State of Missouri ex rel. Catherine L. Hanaway vs. The Honorable Page Bellamy, Associate Circuit Judge, and Janet Horine, Circuit Clerk

STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel. ) CATHERINE L. HANAWAY, ) ) Relator, ) v. ) WD88167 ) ) OPINION FILED: THE HONORABLE PAGE ) January 27, 2026 BELLAMY, ASSOCIATE CIRCUIT ) JUDGE, and JANET HORINE, ) CIRCUIT CLERK, ) ) Respondents. ) ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN CERTIORARI

Before Writ Division: Karen King Mitchell, Presiding Judge, Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judge, and W. Douglas Thomson, Judge This is an original proceeding in certiorari to review the record in State ex rel. Nail v. Walden, from the Circuit Court of Carroll County, Missouri, case number 24CR- CC00085, where the Honorable Wm. Page Bellamy (habeas court) issued a writ of habeas corpus in favor of Julie Ann Nail. 1 The writ of habeas corpus vacated the trial

1 Since the original criminal matter, Nail has divorced and remarried and is now known by the name Julie Kinnard-Layman. Because the documents at issue in this case all refer to her as Julie Ann Nail, we will continue to use that name to avoid confusion. We intend no disrespect in doing so.

2 court's March 27, 2024 order, which had (1) revoked Nail's probation; (2) imposed sentences on Counts V, VI, and VII; and (3) continued Nail on judicial parole in State v. Nail, Carroll County Case No. 10RY-CR00083-02. After a thorough review, we refuse to quash the habeas record. The March 27, 2024 order is vacated, and Nail is ordered discharged as set forth in this Opinion. Background On December 7, 2011, Nail pled guilty to a seven-count felony information in the Circuit Court of Carroll County, case number 10RY-CR00083-02, pursuant to an agreement with the State. The felony information was based on Nail's theft of $245,664.04 from the First Baptist Church of Hardin, Missouri, and the Hardin Fire Protection District. The seven counts included two counts for class B felony stealing (Counts I and II), and five counts for class C felony forgery (Counts III-VII). Pursuant to the agreement with the State, the trial court sentenced Nail as follows: Count I: twelve years' imprisonment, subject to 120-day callback under § 559.115 Count II: twelve years' imprisonment, subject to 120-day callback under § 559.115 Count III: seven years' imprisonment, suspended execution of sentence (SES), with five years' probation Count IV: seven years' imprisonment, suspended execution of sentence (SES), with five years' probation Count V: suspended imposition of sentence (SIS) with five years' probation Count VI: suspended imposition of sentence (SIS) with five years' probation Count VII: suspended imposition of sentence (SIS) with five years' probation

3 The sentences imposed in Counts I-IV were to run concurrently, as were the five-year probationary terms. Both the State and Nail agreed that the sentencing recommendation was structured for the purpose of "keep[ing Nail] on a probation as long as possible, up to eleven years, and so that [she] c[ould] make as much restitution" to the victims as possible. Nail's probation on Counts III-VII began on January 4, 2012, and her probation on Counts I-II began May 10, 2012, following her release from prison under § 559.115. The parties agreed to establish conditions for Nail's probation on all seven counts on June 12,

1. On that date, in addition to the standard conditions of probation, the court imposed

a special condition upon Nail that she "make restitution for any loss or damages sustained by the victims of these particular crimes within 60 months through the Office of the Circuit Clerk of Ray County in the sum of $245,664.04 [and that she] make minimum payments equal to fifty percent net take home pay on a monthly basis." The court noted its understanding that, at the end of the probationary periods, "without question, there will still be a balance due on the restitution," and "if the payments have been made as I require, the minimum, . . . I would intend to discharge assuming those payments were made on a regular basis." The prosecutor noted that the parties had agreed that "the SIS probations and the availability at the end of the five or six years, on the SES probations, that she would be discharged from those, but the SIS probations allow us to keep her on for a total of eleven years." 2

2 When Nail was originally sentenced, § 559.036.3 provided that, if a defendant initially received an SIS with probation, the court could later revoke probation and, "upon

