Oak Ridge Property Management, LLC, et al., Appellants, vs. Robert P. Greene, et al., Respondents.

OAK RIDGE PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, ) No. ED113519 LLC, et al., ) Appellants, ) ) vs. ) ) ROBERT P. GREENE, et al., ) ) Respondents. ) FILED: November 18, 2025

Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Cause No. 19SL-CC03451 The Honorable Ellen H. Ribaudo

Before: Michael S. Wright, Presiding Judge, Philip M. Hess, Judge, and Virginia W. Lay, Judge.

Introduction Stephen Capron, Oak Ridge Property Management, LLC (Oak Ridge), and WCMD, LLC (WCMD) appeal from an order granting Respondents' motion for sanctions. 1 Appellants raise four points on appeal: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose sanctions because Appellants filed an effective voluntary dismissal before judgment, (2) the trial court abused its discretion in granting sanctions because there was no evidence of bad faith, (3) the trial court abused its

1 Appellants argue that Mr. Capron has standing to appeal this judgment in his own name. We decline to reach this question, but agree that standing to appeal the jurisdictional questions regarding the sanctions imposed on Mr. Capron exists for Oak Ridge and WCMD, or Mr. Capron, or all three. See State v. Gardner, 932 S.W.2d 858, 860-61 (Mo. App. E.D. 1996). Because Oak Ridge, WCMD and Mr. Capron all appeal, we need not determine which Appellant properly has standing in order to address the threshold questions raised.

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discretion by awarding $19,000 in damages, and (4) the trial court erred by delegating its inherent authority to a special master and by adopting the special master's findings without allowing the appellants to present evidence. Because Appellants did not file an effective dismissal, we find the trial court had jurisdiction to impose sanctions and therefore affirm on Point I. Further, because an order of sanctions is not an appealable order, this Court lacks jurisdiction to rule on the merits of Appellants' remaining arguments. We dismiss Points II, III, and IV. Factual and Procedural Background Appellants Oak Ridge and WCMD are limited liability companies that are members of Respondent organization Cannavations Investors, LLC (Investors), which is itself a member of Cannavations MD, LLC (MD). MD owns and operates a cannabis dispensary in Maryland. MD and Investors are managed by Respondent Robert Greene. Oak Ridge and WCMD each own a 10% share of Investors, which itself owns 40% of MD. 9 Cranbrook Road, LLC (Cranbrook) owns and leases property in Maryland to MD. Appellants are not, and were not, direct members of MD, nor signatories to MD's Operating Agreement. Mr. Capron is the managing member of Oak Ridge. Mr. Capron also served as attorney pro hac vice for Oak Ridge and WCMD in the trial court, with Richard Elias serving as supervising local counsel. On August 12, 2019, Oak Ridge and WCMD sued Investors, MD, Greene and Cranbrook seeking various records; Greene and Cranbook for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and unjust enrichment; and Greene alone for breach of contract and tortious interference. On September 13, 2019, the trial court entered a stipulated Protective Order governing the exchange of confidential information by the parties during discovery. The Protective Order provided: Confidential information shall be used solely for the purpose of the prosecution or defense of this litigation, and shall not be disclosed in any manner to any person

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except as provided in this Joint Stipulation & Protective Order. . . . No party or said party's counsel having access to any Confidential Information shall disclose in any manner its contents to any person other than those described in this Joint Stipulation & Protective Order. . . . The parties agree that the disclosure of the Confidential Information to be exchanged in this litigation would be extremely damaging to the parties herein . . . . Therefore, the parties agree that a violation of this Order shall be a contempt of Court, and may be redressed by an appropriate process or motion of any party.

After a series of ongoing discovery disputes, the trial court appointed a Special Master on November 26, 2024 to supervise discovery. On December 28, 2024, Mr. Capron emailed twenty-nine recipients, many of whom were not members of either Investors or MD. He provided a DropBox link giving access to—and potentially allowing further dissemination of—documents pertaining to Investors and MD. Many of the provided documents were marked "Confidential" or otherwise subject to the Protective Order. Mr. Capron further encouraged the email recipients to share the materials with their accountants and lawyers. In response, Respondents filed motions for sanctions and a temporary restraining order against Appellants 2 on January 3, 2025. Mr. Capron deleted the DropBox link sometime thereafter. The Special Master, following a hearing, found Appellants disseminated protected information "meant to humiliate, embarrass and intimidate Mr. Greene . . . by revealing the information in the documents and aggressively suggest that what Mr. Greene was doing in Missouri was improper." The Special Master described the email—which included numerous derogatory statements about Mr. Greene, Investors, and MD—as "unnecessary and predatory," concluding "Mr. Capron's conduct was wholly improper and in bad faith."

