Maurice R. Charles vs. Department of Corrections

MAURICE R. CHARLES, ) ) WD87655 Appellant, ) v. ) OPINION FILED: ) DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ) December 30, 2025 ) Respondent. ) ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri The Honorable Christopher Kirby Limbaugh, Judge

Before Division Three: Alok Ahuja, Presiding Judge, Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge, and Thomas N. Chapman, Judge

Maurice Charles ("Charles") appeals a judgment of the Circuit Court of Cole County that granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the Department of Corrections ("DOC") on Charles's petition for declaratory judgment. Charles's petition requested that the calculation of his parole eligibility date be declared an unlawful application of a parole eligibility statute and regulation in violation of the ex post facto clause of the Missouri Constitution and the Constitution of the United States. The judgment is affirmed.

2 Background In October of 2022, Charles filed a petition for declaratory judgment that requested that the circuit court declare unlawful the DOC's calculation of his parole eligibility date on his consecutive sentences for the offenses of second-degree murder and armed criminal action. Charles asserted that the DOC's 2021 calculation of his parole eligibility date constituted an unlawful application of a statute and regulation in violation of the ex post facto clause of the Missouri Constitution and the Constitution of the United States. Charles's petition contained the following allegations. In 2000, Charles was convicted of second-degree murder and armed criminal action. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder. He was sentenced to ten years for armed criminal action. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively. In 2010, Charles received correspondence 1 from an institutional parole officer. This correspondence indicated that he was scheduled for a parole hearing in August of

1. In 2021, Charles received correspondence from the Missouri Board of Probation

1 This unsigned document was addressed to Charles from an institutional parole officer and provided:

RE: Hearing/Release Date

Your 85% date is 8/18/2024. You are scheduled for a hearing in August 2022. However, since you are serving a Life sentence the Board does not have to release you. This will depend partly on your conduct, program participation and if you maintain a work assignment.

3 and Parole (the "Board"). 2 This correspondence indicated that his eligibility had been recalculated and that he was scheduled for a parole consideration hearing in December of

1. The correspondence indicated that Charles's eligibility date had been recalculated

upon review in light of Edger v. Missouri Board of Probation and Parole, 307 S.W.3d 718 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010). Charles asserted that, at the time of his offenses, parole eligibility was governed in part by section 558.019.5, RSMo Cum. Supp. 1994. 3 In 2005, the statute was amended to remove the provision that granted the parole board discretion to convert consecutive sentences to concurrent sentences. Charles asserted that the calculation of his parole eligibility date based on application of the amended statute rather than the statute in effect when he committed his crimes constituted a violation of the ex post facto clauses of both the United States and Missouri Constitutions. In the alternative, Charles asserted a second ex post facto violation in the event

2 The Board is part of the DOC. See § 217.015.2, RSMo 2016.

3 Section 558.019.5, RSMo Cum. Supp. 1994, provided:

For purposes of this section, the term "minimum prison term" shall mean time required to be served by the defendant before he is eligible for parole, conditional release or other early release by the department of corrections. Except that the board of probation and parole, in the case of consecutive sentences imposed at the same time pursuant to a course of conduct constituting a common scheme or plan, shall be authorized to convert consecutive sentences to concurrent sentences, when the board finds, after hearing with notice to the prosecuting or circuit attorney, that the sum of the terms results in an unreasonably excessive total term, taking into consideration all factors related to the crime or crimes committed and the sentences received by others similarly situated.

4 that "the Board decide[d] in good faith not to convert his sentences." Charles asserted that the DOC committed an ex post facto violation by applying post-2008 Board regulations rather than the regulations in effect at the time of his offense. Charles asserted that application of the 2008 amendments to Board regulations required Charles to serve 33% (three years and four months) of his armed criminal action sentence and that he would otherwise be eligible for parole after serving three years of his armed criminal action sentence. The DOC moved for judgment on the pleadings. On Charles's first ex post facto claim, the DOC argued that Charles could not establish an ex post facto violation regarding the Board's decision not to convert consecutive sentences to concurrent sentences. On Charles's second ex post facto claim, the DOC argued that a claim identical to Charles's claim had previously been rejected in Dunn v. Missouri Dep't of Corrs., 645 S.W.3d 565 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022). The trial court granted the DOC's motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that Charles's claims failed as a matter of law. Charles appeals. Standard of Review We review the circuit court's ruling on a motion for a judgment on the pleadings de novo. Roy v. Missouri Dep't of Corrs., 703 S.W.3d 673, 675 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (citing Woods v. Mo. Dep't of Corrs., 595 S.W.3d 504, 505 (Mo. banc 2020)). "A motion for judgment on the pleadings should be sustained if, from the face of the

5 pleadings, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. Analysis Charles raises two points on appeal arguing that the trial court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings because the Board's calculation of his parole eligibility date constituted ex post facto violations. We address these points in turn. Point One In his first point on appeal, Charles argues that the DOC violated the ex post facto clause of the Missouri Constitution and the Constitution of the United States in its calculation of his parole eligibility date. 4 He argues that the Board applied the post-2005 amendments to the calculation of his parole eligibility date and that the Board should have applied the versions of the statutes in effect on the date of his offenses. "An ex post facto law is a law that provides for punishment for an act that was not punishable when it was committed or that imposes an additional punishment to that in effect at the time the act was committed." Roy, 703 S.W.3d at 676 (internal quotations