4 On November 27, 2013, the State filed a Notice of Probation Violation and Application for Revocation of Probation, wherein it alleged that Nail had violated her probation "by failing to pay restitution and court costs as ordered." The court held a hearing on the notice on January 10, 2014, wherein the State withdrew the application to revoke and, instead, requested that the court amend the special condition for restitution to set a minimum amount of $500 for Nail's monthly payment, rather than simply 50% of her net income, because there were months where the payments were very small as a result of Nail losing her job when her employer's business closed. The court found no violation but expressed that, when the original restitution condition was set, "the operating assumption was that [Nail] would be working as close to full time as [possible]." Accordingly, the court agreed to give Nail some additional time to find full- time employment and reset the hearing for March 20, 2014, to discuss the proposed amendment to the restitution condition. At the March 20, 2014 hearing, the court added a minimum $500 per month payment to Nail's existing condition to pay 50% of her net income each month, meaning

revocation of probation, place an offender on a second term of probation . . . for a term . . . as provided by section 559.016, notwithstanding any amount of time served by the offender on the first term of probation." § 559.036.3, RSMo (2012). Thus, it appears that the sentencing court initially suspended imposition of Nail's sentences on Counts V-VII so that, if restitution had not been paid in full by the end of the first probationary terms, the court could revoke Nail's probation on those three counts, impose sentences, suspend execution of the sentences, and place Nail on new five-year terms of probation, subject to one-year extensions. It appears that this structure was meant to maximize the period of time Nail was subject to probation and its special condition of restitution.

5 that Nail needed to pay either $500 or 50% of her net income each month, whichever was greater. On July 29, 2014, the court, by written order, purported to suspend Nail's accumulation of earned compliance credits (ECCs), pursuant to § 217.703.3. Nail's probation officer filed a violation report on November 15, 2016, alleging that Nail had violated her probation by having an outstanding balance on her restitution. The report recommended that Nail's probation be continued and extended for one year "to allow her extra time to pay towards her restitution balance." The report also noted that Nail had "paid restitution on a regular basis, remained employed, and . . . been on the lowest level of supervision with minor issues." In conjunction with the violation report, the State filed an application to revoke Nail's probation on November 22, 2016, alleging that she failed to pay restitution as ordered. On December 9, 2016, the court held a hearing on the alleged violation, given that Nail still owed $223,729.65 in restitution and the end of her first term of probation was approaching. Nail, through counsel, admitted the violation, and the court made the following finding: "Probationer is in violation of condition number 11.5, though I would qualify that to the extent that I would say that violation has to do with payment of the entire amount as opposed to payment on a monthly amount that I established back when this probation started." The court then extended Nail's probation on all counts for one additional year, noting that, "notwithstanding the aforesaid violations, the probationer should be and is continued on probation."

6 On October 25, 2017, the parties appeared for a hearing on "historical payment history." As of October 17, 2017, Nail still owed approximately $219,000 in restitution. At the hearing, which was not noticed up as a violation hearing, the court found Nail to be in violation of the restitution condition of her probation based solely on the fact that there was still a remaining balance; the court recognized that Nail had been making payments as ordered. Accordingly, the court revoked Nail's probation on Counts I-IV, and purported to suspend execution of the sentences; 3 the court also revoked Nail's probation on Counts V-VII and purported to suspend imposition of the sentences, placing Nail on new five-year terms of probation for each count, with all conditions to remain the same other than transferring supervision from Probation and Parole to the court. The court also ordered that payments be made each month in a total amount of $500 beginning December 20, 2017. Under the new five-year terms, Nail's probation on all counts was set to expire on October 24, 2022. On January 21, 2020, the State filed a Notice of Probation Violation and Application for Probation Revocation, alleging that Nail failed to make required restitution payments. The court held a hearing on the State's application on August 7, 2020, wherein Nail admitted the violation, given the outstanding restitution balance but noted that she was current on all ordered payments. The parties agreed that the court could extend Nail's probation for an additional year. The court then continued Nail's

3 In the transcript of this hearing, the court indicated that it was staying imposition of the sentences, but that is impossible, as the 12-year sentences for Counts I and II and the 7-year sentences for Counts III and IV had already been imposed.

