State of Missouri, Respondent, vs. James Keith Eggleston, Appellant.

STATE OF MISSOURI,

Respondent,

v.

JAMES KEITH EGGLESTON,

Appellant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Opinion issued February 3, 2026 No. SC101152 APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COLE COUNTY The Honorabl e Jon E. Beetem, Judge James Eggleston appeals his judgment of conviction for one count of possession of a controlled substance under section 579.015. 1 Eggleston argues the state did not produce sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt he knowingly possessed the methamphetamine found in the vehicle he was driving. Because Eggleston's conviction is supported by sufficient evidence, this Court affirms the circuit court's judgment. Factual Background and Procedural Hi story At approximately 11:45 p.m., a Jefferson City police officer in his parked patrol

1 All statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 2020. Some documents refer to Eggleston as "Jamie K. Eggleston" or "Jamie Keith Eggleston." This Court utilizes the spelling used by the court of appeals and intends no disrespect.

2 car observed a vehicle emerge from behind a building. The officer observed the vehicle enter the street, enter another parking lot, and drive behind another building. The businesses in both buildings were closed. The area was prone to theft and burglaries. The officer viewed the vehicle's activities as suspicious and stopped the vehicle in the parking lot as it emerged from behind the second building. Eggleston was driving the vehicle. The only other person in the vehicle was a female in the passenger seat. The officer believed the passenger to be under the influence of a narcotic because the passenger had dilated pupils, her body was jerking, and her movements were uncontrollable. The officer asked Eggleston what he was doing, and Eggleston said he was looking for an ATM and volunteered there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest. The o fficer confirmed Eggleston had an active warrant, learned Eggleston also had a revoked driving status, arrested Eggleston, and secured Eggleston in the back of the patrol car. Because the vehicle was in the middle of the parking lot and not in a parking space and would have been obstructing business during business hours, and because the officer had also learned the passenger did not have a valid driver's license, the officer asked Eggleston if Eggleston would like the officer to park the vehicle. Eggleston responded by saying the officer could not search the vehicle. The officer found Eggleston's nonresponsive statement suspicious and contacted a canine unit for assistance. When the canine unit arrived, the canine conducted a free air sniff of the vehicle and alerted to the open driver's side window, indicating the canine had detected the odor of narcotics. The officer then searched the vehicle and recovered a black medical marijuana bottle without

3 a label containing four baggies with a total of 4.47 grams of methamphetamine. The officer testified he associated a container like that with storage for narcotics and found the bottle in a cubby or storage area along a large portion of the bottom of the dashboard on both sides of the center console. The officer testified the bottle was within reach of the driver's seat "just on the other side of that shifter selector." A second officer handling the canine searched the passenger side of the vehicle and found in the glove box a cloth bag containing marijuana pipes and the passenger's identification. In June 2021, the state charged Eggleston with possession of a controlled substance in violation of section 579.015. After a bench trial, the circuit court found him guilty and sentenced him to three years' imprisonment. Eggleston appealed. This Court granted transfer after an opinion by the court of appeals. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10. Standard of Revi ew "[T]his Court reviews whether there is sufficient evidence to support the charged crime, based on the elements of the crime as set forth by statute and common law and the evidence adduced at trial." State v. Winter, 719 S.W.3d 738, 745 (Mo. banc 2025) (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted). "Common law" in this context refers "to judicial constructions given those statutory elements when necessary." Id. "The elements of a crime are found only in the statute creating that crime." Id.; see also sec. 556.026, RSMo 2016 ("No conduct constitutes an offense or infraction unless made so by this code or by other applicable statute."). In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support a judgment of conviction, "the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most

4 favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Winter, 719 S.W.3d at 746 (alteration and internal quotation omitted). "[T]he Court does not act as a 'super juror' with veto powers, but gives great deference to the trier of fact." Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted). This Court "accepts as true all evidence tending to prove guilt together with all reasonable inferences that support the verdict, and ignores all contrary evidences and inferences." Id. (internal quotation omitted). This Court "may not supply missing evidence, or give the [s]tate the benefit of unreasonable, speculative or forced inferences." Id. (internal quotation omitted). Anal ysi s In a single point on appeal, Eggleston argues there was insufficient evidence to prove he knowingly possessed a controlled substance because the methamphetamine found in the vehicle he was driving was i n a closed container within a shared dashboard compartment and the record lacked "additional incriminating evidence ... needed to convert proximity or access into knowledge or control." The statute defining the offense of possession of a controlled substance provides: "A person commits the offense of possession of a controlled substance if he or she knowingly possesses a controlled substance[.]" Sec. 579.015.1. The elements of the offense are whether a person 1) knowingly, 2) possessed, 3) a controlled substance. There is no dispute the methamphetamine found in the vehicle is a controlled substance under the statutory definition. See sec. 195.010(6). The legislature has defined both "knowingl y" and "possessed." In section 556.061(31)(a), the legislature defined

