State of Missouri, Respondent, vs. Amanda Joy Rogers, Appellant.

STATE OF MISSOURI,

Respondent,

v.

AMAND A J OY ROGERS,

Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Opinion issued February 3, 2026 No. SC101172

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF POLK COUNTY The Honorable Michael O. Hendrickson, Judge

Amanda Rogers appeals her judgment of conviction for one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon under section 571.070. 1 Rogers challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction and asserts the circuit court erred in overruling her motion to suppress the firearm and ammunition because the state lacked probable cause for the vehicle stop. This Court affirms the circuit court's judgment. Factual Background and Procedural Hi story In May 2023, Informant contacted the Missouri State Highway Patrol and stated he may have purchased a stolen gun from Seller. Informant became concerned after the

1 All statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2020, and all rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2025).

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sale when Seller said he was a felon and on probation. A law enforcement officer verified the gun was not stolen, and additional law enforcement officers arrived at Informant's location after he stated Seller was returning to sell Informant another gun. Seller did not arrive at the designated time. After law enforcement officers left, a vehicle with a temporary tag arrived. Rogers drove the vehicle, and Seller rode in the passenger seat. Seller said he was late because he could not find a ride. Rogers exited the vehicle and conversed with Informant's friend behind the vehicle while Seller remained in the passenger seat and spoke to Informant through the passenger window. Seller pulled a ".410/.45 pistol" from under the passenger seat. Informant declined to buy the gun when Seller could not produce proof of ownership. Seller put the gun back under the passenger seat, and Rogers drove the vehicle away. Informant called law enforcement officers to describe the vehicle with the temporary tag and its occupants, where he believed the gun was in the vehicle, and where the vehicle was headed. Trooper Enderle saw a vehicle matching Informant's description driving in the direction Informant had reported with occupants matching Informant's description. She pulled behind the vehicle and began following it without activating her emergency lights or siren. The vehicle took the next exit, made another turn, pulled into a residential dr i ve way, and stopped "a little bit down the driveway" instead of driving close to the house, which Trooper Enderle found unusual. Trooper Enderle activated her emergency lights. Trooper Enderle testified she did not activate her lights before then because she knew there was a gun in the vehicle and she was waiting until she had backup, which

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arrived soon after. As Trooper Enderle approached the vehicle, Rogers opened the door, exited the driver's seat, and began walking toward Trooper Enderle. Trooper Enderle found this suspicious because it is unusual for someone to exit a vehicle during a traffic stop when not prompted to do so. Trooper Enderle learned from dispatchers that Seller and Rogers had felony convictions. Rogers seemed nervous, aggravated, agitated, and distressed. Trooper Enderle described Rogers as more nervous "than the normal person[.]" When Trooper Enderle asked where Rogers was coming from, Rogers said she was coming from a specific t o wn, which Trooper Enderle found suspicious because Informant had reported Rogers and Seller coming from a different town and there was no direct route between the towns. Seller, who was still in the vehicle, also seemed agitated and aggravated. When Trooper Enderle asked Rogers if there was a firearm in the vehicle, Rogers responded: "Not that I'm aware of." Trooper Enderle found this response suspicious because "somebody normally answers yes or no." Rogers gave the same response to Corporal Rorie, who also found the response suspicious because it was e vas i ve and nonresponsive. Corporal Rorie asked Rogers if she was on probation, and she volunteered she was on bond for possession of drugs. Trooper Enderle and Corporal Rorie asked for consent to search the vehicle, and Rogers refused. Corporal Rorie decided to call a canine unit to the scene. The canine unit arrived about 20 to 30 minutes after Trooper Enderle initiated the stop. After the canine unit arrived, Trooper Enderle searched the vehicle and found ".410 ammunition" on the driver's side of the vehicle. Trooper Enderle testified she

