State of Missouri vs. Darron D. Ross-Garner

STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Respondent, ) WD87368 ) V. ) OPINION FILED: ) JANUARY 20, 2026 DARRON D. ROSS-GARNER, ) ) Appellant. )

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri The Honorable Bryan Round, Judge

Before Division One: Janet Sutton, Presiding Judge, Gary D. Witt, Judge and W. Douglas Thomson, Judge

Darron Ross-Garner appeals the judgment of the circuit court of Jackson County, Missouri ("trial court"), convicting him, following a jury trial, of one count of unlawful use of a weapon, section 571.030, 1 one count of second-degree domestic assault, section 565.072, and one count of armed criminal action, section 571.015. Ross-Garner was sentenced to a total of twenty-five years. 2

1 All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri (2016) as currently updated by supplement unless otherwise noted. 2 Ross-Garner received fifteen years imprisonment for unlawful use of a weapon, seven years imprisonment for second-degree domestic assault, and ten years for armed criminal action. The sentences for unlawful use of a weapon and domestic assault were to run concurrently; the sentence for armed criminal action was to run consecutively.

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On appeal, Ross-Garner claims that: (1) the trial court plainly erred in failing to declare a mistrial or issue a curative instruction sua sponte when the prosecutor's closing argument referenced violence documented in an October 2021 police report; (2) the prosecution engaged in misconduct by making an improper closing argument that included reference to the October 2021 police report; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying Ross-Garner's request for a mistrial after the Victim voluntarily testified that Ross-Garner had a probation officer. We affirm the sentence and judgment of the trial court. Factual and Procedural Background The facts, in the light most favorable to the verdict, are as follows. Ross-Garner and "Victim" 3 had been dating for about five years. 4 On the morning of April 15, 2023, Ross-Garner and Victim were asleep in bed when Ross-Garner received a text message and phone call from another woman Ross-Garner was also dating ("Girlfriend"). Victim answered Ross-Garner's phone and Girlfriend told Victim that she and Ross-Garner were dating and that Girlfriend was pregnant. After the phone call, Victim and Ross-Garner "got into an argument" that led to a fight. The next evening, Ross-Garner called Victim and asked to talk in person. Ross- Garner sent Victim an address at which he wanted them to meet; 5 she arrived at the

3 Pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Operating Rule 2.02(c)(3), we do not list the names of individuals and witnesses other than parties. 4 Victim and Ross-Garner were "going through a break-up" at the time of the shooting. 5 Victim testified that Ross-Garner frequently asked Victim to meet him at unknown addresses. "When he wanted to talk to me and he wasn't at home, he would tell

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address around 9:30 p.m. As Victim pulled up to the duplex, she saw Ross-Garner's car parked in the driveway. Victim parked in front of the house with the driver's side of her vehicle facing the house. When Victim arrived, Girlfriend came outside. 6 Victim rolled down the driver's side window and asked Girlfriend if Ross-Garner was there. Girlfriend told Victim that Ross-Garner was not there; Girlfriend then returned to the house and closed the door. Victim then got out of her vehicle and began walking around her car while waiting for Ross-Garner. As she turned to get back into her car, Ross-Garner exited the residence, raised a gun and began shooting at Victim. 7 After one of the bullets hit Victim in the shoulder, she got back into her car and drove to Truman Medical Center (now University Health) emergency room. Ross-Garner continued shooting at her as she drove away. On the way to the emergency room, Victim called her daughter and told her that Ross-Garner had shot her. Feeling like she might pass out, Victim was speeding on the way to the emergency room; soon she had a police car following her. When she arrived at the emergency room, the KCPD police detective ("Detective") driving the police car met Victim as she exited her car. Detective observed an apparent gunshot wound on Victim's upper left shoulder. Victim told Detective that Ross-Garner had shot her and gave him the address.

me to meet him at a[n] address or meet him at the gas station. So it was always different places." 6 At some point, Victim learned that the residence belonged to Girlfriend. 7 Victim testified that Ross-Garner fired approximately eight bullets at Victim.

