IN THE MATTER OF: SHIRLEY MAE BUTLER, INC/DSB, GREGORY LEE, Petitioner-Appellant v. KIMBERLY CLARK, Respondent-Respondent, LORETTA ROUSE and REBECCA ALLEN, Intervenors-Respondents

IN THE MATTER OF: SHIRLEY MAE BUTLER, INC/DSB,

GREGORY LEE,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

KIMBERLY CLARK,

Respondent-Respondent,

LORETTA ROUSE and REBECCA ALLEN,

Intervenors-Respondents.

No. SD38425

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PULASKI COUNTY Honorable Brad D. Eidson, Special Judge AFFIRMED Gregory Lee (Lee) appeals from the orders entered on February 13, 2024, which: (1) approved the final settlement of conservator Loretta Rouse (Rouse); and

In Division

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(2) discharged her and the sureties on her bond. See § 475.290; § 475.315. 1 Lee presents four points on appeal. Two of the points involve the judgment appointing a guardian and conservator for Shirley Butler (Mother) in November 2019. Lee contends that judgment is void because Mother's due process rights were violated. The other two points involve the approval of the final settlement of conservator Rouse an d the grant of a discharge to her in February 2024. Lee contends the order approving the final settlement was void because: (1) he was not given a hearing on his objections; and (2) the trial court exceeded its statutory authority in granting a discharge because no one provided Rouse with a receipt that complied with § 475.315. Because none of these points have merit, we affirm. Due to their interrelated nature, we will review Points 1 and 2 together, followed by Points 3 and 4 together. Since Lee's points involve rulings at the beginning and end of this portion of the probate proceeding, the facts relevant to each set of points will be set out in the discussion and decision section of this opinion. Standard of Review In re Estate of Blair, 317 S.W.3d 84 (Mo. App. 2010), provides the following summary of the applicable standard of review for this appeal: In this court-tried case, our review is governed by Rule 84.13(d) and the principles articulated in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). This Court must affirm the trial court's judgment unless it

1 All references to § 475.290 are to RSMo Cum. Supp. (2018). Unless otherwise specified, all other statutory references are to RSMo (2016). All rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2024).

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is not supported by substantial evidence, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. The trial court's ruling on questions of law is reviewed de novo. We review the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the judgment and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences. We defer to the trial court's determination of witness credibility and recognize that the court is free to accept or reject all, part or none of the testimony presented.

Blair, 317 S.W.3d at 86 (internal footnote, quotation marks, and citations omitted); see Estate of Jones, 696 S.W.3d 485, 488 (Mo. App. 2024). "The judgment is presumed correct, and the party challenging the judgment bears the burden of proving it erroneous." O'Connell v. Deering, 631 S.W.3d 649, 652 (Mo. App. 2021); see Matter of Spruill, 709 S.W.3d 438, 445 (Mo. App. 2025). Our summary of the relevant facts, which is set forth below, has been prepared in accordance with these principles. Blair, 317 S.W.3d at 86. Discussion and Decision Points 1 and 2 Lee's first two points arise from the appointment of a guardian and conservator for Mother in November 2019. The following facts are relevant to the disposition of these two points. On August 29, 2019, Lee's counsel filed a verified petition seeking the appointment of a guardian for Mother's person and a conservator of her estate. The petition alleged that, due to diagnoses of depression, cognitive impairment, and early Alzheimer's disease, Mother lacked the capacity "to meet essential requirements for food, clothing, shelter, safety or other care such that serious physical injury, illness or disease is likely to occur because of the physical or mental condition specified

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above" and lacked the ability "to manage [her] financial resources without supervision because of the physical or mental condition specified above." The petition further alleged that "[t]here are no less intrusive alternatives to guardianship and conservatorship available to provide for [Mother's] care and financial needs." According to the petition: The attached progress notes by Michael M. Whetstone, PhD summarize that [Mother] demonstrates some very severe deficiencies. She has significant deficits in visual perception and visual motor speed and coordination. Auditory and visual memory performances are defective. She is poorly oriented to time and her attention to tasks is defective.