2 All Appellants were sanctioned jointly because the trial court found Mr. Capron violated the protective order "individually, and on behalf of his clients."

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The next day, Appellants filed a voluntary dismissal without prejudice (First Dismissal) of their action, signed only by Mr. Capron, without any local counsel's signature. Mr. Elias's printed name appeared in the signature block. The trial court, finding that it retained ancillary jurisdiction, adopted the Special Master's recommendations and granted Respondents' motion for sanctions on March 18, 2025, ordering Appellants to pay $19,000 in costs, penalties, and attorney's fees. Appellants subsequently filed notice of appeal. On May 14, 2025, this Court preliminarily raised the jurisdictional question of whether the First Dismissal was valid, noting that it did not appear to have been filed in compliance with Rule 9.03, 3 and therefore an open question remained of whether the case had been properly dismissed. Appellants then filed an amended dismissal without prejudice (Amended Dismissal)—signed by Mr. Elias—with the trial court. This appeal follows. Discussion I. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction We must begin by addressing questions of subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte because without subject-matter jurisdiction, this Court has no authority to act. Emerald Pointe, L.L.C. v. Jonak, 202 S.W.3d 652, 664 (Mo. App. S.D. 2006). When the facts are uncontested, subject- matter jurisdiction is purely a question of law that we review de novo. Mo. Soybean Ass'n v. Mo. Clean Water Comm'n, 102 S.W.3d 10, 22 (Mo. banc 2003). In Golden Valley Disposal, LLC v. Jenkins Diesel Power, Inc., 183 S.W.3d 635, 640 (Mo. App. S.D. 2006), the Court rejected an improperly filed notice of voluntary dismissal and upheld sanctions, finding the trial court retained primary jurisdiction. When "a plaintiff attempts to

3 All rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2024), unless otherwise indicated.

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voluntarily dismiss a case in a way not authorized by the rules of civil procedure . . . the purported dismissal is invalid and of no legal effect." Id. at 639. Appellants contend the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose sanctions because the First Dismissal ended the case. The trial court implicitly treated the First Dismissal as valid and effective and found that the Court retained "ancillary jurisdiction" under Rule 67.05. We affirm the trial court's jurisdiction on a separate basis: that the First Dismissal was not effective, and the trial court had continuing jurisdiction. While we need not reach it, we note the trial court also has ancillary jurisdiction over Respondents' pending motion for sanctions. A. Signature Validity Appellants raise several arguments in support of the First Dismissal's validity. Appellants first argue the First Dismissal was effective because it was validly signed in compliance with court rules. We disagree. Rule 9.03 governs the requirements for an out-of-state attorney, like Mr. Capron, to participate in a Missouri case pro hac vice. Rule 9.03(c) requires, inter alia, that supervising local counsel "[s]ign all pleadings, briefs and other filed or served documents." Appellants' First Dismissal was not filed in compliance with this rule, as it was not signed by local counsel Mr. Elias, only Mr. Capron. Rule 9.03(c)(3) requires that local counsel, not pro hac vice counsel, sign documents as attorney of record. And any filing must be signed by an attorney of record or self-represented party. Rule 55.03(a); Naylor Senior Citizens Hous., LP v. Sides Constr. Co., 423 S.W.3d 238, 248 (Mo. banc 2014). Rule 55.03 is intended not to prevent the unauthorized practice of law, but to ensure each filing is binding upon the party filing it. Id. The First Dismissal was thus doubly infirm: (1) Mr. Capron's filing constituted the unauthorized practice of law, and (2) Mr. Capron lacked the authority to sign as attorney of record, so the First Dismissal was not clearly binding.

