Ralph Alexander, Appellant, v. State of Missouri, Respondent.

RALPH ALEXANDER, ) ) No. ED113096 Appellant, ) ) v. ) ) STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Filed: October 21, 2025 Respondent. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS CITY The Honorable Scott A. Millikan, Judge Introduction Appellant Ralph Alexander appeals the motion court's judgment denying his amended Rule 29.15 1 post-conviction relief motion following an evidentiary hearing. In three points on appeal, Appellant alleges that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial. Because the motion court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are not clearly erroneous, the judgment is affirmed. Factual and Procedural Background Appellant was charged with murder in the first degree, assault in the first degree, two counts of armed criminal action, and two counts of unlawful use of a weapon following two

1 All Rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2024).

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separate incidents on April 5, 2012. Appellant was convicted following a jury trial. The relevant facts are outlined below. a. Aldine Avenue Incident Victim 1 drove his girlfriend, E.J., and several of her family members to E.J.'s aunt's home on Aldine Avenue. Victim 1 parked on the street in front of the house and let the others out of the car to go into the residence while he remained in the parked car. After waiting for some time, Victim 1 called E.J. to ask her to come back outside so they could leave. While on the phone, two men approached the car, looked inside, and then continued around the block. They turned around and approached the car again, prompting Victim 1 to drive away, but in order to leave he had to drive toward the two men. As he passed them, they pulled out firearms and began firing at the car. Victim 1, still on the phone with E.J., told her "Boo Man" and "Little Ralph" were shooting at him. E.J. testified that she heard gun shots before the call with Victim 1 dropped. The shooters fired six or seven shots in the direction of the car. Victim 1 continued driving until he found two police officers. He reported the shooting and told them Boo Man and Little Ralph were the shooters. About five minutes later, and while he was speaking with the police officers, he heard more gunshots fired in rapid succession from somewhere nearby. E.J. also heard the second round of gunshots from her aunt's house. Sometime after the incident, Victim 1 identified Little Ralph as Ralph Alexander in photo and physical lineups. He also identified Boo Man, who was Appellant's co-defendant. Another witness, J.W., testified that he could see two men shooting at a car on Aldine but could not identify the two men because they were wearing black hoodies.

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b. "The Yard" Incident Victim 2 and S.S. drove together to "The Yard," a gathering place on Whittier Street near Aldine Avenue. Victim 2 parked across the street and walked over to "The Yard" while S.S. remained in the car. After a few minutes, Victim 2 returned to the car. At the same time, several gunshots could be heard coming from the direction of Aldine Avenue. S.S. ducked down in the car. Victim 2 went back to "The Yard" to tell J.W., who had just witnessed the shooting on Aldine Avenue, that he was going to take S.S. home. As Victim 2 crossed the street again, J.W. saw the same two gunmen run toward the car where S.S. was sitting and open fire on Victim 2 as he tried to get into the car. J.W. could see both men firing their weapons and testified that he heard more than ten rounds fired in succession. Victim 2 tried to get into the car and cover S.S.'s body with his own. As soon as they finished shooting, the two men walked away and J.W. approached the car where he saw Victim 2 slumped over on the passenger side bleeding profusely. Victim 2 died from his injuries and S.S. was wounded by a bullet entering her leg. The same police officers that heard Victim 1's report responded to the shooting at "The Yard" and put out a radio broadcast identifying Boo Man and Little Ralph as suspects. Another officer heard the broadcast and recognized the nicknames as belonging to Appellant and his co- defendant. That officer knew Appellant and co-defendant both lived near the shootings and went to co-defendant's house looking for them, but co-defendant's father told the officer only co- defendant was at the house. As the officer was interviewing co-defendant and his father, the officer saw Appellant leave the house, at which time the officer detained Appellant. The owner of the house where co-defendant was staying gave police officers permission to search his bedroom, where officers found gun boxes and ammunition that were later connected to the evidence found at the scenes of the shootings. Fifteen shell casings were