Finally, the petition alleged the following examples of recent "concerning behavior" by Mother: She has accused family members of breaking into her house and moving things around as well as hiding her medication. She has accused various family members of stealing her money. She had her mail stopped because she thought someone was stealing her mail. She hid $16,000.00 in cash in her home. She ran away from her daughter's home. [Mother] has executed three different powers of attorneys in the past eighteen months, one on February 23, 2018 appointing her son and daughter as co-attorneys-in-fact, one on August 27, 2018 appointing her son as attorney-in-fact and her daughter as successor, and the third on January 15, 2019, appointing her daughter as attorney-in-fact and designating a successor. She is unable to consistently relate what she desires as to her care and placement. Cash is missing from her bank account. There have been approximately three calls made to the Elder Abuse hotline regarding [Mother] by both family members and healthcare providers. In January she left her Pulaski County home of more than thirty years and her whereabouts were unknown to her son for several weeks even though he was previously caring for [Mother] on a daily basis.

The petition requested that Rouse, the Pulaski County Public Administrator, be appointed as Mother's guardian and conservator. The exhibits attached to the

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petition included Dr. Whetstone's medical records for Mother and a letter regarding Mother's treatment from Dr. Saima Jabeen. Dr. Jabeen stated that Mother, a 71-year- old female, was "an established patient at our clinic. She has been suffering from cognitive decline over the last many months, progressive in nature. It is to the point that she is no longer safe to stay alone in her home. In my opinion, I would recommend [an] assisted living facility." Exhibit B of the petition stated that Lee was Mother's son and Kimberly Clark (Clark) was Mother's daughter. In addition to the petition, Lee also filed a motion for the appointment of a guardian ad litem, a motion for the appointment of a special process server, a notice of hearing to interested parties, and a notice of hearing to Mother. On August 30, 2019, the trial court entered an order appointing a special process server. On September 5, 2019, the court entered an order appointing Carrie Williamson (Williamson) as Mother's attorney. The court also sent a notice of hearing to Mother advising her that the petition would be heard on September 18, 2019, and notifying her that Williamson had been appointed as Mother's attorney. Mother was personally served with a copy of the summons and petition on September 7, 2019. On September 11, 2019, an attorney entered her appearance for Clark and requested a continuance of the hearing date. On September 18, 2019, the trial court granted the continuance and rescheduled the hearing for November 25,

1. Notice of the ruling was sent to all of the attorneys. On September 24, 2019,

Mother was sent a notice that the petition would be heard on November 25, 2019.

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On October 15, 2019, Mother's attorney, Williamson, filed a motion requesting the appointment of an emergency guardian ad litem and conservator ad litem. The motion alleged that: (1) Mother suffered from Alzheimer's disease and presented symptoms of significant memory loss and confusion; (2) her current condition and circumstances caused her to experience depression and anxiety; (3) Lee and Clark were in a dispute about what actions should be taken for Mother; (4) the dispute was causing Mother to experience distress; and (5) Rouse had consented to be temporarily appointed as Mother's guardian ad litem and conservator ad litem. On October 21, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on Williamson's motion. The court's docket entry stated the parties were in agreement that the court appoint Rouse as a temporary guardian and conservator. The memo was signed by Clark and her attorney, Lee and his attorney, Rouse, and Williamson. In relevant part, the court's formal order stated:

1. [Mother] suffers from Alzheimer's disease and presents symptoms

of significant memory loss and confusion. [Mother's] condition and her current circumstances also cause her to experience depression and anxiety.

1. [Mother] is not able to live independently in her private residence

and, when she last resided on her own, [Mother's] memory issues caused her to be unable to ensure that her basic essential needs were met, in that she was unable to manage her own medications, she was unable to drive, she was not sleeping on a regular schedule, and she struggled to remember what she had or had not done on a daily basis.

1. [Mother] is not able to independently manage her own financial

affairs ... within the past nine months.

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1. [Mother's] present condition meets the definitions of an

"incapacitated" and "disabled" person, as defined by Missouri Revised Statutes § 475.010(6)(a) and (11).

1. The appointment of the public administrator is necessary on a

temporary and emergency basis to be appointed as temporary guardian and conservator regarding [Mother's] care and maintenance and regarding the management of [Mother's] assets.

The court issued letters appointing Rouse as guardian ad litem and conservator ad litem. On November 19, 2019, Williamson filed her report as Mother's counsel in affidavit form. In relevant part, this report stated:

1. Pursuant to Missouri law, the undersigned visited [Mother] at

Hopedale Cottage ... on September 7, 2019, October 11, 2019 and November 8, 2019.

