the failure to rectify ground because the trial court's judgment was legally infirm by "merely track[ing] the statute's language" and thus "lack[ing] the requisite finding of a harmful impact on the Children, presently or in the future." His fourth point on appeal contends that the trial court erred by terminating his parental rights on the time-in-care ground since the presumption of Father's unfitness was not met as the duration of his struggle with sobriety and failure to provide was not "per se determinative of severance." In his fifth point on appeal, Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that termination was in the Children's best interests by imputing safety concerns about the Children's Mother onto Father and by finding that "the Children might be better off in another home."

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Because Father has not established error in the termination of his parental rights pursuant to section 211.447.5(3), the subject of Father's third point on appeal, we need not address Father's first, second, and fourth points on appeal. Id.; Interest of A.O.B., 666 S.W.3d 295, 298 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023). We also find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that termination of Father's parental rights was in the Children's best interests, the subject of Father's fifth point on appeal. In re A.C.G., 499 S.W.3d at 347; Interest of A.O.B., 666 S.W.3d at 298. Point Three: The trial court did not err in terminating Father's parental rights on the failure to rectify ground Father's third point on appeal asserts that the trial court erred by terminating his parental rights on the failure to rectify ground because its finding "merely track[ed]" the language of section 211.447.5(3) and thus lacked the "requisite finding of a harmful impact on the Children, presently or in the future." The termination ground set forth in section 211.447.5(3) is commonly referred to as "failure to rectify." Interest of A.M.W., 652 S.W.3d 225, 235 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022) (citing J.A.R. v. D.G.R., 426 S.W.3d 624, 625 n.2 (Mo. banc 2014)). In order to terminate parental rights based on the failure to rectify, the trial court must find clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that (1) the child has been under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for at least a year; (2) the conditions that led to the assumption of jurisdiction persist, or conditions of a potentially harmful nature currently exist; and (3) there is little likelihood that the conditions will be remedied at an early date so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future, or continuation of the parent-

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child relationship greatly diminishes the child's prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home. In re I.G.P., 375 S.W.3d 112, 120-21 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012); section 211.447.5(3). Additionally, when determining whether to terminate parental rights under section 211.447.5(3), the trial court must consider and make findings on the following factors: (a) The terms of a social service plan entered into by the parent and the division and the extent to which the parties have made progress in complying with those terms;

(b) The success or failure of the efforts of the juvenile officer, the division or other agency to aid the parent on a continuing basis in adjusting his circumstances or conduct to provide a proper home for the child;

(c) A mental condition which is shown by competent evidence either to be permanent or such that there is no reasonable likelihood that the condition can be reversed and which renders the parent unable to knowingly provide the child the necessary care, custody and control;

(d) Chemical dependency which prevents the parent from consistently providing the necessary care, custody and control over the child and which cannot be treated so as to enable the parent to consistently provide such care, custody and control.

Section 211.447.5(3)(a)-(d). Though each of these factors is "a category the court must consider with all other relevant evidence" in deciding whether to terminate parental rights based on a failure to rectify, none of the factors constitutes a separate ground for termination. In re T.J.P., Jr., 432 S.W.3d 192, 202 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014) (abrogated on other grounds) (citing In re L.J.D., 352 S.W.3d 658, 674 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011)). Nonetheless, "proof of just one factor is sufficient to support termination of parental rights" pursuant to section 211.447.5(3). In re S.D., 472 S.W.3d 572, 577 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (citing In re S.Y.G.B., 443 S.W.3d 56, 60-61 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014)).

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Here, Father argues in his point relied on that the trial court's finding that his parental rights should be terminated under section 211.447.5(3) was "legally infirm" because the Judgment simply tracked the statutory language and thus "lack[ed] the requisite finding of a harmful impact on the Children, presently or in the future." He contends that he preserved this claim of error since "[t]he case was tried without a jury, and as such, the law obliges review based upon the law and evidence as in suits of an equitable nature, giving due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to have judged the credibility of witnesses." We disagree. Father's third point complains that the Judgment omitted a "requisite finding" addressing the harmful impact to the Children. "In all cases, allegations of error relating to the form or language of the judgment, including the failure to make statutorily required findings, must be raised in a motion to amend the judgment in order to be preserved for appellate review." Rule 78.07(c) 6 ; see Interest of A.O.B., 666 S.W.3d at 303 ("Rule 78.07(c) applies to termination of parental rights cases") (citation omitted). Father did not file a Rule 78.07(c) motion. His claim of error in his third point on appeal is not preserved for our review. Even had Father preserved this claim of error, we would find it to be without merit. Father correctly observes that after determining a child has been in the jurisdiction of the court for at least one year, section 211.447.3(5) requires the trial court to make two additional findings, each of which permits alternative findings. First, the trial court must

