State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Alexis R. Irvin, Appellant.

STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent, v. ALEXIS R. IRVIN, Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ED113035

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis The Honorable Joan L. Moriarty, Judge Introduction Alexis Irvin ("Appellant") appeals the circuit court's judgment entered after a jury convicted her of second-degree involuntary manslaughter and armed criminal action ("ACA"). In her sole point on appeal, Appellant challenges her ACA conviction, arguing she lacked the requisite mens rea. Appellant asserts if a mens rea is not provided in an offense's governing statute, courts will generally impute a mental state of knowingly. Because the ACA's governing statute did not prescribe a mental state, Appellant contends this Court should impute a mens rea of knowingly, requiring the State prove she (1) knowingly committed the underlying felony and (2) knowingly used a deadly weapon. Because she negligently committed the underlying felony of second-degree

2 involuntary manslaughter, Appellant asserts she lacked the requisite mental state to be convicted of ACA. Appellant's reading of the ACA statute conflicts with controlling precedent from the Supreme Court of Missouri and the plain language of the ACA statute. Accordingly, this Court rejects her argument. Point One is denied. The circuit court's judgment is affirmed. Factual and Procedural History On October 4, 2020, Victim was talking to two women, Appellant and Friend, on the corner outside B.P.'s Place ("Pub"). Patron, a regular at Pub and an eyewitness to the crime, saw the three talking as she went into Pub. Soon after, Victim, Appellant, and Friend entered Pub together. Inside, Bouncer, a part-time and then-off-duty bouncer for Pub, played darts with Victim. Victim would throw a round of darts, talk with people at the bar, including Appellant and Friend, then return to play another round. Bouncer described Appellant as "very aggressive" and said it seemed "she didn't want [Victim] to be" near them. While Patron and Bouncer differed in their testimony as to the exact details of the fight, according to Bouncer, this verbal disagreement between Appellant and Victim turned physical. Both Bouncer and Patron agreed Bouncer broke up the altercation. Bouncer pinned Victim against the dart board to calm him down. At this point, both Bouncer and Patron thought the fight was over and did not believe anyone's life was in danger. Instead, Appellant pulled a pistol out of her bra and shot at Victim. The shot missed and lodged at the top of the dartboard. Patron ran into the kitchen. Bouncer

3 released his grip on Victim, who also ran towards the kitchen. Bouncer heard another gunshot and saw Victim fall down face-first at the kitchen's entrance. Bouncer saw Appellant stand over Victim and shoot him "a few more times." Bouncer testified Appellant said, "I told you I was going to kill you tonight." Victim's autopsy revealed four bullet wounds. One wound was in back of the right thigh, which was consistent with the shooter standing behind or above Victim and shooting down. Two bullets entered the left thigh and the left buttock. The fatal shot entered through the front of his chest at the right side of the breastbone. After she shot Victim, Appellant and Friend fled the scene. As Appellant ran to her car, other patrons shot at her and her vehicle. One bullet grazed her shoulder and another hit her car's tire. Appellant's car only made it a couple blocks before it became inoperable. Friend drove Appellant to the hospital. Meanwhile, the police arrived at Pub and spoke with eyewitnesses. The eyewitnesses knew Appellant and gave police a picture of her from her Facebook account. The hospital notified the police they had a gunshot victim who was previously at Pub. Police responded to the hospital and identified the gunshot victim as Appellant. The police then identified her as the woman in the Facebook picture. After Appellant was discharged from the hospital, the police brought her in for questioning. Appellant initially denied involvement in the shooting, but later admitted she got involved after Friend and Victim started fighting. Appellant said Victim was harassing them and needed to "learn how to take rejection." Appellant said when she jumped in to help Friend, she did not intend to kill anyone, she just "wanted it to stop."

4 She said she had been abused by men in the past and when she looked at Victim, she "saw every man who had ever abused" her and "just wanted to feel safe." She stated she followed Victim into the kitchen and continued to shoot him because she wanted to "make sure he didn't come after us." The State charged Appellant with first-degree involuntary manslaughter and ACA. The jury convicted Appellant of the lesser-included second-degree involuntary manslaughter and ACA. It recommended she serve four years' imprisonment for the involuntary manslaughter conviction and three years' imprisonment for the ACA conviction. The circuit court accepted the jury's recommendation and ordered the sentences to run consecutively. This appeal follows. Discussion Point One: Insufficient Mens Rea Party Positions Appellant argues the State did not present sufficient evidence to support her ACA conviction because she lacked the requisite mens rea. Because the ACA statute does not provide a mens rea, Appellant argues this Court should impute a knowingly mens rea to each element of the crime. See Section 562.021.3, RSMo. 2016 ("[I]f the definition of any offense does not expressly prescribe a culpable mental state for any elements of the offense, a culpable mental state is nonetheless required and is established if a person acts purposely or knowingly ....") Because she negligently committed the underlying felony, Appellant contends she lacked the knowingly mental state to support her ACA