1. At the visit on November 8, 2019 and during the prior visits, counsel

for [Mother] specifically advised [Mother]:

a. She has the right to be represented by an attorney, including an attorney retained by her or by the undersigned court appointed at torney;

b. She has the right to have a jury trial on the petitions for guardianship and conservatorship filed in the above and foregoing cause;

c. She has the right to present evidence in her behalf;

d. She and her attorney have the right to cross-examine witnesses who testify against her;

e. She has the right to remain silent;

f. She has the right to have the hearing open or closed to the public;

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g. She has the right to a hearing conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence in civil proceedings, except as modified by Missouri Revised Statutes Chapter 475; and

h. She has the right to be present at the hearing.

1. At each of the three above mentioned visits, counsel observed that

[Mother] appeared to be well groomed and well nourished. [Mother] was able [to] follow and participate in a conversation with the undersigned, although at times the undersigned had to redirect the conversation back to the subject matter being discussed. At times during these visits, [Mother] would become confused about recent events and [Mother] appeared to struggle remembering daily matters, such as how many cups of coffee she had consumed, where she put her room key, where she put her television remote, et cetera. Additionally, [Mother] exhibited emotional responses when she thought about having to transition from independent living to being in a care facility and about the person who would be the one to make decisions for her in the future.

1. Counsel has communicated with [Mother] and received the

following authorizations:

a. To announce to the court that [Mother] has not retained and does not intend to retain a separate attorney to represent her;

b. To waive and give up the right to jury trial and to instead have the issues determined by the judge only;

c. To request the hearing be closed to the public;

d. To announce to the court that [Mother] does not wish to be present at the hearing on this matter; ....

1. The undersigned reviewed [Mother's] medical records and

confirms that [Mother] has been diagnosed with early onset Alzheimer's disease and depression and that she also has issues with auditory perception, visual perception, and visual motor speed and coordination.

1. Based on the undersigned counsel's personal observations of

[Mother], a review of [Mother's] medical records, discussions with the

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Division of Senior Services, discussions with the Hopedale Cottage staff, discussions with [Rouse], and discussions with [Lee] and [Clark], counsel for [Mother] believes that [Mother] is disabled and incapacitated, as those terms are defined by the Missouri Probate Code. Counsel for [Mother] further believes that it would be in the best interest of [Mother] for the court to issue letters of guardianship and conservatorship and to enter such other and further orders as the court finds to be in the best interests of [Mother].

The trial court conducted the hearing on November 25, 2019, as scheduled. The court took judicial notice of the entire file. Lee and his attorney were present. Clark and her attorney were present. Mother appeared by Williamson. Rouse appeared in person. Lee called Rouse as a witness, who gave the following testimony:

1. Rouse was the Pulaski County Public Administrator.

1. She had been asked to be appointed as Mother's guardian and

conservator.

1. Mother, who was 72 years old, had been diagnosed with

Alzheimer's disease and had cognitive impairment and depression.

1. Rouse had met with Mother on four occasions and determined

that she lacked the capacity to meet her essential requirements for food, clothing and self-care, so the requests in the petition were in Mother's best interest.

1. Rouse believed that Mother lacked the ability to manage her

financial resources without supervision because of her medical and mental conditions.

1. After reviewing Mother's medical records and meeting with her

on a number of occasions, Rouse believed Mother needed to be placed in a supervised living facility with 24-hour care because Mother had extreme short-term memory issues.

1. Rouse consented to act as Mother's guardian and conservator

and believed those appointments were in Mother's best interest.

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1. Rouse agreed to work with Lee and Clark to facilitate further

communication and relationships that would be in Mother's best interest.

There was no cross-examination of Rouse by any party. Neither Lee nor Williamson asserted any objections that Mother's due process rights had been violated in any way. Dr. Whetstone's May 2019 neuropsychological assessment was admitted in evidence. Williamson summarized the findings in that report this way: MS. WILLIAMSON: It's my understanding that my client has seen Dr. Michael Whetstone, a neuropsychologist in Springfield, and he did a complete neuropsychological assessment, Your Honor. And in his report he did identify a significant decline in general intellectual functioning for [Mother]; that she has a severe deficiency of general memory and learning; that she was poorly oriented to time; that she has visual perceptual abilities that are significantly impaired as well as auditory deficits. And that she was diagnosed with early onset of Alzheimer's disease and depression. And I believe the information in this assessment report supports the Court's finding that my client is incapacitated and disabled, Your Honor.