5 "knowingl y," when used with respect to "[c] onduct or attendant circumstances," as meaning "a person is aware of the nature of his or her conduct or that those circumstances exist[.] " In section 195.010(38), the legislature defined "possessed" or "possessing a controlled substance" as: [A] person, with the knowledge of the presence and nature of a substance, has actual or constructive possession of the substance. A person has actual possession if he has the substance on his or her person or within easy reach and convenient control. A person who, although not in actual possession, has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over the substance either directly or through another person or persons is in constructive possession of it. Possession may also be sole or joint. If one person alone has possession of a substance possession is sole. If two or more persons share possession of a substance, possession is joint[.]

Sec. 195.010(38); see also sec. 556.061(38) (providing a virtually identical definition of "possess" or "possessed" for the revised criminal code). 2

Contrary to Eggleston's argument, none of the relevant statutes requires "additional incriminating evidence" when a controlled substance is in a vehicle or other shared space. Section 195.010(38) explicitly permits "joint" possession of a controlled substance, meaning multiple people can actually or constructively possess the same controlled substance at the same time in a vehicle or other shared space under the

2 Section 195.010(38), by its plain language, contains no time limit on when "possession" occurs. In State v. Twitty, 506 S.W.3d 345, 347 (Mo. banc 2017), this Court rejected Twitty's argument the state presented sufficient evidence only that he possessed "pseudoephedrine prior to the search but could not prove that he possessed pseudoephedrine at the time of the search." This Court noted: "This is a distinction without a difference—nothing in the relevant statutes limits the concept of possession to possession at the time of search or arrest." Id. This Court concluded the state presented sufficient evidence Twitty possessed the pseudoephedrine on the date of the offense as charged by the state, which is all that is required. Id. at 348.

6 statute's plain language. Some of this Court's opinions have created confusion by suggesting, contrary to the plain language of the relevant statutes, "additional incriminating evidence" is required when a defendant is in a shared space or otherwise does not have sole possession or exclusive control of a vehicle or other premises. See State v. Clark, 490 S.W.3d 704, 710 (Mo. banc 2016) ("Because the premises were shared, the state was required to present additional incriminating evidence to support the inference that Mr. Clark had knowledge and control over the methamphetamine in the two closed pouches in the east bedroom[.]" (internal quotation omitted)); State v. Zetina-Torres, 482 S.W.3d 801, 807 (Mo. banc 2016) ("When joint control of the premises or vehicle exists, the state is required to demonstrate some further evidence or admission connecting the accused with the illegal drugs." (internal quotation omitted)); State v. Stover, 388 S.W.3d 138, 147 (Mo. banc 2012) ("[W]hen there is joint control over the premises where the drugs are discovered, some further evidence or admission must connect the accused with the illegal drugs."); State v. Withrow, 8 S.W.3d 75, 80 (Mo. banc 1999) ("When the accused shares control over the premises, as here, further evidence is needed[.]"). Each of these cases c ites State v. Purlee, 839 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Mo. banc 1992), in which this Court found sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions for possession of more than 35 grams of marijuana and unlawful use of a weapon. In Purlee, this Court recited the then-valid circumstantial evidence rule and the then-valid equally valid inferences rule: "When the [s]tate's case is founded entirely upon circumstantial evidence, the facts and circumstances must be consistent with each other and with the

7 hypothesis of defendant's guilt, and they must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of his innocence." Id. at 587. Purlee asserted the state did not produce sufficient evidence he was aware of or had access to marijuana hidden in duffel bags in a van's rear storage compartment. Id. This Court explained the state's burden of proof absent proof of actual possession: Absent proof of actual possession, constructive possession may be shown when other facts buttress an inference of defendant's knowledge of the presence of the controlled substance. Thus, proof of constructive possession requires, at a minimum, evidence that defendant had access to and control over the premises where the substance was found. Defendant's exclusive control of the premises is enough to raise an inference of possession and control of the substance. Joint control of the premises, however, requires some further evidence or admission connecting the accused with the illegal drugs. It follows that merely being a guest in the premises of another where drugs are found is not sufficient to sustain a conviction for possession of controlled substances. The [s]tate must present some incriminating circumstance that implies that the accused knew of the presence of the drugs and that the same were under his control.