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Detective later collected Victim's bloody clothing. As part of the investigation, Victim's car was searched. No firearms, weapons, bullet fragments, or shell casings were recovered during the search) but there was fresh blood on the steering wheel and two fresh bullet-shaped indentations on the trunk of the car. 8

A second KCPD detective ("Detective 2") responded to the Girlfriend's address following a "Shot Spotter" call the night of the shooting. Four shell casings were recovered on or near the porch of the residence. No DNA was recovered from the shell casings, and no evidence connected the shell casings to a specific weapon. Detective 2 testified that when multiple shell casings are found that close together, the bullets likely were fired from the same gun around the same time. Detective 2 also testified that shootings do occur in Girlfriend's neighborhood, although Girlfriend's specific residence had no previous history of shootings. No witnesses saw the actual shooting, but two unidentified witnesses told Detective 2 that they heard gunshots. Ross-Garner was apprehended several days later. His vehicle was towed and searched; no weapons were found. The trial began on June 17, 2024. At trial, during direct examination, when Victim was asked how long she had dated Ross-Garner, Victim stated, "[W]e met in 2017. And then [Ross-Garner] went to jail in 2018." Defense counsel objected that information about Ross-Garner's previous criminal sentence was prejudicial. The trial court overruled the objection on the basis

8 Both detectives testified that the indentations were consistent with a dent from a bullet. Neither detective could testify as to exactly where the bullet came from or the exact time or date of the damage. Both officers agreed that the indentations were new because there was no rust, dirt, debris, or weathering around the indentations.

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that one of the counts charged was unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon; 9 the trial court then instructed counsel to move on. As direct examination continued, Victim was asked if the April 2023 shooting was the first time she made a police report involving Ross-Garner. Victim replied, "No." Defense counsel renewed her previous objection that the prior report was prejudicial, and the trial court instructed State's counsel to avoid asking anything about the reason Victim filed the earlier report. Victim did go on to testify, without objection, that she filed a police report in October 2021. Nothing was said about the reason why she filed the report. Victim also testified that Ross-Garner was abusive during their relationship, he "had been telling me that he was going to kill me," and he had "been kicking my ass left and right." During cross-examination, defense counsel asked Victim if she had "reported to law enforcement [] information to get [Ross-Garner] into trouble." Victim responded, "I've told what to who?" When defense counsel repeated, "[t]old law enforcement," Victim replied, "I didn't tell no law enforcement. Are you talking about when I told [Ross-Garner's] probation officer?" Defense counsel then asked to approach the bench and, out of hearing of the jury, moved for a mistrial on the basis that Victim was improperly bringing in past convictions by mentioning Ross-Garner had a parole officer. Ultimately, the trial court overruled the motion for mistrial and noted both that 1) it

9 The trial court dismissed the unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon charge because the State failed to prove Ross-Garner had a prior felony conviction prior to resting its case.

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wasn't unreasonable to consider probation officers to be law enforcement, and 2) defense counsel "can ask these questions if you want, but you might not get the answers you want the jury to hear and it is a fine line." Defense counsel did not ask for a curative instruction. Finally, during closing, defense counsel made no objection when the State referred to the 2021 police report and stated that the Victim had "experienced violence at [Ross-Garner's] hands." The jury found Ross-Garner guilty of unlawful use of a weapon, second-degree domestic assault, and armed criminal action. Ross-Garner's post-trial Motion for Judgment of Acquittal or, in the alternative, Motion for New Trial was denied. Ross- Garner also filed, pro se, a Motion for Dismissal and a Motion For Retrial Due to Error, Mistake, and Inadvertence of the Court, Directed Verdict. That motion was also denied. He was sentenced to a total combined sentence of twenty-five years. 10

I. Plain Error in Failing to Declare a Mistrial Sua Sponte.

Standard of Review To preserve an issue for appeal, an objection stating the grounds must be made at trial, reiterated in a motion for new trial, and carried forward in the brief on appeal. State v. Culpepper, 505 S.W.3d 819, 831 (Mo. App. S.D. 2016). When no such objection is made, plain error review applies. State v. Johnson, 284 S.W.3d 561, 582 (Mo. banc 2009). Ross-Garner concedes that the claim alleged in Point I was not objected to at trial