Williamson also reported on her discussions with Mother about her rights: I did further talk to [Mother] on all three occasions about her rights. And I wasn't sure the first time that I met with her that she would be able to be cognizant of them. But the more that she has become settled; my last visit with her, I think she did understand what we were talking about. And she definitely did not want a jury trial. She did request that this hearing be closed to the public. She did not want to be here because she thought that would [be] too upsetting. And she – she had me make a few statements on her behalf which are in my report. And she has met with [Rouse] on several occasions and I think that she will work well with [Rouse]. And I do recommend to the Court that the Court find [Mother] to be incapacitated and disabled and to appoint [Rouse] to be her guardian and conservator.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered a judgment of incapacity and disability and appointed Rouse as Mother's guardian and conservator

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(hereinafter, the November 2019 Judgment). The court made the following relevant findings:

1. This was an "uncontested matter[.]"

1. "Reasonable, sufficient and timely notice of the petition and

hearing was duly served upon all parties entitled thereto by law or order of this Court."

1. Clear and convincing evidence showed that Mother was a totally

incapacitated person, as defined by § 475.010 RSMo Cum. Supp. (2018), because her capacity to receive and evaluate information or to communicate decisions was "impaired to such an extent as to render [Mother] incapable of meeting all of [her] essential requirements for food, clothing, shelter, safety or other care so that serious physical injury, illness or disease is likely to occur."

1. Mother was a totally disabled person, as defined by § 475.010

RSMo Cum. Supp. (2018), because her ability to receive and evaluate information or to communicate decisions was "impaired to such an extent as to render [her] unable to manage all of her financial resources."

1. By reason of Mother's total and absolute incapacity and

disability as a result of her early onset of Alzheimer's disease, depression, visual and auditory perception, and visual motor speed and coordination, it was necessary to appoint a guardian of Mother's person and a conservator of her estate.

Letters of guardianship and conservatorship of an incapacitated and disabled person were issued to Rouse that same day. No party filed any authorized after-trial motion relating to the November 2019 Judgment. Lee's first and second points challenge the November 2019 Judgment finding Mother incapacitated and disabled and appointing Rouse as Mother's guardian and conservator. These two points state:

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POINT 1

The trial court erred entering the [November 2019 Judgment] because the Judgment is void for lack of personal jurisdiction over [Mother,] which violated her constitutional right to due process, guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Art. I, § 10, Missouri Constitution, in that [Mother] was not served with Notice of the November 25, 2019 hearing as required in § 475.075.2, RSMo [Cum. Supp. (2018)] depriving her of notice and an opportunity to be heard.

POINT 2

The trial court erred in entering the [November 2019 Judgment], because the Judgment is void since [Mother's] constitutional right to due process was violated, in that she had a statutory right to effective assistance of counsel (§ 475.075.4, RSMo [Cum. Supp. (2018)]) but she received ineffective assistance of counsel.

For the following reasons, these points lack merit. Lee Did Not File a Timely Notice of Appeal from the November 2019 Judgment The right to appeal from a probate court's judgment is purely statutory. Int. of Z.N.B., 703 S.W.3d 700, 703 (Mo. App. 2024); Matter of Huelsing, 682 S.W.3d 65, 71 (Mo. App. 2023). "The probate code contains a specific set of statutes that govern when a party may appeal from a judgment issued by the probate court, including guardianships and conservatorships." In re Est. of Whittaker, 261 S.W.3d 615, 617 (Mo. App. 2008). A petitioner who applied for an adjudication of the mental condition of another person may appeal from the final adjudication of that issue. See § 472.170.1; In re Forbeck, 310 S.W.3d 740, 749 (Mo. App. 2010). An appeal must be taken within the time and in the manner provided by statute for this Court to address it. In re Est. of Forhan, 149 S.W.3d 537, 541 (Mo. App. 2004). An appellate court may not enlarge the statutory period within which an appeal