Id. at 588 (internal citations omitted).

This Court affirmed Purlee's judgment of conviction for possession of more than 35 grams of marijuana after concluding the state presented four additional "factors" incriminating Purlee, and "that the jury's verdict was consistent with the most reasonable hypothesis, Purlee's guilt." Id. at 588-89. The difficulty with this Court's opinions continuing to cite and rely on Purlee concerning how circumstantial evidence cases should be reviewed and what evidence is required in joint possession cases, cases involving shared spaces, or cases involving something other than sole possession, is this Court subsequently has rejected unequivocally both the circumstantial evidence rule and the equally valid inferences rule.

8 In State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 407 (Mo. banc 1993), this Court held: "[W ]e reject the circumstantial evidence rule as a standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence." This Court further observed: " Any societal distrust of circumstantial evidence has long been abandoned. We no longer need to hold circumstantial evidence cases to a higher standard than direct evidence cases." Id. at 406. In Grim, this Court also rejected the equally valid inferences rule, noting this Court's standard of review requires it "accept[ ] as true all the evidence favorable to the state, including all favorable inferences drawn from the evidence[.]" Id. at 413-14 (first alteration in original). This Court further observed: "If an appellate court sets itself up to select between two or more acceptable inferences, it ceases to function as a court and functions rather as a juror, actually a 'super juror' with veto powers. It is not the function of the court to decide the disputed facts[.]" Id. at 414. If Grim left any confusion as to whether this Court had rejected the circumstantial evidence or the equally valid inferences rules, this Court reiterated in State v. Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47 (Mo. banc 1998), its previous rejection of both rules. In Chaney, this Court noted "[t]he equally valid inferences rule was effectively abolished by State v. Grim." Id. at 54. "Because the equally valid inferences rule is at war with the due process standard governing an appellate court's review of the sufficiency of evidence, the equally valid inferences rule should no longer be applied." Id. Th is Court also noted Grim abrogated the circumstantial evidence rule. Id. In Chaney, this Court noted Grim had rejected a rule imposing on the state "an affirmative duty to disprove every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt." Id.; see also State v. Claycomb, 470 S.W.3d

9 358, 364 (Mo. banc 2015) ("Claycomb argues this Court should readopt the 'equally valid inferences' rule under which, if the factfinder could draw two, equally valid inferences from the evidence, one consistent with guilt and the other with innocence, the [s]tate has failed to meet its burden of proof. But this Court rejected the 'equally valid inferences' rule in [Chaney, 967 S.W.2d at 54]."). Neither the circumstantial evidence rule nor the equally valid inferences rule remains valid under Missouri law. Circumstantial evidence cases should be analyzed no differently from any other case. "[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Winter, 719 S.W.3d at 746 (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted). To the extent this Court's opinions or opinions of the court of appeals hold or suggest "additional incriminating evidence" is required to establish sufficient evidence of possession of a controlled substance when there is a shared space, joint possession, or arguably something other than exclusive or sole possession, these cases do not follow the plain language of the relevant statutes and should no longer be followed. These cases include Clark, Zetina-Torres, Stover, Withrow, Purlee, and all similar cases requiring proof of "additional incriminating evidence" to establish sufficient evidence of possession (actual or constructive) when there is a shared space, joint possession, or arguably something other than exclusive or sole possession. 3

3 Although not an exhaustive list, other cases that no longer should be followed include: State v. Gilmore, 537 S.W.3d 342 (Mo. banc 2018); State v. Barnett, 595 S.W.3d 515