4 In his first point on appeal, Charles asserts that the DOC's calculation involved an ex post facto violation and a due process violation. The DOC argues that Charles's point on appeal is multifarious in that it combines in a single point a claim that the DOC's action violated the ex post facto clause and a claim that the DOC's action violated due process. See Peters v. Johns, 489 S.W.3d 262, 268 n.8 (Mo. banc 2016) ("Multifarious points relied on are noncompliant with Rule 84.04(d) and preserve nothing for review."). Regardless of whether Charles's first point is multifarious, the argument section that follows fails to make an intelligible due process argument such that Charles's has abandoned any such claim on appeal. "Arguments raised in the points relied on which are not supported by argument in the argument portion of the brief are deemed abandoned and present nothing for appellate review." State v. Edwards, 280 S.W.3d 184, 190 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009) (citation omitted). "A point is considered abandoned if a party fails to support a contention with relevant authority or argument beyond conclusions." Id. (citation omitted).

6 and citation omitted). Charles argues that application of the post-2005 version of section 558.019.5 to the calculation of his parole eligibility date constitutes the imposition of an additional punishment because it removes the Board's ability to convert his consecutive sentences to concurrent sentences. "To decide whether an amendment violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws, 'we must determine whether it produces a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes.'" Roy, 703 S.W.3d at 676 (quoting California Dep't of Corrs. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509 (1995)). "An amendment that 'creates only the most speculative and attenuated possibility of producing the prohibited effect' of increasing an inmate's term of imprisonment is insufficient to constitute an ex post facto violation." Id. (quoting Morales, 514 U.S. at 509); see also State ex rel. Cavallaro v. Groose, 908 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Mo. banc 1995). In Roy, this Court rejected an argument essentially the same as the one presented in Charles's petition. See Roy, 703 S.W.3d at 676. The Roy Court recognized that the removal of the Board's authority to convert consecutive sentences to concurrent sentences presented only a speculative risk of increasing an inmate's term of imprisonment in that the pre-2005 version of section 558.019.5 did not require the Board to convert sentences, did not even require the Board to consider converting sentences, did not require the Board to hold a hearing in all cases in which offenders requested to have their consecutive sentences converted, and provided no mechanism for offenders to challenge a Board decision not to utilize its discretion to convert the offender's sentences.

7 Roy, 703 S.W.3d at 676. Ultimately, this Court held that the offender's claim that the 2005 amendment eliminated his substantive right to obtain an earlier release was "purely conjectural and, therefore, insufficient to establish a violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws." Id. (citing Morales, 514 U.S. at 509). Charles seeks to distinguish his case from that of the offender in Roy by asserting that the Board did exercise its discretionary power to convert his consecutive sentences to concurrent sentences. However, no such factual allegation was present in Charles's petition. Rather, as the trial court correctly recognized, Charles's petition did "not allege that his sentences were actually converted to concurrent." On appeal, Charles asserts that the only possible explanation for the institutional parole officer's 2010 correspondence was that the Board had decided to exercise its discretion to convert his concurrent sentences. However, this argument is speculative and does not follow from that correspondence. Moreover, this argument is contrary to the theory of Charles's petition. Charles's petition operated on the theory that the Board was "permitted" to exercise its discretion to convert his sentences and the notion that he "may" be eligible for parole after serving 85% of his life sentence. Charles's petition operated on the theory that the Board should be able to exercise its discretion to decide whether to convert his sentences while expressly recognizing that the Board could "decide in good faith not to convert his sentences." In other words, Charles sought a declaration that he should be eligible to have his sentences converted. It is clear from the petition that

8 Charles did not allege that the Board had previously decided to convert his consecutive sentences to concurrent sentences. Notably, Charles's petition did not allege that the Board had conducted a hearing, after notifying the prosecuting attorney, to convert his sentences, as required by section 558.019.5, RSMo Cum. Supp. 1994. Charles cannot now on appeal assert that the trial court erred based on factual allegations that the trial court correctly recognized were never presented to the trial court. Point one is denied. Point Two In his second point on appeal, Charles argues that the trial court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings because the DOC committed an ex post facto violation when it calculated his parole eligibility date by determining that he was required to serve 33% of his consecutive ten-year ACA sentence (three years and four months) rather than three years before becoming parole eligible. Charles recognizes that the argument he raises was previously rejected by this Court in a case presented with materially indistinguishable facts. See Dunn v. Missouri Dep't of Corrs., 645 S.W.3d 565, 570-72 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022). He nevertheless argues that Dunn was erroneously decided and should be overruled, either by this Court en banc or by the Missouri Supreme Court. This Court in Dunn has previously considered and rejected Charles's argument in a thoroughly reasoned opinion. We adhere to Dunn's precedent. Point two is denied.

9 Conclusion The judgment is affirmed. ___________________________________ Thomas N. Chapman, Judge All concur.