10 Supra, note 2.

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or raised in the motion for new trial. Accordingly, Point I was not preserved and is only reviewable, if at all, for plain error. Plain error review is a two-step process. State v. Boyd, 659 S.W.3d 914, 926 (Mo. banc 2023). Step one requires this Court to determine whether the claim of error was "facially evident, obvious, and clear." State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566, 579 (Mo. banc 2019) (citation modified). In this Court's discretion, and only if this Court finds evident, obvious, and clear error occurred, does the Court then consider "whether or not a miscarriage of justice or manifest injustice will occur if the error is left uncorrected." State v. Mullins, 140 S.W.3d 64, 68 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004) (citing Rule 30.20 11 ) (citation modified). A conviction involving plain error in closing argument will be reversed only when "it is established that the argument had a decisive effect on the outcome of the trial and amounts to manifest injustice." State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 536-37 (Mo. banc 2003). Statements made in closing argument rarely constitute reversible plain error (Wood, 580 S.W.3d at 579) because, without an objection and request for relief, "the trial court's options are narrowed to uninvited interference with summation and a corresponding increase of error by such intervention." State v. Blue, 655 S.W.3d 396, 400 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022) (citation modified). As this Court previously stated, "trial judges are not expected to assist counsel in trying cases, and trial judges should act sua sponte only in exceptional circumstances." State v. Barker, 410 S.W.3d 225, 235 (Mo.

11 Rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2024), the version applicable to Ross-Garner's criminal trial, unless otherwise noted.

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App. W.D. 2013) (citation modified). Ross-Garner bears the burden of demonstrating manifest injustice. State v. Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d 519, 526 (Mo. banc 2020). Analysis In Point I, Ross-Garner alleges that the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial or issue a curative instruction sue sponte after the State mentioned, in closing argument, the October 2021 police report and tied it to Victim's allegations of violence against her by Ross-Garner. A "declaration of a mistrial in a criminal case is a drastic remedy warranted only by the most compelling of circumstances." State v. Carr, 50 S.W.3d 848, 856 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001) (citation modified). "Appellate courts are particularly wary of claims that a trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial sua sponte." Id. Thus, a court "should declare a mistrial sua sponte only in exceptional circumstances." Boyd, 659 S.W.3d at 926 (citation modified). Moreover, "a prosecutor is allowed to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence during closing arguments." State v. Minor, 648 SW.3d 721, 732 (Mo. banc 2022) (citation modified). Here, the only evidence the jury heard related to the 2021 police report was that Victim had filed a report. The allegations contained in the report did not come into evidence. The jury did hear the Victim testify that Ross-Garner was abusive, he had threatened to kill her, he shot her, and, over Ross-Garner's objection, that he had previously gone to jail in 2018. In closing, the jury also heard, without objection, the State reference the 2021 police report and connect it to "violence at [Ross-Garner's] hands." "A defendant who permits testimony to be introduced at trial without objection

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cannot later complain about the prosecutor's improper remarks on such evidence during closing argument." State v. Williams, 849 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993). Ross- Garner does not challenge the admission of this evidence at trial, but only the State's closing argument that referred to this evidence. While the record does not establish what the 2021 police report concerned, the reference to the 2021 police report was, at most, cumulative of other evidence that was admitted at trial. The fact that there was a 2021 police report was merely a reference to its existence, the report itself was not admitted in evidence. The Victim testified about her five-year romantic relationship with Ross-Garner, his threats to kill her, and that he had "been kicking my ass left and right." The connection between what gave rise to the 2021 police report and the "violence" admitted through Victim's testimony was mentioned once in closing, and defense counsel made no objection at the time. Finding no facially obvious, evident, or clear error by the trial court, we deny point I. II. Prosecutor Misconduct. In Point II, Ross-Garner alleges the prosecution engaged in misconduct when it referenced the 2021 police report in closing argument. While Ross-Garner is correct that an unpreserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct involving improper closing argument must be raised, if at all, on direct appeal (State v. Johnson, 599 S.W.3d 222, 230 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020)), those claims must be explicitly framed as a trial court error. Id.; Rule 84.04(d)(1)(A). Rule 84.04(d)(1)(A) requires that points relied on "[i]dentify the trial court ruling or action that the appellant challenges." Freestanding claims of prosecutorial

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misconduct "untethered to a claim of trial court error" are not cognizable by this Court. Johnson, 599 S.W.3d at 231; see also State v. Frazier, 721 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (no cognizable point on appeal regarding prosecutorial misconduct without identifying specific trial court error); State v. McCarthy, WD86568, 2025 WL 3072866, at *7 (November 4, 2025) (allegation of prosecutorial misconduct not cognizable on appeal absent identification of specific trial court error). Ross-Garner urges this Court to reconsider our holding in Johnson; we decline to do so. Point II is denied. III. Abuse of Discretion in Failing to Declare a Mistrial.

