State of Missouri, Respondent, vs. Gerald R. Nytes, Appellant.

STATE OF MISSOURI, ) No. ED113261 ) Respondent, ) ) vs. ) ) GERALD R. NYTES, ) ) Appellant. ) FILED: February 17, 2026

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Warren County The Honorable Nathan A. Carroz

Before: Michael S. Wright, Presiding Judge, Philip M. Hess, Judge, and Virginia W. Lay, Judge.

Introduction Gerald Nytes (Nytes) appeals from his conviction after a bench trial for violating a full order of protection. In his sole point on appeal, Nytes argues the trial court erred in entering judgment and sentence against him because the State's evidence was insufficient to infer that Nytes had notice, legal or actual, as required by section 455.085. 1 We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court. Factual and Procedural Background This case stems from Nytes's violation of the full order of protection (OP) granted to Nytes's now ex-wife, Victim. The circuit court granted the OP—which prohibited Nytes from,

1 All section references are to RSMo (2016).

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among other things, initiating communication with Victim—on July 31, 2019. On January 29, 2020, Nytes made four calls from Warren County Jail to Victim's cell phone. Victim reported the calls to the sheriff's office the same day. Deputy B.M. interviewed her and retrieved the jail call log confirming the calls were made from Warren County Jail to Victim's phone. A bench trial was held on November 15, 2024. 2 The State put on three witnesses: Detective J.D., Deputy B.M., and Victim. Detective J.D. testified to the authenticity of the call logs. Deputy B.M. described his prior interview of Victim, his review of her cell phone call log, and his confirmation of the calls' origin. Victim identified Nytes's voice from the prerecorded greeting on his jail account and, in response to questioning by Nytes, detailed Nytes's previous violations of the OP and his subsequent guilty pleas. The State also introduced a certified copy of the circuit court's Judgment of the Full Order of Protection, which indicated via checked box that Nytes had been present on July 31, 2019 for the contested OP hearing. The State introduced no evidence confirming that Nytes was ever served with a copy of the OP. Nytes did not testify at trial. Nytes also did not introduce any evidence that would call into question his presence at the OP hearing. The trial court found Nytes guilty of one count of violating an order of protection, a Class A misdemeanor. The court sentenced Nytes to one year in Warren County Jail, said sentence execution suspended, with two years of probation. This appeal follows. Standard of Review Claims regarding the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a criminal conviction are always preserved for appellate review. Rule 29.11(e); 3 State v. Claycomb, 470 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Mo.

2 Though the calls occurred in 2020, the case was not initiated until November 1, 2023. Nytes did not raise a statute of limitations defense. Nytes had already been convicted of four similar violations of the same order in 2020, convictions which were upheld by this Court in State v. Nytes, 711 S.W.3d 898 (Mo. App. E.D. 2025) (Nytes I). 3 All rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2025).

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banc 2015). Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence "is limited to whether the State has introduced sufficient evidence for any reasonable [trier of fact] to have been convinced of [defendant's] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Bateman, 318 S.W.3d 681, 686-87 (Mo. banc 2010) (internal quotation omitted). We do not assess whether we believe the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational fact-finder "could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 687 (internal quotation omitted). We accept as true "all of the evidence favorable to the state, including all favorable inferences drawn from the evidence and disregard[] all evidence and inferences to the contrary." Id. (internal quotation omitted). Discussion In his sole point on appeal, Nytes argues there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had legal or actual notice of the OP and therefore cannot be liable for violating it in January of 2020. We disagree. The Judgment of the Full Order of Protection denoting Nytes's presence at the contested OP hearing, bolstered by Victim's testimony in response to Nytes's cross examination—that Nytes had pled guilty to prior violations of the OP—suffices to show Nytes had actual notice of the OP. "To find that a violation of the terms of a full order of protection has occurred, section 455.085 requires notice of the full order of protection either by service or by 'actual communication to the respondent in a manner reasonably likely to advise the respondent.'" Nytes I , 711 S.W.3d at 904–905 (quoting section 455.085.8(2)). Notice is sufficient only when "it arrives before the fact, when knowledge of the acts the statute forbids can, if heeded, permit a person to conform her legal conduct to the demands of the law.'" Id. at 905 (quoting State v.