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must be taken. Id. In probate cases, § 472.180 states that "[a]ll appeals shall be taken within the time prescribed by the rules of civil procedure relating to appeals." Id. Rule 81.04(a) provides that a notice of appeal must be filed no later than ten days after the judgment or order appealed from becomes final. Id. Rule 81.05(a)(1) states that "[a] judgment becomes final at the expiration of thirty days after its entry if no timely authorized after-trial motion is filed." Id.; see also Clark's Est. v. Finney, 610 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Mo. App. 1980) (the probate division retains control over a judgment adjudicating mental condition for 30 days pursuant to Rule 75.01). The November 2019 Judgment was entered on November 25, 2019. It became final on December 25, 2019. Any notice of appeal from the judgment was due by Monday, January 4, 2020. Lee did not file any notice of appeal from the November 2019 Judgment. His notice of appeal, filed February 23, 2024, stated that he was appealing from the order approving final settlement entered on February 13, 2024. 2

Lee Cannot Appeal from the November 2019 Judgment Because He Is Not Permitted to Take an Inconsistent Position on Appeal As noted above, a petitioner who applied for an adjudication of the mental condition of another person may appeal from the final adjudication of that issue. See

2 Lee's appeal from the order approving final settlement is statutorily authorized. "The provisions of Chapter 472, unless therein restricted to decedents' estates, apply to guardianships and conservatorships." § 475.020. A conservator who resigns must file a final settlement within 90 days. § 475.290.1. An order approving a conservator's final settlement is appealable pursuant to § 472.160(14), which is not restricted in its application to just decedents' estates. See Int. of Z.N.B., 703 S.W.3d at 704.

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§ 472.170. An appellant seeking relief via this statute, however, will not be permitted to take an inconsistent position on appeal. Lee is the party who filed the petition seeking the appointment of a guardian and conservator for Mother. He is the party who presented evidence in support of that petition. He received all of the relief he requested because the court ruled in his favor and appointed Rouse as guardian and conservator, just as Lee proposed. He waived the right to challenge the November 2019 Judgment because his arguments are inconsistent with the position he took in the trial court. In Matter of Doze, 717 S.W.3d 240 (Mo. App. 2025), the western district of this Court addressed the same issue this way: Under Section 472.170, appeals are allowed from the circuit court's final adjudication in an investigation of the mental condition of any person alleged to be disabled, incapacitated, or mentally ill, and may be brought by the petitioner who applied for the adjudication. Two of [the petitioner-appellant's] points (Points III and IV) challenge the circuit court's determination that [the respondent] Queen is totally incapacitated and disabled. While [the appellant] can statutorily bring these claims, they have been waived.

[The appellant's] "Petition for Appointment of a Guardian and/or Conservator" alleged that Queen has an intellectual disability and fully lacks the capacity to meet essential requirements for food, clothing, shelter, safety or other care. Further, that Queen fully lacks the ability to manage her financial resources. After hearing evidence, the circuit court agreed and entered a "Judgment of Incapacity and Disability." The court found Queen "totally incapacitated" and "totally disabled." [The appellant] now contends the court erred in finding Queen totally incapacitated and disabled and argues the court should have found Queen only partially incapacitated and disabled.

"An appellant cannot take a position on appeal contrary to the position taken at trial," and "remains bound to the position it took in the trial court." Winter v. Winter, 167 S.W.3d 239, 253 (Mo. App. 2005);

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Eastwood v. North Cent. Missouri Drug Task Force, 15 S.W.3d 65, 68 (Mo. App. 2000). Because [the appellant] advocated (and even presented evidence to support) that Queen is totally incapacitated and disabled, she cannot now claim the circuit court erred [by] finding Queen totally incapacitated and disabled. [The appellant's] third and fourth points on appeal are denied.

Doze, 717 S.W.3d at 242-43 (emphasis in original). We reach the same conclusion here. Lee Lacks Standing to Assert Any Alleged Due Process Violations of Mother's Rights Lee's first and second points purport to assert alleged due process violations of Mother's rights during the hearing on Lee's petition to appoint a guardian and conservator for her. Based on these alleged violations, Lee claims the November 2019 Judgment is void. Preliminarily, we note that the November 2019 Judgment cannot be collaterally attacked by Lee because it is not void as to him. "Courts favor finality of judgments, so the concept of a void judgment is narrowly restricted." Goins v. Goins, 406 S.W.3d 886, 891-92 (Mo. banc 2013). A judgment is void "only if the circuit court that rendered it (1) lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (2) lacked personal jurisdiction; or (3) entered the judgment in a manner that violated due process." Id. Here, the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this civil case, personal jurisdiction over Lee, and did not violate his due process rights in entering the November 2019 Judgment. Therefore, Lee cannot collaterally attack that prior judgment in this appeal. See Brown v. Haley, 687 S.W.3d 27, 35 (Mo. App. 2024). Furthermore, a void judgment can only have its validity questioned by someone with