7 probation with a one-year extension, resulting in a new anticipated discharge date of October 24, 2023. On September 26, 2023, the State filed another Notice of Hearing and Application for Revocation, alleging that "Defendant has violated the terms of probation," and moved to revoke Nail's probation. Nail denied this allegation, and the court set the matter over for a later hearing. On March 15, 2024, the court held a probation revocation hearing on the State's motion. As a preliminary matter, the prosecutor sought clarification on the type of evidence the court wanted at the hearing—whether the court wanted evidence on the total amount of restitution owed versus the total amount paid or whether the court wanted evidence solely related to whether Nail made the payments as required. The parties agreed that Nail had not paid the full restitution amount (the outstanding balance was then $182,279.65) but that she had made all required payments since October 2017. The court took judicial notice of Nail's dissolution of marriage case, which included Nail's testimony that (1) she made $14.65 an hour for twenty hours per week at Home Depot and (2) more hours at Home Depot were available to her in 2016. The court also considered Nail's Home Depot employment records from 2016 as State's Exhibit A. Nail testified that she understood when she originally pleaded guilty that she would be on probation for eleven years in order to try to get the victims as much money as possible. She testified she worked only part-time for the past seven years, because she babysat her grandchildren to help her daughter, and the highest income she made from her Home Depot employment was at a rate of $18.53 an hour after a recent raise she

8 received in February, 2024. She further testified that she paid what she was able to pay and sometimes had to borrow from her husband, but she also acknowledged that, if she had kept her full-time job, she would have been able to pay more. The court expressed disapproval of Nail's choice to work part-time, rather than full-time, and then explained that he needed to review the records provided by the State to determine if Nail had the ability to pay restitution before rendering a decision on the State's application to revoke her probation. The parties reconvened on March 27, 2024. At that time, the court first noted, although [Nail] has paid a significant amount of restitution in this case— and in my experience [Nail] is probably in the top three of all the cases I've seen in my career in terms of the amount of restitution paid by one individual defendant in a case. I've had cases where there was more restitution but multiple defendants where all the restitution was paid but it was paid by a number of folks. So I will acknowledge certainly that the amount of restitution paid, at least by or on behalf of [Nail], is greater than the overwhelming majority of people that I see. And I think she's to be commended for that. The court nevertheless determined that [Nail] violated the terms and conditions of her probation, although she may not have had the ability to pay the entire amount of probation from reviewing the evidence in the record in this case, I think she's had the ability to pay more than she has paid. And that is included and considered in my decision in finding that [Nail] has violated the terms and conditions of her probation. The court then purported to revoke Nail's probation on Counts I-IV and credited her time spent on probation toward the sentences on those counts. On Counts V-VII, the court purported to revoke Nail's suspended imposition of sentences and impose three separate one-year sentences in the county jail to run consecutively to each other and consecutively

9 to the sentences imposed on Counts I-IV. The court then placed Nail on judicial parole for Counts V-VII under the supervision of the Missouri Board of Probation and Parole, and imposed the following special conditions: (1) that Nail continue making payments towards the restitution; (2) that she pay the restitution amount in full; (3) that she enroll in and complete a financial management course; and (4) that she follow a court-approved budget. In response, Nail filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that (1) there was "insufficient evidence to find Ms. Nail willfully refused to make payments or failed to make a bona fide effort to pay the restitution owed," and (2) the court lacked authority to revoke Nail's probation because her "probation for counts III-VII expired more than nine years prior to March 27, 2024," when the court purported to revoke it. The habeas court agreed with Nail on both arguments and entered a writ of habeas corpus, vacating the trial court's March 27, 2024 order. The State petitioned this court for a writ of certiorari to review the habeas record below. 4

Standard of Review Certiorari is available to correct habeas judgments, not otherwise reviewable on appeal, that either exceed a habeas court's authority or represent an abuse of its discretion. State ex rel. Bailey v. Horsman, 700 S.W.3d 1, 20 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024).