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recovered from the area where Victim 2 was shot and killed and eight shell casings were recovered from Aldine Avenue where Victim 1 was targeted. Both cars had extensive damage from the gun fire and multiple bullets were recovered inside each vehicle. In total, twenty-three shell casings and seven bullets were recovered. c. Trial and Post-Conviction Proceedings At trial, the jury heard testimony from Victim 1, E.J., J.W., S.S., and some of the police officers involved with the case. Appellant did not present any evidence. The jury found Appellant guilty of murder in the first degree, assault in the first degree, two counts of unlawful use of a weapon, and two counts of armed criminal action. The jury acquitted Appellant of a separate assault charge and the associated armed criminal action c ount. Appellant was sentenced to life without parole for first-degree murder, to be served consecutively with a life sentence on the associated armed criminal action charge. Appellant was also sentenced to life imprisonment on the assault charge and two fifteen-year sentences on the unlawful use of a weapon charges, to be served concurrently with the first life sentence. This Court affirmed the convictions and sentences in State v. Alexander, 505 S.W.3d 384 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016). Appellant timely filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 29.15, and the motion court appointed a public defender to represent Appellant. Counsel timely filed an amended motion, which alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call M.L. as an alibi witness, failing to file a motion in limine to exclude all evidence of prior bad acts or crimes, and for introducing triple hearsay from a non-witness identifying Appellant as one of the shooters. Following an evidentiary hearing, the motion court denied Appellant's claims. This appeal follows.

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Standard of Review The standard of review for post-conviction relief is "limited to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the trial court are clearly erroneous." Rule 29.15(k). "Appellate courts presume the motion court's findings are correct and a 'judgment is clearly erroneous when, in light of the entire record, the court is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made.'" Flaherty v. State, 694 S.W.3d 413, 416 (Mo. banc 2024) (quoting Davis v. State, 486 S.W.3d 898, 905 (Mo. banc 2016)). This Court defers to "the motion court's superior opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses." Id. at 419. For an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Strickland standard applies. McFadden v. State, 619 S.W.3d 434, 445 (Mo. banc 2020). "Under Strickland, a movant must demonstrate that: (1) his or her counsel failed to exercise the level of skill and diligence that a reasonably competent counsel would in a similar situation, and (2) he or she was prejudiced by that failure." Johnson v. State, 406 S.W.3d 892, 898-99 (Mo. banc 2013). To satisfy the first prong, the movant must overcome "a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). The second prong, prejudice, is satisfied when "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Johnson, 406 S.W.3d at 899 (internal quotations omitted). Analysis Point One – Motion Court did not Err in Finding No Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Where Trial Counsel Investigated Every Witness Appellant Suggested In point I, Appellant argues that the motion court erred 2 in finding that Appellant was not denied effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to investigate and call M.L. as a

2 Appellant's points relied on state that the motion court committed plain error, but that is not the correct standard as there is "no plain error review in appeals from postconviction judgments for

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witness because M.L. was available to testify as an alibi witness. Appellant asserts that he was prejudiced by this failure because M.L.'s anticipated testimony had a reasonable probability of affecting the outcome of the case in that an alibi witness would bolster the defense's misidentification strategy. In criminal cases, "counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments." Barton v. State, 432 S.W.3d 741, 759 (Mo. banc 2014) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). To assert a claim of ineffective assistance for failure to investigate a witness, a movant must allege facts that indicate that four factors were present: "1) Trial counsel knew or should have known of the existence of the witness; 2) the witness could be located through reasonable investigation; 3) the witness would testify, and 4) the witness's testimony would have produced a viable defense." Watkins v. State, 684 S.W.3d 141, 146 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023), transfer denied (Mar. 5, 2024) (quoting Worthington v. State, 166 S.W.3d 566, 577 (Mo. banc 2005)). "When the testimony of the witness would negate an element of the crime for which a movant was convicted, the testimony provides the movant with a viable defense." Lewis v. State, 694 S.W.3d 138, 143 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024) (quoting Hays v. State, 360 S.W.3d 304, 310 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012)).

claims that were not presented in the post-conviction motion." McLaughlin v. State, 378 S.W.3d 328, 340 (Mo. banc 2012). However, Appellant's brief states the correct standard in a different section. Appellant has also failed to "include a concise statement describing whether the error was preserved for appellate review; if so, how it was preserved" as required by Rule 84.04(e). Nevertheless, Appellant's claims were included in the amended motion and are therefore preserved for appellate review.