6 All Rule references are to Missouri Court Rules, Volume I - State, 2025, unless otherwise noted.

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find either the conditions which led to the assumption of jurisdiction still exists or conditions of a potentially harmful nature continue to exist. Second, the trial court must find either there is little likelihood that those conditions will be remedied at an early date so that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future or the continuation of the parent-child relationship greatly diminishes the child's prospects for an early integration into a stable and permanent home. See In re B.J.K., 197 S.W.3d 237, 243 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006) (explaining this statutory interpretation of section 211.447.4(3), the statutory predecessor to section 211.447.5(3)); see also In re K.M.A.-B., 493 S.W.3d 457, 472-73 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (applying this statutory interpretation of the failure to rectify grounds under section 211.447.4(3) to the failure to rectify grounds under section 211.447.5(3)). This interpretation of the statute "is not only a logical reading of the statute, but is consistent with one of the essential considerations in any termination case, namely the existence of a harmful condition presently or in the future." In re K.M.A.-B., 493 S.W.3d at 473. Here, after finding that the Children had been under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for at least one year, 7 the trial court concluded as to the first additional finding that the conditions leading to the assumption of jurisdiction still persisted or a condition of a potentially harmful nature continued to exist. Specifically, the trial court found the following: [T]wo of the [C]hildren, [A.L.L.] and [A.L.L.], have been in alterative care for seven years and have never resided with Father during that time. [A.L.] has been

7 Father does not dispute that the Children have been under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for at least one year.

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under jurisdiction for over four years and has not lived with Father during that time. Father has not demonstrated sobriety in that he refuses to consistently participate in drug testing and treatment programs. While Father testified that he will engage in drug treatment now and had recently entered into drug treatment in September 2024, the [trial court] is not persuaded by his testimony. Father has not consistently engaged in substance abuse treatment since the case opened in 2017. Father has shown a pattern of testing positive for PCP and methamphetamine and then not testing regularly. In September 2024, he tested positive for ecstasy, methamphetamines, PCP, and [marijuana]. Father tested positive for PCP and methamphetamines via a hair follicle test on October 8, 2024. He has not established a safe, stable home to which the Children can be returned.

Father's third point on appeal does not complain about the trial court's findings and conclusions relating to the first additional finding required by section 211.447.5(3). As to the second additional finding, the trial court concluded that there was little likelihood that "these conditions" would be remedied at an early date so that the Children could be returned to Father in the near future. This finding necessarily refers to the "conditions" that are the subject of the first additional finding. It is plain, therefore, that when the trial court concluded that "these conditions" would not likely be remediated at an early date, it was referring to: (i) the extended number of years that each of the Children had been in alternative care and not living with Father; (ii) Father's failure to demonstrate sobriety and his refusal to consistently participate in drug testing and treatment programs; (iii) Father's demonstrated pattern of testing positive for PCP and methamphetamine; and (iv) Father's failure to establish a safe, stable home for the Children. And it is plain that the trial court's conclusions regarding the second alternative finding necessarily incorporated the conclusion in connection with the first alternative finding that the aforesaid conditions were of a "potentially harmful nature."