4 We granted a preliminary writ as a matter of right. See State ex rel. Bailey v. Davis, 705 S.W.3d 568, 572 n.5 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) ("the State has no right of appeal, but is entitled as a matter of right to file a writ of certiorari requiring an appellate court to review the record in the habeas proceedings to determine if the writ of habeas corpus should be quashed or not quashed").

10 "A writ of certiorari requires an inferior court to produce a certified record of a particular case for review for irregularities." Id. (quoting State ex rel. Koster v. McElwain, 340 S.W.3d 221, 231 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011)). Our review is limited to questions of law presented by the record before the habeas court; we do not review any findings of fact. Id. A habeas court exceeds its authority only if "the evidence as a whole does not support the grant of a writ of habeas corpus in light of the applicable law." Id. (quoting State ex rel. Koster v. Green, 388 S.W.3d 603, 606 (Mo. App. W.D. 2012)). And it abuses its discretion only if its "ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration." Id. at 21 (quoting Green, 388 S.W.3d at 606-07). Following review of the habeas record, we will either uphold the decision of the habeas court or quash the writ, in whole or in part. Id. And where, as here, the habeas court's decision rests on multiple avenues for relief, "we need only determine that at least one avenue permits habeas review, and that at least one [c]laim has merit." Id. (quoting McElwain, 340 S.W.3d at 232). Analysis The State raises five claims of error by the habeas court: (1) Nail's argument that the court lacked authority to revoke her probation belongs in a Rule 24.035 proceeding, rather than habeas; (2) Nail's release was prohibited by § 559.105.2 because she still had an outstanding balance on her restitution; (3) Nail is not entitled to relief due to self- invited error; (4) there were sufficient findings that Nail willfully failed to pay the full restitution amount; and (5) the habeas court exceeded its authority in finally discharging

11 Nail from judicial parole. In light of our standard of review, we need only consider whether one of the two bases for the habeas court's decision is supported by the record. The State's first three claims relate to the habeas court's determination that the sentencing court lacked authority to revoke Nail's probation on Counts III-VII; its fourth claim relates to the habeas court's determination that the sentencing court made insufficient findings to support a willful failure to pay restitution; and its fifth point relates solely to the propriety of the relief awarded by the habeas court. Because we find that the habeas record supports the habeas court's determination that the sentencing court lacked authority to revoke Nail's probation, we need not address the State's fourth claim of error. I. The sentencing court lacked authority to revoke Nail's probation on Counts III-VII. "Section 559.036 governs the duration of probation terms and the power of a court to revoke a defendant's probation." State ex rel. Bailey v. Hilton, 675 S.W.3d 644, 649 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023). A "court's authority to revoke probation extends only through the duration of the probation term." Id. (citing § 559.036.2). "When the probation term ends, so does the court's authority to revoke probation." Id. (quoting State ex rel. Strauser v. Martinez, 416 S.W.3d 798, 801 (Mo. banc 2014)). A court's authority to revoke probation may be extended "for any further period which is reasonably necessary for the adjudication of matters arising before [the probation period's] expiration." § 559.036.8, RSMo (2012). But, in order to do so, the court must meet the following two conditions: (1) there must be "some affirmative

12 manifestation of an intent to conduct a revocation hearing . . . prior to the expiration of the period" and (2) the court must make "every reasonable effort . . . to notify the probationer and to conduct the hearing prior to the expiration of the period." Id. "Unless both requirements are satisfied, the trial court loses the authority to revoke probation beyond the expiration of its term." Hilton, 675 S.W.3d at 649 (quoting Miller v. State, 558 S.W.3d 15, 20 (Mo. banc 2018)). The probationer bears the burden of demonstrating the failure to meet these two requirements. Id. Here, Nail argued in her habeas petition that her probation for Counts III-VII expired on or about November 15, 2014, as a result of ECCs; therefore, the court lacked authority to revoke her probation on March 27, 2024. We agree. A. This matter is properly raised in a habeas action. In its first claim, the State argues that the habeas court exceeded its authority by granting relief in a habeas action when Nail's claim should have been addressed in a Rule 24.035 proceeding. 5 But the State also recognizes that § 217.703.8 expressly directs that "[t]he award or rescission of any [ECCs] under this section shall not be subject to appeal or any motion for postconviction relief." And the Missouri Supreme Court has directly held that "[s]ection 217.703.8 does not prohibit a challenge to the calculation of ECCs in habeas corpus." State ex rel. Jonas v. Minor, 602 S.W.3d 189, 194 (Mo. banc 2020). Yet the State invites us to find an exception based on a single case out of our Southern District wherein the court addressed an issue regarding the accumulation of ECCs in a