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found a .410 Taurus firearm in an open bucket on the floor behind the vehicle's center console in the center area between the driver and passenger seats. The ammunition found on the driver's side of the vehicle was compatible with the firearm found in the bucket. On cross-examination, Trooper Enderle agreed the firearm was within easy reach of the passenger seat. Trooper Enderle testified the firearm was not immediately visible in the bucket because it was covered by other items. In September 2023, the state charged Rogers with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of section 571.070. After a jury found her guilty, the circuit court sentenced her to seven years' imprisonment and placed her in a long-term treatment program. Rogers appealed. This Court granted transfer after an opinion by the court of appeals. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10. Anal ysi s I. The state presented sufficient evidence Rogers knowingly possessed a firearm Rogers asserts the circuit court erred in overruling her motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all of the evidence because the state failed to present sufficient evidence she "possessed the gun by exercising dominion or control over it[.]" Relying on State v. Glass, 439 S.W.3d 838, 846 (Mo. App. 2014), Rogers asserts, "In joint possession cases, [the state] 'is also required to present evidence of additional incriminating circumstances indicating a defendant's knowledge of and control over the firearms.'" This case, like State v. Eggleston, handed down today, involves whether sufficient evidence supports the defendant's conviction for knowingly possessing an item. State v.

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Eggleston, No. SC101152, _ S.W.3d _ (Mo. banc Feb. 3, 2026). Although Eggleston i nvo l ves possession of a controlled substance under section 579.015 and this case involves possession of a firearm by a felon under section 571.070, the relevant statutory language is virtually identical in both cases. The same standard of review and analysis applies in both cases. The statute defining unlawful possession of a firearm provides: "A person commits the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm if such person knowingly has any firearm in his or her possession and ... [s]uch person has been convicted of a felony[.]" Sec. 571.070.1(1). The elements of the offense are whether a person 1) previously convicted of a felony, 2) knowingly, 3) possessed, 4) a firearm. There is no dispute Rogers had a prior felony conviction and the firearm qualifies as a firearm under the statute. The legislature has defined both "knowingly" and "possessed." In section 556.061(31)(a), the legislature defined "knowingly," when used with respect to "[c]onduct or attendant circumstances," as meaning "a person is aware of the nature of his or her conduct or that those circumstances exist[.]" In section 556.061(38), the legislature defined "possess" or "possessed" as: [H]aving actual or constructive possession of an object with knowledge of its presence. A person has actual possession if such person has the object on his or her person or within easy reach and convenient control. A person has constructive possession if such person has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over the object either directly or through another person or persons. Possession may also be sole or joint. If one person alone has possession of an object, possession is sole. If two or more persons share possession of an object, possession is joint[.]

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Sec. 556.061(38); see also sec. 195.010(38) (defining "possessed" or "possessing a controlled substance" virtually identically to sec. 556.061(38)). The plain language of the relevant statutes does not require the state to offer "additional incriminating evidence" or "additional incriminating circumstances" to establish sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find the elements of knowing possession of a firearm by a felon when the firearm is in a vehicle or other shared space. See secs. 571.070.1(1); 556.061(38); Eggleston, No. SC101152, slip op. at 5-6, 9, 14. Section 556.061(38) explicitly permits "joint" possession of an object, meaning multiple people can actually or constructively possess the same object at the same time in a vehicle or other shared space under the statute's plain language. To t he extent this Court's opinions or opinions of the court of appeals hold or suggest "additional incriminating evidence" is required to establish sufficient evidence of possession of an object when there is a shared space, joint possession, or arguably something other than exclusive or sole possession, these cases do not follow the plain language of the relevant statutes and should no longer be followed. See Eggleston, No. SC101152, slip op. at 9. As set out in Eggleston, consideration of a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge should begin with whether the state presented sufficient evidence of actual possession. Eggleston, No. SC101152, slip op. at 10. It is of no consequence to this Court's sufficiency-of-the-evidence review that the state in this case chose to argue only constructive possession to the jury. The definition of possession in section 556.061(38), and as submitted to the jury in the verdict director, includes both actual and constructive

