State of Missouri vs. Jeri Sue Lasker

STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Respondent, ) WD88083 ) v. ) OPINION FILED: ) FEBRUARY 24, 2026 JERI SUE LASKER, ) ) Appellant. )

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Platte County, Missouri The Honorable Susan Marie Casey, Judge

Before Special Division: Anthony Rex Gabbert, Chief Judge, Presiding, Cynthia L. Martin, Judge and Gary D. Witt, Judge

In this appeal following a bench trial, Jeri Lasker ("Lasker") challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her convictions for one count of driving while suspended, one count of possessing a prohibited item at a county jail, one count of unlawfully possessing drug paraphernalia, and one count of driving while intoxicated. We affirm in part and reverse in part, and remand this matter with directions to amend the judgment on the charge of driving while suspended.

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Factual and Procedural Background Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, 1 the evidence presented at trial established that on the evening of November 27, 2022, a Parkville, Missouri police officer ("initial officer") stopped a vehicle because it had an invalid license plate. The initial officer approached the driver, who was Lasker, and requested her driver's license and insurance information. While speaking with Lasker, the initial officer smelled an odor of alcohol and saw a bottle of alcohol in the vehicle. The initial officer provided Lasker's information to a dispatcher and was told that Lasker's driver's license was suspended. The initial officer asked Lasker to exit the vehicle and placed her under arrest for driving while suspended. A Platte County Deputy Sheriff who was a DWI enforcement officer and certified as a Drug Recognition Expert ("deputy") arrived at the scene shortly after the initial stop. After conferring with the initial officer, the deputy began an investigation into whether Lasker was driving under the influence. The deputy asked Lasker to step out of the initial officer's patrol car. During his initial interaction with Lasker, the deputy observed that Lasker was emitting a strong odor of alcohol, and had slurred speech and glassy, bloodshot eyes with dilated pupils. Based on these observations, the deputy asked Lasker if she would submit to field sobriety tests, and Lasker agreed to do so. The deputy observed multiple signs of impairment during the administration of the field sobriety

1 When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts accept all evidence and inferences favorable to the State and disregard any contrary evidence and inferences. State v. Liberty, 370 S.W.3d 537, 543 (Mo. banc. 2012).

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tests, including a lack of smooth pursuit in the left eye and nystagmus at maximum deviation in both eyes during the horizontal gaze nystagmus test; raised arms, improper turn, and incorrect number of steps during the walk-and-turn test; and swaying during the one-leg stand test. The deputy asked if Lasker would consent to a preliminary breath test, but Lasker refused. The deputy then arrested Lasker for driving while intoxicated. At that point, Lasker told the deputy that she wanted to consent to a preliminary breath test. The preliminary breath test was performed and registered positive for the presence of alcohol. The deputy then asked Lasker to consent to a chemical breath test. Lasker agreed to do so. While the breathalyzer equipment was calibrating, the initial officer and the deputy searched Lasker's vehicle. They found a half empty bottle of wine, a pipe with burnt marijuana residue, a pill bottle with a peach tablet and a partial blue tablet, a plastic capsule containing an unknown white powder, a lockbox, and identity cards with other people's names. After searching Lasker's vehicle, the deputy administered the chemical breath test, which established that Lasker had a blood alcohol content of 0.013 percent. The deputy then asked Lasker about the items found in her car. Lasker admitted that she had used marijuana, though she denied doing so recently. Lasker denied having any knowledge about or ownership of the plastic capsule with the unknown white powder, the lockbox, or the identity cards, but did not deny that she knew of and owned the marijuana pipe. The deputy asked Lasker if she would submit to additional field sobriety tests designed to identify whether a person is under the influence of drugs. Lasker consented.

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These tests revealed a lack of convergence and refusal to follow the stimulus during the lack of convergence test, and involuntary eyelid tremors and an eleven second time delay during the modified Romberg balance test. The deputy then asked Lasker if she would consent to a chemical test of her blood. Lasker refused. However, Lasker admitted to the deputy that she had taken five milligrams of alprazolam (commonly known as Xanax), 30 milligrams of Adderall, and 20 milligrams of Lexapro. The deputy transported Lasker to the county jail. During the booking process, a device was used to scan Lasker's body. The device operator reported a discrepancy to the deputy. The deputy went over to the body scan device and "observed an obvious defect which appeared to be consistent with the shape of two glass smoking pipes" in Lasker's pelvic region. Detention staff moved Lasker to the booking area shower where Lasker was directed to remove the objects. The deputy then heard the sound of glass breaking. The deputy testified that some of the broken pieces of glass at Lasker's feet resembled the bulb of a pipe. The two tablets found in Lasker's car were analyzed and identified as 0.05 gram of alprazolam, a Schedule IV controlled substance, and 0.37 gram of amphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance. The State charged Lasker with one count of operating a motor vehicle with an unlawful plate or placard in violation of section 301.320, 2 one count of driving while suspended in violation of section 302.321, one count of possessing a prohibited item at a

2 All statutory references are to RSMo 2016 as supplemented through November 27, 2022, the date of Lasker's offenses, unless otherwise indicated.