5 Nail has a pending Rule 24.035 proceeding in case number 24CR-CC00079.

13 Rule 24.035 proceeding. But, as the State candidly admits, any potential effect of § 217.703.8 "was not briefed" or addressed by the court in that case. Because the cases that do address the effect of § 217.703.8 on ECC claims uniformly hold that a Rule 24.035 proceeding is not the proper avenue for relief, 6 we decline the State's invitation to establish an exception. B. Nail accumulated sufficient ECCs under § 217.703 to be discharged from probation on Counts III-VII no later than December 2014. Section 217.703, originally enacted in August 2012, mandates that certain offenders on probation or parole earn credits towards completion of their probation or parole term based on their compliance with the conditions of their probation or parole. 7

When originally enacted, § 217.703.1(2) provided that ECCs were available for those on probation for class C or class D felonies with some exceptions inapplicable here. 8

§ 217.703.1(2), RSMo (2012). ECCs "shall reduce the term of probation, parole, or conditional release by thirty days for each full calendar month of compliance with the terms of supervision." Id. § .3. The original statute provided that credits were "to accrue

6 See, e.g., State ex rel. Schmitt v. Hayes, 583 S.W.3d 73, 83-84 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019); State ex rel. Hawley v. Chapman, 567 S.W.3d 197, 205-06 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018). 7 Under § 217.703, "the term 'compliance' shall mean the absence of an initial violation report submitted by a probation or parole officer during a calendar month, or a motion to revoke or motion to suspend filed by a prosecuting or circuit attorney, against the offender." § 217.703.4, RSMo (2012). 8 This section was amended in 2014 to remove class C felonies from eligibility, but that amendment did not take effect until January 1, 2017. Because Nail had already accrued sufficient ECCs combined with time served on probation for mandatory discharge on Counts III-VII well before January 1, 2017, this amendment did not affect her.

14 for eligible offenders after the first full calendar month of supervision or on October 1, 2012, if the offender began a term of probation, parole, or conditional release before September 1, 2012." Id. ECCs do not accrue "during any calendar month in which a violation report has been submitted or a motion to revoke or motion to suspend has been filed." Id. § .5. ECCs are likewise "suspended pending the outcome of a hearing, if a hearing is held." Id. But, [i]f no hearing is held or the court or board finds that the violation did not occur, then the offender shall be deemed to be in compliance and shall begin earning credits on the first day of the next calendar month following the month in which the report was submitted or the motion was filed. Id. And, once the combination of . . . time served on probation . . . and earned compliance credits satisfy the total term of probation, . . . the board or sentencing court shall order final discharge of the offender, so long as the offender has completed at least two years of his or her probation or parole. Id. § .7. 9

Here, because Nail began her probation on the class C felonies on January 4, 2012, she began to accrue ECCs starting August 28, 2012. Her accumulation of ECCs was suspended in November 2013, as a result of a violation report, but the accumulation resumed on December 1, 2013, because the court found no violation. Though the court purported to suspend Nail's accumulation of ECCs by written order on July 29, 2014, the

9 This section was amended in 2018 to require an offender to have completed not only two years of probation but also "completed restitution" before discharge is required. But, because Nail had already satisfied all conditions for mandatory discharge on Counts III-VII no later than December 2014, this amendment also did not affect her.