5 conviction. The State argues the Supreme Court of Missouri settled this issue in State v. Belton, 153 S.W.3d 307, 310–11 (Mo. banc 2005), which held the knowingly mens rea applies only to the use of a dangerous weapon element. The mens rea for the underlying felony, the State contends, is irrelevant. Standard of Review "An appellate court's 'review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is limited to determining whether there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Harris, 709 S.W.3d 475, 479 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) (quoting State v. McClain, 685 S.W.3d 35, 38–39 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024)). "The evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, disregarding any evidence and inferences contrary to the verdict." Id. "This Court 'does not act as a 'super juror' with veto powers, but gives great deference to the trier of fact.'" Id. Analysis Appellant was convicted of two crimes: second-degree involuntary manslaughter and ACA. Second-degree involuntary manslaughter is committed when a person "acts with criminal negligence to cause the death of any person." Section 565.027.1. 1 1 All statutory references are to RSMo. Cum. Supp. 2021, unless otherwise indicated. A person acts with criminal negli gence when "he or she fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or a result will follow, and such failure

6 constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation." Section 562.016.5. ACA is committed when a person "commits any felony under the laws of this state by, with, or through the use, assistance, or aid of a dangerous instrument or deadly weapon ...." Section 571.015.1 (emphasis added). A "deadly weapon" includes "any firearm." Section 556.061(22). Thus, as relevant here, ACA has two elements: (1) commission of the underlying felony (2) by, with, or through the use of a deadly weapon. See State v. Johnson, 524 S.W.3d 137, 141 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017). This exact argument was rejected by the Supreme Court of Missouri over two decades ago in State v. Belton. There, the Court held because an ACA charge can attach to "any felony" committed with a deadly weapon—without further qualification—the Legislature intended for an ACA charge to be eligible for every felony, regardless of its mens rea. Belton, 153 S.W.3d at 310 (emphasis added); see also State v. Jones, 596 S.W.3d 168, 175 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020) (construing "any felony" to mean "every felony."). Indeed, although the general rule is that the lack of a specified mental state means courts will impute a knowingly mens rea, courts will not impute such a mens rea if it would lead to an "absurd or unjust result." Id. For these reasons, the Court held the knowingly mens rea applies only to the use of the weapon element. Id. The mens rea for the underlying felony element is "irrelevant." Id. at 310. The same reasoning applies here. Like the defendant in Belton, Appellant argues the lack of a mental state in the ACA statute means both elements of the crime have a knowingly mens rea. This is incorrect. To convict Appellant of ACA, the State had to

7 prove she knowingly used a dangerous weapon in committing a felony, but the underlying felony could have any mental state. Id. at 310–11. Appellant's proposed rule would restrict ACA-eligible felonies to only those with a purposely or knowingly mens rea. This limitation would thwart the Legislature's clear mandate that "any" felony be eligible for ACA attachment. Section 571.015.1. Because Appellant's reading of the ACA statute flouts both Belton and the statute's plain language, this Court rejects her claim. Appellant attempts to distinguish Belton by claiming the recent ACA amendment was intended to abrogate its holding. The amendment of the statute in fact cuts the other way: because the Legislature left untouched the relevant part of the statute, the Legislature adopted Belton. When the Legislature amended the ACA statute in 2020, it did not change the expansive "any felony" language Belton relied on. 2 2 The only substantial change the Legislature made was to mandate consecutive imprisonment sentences if a person is convicted of both an underlying felony and an accompanying ACA. Section 571.015.1. "[W]here a court of last resort construes a statute, and that statute is afterwards re-enacted, or continued in force, without any change in its terms, it is presumed that the legislature adopted the construction given to it by the court." State v. Nowicki, 682 S.W.3d 410, 415 n.5 (Mo. banc 2024) (quoting State v. Harris, 675 S.W.3d 202, 205 (Mo. banc 2023)). Because the Legislature re-enacted the ACA statute without changing which felonies are eligible for ACA attachment, this Court presumes the Legislature adopted—not abrogated—Belton's interpretation.

8 Through this understanding of knowingly, Appellant makes no assertion she did not knowingly use a dangerous weapon. In fact, she admitted to police she walked into the kitchen to shoot Victim again to ensure he would not "come after us." There was sufficient evidence she knowingly used a deadly weapon in the commission of a felony. Appellant thus possessed the requisite mens rea to support her ACA conviction. Point One is denied. 3

3 Appellant also argues Belton is inconsistent with an earlier Supreme Court of Missouri case, State v. Williams, 126 S.W.3d 377 (Mo. banc 2004). The two cases can be harmonized. Williams holds the mens rea for ACA is "knowingly." Id. at 385. The Belton Court was aware of Williams because it cited Williams in its analysis. Belton, 153 S.W.3d at 310. Belton only clarified Williams: while ACA has a knowingly mens rea, that does not apply to the underlying felony element because to do so would be absurd or unjust. Id. at 310–11. Conclusion

The circuit court's judgment is affirmed. _____________________________________ Philip M. Hess, J udge Michael S. Wright, Presiding Judge and Virginia W. Lay, Judge concur.