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"Ordinarily the choice of witnesses is a matter of trial strategy and will support no claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." Anderson v. State, 564 S.W.3d 592, 601 (Mo. banc 2018) (quoting Barton, 432 S.W.3d at 750). "As a matter of trial strategy, the determination to not call a witness is virtually unchallengeable." Hughes v. State, 693 S.W.3d 217, 222 (Mo. E.D. App. 2024). "Failure to call a witness only constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel if the witness's testimony unqualifiedly supports Movant." Lewis, 694 S.W.3d at 143 (internal quotations omitted). "A conceivable effect on the outcome is not enough to show prejudice." Jindra v. State, 580 S.W.3d 635, 643 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019). Appellant argues that his relative, M.L., would have testified as an alibi witness at his trial if trial counsel had not failed to investigate and call M.L. as a witness and that the failure to investigate constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant testified at the evidentiary hearing that he provided trial counsel with the name and contact information for M.L. On the contrary, trial counsel testified that Appellant provided trial counsel with a list of ten potential alibi witnesses and that M.L. was not on that list. Trial counsel testified that he tried to contact every person on Appellant's list but was unable to reach a single person. M.L. testified at the evidentiary hearing that he was at the residence where Appellant claimed to have been all evening. He testified that he sat on the couch in the front room for more than 4 hours and could see the front door from where he sat. He testified that he never saw Appellant, who was allegedly upstairs the whole time, leave the house. There was a back door that was not in M.L.'s view and there were at least 9 people in the residence during the relevant period. The motion court found that "Movant has not shown that trial counsel could have located M.L., that M.L. would have testified at trial, or that M.L. would have provided a viable defense."

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The motion court did not find Appellant's testimony that he provided trial counsel with M.L.'s name and contact information to be credible in light of trial counsel's testimony that he investigated every name he was given, that M.L. was not on that list, and that no one on the list responded to trial counsel's attempts to contact. Upon review of the motion court's findings, "[w]e defer to the motion court's determinations of credibility." Lindsey v. State, 633 S.W.3d 547, 551 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021); see also Sokolic v. State, 710 S.W.3d 630, 634 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) ("the motion court weighed Movant's and trial counsel's contradictory testimony and found trial counsel's to be more credible. On appeal, we defer to the motion court's determinations regarding witness credibility."); Flaherty, 694 S.W.3d at 419. Furthermore, "[f]ailure to call a witness only constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel if the witness's testimony unqualifiedly supports Movant," and M.L.'s testimony that he was in a crowded residence with multiple entrances and exits and was not in the same room as Appellant at any point during that time does not provide unqualified support for Appellant. Lewis, 694 S.W.3d at

1. Thus, the motion court did not clearly err in finding that this claim was without merit. Point

I is denied. Analysis Point Two – Motion Court did not Err in Finding No Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Where Trial Counsel did not File a Motion in Limine In Point II, Appellant argues that the motion court erred in finding that Appellant was not denied effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to file a motion in limine to prevent the State from arguing prior bad acts. Appellant contends that he was prejudiced because there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome if the jury never heard that Appellant was connected with a firearm found in the home of his co-defendant. In general, evidence of prior crimes or bad acts is not permitted because of "the rule that prevents using a defendant's character as the basis for inferring guilt." State v. Mahoney, 70