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The trial court also concluded as to the second additional finding that continuation of the parent-child relationship greatly diminished the Children's prospects for early integrations into a stable and permanent home. The trial court thus found both of the permissible alternatives for the second additional finding. Father's argument developing his third point on appeal only complains about the second additional finding in the Judgment, and even then, only about the first permissible means by which that finding can be made relating to the inability to remediate conditions at an early date. Father notes that this finding in the Judgment merely tracked the language of the statute, but omitted a "requisite finding" that the conditions referred to had a harmful impact on the Children. Father then argues that the trial court failed to find that any "harmful conditions" could not be corrected. Father's argument ignores that the trial court's reference to "these conditions" in addressing the second additional finding necessarily referred to the conditions identified by the trial court in addressing the first additional finding, including that the identified conditions were "potentially harmful." The trial court thus made a finding that the conditions that could not be remedied at an early date were harmful to the Children. Moreover, the trial court also evaluated the four non-exclusive evidentiary factors identified under section 211.447.5(3), concluding that clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supported findings under subsections (a), (b), and (d) of section 211.447.5(3). Father's argument developing his third point on appeal suggests that the trial court was required to make a requisite finding of harm to the Children in relation to each of these subsections. Father argues that "even if the court found the Father's parental rights

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should be terminated based on both factor (a) and factor (b) of [section] 211.447.5(3), this would be insufficient to establish that the harmful condition – Father's alleged chemical dependency and failure to provide–was left uncorrected." To support his assertion, Father relies on In re I.G.P., 375 S.W.3d at 121. In the cited portion of In re I.G.P., this Court discussed subsection (a), which relates to compliance with a social service plan, and observed that although "[f]ailure to comply with parts of the service plan is not grounds for automatic termination," "failure to achieve progress towards the terms of a social service plan supports 'termination of parental rights when a dangerous condition is left uncorrected as a result.'" Id. (citation and quotation omitted). In so holding, the Court underscored that the factor addressing whether a parent has complied with a service plan is meant to focus on whether progress has been made toward achieving the plan's goals to correct a dangerous condition. Id. "A lack of effort to comply with a plan, or a lack of success despite effort, can predict future problems," as it can show "the parent's likely efforts in the future to care for the child." In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d at 10 (citations omitted). Here, the trial court found: Father has failed to make progress in complying with the terms of the social service plans entered into with the Children's Division. Father was provided therapy . . . in 2018 but was discharged due to lack of engagement. In March 2022, he stopped participating with his therapist . . . . He reinitiated services with [his therapist] in the summer of 2022 but again failed to participate consistently such that [his therapist] unsuccessfully discharged him in May 2023. Father has not otherwise completed individual therapy. Father has been provided services through the Family Treatment Court Program, including substance abuse testing, treatment resources, and referrals. Father was discharged from the Treatment Court Program due to lack of participation. Overall, he has inconsistently participated in drug testing services and has tested positive for methamphetamine,

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PCP, [marijuana], and cocaine. His hair test taken September 30, 2021 was positive for cocaine. Since that positive test, he has continued to be inconsistent in submitting to drug testing and has not successfully completed substance abuse treatment. Father has not demonstrated sobriety to be able to safely parent the Children. Father has been provided parent aide services throughout the time the Children have been in alternative care[,] however he has been inconsistent in exercising his parenting time. Father refuses to follow the parent aide's rules established for the Children's safety and well-being, causing the Children to become upset. He has not established a safe, stable home to which the Children can be returned. Given the length of time the Children have been in alternative care and that services have been available, these circumstances are not likely to change in the reasonably foreseeable future to warrant reunification.

Contrary to Father's argument, these findings express the trial court's determination that the harmful conditions of Father's insobriety and unstable housing had been left uncorrected because, despite seven years of being on a social service plan, Father had never progressed toward achieving these objectives. Subsection (b) of section 211.447.5(3), regarding Father's failure to adjust his circumstances despite provided services, "require[d] the trial court to determine whether past services were successful in helping [him] remedy a harmful condition." Interest of A.M.W., 652 S.W.3d at 239 (quoting In re I.G.P., 375 S.W.3d at 125). The trial court found that Father had failed to adjust his circumstances and conduct on a continuing basis to provide a proper home for the Children, in spite of the Children Division's offered services for individual therapy, Family Treatment Court Program, weekly drug screenings, regular visitation with the Children, and parent aide parenting education. The trial court determined that Father had failed to complete therapy, the Family Treatment Court Program, and substance abuse treatment; that he tested positive for illicit drugs in September and October 2024; that he inconsistently exercised his parenting time; that he