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whose rights or interests it conflicts. D.H.C. v. Juv. Officer, 674 S.W.3d 804, 808 (Mo. App. 2023); Taylor v. Taylor, 47 S.W.3d 377, 384 (Mo. App. 2001). That does not apply to Lee because he sought the appointment of a guardian and conservator for Mother and received all of the relief he requested. The premise of Lee's first and second points is that Mother's due process rights were violated. Mother's attorney did not raise any such objection at trial, and Mother did not appeal from the November 2019 Judgment. Before addressing the issues on the merits, we first must decide whether Lee has standing to make these arguments. See Byrne & Jones Enters., Inc. v. Monroe City R-1 Sch. Dist., 493 S.W.3d 847, 851 (Mo. banc 2016); Laws v. Allen, 697 S.W.3d 834, 837-38 (Mo. App. 2024); Four Star Enters. Equip., Inc. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 648 S.W.3d 903, 907-08 (Mo. App. 2022). The definition of adversary probate proceeding includes "any proceeding brought pursuant to any provision of chapters 472, 473, 474, and 475 which requires, as a condition precedent to an entry of an order or judgment on the merits, notice of hearing to persons interested in the proceeding[.]" § 472.140.2. When the appointment of a guardian or conservator of a protectee is sought, the alleged protectee – the respondent, must be served with: A copy of the petition; a written notice stating the time and place the proceeding will be heard by the court, the name and address of appointed counsel, and the names and addresses of the witnesses who may be called to testify in support of the petition; and with a copy of the respondent's rights as set forth in subsections 9 and 10 of this section.

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§ 475.075.2 RSMo Cum. Supp. (2018). Therefore, a proceeding to appoint a guardian or conservator for an adult is an adversary proceeding. Spruill, 709 S.W.3d at 442; McDermot v. Doner, 637 S.W.3d 402, 410 (Mo. App. 2021); Matter of Gurgel, 543 S.W.3d 135, 138 n.6 (Mo. App. 2018). "Since guardianship and conservatorship entail a deprivation of the fundamental liberty to go unimpeded about one's ordinary affairs, due process requirements apply to such actions." State ex rel. Owen v. Rea, 929 S.W.2d 244, 245 (Mo. App. 1996). The premise of Lee's arguments in his first and second points is that he has standing to assert an alleged violation of his adversary's due process rights during the appointment hearing. That premise is false. "Constitutional rights are personal to the affected party, and third parties do not have standing to challenge their violation." State ex rel. Robinson v. Off. of Atty. Gen., 87 S.W.3d 335, 339 (Mo. App. 2002); see also Silcox v. Silcox, 6 S.W.3d 899, 903 (Mo. banc 1999) (in order to have standing to raise a constitutional issue, the objecting party's rights must have been affected); Baker v. Baker, 690 S.W.3d 616, 621 (Mo. App. 2024) (a party lacked standing to assert a due process challenge belonging to another party). We also note that this appeal necessarily arises from § 472.170. The scope of an appeal pursuant to that statute is limited to the court's determination of mental disability and incapacitation. See Doze, 717 S.W.3d at 243; Matter of Gonsalves, 616 S.W.3d 745, 747 (Mo. App. 2020). In Doze, the western district of this Court held that the petitioner lacked standing to challenge: (1) the respondent's waiver of a jury trial; (2) the waiver of respondent's right to be present during hearings; (3) the