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Appellants also argue Mr. Elias's printed name was sufficient because Rule 103.04(d), governing electronic filings, allows for forms of electronic signature other than "/s/ John or Jane Person." Appellants are partially correct: Rule 103.04(d) allows a "stamped" signature or other graphic representation to qualify as proper signature. Neither allowable alternative form is present in the First Dismissal. Because Mr. Elias's name in the signature block is not, absent more, an approved form of signature, Rule 103.04(d) provides no help to Appellants. Appellants counter that Mr. Elias's name in the signature block is sufficient to qualify as a signature because the First Dismissal was filed from his electronic filing account. Appellants cite only to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d)(3)(c) ("A filing made through a person's electronic- filing account and authorized by that person, together with that person's name on the signature block, constitutes the person's signature."). Appellants' reliance is misplaced. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not bind this court, and such a ruling would contradict Rule 103.04(d). For the foregoing reasons, we find the First Dismissal was not validly signed in compliance with Rule 9.03. B. Unauthorized Practice of Law Appellants next assert that even if the First Dismissal was not validly signed, it was still effective because improperly signed documents are only void if they constitute the unauthorized practice of law. 4 The First Dismissal's filing by Mr. Capron, Appellants continue, did not qualify as the practice of law because filing a dismissal is a simple "ministerial act" requiring no legal skill or training. This argument is without merit.

4 Appellants also argue, specifically, that failure to comply with Rule 9.03 does not nullify a filing. The cases cited in support of this proposition are misrepresented. For example, Appellants describe the holding of Stott v. State, 771 S.W.2d 841 (Mo. App. E.D. 1989), as "plea made by counsel failing to comply with Rule 9.03 not defective." This is a deeply inaccurate description—Stott held, rather, that on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel noncompliance with Rule 9.03 (1989) was not constitutional error requiring reversal of a judgment of conviction simply because trial counsel was not admitted to practice in Missouri. Stott, 711 S.W.3d at 843. That holding has no relevance to this case.

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Section 484.010 5 defines the practice of law: "the appearance as an advocate in a representative capacity or the drawing of papers, pleadings or documents or the performance of any act in such capacity in connection with proceedings pending or prospective before any court . . . ." Mr. Capron signed the First Dismissal as a representative of Oak Ridge and WCMD; "It is axiomatic that a corporation must act through an attorney in all legal matters." Hensel v. Am. Air Network, Inc., 189 S.W.3d 582, 584 n.3 (Mo. banc 2006) (quoting Reed v. Labor & Indus. Rels. Comm'n, 789 S.W.2d 19, 23 (Mo. banc 1990)). While Rule 55.03 allows signature and filing by either an attorney-of-record or a self-represented party, 6 corporations cannot be self-represented plaintiffs. By signing, Mr. Capron held himself out as attorney of record for Oak Ridge and WCMD (despite noncompliance with Rule 9.03). "A nonresident attorney who is unlicensed to practice in Missouri, and who has also failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 9.03 in obtaining permission to appear in a given case pro hac vice, is thus unauthorized to file any pleadings in the case." Strong v. Gilster Mary Lee Corp., 23 S.W.3d 234, 240 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000) (italics added). By signing the First Dismissal as attorney of record without the signature of local counsel, Mr. Capron was out of compliance with Rule 9.03, and was "as much engaged in the unauthorized practice of law as a mere layman." Id. (internal quotation omitted). Appellants insist nullification of the First Dismissal requires timely objection in the trial court. For support, Appellants cite to Haggard v. Div. of Emp. Sec., 238 S.W.3d 151, 155-56 (Mo. banc 2007) and Naylor. Neither case applies as both involved litigants seeking to nullify entire proceedings based on a single act of unauthorized practice of law. Those cases considered nullification of proceedings as punishment, while our inquiry concerns only the validity of the

5 All statutory references are to RSMo (2016). 6 The rationale behind this exception for self-represented individuals further supports our conclusion. See Naylor, 423 S.W.3d at 246 ("When an individual appears pro se, i.e., for himself, that person is not engaging in the practice of law because he is not representing another in court.") (emphasis in original).