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Gentry, 936 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Mo. banc 1996)). Even if a defendant lacked legal notice, "actual notice of a protective order and its contents" would suffice. State v. Burton, 320 S.W.3d 170, 175 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010). Here, the State introduced a certified copy of the full OP signed by the issuing judge, confirming that Nytes was present at the contested OP hearing. A reasonable fact-finder could infer that Nytes was therefore aware of the full OP and its terms. See State v. Graham, 553 S.W.3d 411, 419 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (finding defendant's presence at an order of protection hearing supported an inference of actual notice). Further, Victim's testimony about Nytes's previous violations of the same OP and his guilty pleas supports a reasonable inference that Nytes understood he was bound by the OP and aware of its prohibitions. In a prior case, Nytes I, Nytes argued—as he does here—that the State produced insufficient evidence that he had (legal or actual) notice of the OP. 711 S.W.3d at 904. There, the State introduced not only the same signed order present here, but also 1) a docket entry from Case.net marking that Nytes was personally served with a copy of the OP after the hearing, and 2) corroborating testimony from Victim directly asserting Nytes was present at said hearing. Id. at 905. The Nytes I court found this evidence sufficient for a fact-finder to infer both legal and actual notice. Id. at 905-06. Nytes contends that the additional evidence of legal and actual notice (which is absent here) was crucial to the sufficiency finding in Nytes I, requiring us to reach the opposite conclusion. Nytes is partially correct: The Nytes I court clearly rejected the State's argument that the OP—which includes a section specifying that Nytes was supposed to be served with a copy of the order following the hearing—was sufficient to support an inference of legal notice. Id. at 905 ("Language evincing an intended method of service is not the same as proof that service has

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occurred."). Unlike Nytes I, we have no Case.net entry from which a reasonable trier of fact could infer that Nytes had been served with a copy of the OP, so the record here cannot support a finding that Nytes had legal notice. But contrary to Nytes's argument, Nytes I did not establish a minimum requirement for an inference of actual notice. Nytes I merely noted that Victim's corroborative testimony supported such an inference, not that it was necessary. Here, we have (1) the checked box on the certified copy of the OP confirming Nytes's presence at the contested hearing, and (2) testimony from Victim in response to Nytes's questioning, establishing previous violations of the OP and guilty pleas by Nytes to those violations. The checked box on the Judgment of Full Order of Protection indicating Nytes was present at the OP hearing would likely be sufficient, even standing alone, to support a finding that Nytes had actual notice of the OP. 4 Victim's testimony, though not strictly necessary, further supports that inference of actual notice. Nytes's reliance on Burton is also misplaced. In Burton, the State submitted no evidence at all that Burton had legal or actual notice of the protective order he violated. See Burton, 320 S.W.3d at 172–76 (joint stipulation to the existence of valid order of protection that did not include acknowledgement of notice to Defendant is not, standing alone, sufficient to support an inference of actual notice). The Burton court specifically noted that "The State failed to adduce readily obtainable evidence from the Illinois judicial proceedings" and "failed to have [the victim] testify that Defendant knew about the Illinois Order and its prohibitions." Id. at 176. Here, the State adduced uncontested evidence—from just such a judicial proceeding—that Nytes was present at the OP hearing, and Victim testified that Nytes had already pleaded guilty to violating the OP. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find a rational trier of

4 To be clear, this is not a memorandum of a default hearing, but proof of a contested hearing which inherently required Nytes be present or represented by an attorney. The checked box confirms his personal attendance.

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fact could determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Nytes had actual notice of the OP and its terms. See Bateman, 318 S.W.3d 686-87. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

_________________________ Virginia W. Lay, Judge Michael S. Wright, Presiding Judge, concurs. Philip M. Hess, Judge, concurs.