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appointment of someone else as respondent's guardian and conservator; (4) the court's ruling as to respondent's right to vote, drive and marry; and (5) the court's financial findings. Doze, 717 S.W.3d at 243. In Gonsalves, our Court held in a § 472.170 appeal that the respondent's granddaughter lacked standing to challenge: (1) the waivers of the respondent's right to a jury trial and to attend certain hearings; (2) the alleged ineffectiveness of respondent's counsel; (3) the failure to swear respondent as a witness; and (4) the failure to appoint the granddaughter as guardian. Gonsalves, 616 S.W.3d at 747. For all of the reasons set out above, Points 1 and 2 are denied. Points 3 and 4 Points 3 and 4 involve the approval of conservator Rouse's final settlement and the grant of a discharge to her. The following facts are relevant to the disposition of these two points. On November 16, 2023, conservator Rouse filed her annual settlement. The ending inventory showed a balance of $11,387.96. Rouse's term as Pulaski County Public Administrator was to end on December 31, 2024. On December 27, 2023, Rouse tendered her early resignation and asked that the new public administrator, Rebecca Allen (Allen), be appointed in Rouse's stead. Rouse also filed a proposed final settlement dated "12/15/2023" that showed an ending inventory balance of $11,358.09. Lee's attorney received an electronic notice of the filing through Case.net. On December 27, 2023, Allen filed a proposed inventory of the estate

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showing the same $11,358.09 balance. The inventory contained Allen's affidavit. In relevant part, it stated: The undersigned Conservator, being first duly sworn, states that the foregoing is a full inventory and description of all the real and personal property of the ward which has come into the possession or to the knowledge of the Conservator, including a statement of all encumbrances, liens, and other charges on any property, and of all the property which was in the possession of the disabled ward but which is being held or is being claimed by another, as far as the Conservator knows ....

On January 4, 2024, the trial court entered an order accepting Rouse's resignation and granting letters of guardianship and conservatorship to successor Allen. In relevant part, this order stated that Allen "is further directed and authorized to collect and receipt for all the assets of this estate, as required by law." On January 13, 2024, Lee filed objections to Rouse's final settlement and past annual settlements. Lee submitted 20 objections in his filing. On February 13, 2024, the trial court approved Rouse's final settlement. That same day, the court entered an order discharging Rouse. In relevant part, the order stated: The final settlement of Loretta Rouse, former fiduciary in the above estate, having been heretofore approved and, distribution of the personal assets in the above to Rebecca Allen, public administrator, and successor fiduciary having been ordered, there now being exhibited to the court the receipt of said successor fiduciary. Lee's third and fourth points challenge the order approving final settlement and granting Rouse a discharge. These two points state: POINT 3

The trial court erred in approving [Rouse's] final settlement, because the required statutory notice that she would file her final settlement was

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not given [to Mother] and [Lee was] not provided a hearing on the objections to Rouse's final settlement, in that the lack of notice and hearing violated the constitutional rights to due process guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Art. I, § 10, Missouri Constitution of [Lee and Mother], for failing to provide them with notice and an opportunity to be heard.

POINT 4

The trial court erred in granting [Rouse] a discharge, because the court exceeded its statutory authority when it granted her discharge, in that no one provided [Rouse] with a receipt that complied with § 475.315, RSMo.

For the following reasons, these points lack merit. Point 3 is based on § 475.290. In relevant part, this statute states:

1. Conservators shall make final settlement of their conservatorship at

a time fixed by the court, either by rule or otherwise, within ninety days after termination of their authority[.] For the purpose of settlement, the conservator shall make a just and true exhibit of the account between himself or herself and the protectee, and file the same in the court having jurisdiction thereof, and cause a copy of the account, together with a written notice stating the day on which and the court in which the conservator will make settlement, to be delivered ... in case of ... resignation, to the succeeding conservator ... at least twenty days before the date set for settlement. ....

1. At the time specified in the notice, the court, upon satisfactory proof

of the delivery of a copy of the account and written notice of the settlement to the ... person entitled thereto, ... then upon proof of compliance with such order, shall proceed to examine the accounts of the conservator, correct all errors therein, if any there be, and make a final settlement with the conservator; or the court may, for good cause, continue the settlement and proceed therein at any time agreed upon by the parties or fixed by the court.

Id.