15 court lacked authority to do so, as the accumulation of ECCs is mandatory in the absence of a violation report or motion to revoke, neither of which existed on July 29, 2014. Thus, Nail continued to accrue ECCs from December 1, 2013, as there were no further violation reports filed until November 15, 2016. Accordingly, Nail accrued 14 months of ECCs from September 2012 through October 2013. As of October 2013, she had also served 22 months of probation. She accrued 13 more months of ECCs from December 2013 through December 2014. During that same period, she served roughly 12 more months of probation. And Nail had served a minimum of two years of probation by that time. Thus, under § 217.703.7, discharge from probation on Counts III-VII was mandatory no later than December 2014. 10

Although "[a]ll earned credits shall be rescinded if the court or board revokes the probation or parole," 217.703.5, RSMo (2012), the first time Nail's probation was purportedly revoked was October 25, 2016, well after she should have been mandatorily discharged on Counts III-VII under § 217.703.7. 11 The State concedes that "there is no dispute as to the calculation of Nail's ECCs" and that, "[i]f the law had permitted early discharge from probation while a restitution balance was outstanding, then Nail should have accrued sufficient ECCs to obtain early discharge."

10 Though Nail alleged that her probation expired as a result of ECCs on November 15, 2014, we need not calculate the exact date of probation expiration, as the latest possible date occurred well before the first attempted revocation. 11 Nail's probation on Counts I and II was not subject to ECCs because those counts involved class B felonies, which were not eligible for ECCs.

16 C. Section 559.105.2 does not preclude Nail's early discharge. In its second claim, the State argues that, regardless of ECCs, the habeas court exceeded its authority by finding Nail was entitled to early release because § 559.105.2 prohibited her early release due to the outstanding balance owed in restitution. We disagree because § 559.105 does not apply to Nail's sentences. Section 559.105.2 provides that "[n]o person ordered by the court to pay restitution pursuant to this section shall be released from probation until such restitution is complete." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the question before us is whether Nail was ordered to pay restitution pursuant to § 559.105. Nail's offenses occurred between 2007 and 2009, and she was sentenced in 2011. As noted above, her sentences included concurrent terms of 12 years (with 120-day callback) for Counts I and II, seven years for Counts III and IV with suspended execution, and suspended imposition of sentences on Counts V-VII. For all counts, the court placed Nail on probation with a special condition of restitution. Se ction 559.105 (both as it existed at the time of Nail's sentencing and in its present form) gave a sentencing court authority to order restitution as part of a defendant's sentence in addition to imprisonment. 12 Bellamy v. State, 525 S.W.3d 166,

12 See State ex rel. Strauser v. Martinez, 416 S.W.3d 798, 805 (Mo. banc 2014) (Fischer, J., concurring) (noting that § 559.105 "repeal[ed] the prior prohibition against requiring a prisoner both to serve a prison term and to pay restitution and, therefore, relieve[d] sentencing courts from having to choose between a prison term and restitution"). Before § 559.105 was enacted, a court lacked authority to order restitution as part of a defendant's sentence because it was not an authorized disposition under § 557.011.2, RSMo (2000). State v. Schnelle, 398 S.W.3d 37, 47 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013). But, under the authority of §§ 557.011.2, 559.021.2, and 559.100.2, RSMo (2012),

17 168 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017). The primary distinction between the version in effect at Nail's sentencing and today is that, when Nail was sentenced, § 559.105 allowed for restitution as additional punishment for only first-degree tampering with a motor vehicle or felony stealing of a motor vehicle, neither of which was a basis for any of Nail's guilty pleas. As the sentencing court did not—and could not—order restitution pursuant to § 559.105 for Nail, the State's reliance on its prohibition on probation release is misplaced, as § 559.105 is inapplicable. D. The doctrine of self-invited error is inapplicable. In its third claim, the State argues that the habeas court exceeded its authority in granting Nail relief because she was not entitled to relief due to self-invited error. We disagree.