10 An analysis of whether there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for possession of a controlled substance should begin with whether there was actual possession of the controlled substance under section 195.010(38). "A person has actual possession if he [or she] has the substance on his or her person or within easy reach and convenient control." Sec. 195.010(38). If yes, then the reviewing court should determine if the person had "knowledge of the presence and nature of [the] substance." Id. Absent an admission, whether the person had knowledge of the presence and nature of the substance will be based on circumstantial evidence alone. It is difficult to envision a circumstance when knowledge of the presence and nature of the substance will not follow from actual possession based on the requirements for actual possession. In other words, if a substance is within a person's easy reach and convenient control, there is likely strong circumstantial evidence the person had knowledge of the presence and nature of the substance based on the person's proximity to and ability to access the substance. 4

Assuming there is actual possession under section 195.010(38), the person still must have acted "knowingl y" under section 556.061(31). As with whether the person had "knowledge of the presence and nature of [the] substance," whether the person acted "knowingl y" will almost always be based on circumstantial evidence, and it is again

(Mo. App. 2020); State v. Glass, 439 S.W.3d 838 (Mo. App. 2014); State v. Buford, 309 S.W.3d 350 (Mo. App. 2010); and State v. Driskell, 167 S.W.3d 267 (Mo. App. 2005).

4 "Evidence that is sufficient to prove the element of possession also may—in some cases—be sufficient to support the inference needed for the second element, i.e., that the defendant had knowledge of the presence and nature of the substance possessed. But this will not be true in every case." Clark, 490 S.W.3d at 716 (Wilson, J., concurring).

11 difficult to envision a circumstance when "knowingl y" will not follow based on the requirements for actual possession. Under the plain language of the relevant statutes, a person who is in "actual possession" of a controlled substance under section 195.010(38) ("he [or she] has the substance on his or her person or within easy reach and convenient control" and had "knowledge of the presence and nature of [the] substance") and acted "knowingl y" under section 556.061(31) is guilty of possession of a controlled substance under section 579.015 regardless of whether the actual possession is joint or sole. The relevant statutes permit multiple persons to be in possession of the same controlled substance at the same time. In other words, if a person is in "sole" actual possession, he or she is guilty of possession of a controlled substance so long as the requirements of sections 195.010(38) and 556.061(31) are met. If two or more people share "joint" actual possession of a controlled substance and the requirements of sections 195.010(38) and 556.061(31) are met, each person is independently guilty of possession of a controlled substance and any (or all) can be charged with and convicted of possession of the controlled substance. If a reviewing court determines there was insufficient evidence of actual possession of the controlled substance, the reviewing court should consider whether there was sufficient evidence of constructive possession of the controlled substance. "A person who, although not in actual possession, has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over the substance either directly or through another person or persons is in constructive possession of it." Sec. 195.010(38). As the plain language

12 of section 195.010(38) states, constructive possession only applies when there is not actual possession. By definition, then, most cases will involve actual possession or constructive possession but not both. 5 And, based on the plain language of section 195.010(38), both actual possession and constructive possession qualify as possession. The legislature has determined a person with drugs in his or her pocket is no more or less guilty than a person whose drugs are in a storage locker or other location outside of the person's easy reach and convenient control. If there was sufficient evidence of constructive possession, then, as outlined above, the reviewing court next should consider whether there was sufficient evidence the person had "knowledge of the presence and nature of [the] substance." Id. The reviewing court then must consider whether there was sufficient evidence the person acted "knowingl y" under section 556.061(31).

5 If there was sufficient evidence of actual possession, a reviewing court need not and should not reach constructive possession. Only if there was insufficient evidence of actual possession should a reviewing court consider whether there was sufficient evidence of constructive possession. That the defendant and the controlled substance we r e remote from one another likely means a reviewing court may need to reach constructive possession. When the defendant and the controlled substance we r e remote from one another, the defendant still must have had "the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over the substance either directly or through another person" under section 195.010(38). An example of a constructive possession case is when a defendant stores a controlled substance at a third-party storage unit. The defendant and the controlled substance are remote from one another, but the defendant retains the power and intention to exercise dominion or control over the substance. Another example is a courier transporting a controlled substance at the defendant's direction. The defendant and the controlled substance are remote from one another, but the defendant retains the power and intention to exercise dominion or control over the substance.