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refused to follow the parent aide's rules "causing dysregulation in the Children"; and that he had not established a safe, stable home for the Children. The trial court found that "[g]iven the length of time the Children [had] been in alternative care and services [had] been available, these circumstances [were] not likely to change in the reasonably foreseeable future to warrant reunification." The trial court properly determined that the multitude of provided services over the seven years of the case had not remedied the harmful conditions of Father's issues with sobriety, consistency, compliance with rules, and stable housing. Regarding subsection (d) of section 211.447.5(3), "drug use is not grounds for termination, nor is chemical dependency: rather, the statute provides grounds for termination for a chemical dependency 'which cannot be treated.'" Interest of S.R.W., 717 S.W.3d 373, 386 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) (quoting In re D.D.C., 351 S.W.3d 722, 730 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011)). The trial court found that Father had a substance abuse addiction that cannot be treated because Father had "failed to consistently participate in drug testing, continued to test positive for illicit substances and . . . failed to successfully complete a drug treatment program during the time the Children [were] in care." The trial court determined that Father's substance abuse problem "directly and negatively impact[ed] his ability to safely parent the Children," and that he had "not demonstrated sobriety to safely parent the Children." The trial court found that "these circumstances [were] not likely to change in the reasonably foreseeable future to warrant reunification" "[g]iven the length of time the Children [had] been in alternative care and that services [had] been available." The trial court explicitly found that Father's chemical dependency was not treatable in

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light of all the substance abuse treatment that had been offered to Father during the pendency of the case, and that Father's untreated chemical dependency had a harmful impact on the Children by affecting his ability to safely parent. Father has not established that the trial court erred in concluding that his parental rights should be terminated for failure to rectify as contemplated by section 211.447.5(3). Point Three is denied. As noted above, because one statutory basis for terminating Father's parental rights is sufficient to permit us to affirm the trial court's Judgment, we need not address Father's first, second, and fourth points on appeal. In re A.C.G., 499 S.W.3d at 347; Interest of A.O.B., 666 S.W.3d at 298. Point Five: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that termination of Father's parental rights was in the Children's best interests Father's fifth point on appeal asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that it was in the Children's best interests to terminate his parental rights because the trial court imputed to Father concerns regarding Mother inappropriately touching or sexually abusing some of the Children, and because the trial court improperly found that the Children "might be better off in another home." After a trial court determines that clear, cogent, and convincing evidence supports one or more statutory grounds for termination, it must assess whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. In re S.M.F., 393 S.W.3d at 644; section 211.447.6. The best-interests determination "is a subjective assessment based on the totality of the circumstances." In re A.C.G., 499 S.W.3d at 344 (quoting In re

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M.T.E.H., 468 S.W.3d 383, 397 (Mo. App. S.D. 2015)). In making this determination, the trial court must evaluate and make findings on the following factors: (1) The emotional ties to the birth parent; (2) The extent to which the parent has maintained regular visitation or other contact with the child; (3) The extent of payment by the parent for the cost of care and maintenance of the child when financially able to do so including the time that the child is in the custody of the division or other child-placing agency; (4) Whether additional services would be likely to bring about lasting parental adjustment enabling a return of the child to the parent within an ascertainable period of time; (5) The parent's disinterest in or lack of commitment to the child; (6) The conviction of the parent of a felony offense that the court finds is of such a nature that the child will be deprived of a stable home for a period of years; . . . (7) Deliberate acts of the parent or acts of another of which the parent knew or should have known that subjects the child to a substantial risk of physical or mental harm.

Sections 211.447.7(1)-(7). There is no number of factors that needs to be proven or negated to find that termination is appropriate. Interest of A.M.W., 652 S.W.3d at 244. Father's fifth point on appeal first contends that the trial court abused its discretion by imputing concerns about Mother's inappropriate touching of some of the Children onto him. Relevant to this contention, the former case manager testified at the termination hearing that A.L.L., A.L.L., and S.K.J., Mother's child with a different father, had accused Mother of inappropriately touching them on separate occasions. She testified that although these incidents had never been adjudicated, one had been substantiated.