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possession. At the circuit court, the parties we r e free to argue actual possession, constructive possession, or both. Whether the jury believed the evidence satisfied the definition of actual possession, constructive possession, or both is an issue of fact for the jury, not a question of submissibility. Regardless of how the jury resolved that question, this Court begins its sufficiency review by considering whether the state presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could have found Rogers actually possessed the firearm. The Court begins its sufficiency review with actual possession because actual possession is a more stringent standard than constructive possession. If the state made a submissible case for actual possession, then the state necessarily also made a submissible case as to the less stringent standard of constructive possession. See State v. Clark, 490 S.W.3d 704, 716 (Mo. banc 2016) (Wilson, J., concurring) (With constructive possession, "the defendant's relationship to the substance possessed is far more attenuated than when there is proof of actual possession. ... Without more, such evidence may well be insufficient to support a reasonable inference that the defendant knew of the presence and nature of the controlled substance he constructively possessed."). The state asserts it presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find Rogers actually possessed the firearm. This Court agrees. Trooper Enderle testified she found the firearm in an open bucket on the floor behind the vehicle's center console in the center area between the driver and passenger seats. On cross- examination, Trooper Enderle agreed the firearm was within easy reach of the passenger seat. A reasonable inference is the firearm was also within easy reach of the driver's seat.

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Rogers does not dispute the firearm was within her easy reach but argues the firearm was not in her convenient control because it was within Seller's control. Rogers' argument disregards a firearm or other object may be within the easy reach and convenient control of multiple people under section 556.061(38). A reasonable factfinder could have concluded, based on Trooper Enderle's testimony the firearm was in a bucket behind the center console between the driver and passenger seats, the firearm was within Rogers' easy reach and convenient control. Based on this evidence, the state presented sufficient e vidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude Rogers was in actual possession of the firearm because it was within her easy reach and convenient control. Sec. 556.061(38). Accepting Rogers' argument would cause this Court to disregard the standard of review and return to the rejected circumstantial evidence and equally valid inference rules by viewing the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Rogers, which this Court declines to do. 2

This is not to say the jury had to conclude Rogers actually possessed or constructively possessed the firearm. Rogers was free to argue, and did argue, Seller possessed the firearm, so she had no dominion or control over it as required to establish

2 Rogers asks this Court to conclude the state made a judicial admission as to Seller's control of the firearm when the prosecutor argued at sentencing she had "no doubt that [Seller] put that gun in that bucket" and "probably threw the ammunition onto her side of the car[.]" Any statement made at sentencing is irrelevant to this Court's standard of review on appeal, requiring it to consider whether the state presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror or other factfinder could have found Rogers guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Tate, 708 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Mo. banc 2025) ("But the legal question in a sufficiency challenge is whether the evidence was strong enough to reach the jury at all." (internal quotation omitted)).

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constructive possession. Specifically, Rogers argued she had no dominion or control over the firearm because Seller sold the first firearm to Informant and, without any involvement by Rogers, was attempting to sell the firearm at issue to Informant, and the firearm was located closer to Seller or equally close to him in the vehicle. The jury rejected her arguments. This Court does not act as a super juror. State v. Winter, 719 S.W.3d 738, 746 (Mo. banc 2025) (In a sufficiency review, "the Court does not act as a 'super juror' with veto powers, but gives great deference to the trier of fact." (alteration and internal quotation omitted)). That the firearm was found within Rogers' easy reach and convenient control may in itself be sufficient circumstantial evidence Rogers had "knowledge of [the firearm's] presence" and "knowingl y" possessed the firearm. But in this case, the state presented additional circumstantial evidence, beyond easy reach and convenient control, to establish Rogers had "knowledge of [the firearm's] presence" and "knowingl y" possessed the firearm: Rogers drove Seller to meet Informant; Rogers took the first exit after the patrol car appeared behind the vehicle; Rogers pulled into a residential driveway without pulling close to the house; Rogers exited the vehicle after being stopped by Trooper Enderle; Rogers appeared nervous, agitated, and distressed; Rogers gave a suspicious, nonresponsive answer when asked by Trooper Enderle whether there was a firearm in the vehicle; Rogers provided false information when questioned about where the vehicle had traveled from; Trooper Enderle found ammunition on the driver's side of the vehicle, and this ammunition was compatible with the firearm found in an area Rogers acknowledges was within her easy reach. All of this circumstantial evidence, beyond the firearm being