13 To be clear, knowledge almost always will be based on circumstantial evidence alone, whether possession is actual or constructive. Possession, too, almost always will be based on circumstantial evidence. "Possession and knowledge may be pr o ve d by circumstantial evidence." Zetina-Torres, 482 S.W.3d at 807. In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence concerning whether a person knowingly possessed a controlled substance, a reviewing court should consider all record evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Although not required, this may include what are known as the Stover factors: Finding a large quantity of drugs in the vehicle;

Finding drugs having a large monetary value in the vehicle;

Easy accessibility or routine access to the drugs;

The odor of drugs in the vehicle;

The presence of the defendant's personal belongings in close proximity to the drugs;

Making false statements in an attempt to deceive the police;

The defendant's nervousness during the search;

The defendant's flight from law enforcement;

The presence of drugs in plain view;

Other conduct and statements made by the accused; and

The fact that the defendant rented the vehicle.

Stover, 388 S.W.3d at 147 (internal quotation omitted).

14 In Stover, this Court noted the factors "while not exhaustive, guide this Court's analysis of whether additional incriminating circumstances sufficiently connected Mr. Stover to the PCP in the trunk of the car." Id. A reviewing court may continue to use the Stover factors to guide its analysis of whether there is sufficient record evidence a person knowingly possessed a controlled substance. But, contrary to Stover, Purlee, and other opinions from this Court and the court of appeals, the state bears no burden under the plain language of the relevant statutes to establish "additional incriminating evidence" and specifically bears no burden to establish all or any of the Stover factors to satisfy the statutory elements of possession of a controlled substance. Using the analysis above demonstrates there was sufficient evidence Eggleston knowingly possessed a controlled substance. The state argues there is sufficient evidence Eggleston was in actual possession of methamphetamine, a controlled substance. This is correct. The state presented evidence a bottle containing methamphetamine was found in the vehicle dashboard cubby, and the bottle was within reach of the driver's seat Eggleston occupied. The state presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude Eggleston was in actual possession of the methamphetamine because it was within his easy reach and convenient control. Sec. 195.010(38). That the methamphetamine was found in a bottle within Eggleston's easy reach and convenient control may, in itself, be sufficient circumstantial evidence Eggleston "had knowledge of the presence and nature" of the methamphetamine and "knowingly" possessed the

15 methamphetamine. 6 But in this case, t he state presented additional circumstantial evidence, beyond easy reach and convenient control, to establish Eggleston "had knowledge of the presence and nature" of the methamphetamine and "knowingly" possessed the methamphetamine: Eggleston dr o ve a vehicle suspiciously late at night; Eggleston's passenger appeared to be under the influence of drugs; Eggleston volunteered he had a warrant; Eggleston volunteered he did not consent to a search of the vehicle when the officer had asked only if Eggleston wanted the officer to park the vehicle; and the canine alerted to the open window on the driver's side of the vehicle. 7

All of this circumstantial evidence, beyond the methamphetamine being within Eggleston's easy reach and convenient control, establishes sufficient record evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude Eggleston "had knowledge of the presence and nature" of the methamphetamine and "knowingl y" possessed the methamphetamine.

6 See Winter, 719 S.W.3d at 753 n.7 ("If a [factfinder] is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, so long as the evidence meets the minimal appellate standard required by due process, we need not disturb the result simply because the case depended wholly, mostly, or partially upon circumstantial proof." (internal quotation omitted)).

7 Eggleston asserts his volunteered statement the officer could not search the vehicle should not be considered against him because he asserted his constitutional right to refuse a search. Eggleston's nonresponsive statement to the officer's question about whether Eggleston would like the officer to park the vehicle is record evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could infer Eggleston "had knowledge of the presence and nature" of the methamphetamine and "knowingl y" possessed the methamphetamine. See State v. Langdon, 110 S.W.3d 807, 813 (Mo. banc 2003) ("[T]he giving of false, evasive or contradictory statements by the defendant ... are matters which may be considered in establishing knowledge." ( internal quotation omitted)).

16 Under the plain language of the relevant statutes, the state was not required to pr o ve Eggleston was in exclusive or sole possession of the methamphetamine, that all or any of the Stover factors were present, or that Eggleston was in "better" possession of the methamphetamine than his vehicle passenger. Although the methamphetamine was found in a vehicle with two occupants, the state had to comply only with the plain language of the relevant statutes and produce sufficient record evidence Eggleston knowingly possessed a controlled substance. The state met its burden. Concl usi on Th is Court affirms the circuit court's judgment. ___________________________________ Ginger K. Gooch, Judge

All concur.