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S.W.3d 601, 605 (Mo. App. S.D. 2002). "To violate the rule prohibiting evidence of other crimes or misconduct by the accused, the evidence must show the accused committed, was accused of, was convicted of, or was definitely associated with, the other crimes or misconduct." State v. Buechting, 633 S.W.3d 367, 381 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (quoting State v. Ponder, 950 S.W.2d 900, 911-12 (Mo. App. S.D. 1997)). A party may file a motion in limine requesting that such evidence be excluded at trial, but "even if it initially found that the evidence should be excluded in a motion in limine, a trial court is free to change its ruling and admit such evidence." State v. Dowell, 25 S.W.3d 594, 601 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000). At trial, the State told the jury that Appellant was previously found in possession of the same firearm that came out of one of the boxes found in his co-defendant's bedroom during the investigation for the underlying case. This assertion was made during the State's opening statement, after which trial counsel objected on the basis that evidence of previous possession of the firearm was inadmissible as a prior bad act. The circuit court sustained the objection. Appellant now asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion in limine prior to trial because once the jury heard the opening statement it was too late to eliminate the prejudice from hearing that Appellant was found with the same firearm at a previous time. Appellant characterizes the State's statement as concerning prior convictions, but that is not what the record reflects. Rather, the State's statement was simply that Appellant possessed that gun at a prior date and it was then found in the bedroom of his co-defendant. Even though the circuit court sustained trial counsel's objection, it is not certain that a motion in limine would have kept the evidence out because a trial court can change its ruling even after granting a motion in limine to exclude that same evidence. Dowell, 25 S.W.3d at 601.

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Because a motion in limine does not "conclusively bar the introduction of the challenged evidence," Appellant "cannot show prejudice from counsel's failure to file a motion in limine." Marshall v. State, 681 S.W.3d 668, 676 n.3 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023). Thus, the motion court did not clearly err in finding that Appellant could not show prejudice. Point II is denied. Analysis Point Three – Motion Court did not Err in Finding that Appellant was not Prejudiced by Trial Counsel Eliciting Objectionable Testimony In Point III, Appellant argues that the motion court erred in finding that Appellant was not denied effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel elicited hearsay testimony from a detective concerning another witness's statements identifying Appellant as one of the shooters. Appellant asserts that this testimony was prejudicial because it bolstered the State's identification evidence and trial counsel had previously objected to this testimony. At trial, the State called a detective who was involved with the investigation. Trial counsel objected to the State's attempts to elicit testimony from the detective that E.J. told her sister that Appellant was one of the shooters and that her sister reported that to the detective. The circuit court sustained the objection, keeping out the sister's identification of Appellant. Then, on cross-examination, trial counsel elicited the identification of Appellant that he had just successfully kept out during the State's direct examination. Because Appellant cannot show that he was prejudiced, we need not address whether trial counsel's conduct was unreasonable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Although Appellant argues that he was prejudiced by the testimony because the identification evidence was not overwhelming, he has not pointed to any authority that states that Strickland prejudice occurs whenever the motion court has not found that overwhelming evidence of guilt existed. This Court has consistently held that "prejudice does not exist when the objectionable evidence is merely cumulative of other evidence that was admitted without

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objection and that sufficiently establishes essentially the same facts." Ordoukhanian v. State, 702 S.W.3d 194, 200 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024), reh'g and/or transfer denied (Nov. 25, 2024) (quoting State v. Shade, 657 S.W.3d 282, 294 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022)) (emphasis added). The jury had already heard E.J. testify that she knew who the shooters were and had identified Appellant in court. The jury had also heard Victim 1's testimony identifying Appellant. Therefore, the triple hearsay was not prejudicial because it did not introduce any new evidence. The motion court did not clearly err in finding that Appellant was not prejudiced. Johnson, 406 S.W.3d at 899. Point III is denied. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, the motion court's ruling is affirmed.

RENÉE D. HARDIN-TAMMONS, PRESIDING JUDGE

Angela T. Quigless, J., and Thomas C. Clark II, J., concur.