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within Rogers' easy reach and convenient control, establishes sufficient record evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude Rogers had "knowledge of [the firearm's] presence" and "knowingl y" possessed the firearm. The state met its burden to produce sufficient record evidence Rogers knowingly possessed a firearm under the plain language of the relevant statutes. The state bore no burden to produce additional incriminating evidence even though Rogers and a passenger occupied the vehicle in which the firearm was found. II. Trooper Enderle had probable cause to search the vehicle Rogers asserts the circuit court erred in overruling her motion to suppress the firearm and ammunition found in the vehicle because there was no probable cause for the search. Standard of Revi ew "A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will be reversed only if it is clearly erroneous." State v. Barton, 669 S.W.3d 661, 664 (Mo. banc 2023) (internal quotation omitted). "[T]his Court considers the evidence presented both at the suppression hearing and at trial to determine whether sufficient evidence exists in the record to support the trial court's decision." State v. Hosier, 454 S.W.3d 883, 891 (Mo. banc 2015). "This Court defers to the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations and considers all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling." Barton, 669 S.W.3d at 664 (alteration and internal quotation omitted). "[W]hether particular conduct violates the Fourth Amendment is a question of law this Court reviews de novo." Id.

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Anal ysi s "The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures." State v. Smith, 595 S.W.3d 143, 145 (Mo. banc 2020). "Article I, section 15 of the Missouri Constitution also protects against unreasonable searches and seizures and is coextensive with the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 145 n.5. Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, l aw enforcement personnel may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle "and seize contraband found if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband and exigent circumstances necessitate the search." State v. Middleton, 995 S.W.2d 443, 458 (Mo. banc 1999). "As a practical matter, exigent circumstances exist whenever an automobile is involved; the mere possibility that the vehicle can be moved is generally sufficient justification for a warrantless search." Id. (internal quotation omitted). "In an automobile context, probable cause to search exists when the facts and circumstances would lead a reasonably prudent [person] to believe that the vehicle contains contraband." State v. Milliorn, 794 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Mo. banc 1990) (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted). "Reduced to its simplest formulation, probable cause requires no more than a reasonable belief that it is more probable than not that the vehicle contains illegal property." Id. The circuit court did not clearly err in overruling Rogers' motion to suppress the firearm and ammunition because Trooper Enderle had probable cause for the vehicle search in that the totality of the circumstances would have lead a reasonable person to believe the vehicle contained contraband in the form of a firearm unlawfully possessed

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by a felon. Informant reported he had purchased a gun from Seller, who Informant later learned was a felon. After Informant declined to buy a second gun whe n Seller could not provide proof of ownership, Informant gave law enforcement officers the description of the vehicle with the temporary tag, the vehicle's occupants, where the gun should be in the vehicle, and where the vehicle was headed. Trooper Enderle saw a vehicle matching all information from Informant. Dispatchers confirmed prior to the search that Seller was a convicted felon, as Informant reported, and Rogers was also a convicted felon. Trooper Enderle, therefore, had probable cause to believe evidence of a crime would be found in the vehicle. The circuit court did not clearly err in overruling Rogers' motion to suppress the firearm or ammunition. 3

Concl usi on This Court affirms the circuit court's judgment. ___________________________________ Ginger K. Gooch, Judge

All concur.

3 Rogers also asserts the traffic stop was unlawfully extended because the search did not occur until after the canine unit arrived. Th e state argues Rogers' point is not preserved for review because her point relied on in the court of appeals referenced only lack of probable cause and did not mention unlawful extension of the stop. See Rule 83.08(b) ("The substitute brief ... shall not alter the basis of any claim that was raised in the court of appeals brief[.]"). In her brief in this Court, Rogers' point now asserts the search lacked probable cause, which included that the stop was unlawfully extended. Eve n assuming Rogers preserved her argument, her argument fails on the merits. Trooper Enderle had probable cause to search the vehicle at the time of the stop, so it is irrelevant (and does not change the probable cause analysis) Trooper Enderle waited to conduct the search until after the canine unit arrived.