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Due to Rouse's resignation, her authority as public administrator was set to end as of December 31, 2023, so she was required to make final settlement within 90 days. § 475.290.1. Rouse filed her final settlement, dated 12/15/2023, on December 26, 2023. Because Rouse was resigning, she was required to provide a copy of the account to the new public administrator, Allen, who was Mother's succeeding conservator. It is obvious that Rouse did so, because Allen filed her own inventory on December 27, 2023, and that inventory matched Rouse's final settlement in every relevant respect. Lee's attorney received a copy of the final settlement by e-notice through Case.net, and Lee was able to file his objections on January 13, 2024. The trial court did not approve Rouse's final settlement until February 13, 2024. We discern no prejudice to Lee from this sequence of events. Lee next argues that his due process rights were violated because he did not receive a hearing on his objections. 3 This argument fails for two reasons. First, our review of the trial court record does not establish that this constitutional objection was ever presented to the trial court. "[T]o preserve constitutional questions for review on appeal, the constitutional issue must be raised in the trial court at the earliest opportunity, consistent with good pleading and orderly procedure." Carpenter v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 250 S.W.3d 697, 701 (Mo. banc 2008). "This rule is necessary to prevent surprise to the opposing party

3 Point 3 also complains that Mother's due process rights were violated, but Lee lacks standing to assert that challenge for the reasons explained in our discussion of Points 1 and 2.

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and to allow the trial court the opportunity to identify and rule on the issue." Id. Thus, this claim of error is not preserved and will not be addressed. Second, § 475.290 does not require that the trial court hold a hearing before approving a final settlement. Cf. § 473.590 (requiring a hearing on objections to be held); Estate of Jones, 718 S.W.3d 167, 171 (Mo. App. 2025). Instead, the court is merely required to "proceed to examine the accounts of the conservator, correct all errors therein, if any there be, and make a final settlement with the conservator[.]" § 475.290.3. In Point 4, Lee contends the trial court exceeded its statutory authority in granting a discharge because no one provided Rouse with a receipt that complied with § 475.315. Lee argues that neither Mother nor Allen provided the required receipt. Based on our review of the statute and the record, this argument lacks merit. Section 475.315 states: Successors of conservators or personal representatives, having received all money and other estate found to be due to their protectees or to the estate of a deceased protectee, and protectees having received all money and other estate due from their conservators on the expiration of their conservatorship, shall acknowledge satisfaction of record in the proper court; or if the protectee, on due notice, neglects or refuses to make acknowledgment, or cannot be found in the county to be served with notice, the court shall enter a discharge of his conservator on the record and give him a certificate therefor but the court shall not enter the discharge, nor give such certificate, until the conservator has exhibited to the court the written statement of the protectee, acknowledging the receipt of all money and other property due from the conservator, which written statement shall be signed by the protectee and in every case acknowledged by the protectee to be his free act and deed, before some officer authorized by law to take acknowledgment of deeds. Upon acknowledgment of satisfaction the conservator shall be discharged of record.

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Whenever a court is called upon to apply a statute, the primary obligation is to ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words in their plain and ordinary meaning. Berhow v. State, 713 S.W.3d 521, 523 (Mo. banc 2025). A statute cannot be interpreted in a way that yields an unreasonable or absurd result which defeats the purpose of the legislation. Id. Section 475.315 applies in two situations. The first situation arises when a successor conservator is appointed. Here, Mother was still totally disabled when Rouse resigned. Allen was appointed as the successor conservator. Pursuant to the plain language of the statute, Allen had to acknowledge satisfaction of record in the trial court once she received all money and other property belonging to Mother. Allen's inventory affidavit stated that she had come into possession of the property listed in the inventory. The court's January 4, 2024, order stated that Allen "is further directed and authorized to collect and receipt for all the assets of this estate, as required by law." The court's February 13, 2024, order discharging Rouse stated that Allen had exhibited to the court her receipt as successor fiduciary. Therefore, the requirements of § 475.315 were met. Contrary to Lee's argument, there is no requirement in the statute that Rouse be provided with a receipt when a successor conservator is appointed. Lee also argues that Mother did not provide a receipt. That argument lacks merit as well. The second situation in which § 475.315 applies is when a

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conservatorship ends and the former protectee, no longer in need of a conservator, has received all money and other estate due from his or her conservator. It is in this second situation that a former protectee must provide a receipt before a conservator can be discharged. As noted above, Mother was still totally disabled when Allen was appointed, so this portion of the statute did not apply. To require a receipt from Mother, who lacks the capacity to either understand her financial affairs or to sign legal documents, would be an absurd and unreasonable construction of the statute. For all of the foregoing reasons, Points 3 and 4 lack merit and are denied. The order approving Rouse's final settlement and discharging her are affirmed.

JEFFREY W. BATES, J. – OPINION AUTHOR DON E. BURRELL, J. – CONCUR BECKY J. WEST, J. – CONCUR