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First Dismissal and the jurisdictional consequences flowing from that determination. Subject- matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, and Missouri courts cannot ignore a jurisdictional issue simply because it was not raised earlier. McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 298 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Mo. banc 2009). This Court requires no objection to address whether the trial court had jurisdiction. C. Effect of the Amended Dismissal Finally, Appellants maintain that even if the First Dismissal was defective, the Amended Dismissal should relate back to it and cure any defects. We disagree. Rule 55.03(a) prescribes that "an unsigned filing . . . shall be stricken unless the omission is corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party filing same." Rule 55.03(a). Once a party has notice of a filing's defectiveness, prompt correction of an omission can allow the amended filing to relate back to the original filing date. See, e.g., Hensel, 189 S.W.3d at 583-84. All caselaw relied upon by Appellants on this point concerns situations where plaintiffs were allowed to cure an unsigned or defective petition. Missouri Courts have explained Rule 55.03(a)'s opportunity to cure petitions is necessary because barring a cause of action entirely is "disproportionate" for what is often a procedural error. Id. at 584. Appellants assume this rule must apply with equal force to an improperly signed voluntary dismissal without prejudice. But unlike a petition, nullification of the First Dismissal does not cost Applicants their one chance for relief, but the opposite: it ensures that Respondents—who the trial court found entitled to recompense for legal costs—will not lose their only chance for relief. Allowing relation back for defective petitions serves the people of Missouri by ensuring the courts do not deny litigants justice via excessive procedural rigidity. Conversely, allowing relation back for an improperly

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filed voluntary dismissal serves only to enable abuse of process and allow litigants to escape consequences of their actions. No precedent compels that result. Because refusing relation back will not deprive Appellants of their cause of action, and because a contrary ruling might invite abuse of process in the future and reward bad faith, we find the Amended Dismissal could not cure the defective First Dismissal, and hold the Amended Dismissal effective on its filing date. We deny Point I. II. Ancillary Jurisdiction Without addressing the First Dismissal defect, the trial court found it retained ancillary jurisdiction over Respondents' motion for sanctions under Rule 67.05. Although we find the First Dismissal not effective, and need not reach it, we note the trial court had ancillary jurisdiction to impose sanctions. Rule 67.05 provides in relevant part that "No dismissal, voluntary or involuntary, of a plaintiff's civil action shall operate to discontinue any ancillary matter pending before the court." Missouri law defines an "ancillary matter" as "supplementary" or "subordinate." Hague v. Trs. of Highlands of Chesterfield, 431 S.W.3d 504, 508-09 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009)) (describing ancillary jurisdiction as encompassing matters that "grow out of the existing litigation"). Appellants argue that Hague precludes ancillary jurisdiction in this case. But in Hague, the Court denied ancillary jurisdiction over a pending motion for sanctions where the motion involved examining behavior that occurred before litigation, requiring the court to delve into the merits of the case, making the request for sanctions akin to a counterclaim. Id. at 509-10. Here, Respondents' motion dealt only with Appellants' behavior in the course of discovery, requiring no

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examination of any matter that did not grow out of Plaintiffs' lawsuit. We agree with the trial court's finding of ancillary jurisdiction over Respondents' pending motion for sanctions. III. Points II, III, and IV – Final Appealable Judgment In determining whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear an appeal, the determination is necessarily made de novo. "The right to appeal is purely statutory and, where a statute does not give a right to appeal, no right exists." Wilson v. City of St. Louis, 600 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Mo. banc 2020) (internal quotation omitted). We find that because an order for sanctions is not a final, appealable judgment, we lack jurisdiction to review it on the merits, so Points II, III, and IV must be dismissed. See, e.g., Buemi v. Kerckhoff, 359 S.W.3d 16, 18 (Mo. banc 2011) ("Because an order imposing monetary sanctions does not dispose of a 'claim for relief' as required by Rule 74.01(b) and does not satisfy the requirement in section 512.020(5) that allows appeals only of final judgments . . . the appeal is dismissed.") (footnote omitted); Wilson, 600 S.W.3d at 770 n.8 (reaffirming Buemi and clarifying that because a motion for sanctions is not a claim, "an order granting such a motion cannot be a judgment"); Riegel v. Forsythe, 608 S.W.3d 777, 783-84 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (holding that a motion for sanctions is also not appealable under the collateral order doctrine). Conclusion The First Dismissal was not effective and the trial court retained jurisdiction to grant Respondents' motion for sanctions. Accordingly, because the order for sanctions is not a final, appealable judgment, we must dismiss the remaining points for lack of jurisdiction.

_________________________ Virginia W. Lay, J. Michael S. Wright, P.J., concurs. Philip M. Hess, J., concurs.