"courts were allowed to order a defendant convicted of a felony to pay restitution as a condition of probation or parole." Bellamy v. State, 525 S.W.3d 166, 168 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017). Here, the sentencing court ordered restitution, not as part of Nail's sentence, but as a special condition of her probation—a circumstance seemingly not covered by § 559.105 at all. See id. We recognize that, in State ex rel. Hillman v. Beger, 566 S.W.3d 600, 608 (Mo. banc 2019), when analyzing whether § 559.105.2's prohibition on probation discharge took precedence over the mandatory discharge for ECCs under § 217.703, the Court made a passing reference to "restitution as a mandatory condition of . . . probation under section 559.105.2." But the issue before the Court was not whether § 559.105 applied to conditions of probation, rather than restitution as an additional punishment, and the restitution orders at issue appear to have been part of the defendants' sentences, rather than conditions of probation. Furthermore, the Hillman Court did not discuss or analyze Strauser, Schnelle, or Bellamy or any other case addressing the distinction between conditions of probation and sentencing as criminal punishment. Thus, we do not read Hillman's passing reference as a binding legal conclusion that § 559.105 applies to restitution ordered as a condition of probation.

18 The invited error doctrine means that "[a] party cannot lead the court into error and then employ that error as a source of complaint." Reed v. Rope, 817 S.W.2d 503, 509 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991). The State argues that, because Nail repeatedly appeared and submitted to the authority of the court well after she was entitled to discharge as a result of ECCs, she somehow invited the court's error in revoking her probation on March 27,

1. But the invited error doctrine is meant to prevent parties from strategically

inducing error or standing silent in the face of error. See State v. Winters, 623 S.W.3d 746, 754 (Mo. App. W.D. 2021) ("[A] defendant cannot affirmatively accept a judge's proposed action in the hope of a strategic advantage; then, turn 180 degrees and urge an appellate court to find the trial court plainly erred in doing that to which the defendant originally agreed." (citation omitted)). We are hard-pressed to see any potential strategic value for Nail in remaining on probation longer than necessary, and she, in fact, challenged the court's erroneous decision to revoke her probation on March 27, 2024, in the very habeas action we are reviewing. Thus, if any party invited error, it was the State in seeking to revoke Nail's probation ten years after she was entitled to discharge. See State ex rel. Schmitt v. Hayes, 583 S.W.3d 73, 80 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (holding that habeas petitioner's acquiescence in the State's erroneous classification of court costs as "restitution" did "not constitute an invitation of error to the sentencing court"; instead, the error was invited by the State and the Board of Probation and Parole). In short, we reject the State's assertion that Nail was not entitled to relief due to invited error.

19 II. The habeas court did not exceed its authority in discharging Nail from judicial parole on Counts V-VII. In its final claim of error, the State argues that the habeas court "exceeded [its] authority by ordering Nail finally discharged from judicial parole in that [the habeas court] only had authority to vacate the last void action in Nail's case and return her to probation status." The record reflects that the sentencing court granted Nail judicial parole on Counts V-VII, following its purported imposition of sentences on those counts. But, as we held above, the habeas record establishes that Nail was entitled to discharge from probation on those counts no later than December 2014, due to the combination of ECCs and actual time served on probation. Thus, she could not have been returned to a nonexistent probationary status as the State suggests. The State argues that the habeas court's action "does not account for the two class B felony stealing counts that Nail was also revoked for at the same time." But the State's point relied on V alleges error only in discharging Nail from judicial parole, and the record does not suggest that the sentencing court ever ordered judicial parole for Counts I and II. On the contrary, the sentencing court noted multiple times its belief that Nail's "maximum term of probation has expired," and that "we have maximized her terms of probation." And, as to Counts I-IV specifically, the sentencing court granted Nail "credit for the time that [she] spent on probation . . . , which by my particular specific calculation perhaps reflects that those twelve-year sentences probably are satisfied." Thus, the judicial parole granted by the sentencing court was in reference to Counts V-VII only. And, because Nail's probation had long ago expired on those counts, the sentencing court

20 lacked any discretion to impose an alternate disposition to judicial parole. Accordingly, we reject the State's fifth claim of error. Conclusion Because at least one avenue for the habeas court's grant of relief is supported by the record, we uphold its decision granting Nail's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State's request to quash the habeas record is denied.

Karen King Mitchell, Presiding Judge Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judge, and W. Douglas Thomson, Judge, concur.

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