In Point III, Ross-Garner alleges the trial court abused its discretion in denying Ross-Garner's request for a mistrial, after the Victim voluntarily testified that Ross- Garner had a probation officer, thereby informing the jury that he had prior criminal convictions. Standard of Review Appellate courts review a trial court's refusal to grant a mistrial for abuse of discretion. State v. Barton, 240 S.W.3d 693, 703 (Mo. banc 2007). "The ruling on a request for a mistrial is left to the sound discretion of the trial court because it is in the best position to observe the impact of the problematic incident." State v. Eaton, 563 S.W.3d 841, 844 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018) (citation modified). An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court's ruling is "clearly against the logic of the circumstances" and is "so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks the sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful, deliberate consideration." Lozano v. BNSF Ry. Co., 421

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S.W.3d 448, 451 (Mo. banc 2014) (citation modified). Review is for prejudice, not mere error; the error must be so prejudicial that it "deprived the defendant of a fair trial." State v. Graves, 619 S.W.3d 570, 574 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (citation modified). For all of these reasons, a mistrial is considered a "drastic remedy used only in the most extraordinary circumstances when grievous error cannot otherwise be remedied." State v. Brown, 661 S.W.3d 27, 41 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023) (citation modified). Analysis "When a witness unexpectedly volunteers inadmissible information, the action called for rests in the trial court's discretion." State v. Moore, 687 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (citation modified). In Moore, this Court held that because a reference to the defendant's probation officer was brief, vague, and occurred only once, the trial court's decision to deny the motion for mistrial, grant the motion to strike the testimony and issue a curative instruction was not an abuse of discretion. Id. Here, as in Moore, Victim's reference to Ross-Garner's probation officer was brief, vague, and occurred only once. Further, here, as in Moore, Victim did not testify about any specific crime committed by Ross-Garner. Here, after the witness volunteered this information in response to a question from defense counsel during cross examination, defense counsel asked to approach the bench, and a bench conference was held outside the jury's hearing. During the bench conference, defense counsel moved for a mistrial. When the trial court denied defense counsel's motion for a mistrial, defense counsel did not then move to strike the testimony or for a curative instruction. "The fact that a defendant limits his request for relief to that of a mistrial rather than making a request for

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a less drastic corrective action cannot aid him." State v. Newton, 689 S.W.3d 785, 791 (Mo. App. S.D. 2024) (citation modified); see also State v. Smith, 934 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996) (noting that the failure to present the trial court with a choice of some form of corrective relief short of a mistrial "dulls any inclination" on the part of appellate courts to find the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant a mistrial). Moreover, as the trial court noted, counsel can ask the questions he or she wants, but "you might not get the answers you want the jury to hear." "Under the doctrine of self-invited error, a party cannot complain on appeal about an alleged error in which that party joined or acquiesced." State v. Gee, 684 S.W.3d 363, 372 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (citation modified). Here, Ross-Garner cannot now complain of an alleged error when defense counsel is the one who asked Victim if she had ever tried to report information about Ross-Garner to law enforcement. Victim merely answered the specific question she was asked by counsel. Given that the Victim's reference to Ross-Garner's probation officer was brief, vague, and only occurred once, compounded by the context in which defense counsel asked the question during cross-examination, we do not find the trial court's denial of the Ross-Garner's motion for mistrial to be "against the logic of the circumstances" and "so unreasonable as to indicate a lack of careful consideration." See Moore, 687 S.W.3d at 10 (citation modified). Even if the trial court erred in denying Ross-Garner's motion for mistrial, which we do not find, Ross-Garner failed to demonstrate prejudice from the denial. Again, there was only a single reference to Ross-Garner's probation officer and the trial court

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was not afforded the opportunity to rule on any other corrective action after denying defense counsel's motion for a mistrial. In light of all the other evidence presented at trial—the gunshots to the Victim's shoulder and vehicle, the four shell casings found at the scene of the shooting, the Victim's testimony about previous threats made to her by Ross-Garner, and the previous police report filed by Victim—we cannot say that the single reference to Ross-Garner's probation officer "deprived [Ross-Garner] of a fair trial." See Graves, 619 S.W.3d at 574 (citation modified). Point III is denied. Conclusion The trial court's sentence and judgment are affirmed.

__________________________________ Gary D. Witt, Judge

All concur