State of Missouri, Respondent, vs. Jayelyn Z. Rivers, Appellant.

STATE OF MISSOURI, ) No. ED113150 ) Respondent, ) ) vs. ) ) JAYELYN Z. RIVERS, ) ) Appellant. ) FILED: December 30, 2025

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cape Girardeau County, Cause No. 23CG-CR00286-01 The Honorable Benjamin F. Lewis

Before: Michael S. Wright, Presiding Judge, Philip M. Hess, Judge, and Virginia W. Lay, Judge.

Introduction Jayelyn Rivers (Rivers) appeals from his convictions after a jury trial of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon and resisting arrest. In his sole point on appeal, Rivers argues the trial court erred denying his motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial because the State's evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for unlawful possession. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. Factual and Procedural Background Just before midnight on February 22, 2023, Cape Girardeau City Patrol Officer J.A. noticed a white passenger car in a Cape Girardeau County Park South parking lot. Officer J.A. approached on foot and saw four individuals seated in the car. Officer J.A. knew the vehicle's

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driver from a prior arrest. All occupants—including Rivers, seated in the front passenger seat— identified themselves. Officer J.A. informed the occupants they were being cited for curfew violation and called for backup. Officer W.S. responded. Officer J.A. asked the driver for permission to search the vehicle. The driver declined. Officers J.A. and W.S. then instructed the occupants to exit the vehicle. Officer J.A. handled the driver and left-side passenger while Officer W.S. patted down Rivers—finding no weapon on his person—and the right-rear passenger. After pat down, Officer J.A. informed the occupants they were under arrest and walked to Officer W.S.'s vehicle to write citations while Officer W.S. stayed with the arrestees. Rivers then fled the scene. Officer J.A. returned to the vehicle, where he saw a gun handle with extended magazine sticking out from under the center of Rivers's seat. Rivers was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon (Count I) and resisting lawful detention (Count II). A jury trial was held on September 30, 2024. Officer J.A. testified Rivers had either exclusive or, at minimum, superior access to the gun. Rivers did not testify or call witnesses. The jury found Rivers guilty on both counts and sentenced him to seven years of incarceration for Count I and one year in jail, which amounted to time served, for Count II. This appeal follows. Standard of Review Our review of the sufficiency of the evidence "is limited to whether the State has introduced sufficient evidence for any reasonable juror to have been convinced of [defendant's] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Bateman, 318 S.W.3d 681, 686-87 (Mo. banc 2010) (internal quotation omitted). We do not assess whether we believe the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether, in light of the evidence most favorable

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to the State, any rational fact-finder "could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 687 (internal quotation omitted). We accept as true "all of the evidence favorable to the state, including all favorable inferences drawn from the evidence and disregard[] all evidence and inferences to the contrary." Id. (internal quotation omitted). Discussion Rivers argues, in his sole point on appeal, the trial court erred by denying his motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial because the State's evidence—namely, Rivers's flight from police—was insufficient to sustain a finding of constructive possession. We need not reach this issue. We affirm the judgment of conviction because the State introduced evidence sufficient to support an inference of actual possession. Section 571.070.1(1) 1 prohibits a convicted felon from knowingly possessing a firearm. Section 556.061(38) defines possession as: having actual or constructive possession of an object with knowledge of its presence. A person has actual possession if such person has the object on his or her person or within easy reach and convenient control. A person has constructive possession if such person has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over the object either directly or through another person or persons. Possession may also be sole or joint. If one person alone has possession of an object, possession is sole. If two or more persons share possession of an object, possession is joint;

Both elements—possession and knowledge—can be proven by circumstantial evidence, "which need not be absolutely conclusive of guilt, nor demonstrate the impossibility of innocence." State v. Mitchell, 442 S.W.3d 923, 930 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014) (internal quotation omitted); see State v. Greer, 674 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023). Access to an area where contraband is found is an incriminating fact not destroyed by others' potential access.

1 All statutory references are to RSMo (Cum. Supp. 2020).

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State v. Clark, 524 S.W.3d 609, 612 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017). But, when control over premises is joint, some further evidence or admission must connect the accused with the contraband. State v. Stover, 388 S.W.3d 138, 147 (Mo. banc 2012). Examples include easy accessibility of contraband, commingling of personal effects, the presence of contraband in plain view, nervousness during a search, and flight from law enforcement. See id. The State introduced sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find Rivers had knowing, actual possession. The location of the gun (under Rivers's seat, with the handle and magazine protruding) satisfies the "easy reach and convenient control" requirement for actual possession. Even if others could have accessed it, Officer J.A.'s testimony Rivers had superior access further supports an inference of actual possession. See id. The gun's visibility—in plain view, immediately visible to Officer J.A. with a flashlight—is sufficient to support an inference that Rivers knew the gun was there. See id. Finally, the fact Rivers fled before the gun was discovered does not preclude a finding of actual possession. See State v. Moore, 352 S.W.3d 392, 400 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011) (finding actual possession when officer discovered cocaine on the passenger seat after a driver had fled). And even though occupation of the car was joint, Rivers's flight, ease of access, and the gun's visibility are all additional circumstances tying Rivers to the gun. Stover, 388 S.W.3d at 147. In the light most favorable to the verdict, the State's evidence is sufficient for a reasonable juror to infer Rivers had actual, knowing possession of the firearm. Although we need not reach the issue of whether Rivers's flight from police would be sufficient—standing alone—to support a finding of constructive possession, flight is one of the Stover factors supporting joint possession and further speaks to his knowledge. See id. Rivers cites State v. Franco-Amador, 83 S.W.3d 555 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002) for the contrary

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proposition. In Franco-Amador, the Court of Appeals found the defendant's unlawful immigration status was an alternative, equally likely explanation for the defendant's nervousness and flight from police, making that flight insufficient to support an inference of constructive possession. Id. at 558-559. Here, the record supports no alternate explanation for Rivers's flight. Rivers asserts he fled in fear of his probation being revoked. But the record contains no evidence that Rivers was, in fact, on probation; Rivers only mentioned probation in opening and closing statements, neither of which are evidence. 2 See, e.g., Phillips v. State, 679 S.W.3d 43, 47-48 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023) (opening statement); United States v. Boen, 59 F.4th 983, 991 (8th Cir. 2023) (statements of counsel). And unlike Franco-Amador, the contraband here was in plain view. See 83 S.W.3d at 558-59. Even if this case hinged on constructive possession, Franco-Amador would provide no help to Rivers. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

_________________________ Virginia W. Lay, J.

Michael S. Wright, P.J., concurs. Philip M. Hess, J., concurs.

2 Rivers's reliance on State v. Dickson, 596 S.W.2d 482, 485 (Mo. App. E.D. 1980) to assert that his closing statement was sufficient evidence of probation is misplaced. Dickson—unlike Rivers—testified that he was on parole, and the trial court erred by preventing Dickson from arguing an inference of innocence from his parole approaching completion. Here, Rivers's probationary status is not in the record at all. Thus, the inferential chain from Rivers's conviction to his flight would require the jury to infer probation solely from the stipulated felony conviction, and then infer motive for flight from probation. We find this unreasonable. By contrast, no intermediate step—and certainly not one so questionable as inferring probation from the mere existence of a conviction, albeit 16 months prior—was required for the jury to infer that Rivers fled because he knew there was a gun under his seat.