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The record reveals that the trial court did not impute these allegations to Father. The trial court found the following in addressing the best-interests factor relating to the Children's emotional ties to the parents: The Children have some emotional ties to Mother and Father. [S.K.J., A.L.L., A.L.L., and A.L.] have attended some family time with both parent[s]. For the past year, [S.K.J. and A.L.L.] have refused to attend visits with the Mother. [A.L.L.] has requested not to attend family time with the Mother. The bond between the parents and Children has undoubtedly deteriorated due to the parents' inconsistency in engagement in services and inability to align themselves with the Children's needs. [S.K.J., A.L.L., and A.L.L.] have all accused the Mother of inappropriate touching and/or sexual abuse. [A.L.L. and A.L.] have been in alternative care their entire life. [S.K.J. and A.L.L.] have shown little interest in participating in visits and have regularly refused to attend visits with Father.

Though these findings explain why the trial court concluded that the Children's emotional ties to Mother and Father had deteriorated, they do not impute Mother's sexual abuse allegations to Father. In any event, the Children's emotional ties to Father was only one of four best- interests factors that the trial court concluded weighed in favor of terminating Father's parental rights. In assessing the other best-interests factors, the trial court never again referenced the sexual abuse allegations against Mother. Father's contention that the trial court abused its discretion in imputing Mother's inappropriate touching of some of the Children to him is without merit. Father also complains that the trial court found that termination of his parental rights was in the Children's best interests because they "might be better off in another home." Father's contention is without merit. The trial court never made a finding that the Children "might be better off in another home." Rather, the record reflects that the trial

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court made its best-interests determination based on careful consideration of the evidence relevant to the factors under section 211.447.7. Pursuant to section 211.447.7(2), the trial court found that both parents had limitations to achieving consistent visits with the Children, such as lack of housing and inability to consistently follow the rules. The trial court determined that Father had additional transportation difficulties and exercised only half his visitation time with A.L. Pursuant to section 211.447.7(3), the trial court concluded that both parents had provided minimal support for the cost and maintenance of the Children, and specifically that Father had not financially supported the Children, other than food during family time and gifts for some birthdays and holidays. Pursuant to section 211.447.7(4), the trial court found the following: Additional services would not be likely to bring about lasting parental adjustment enabling the return of the Children to Mother or Father with[in] an ascertainable period of time. Mother and Father have had the opportunity to participate in numerous services meant to aid in their reunification with the Children for over seven years. Despite those services being in place such as substance abuse treatment, random drug testing, individual counseling, housing assistance, and parent aid[e] education, the same barriers to reunification remain as when the Children entered alternative care. These barriers include but are not limited to long term illicit substance use, unstable housing, and an inability to align themselves with the Children's mental and emotional safety. Following the denial of the previous termination petition in 2022, services were set up with different providers to give the parents a fresh start. Despite new individual and family therapists, new parent aides, new psychological evaluations, continued random drug testing and substance abuse treatment referrals, and housing assistance, the parents failed to engage in services consistently. Admittedly, each parent has participated in supervised visitation but safety concerns have continued throughout the Children being in care. Perhaps most importantly, neither parent has successfully completed drug treatment or demonstrated long term sobriety which is the central concern regarding the parents' ability to safely care for and parent the Children.

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Finally, the trial court found no evidence of a felony conviction for either parent pursuant to section 211.447.7(6), nor any acts that subjected the Children to the risk of physical or mental harm pursuant to section 211.447.7(7). Based on the totality of these factors, the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that it was in the Children's best interests to terminate Father's parental rights. The record does not support a conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in doing so, and certainly does not support Father's contention that the trial court made its best-interests determination based on a subjective view that the Children would be "better off in another home." In the argument portion of his brief, Father summarily asserts that "a finding that he has not successfully completed drug treatment or demonstrated long term sobriety, standing alone, is not enough, and should never be enough, to support a finding that it is in the best interest of the Children to terminate his parental rights as to them." And Father summarily contends that sufficient evidence does not support the trial court's findings on each factor under section 211.447.7. Neither of these summary arguments is contemplated by, or encompassed within, the claims of trial court error identified in Father's fifth point on appeal. Rule 84.04(e) ("The argument shall be limited to those errors included in the 'Points Relied On'"). "Arguments raised for the first time in the argument portion of a brief and not raised in the points relied on are not preserved for review and are considered abandoned." In re A.C.G., 499 S.W.3d at 346 n.4 (quoting In re M.T.E.H., 468 S.W.3d at 398). Point Five is denied.

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Conclusion The Judgment is affirmed. __________________________________ Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

All concur