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county jail in violation of section 221.111, one count of unlawfully possessing drug paraphernalia in violation of section 579.074, one count of driving while intoxicated in violation of section 577.010, and one count of tampering with physical evidence in violation of section 575.100. Lasker filed a motion to suppress evidence collected during and as a product of the driving while intoxicated investigation. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. 3

Lasker waived her right to a jury trial. Her charges were tried to the court on April 7, 2025. To support the preceding facts, the State presented a video from the deputy's dashcam, and the testimony of the initial officer, the deputy, and the officer who analyzed the tablets found in Lasker's vehicle. At the close of the evidence, Lasker changed her plea to guilty on the count of operating a motor vehicle with an unlawful plate or placard. The trial court accepted Lasker's guilty plea, and then found Lasker guilty of driving while suspended, possessing a prohibited item at a county jail, unlawfully possessing drug paraphernalia, and driving while intoxicated. The trial court found Lasker not guilty of tampering with physical evidence. Lasker filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. The trial court sentenced Lasker to concurrent sentences of 20 days for possessing a prohibited item at a county jail and 20 days for driving while intoxicated. The trial court fined Lasker $50 for operating a motor vehicle with an unlawful plate or placard, $150 for driving while

3 Lasker does not challenge the denial of her motion to suppress on appeal.

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suspended, and $150 for unlawfully possessing drug paraphernalia. On May 19, 2025, the trial court entered separate written judgments and sentences for each conviction. On May 27, 2025, at Lasker's request, the trial court entered an order consolidating the four cases wherein Lasker was found guilty following trial. 4 We refer to the separate judgments entered in each of these four cases collectively as the "Judgment" in light of the trial court's consolidation order. Lasker timely appealed. Standard of Review Lasker's points on appeal challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support her convictions. "We assess the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction in a court-tried case using the same standard as in a jury-tried case." State v. Barac, 558 S.W.3d 126, 129 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (citing State v. Sutton, 427 S.W.3d 359, 360 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014)). In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, "this Court must make a de novo determination whether the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable fact-finder to find the necessary facts beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Boedecker, 717 S.W.3d 225, 233 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (quoting State v. Nowicki, 682 S.W.3d 410, 414 (Mo. banc 2024)). "In doing so, this Court will accept as true all evidence tending to prove those facts and will draw all reasonable inferences in favor of finding those facts." Id. (citing Nowicki, 682 S.W.3d at 414). This analysis is

4 The four case numbers in which Lasker was found guilty after a trial to the court were 22AE-CR03917, 22AE-CR03918, 22AE-CR03920, and 22AE-CR03922. The trial court's May 27, 2025 order consolidated the cases into Case No. 22AE-CR03917.

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not an assessment of "whether the Court believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but rather a question of whether, in light of the evidence most favorable to the State, any rational fact-finder 'could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. (quoting State v. Devalkenaere, 684 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023)). However, this Court "will not supply missing evidence or grant the state unreasonable, speculative, or forced inferences." Barac, 558 S.W.3d at 129 (quoting State v. Thompson, 538 S.W.3d 390, 393 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018)). Analysis Lasker raises four points on appeal that respectively challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support her convictions for driving while suspended, possessing a prohibited item at a county jail, unlawfully possessing drug paraphernalia, and driving while intoxicated. We address the points in order. Point One: The conviction for driving while suspended is not supported by sufficient evidence To prove that a defendant drove while suspended, the State must prove: (1) the defendant operated a motor vehicle on a highway; (2) the defendant did so when her operator's license was suspended; and (3) the defendant acted with criminal negligence with respect to knowledge of the fact that her operator's license was suspended. Section 302.321.1; see Missouri Approved Instructions-Criminal ("MAI-CR") 4th 432.04 (jury instruction for driving while license is suspended, revoked, or canceled). Lasker challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the second and third elements.

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Because we find there was not sufficient evidence of the third element, we need not address the sufficiency of the evidence for the second element. Regarding the third element, the State was required to prove that Lasker acted with criminal negligence with respect to knowledge of the fact that her license was suspended. Section 302.321.1; see MAI-CR 4th 432.04. Under section 562.016.5, "[a] person 'acts with criminal negligence' or is criminally negligent when he or she fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or a result will follow, and such failure constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation." The dashcam video was admitted for its truth. In the dashcam video, the deputy and the initial officer can be observed discussing Lasker's stop and arrest. The deputy stated, "And she's suspended. Well, let me see what kind of history she's got on here because I can see it," referring to the computer in the deputy's vehicle. The deputy then entered his patrol vehicle. Lasker was seated in the backseat of the deputy's vehicle. Lasker, who had already been placed under arrest for driving while suspended and driving while intoxicated, asked the deputy not to take her to jail, promising not to drive until her car had a lawful plate and her driver's license was no longer suspended. The deputy informed Lasker that her driver's license had been suspended "for quite a while." Lasker responded, "It's out of Louisiana. It's a ticket. But I didn't know it was a suspension. I was not aware that it had turned into that state." The deputy responded, "No, you've got a failure to appear suspension out of Jackson County also." Lasker asked, "For what?" The DWI officer stated, "It was entered . . . August 2nd of '21." Lasker stated, "I'm not even aware of any speeding ticket or ticket at all."

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The State points to Lasker's statements on the dashcam video to the effect that if her license was suspended, (which Lasker claimed to be unaware of), it must have been because of a ticket she received in Louisiana. The State argues that this provided sufficient evidence to establish criminal negligence because it established Lasker's awareness of a circumstance (the ticket in Louisiana) from which there was a substantial risk that a result (suspension of her Missouri driver's license) would follow. We disagree. The State presented no evidence to support an inference that Lasker's license suspension was the result of a ticket she received in Louisiana. All that the record establishes is that Lasker's license was suspended due to her failure to appear in Jackson County, Missouri, on August 2, 2021. When told about the failure to appear, Lasker's first response was "for what," followed by her statement that she was not aware of having received any ticket in Jackson County. Lasker's acknowledgment of a ticket in Louisiana does not constitute criminal negligence with respect to knowledge that her license had been suspended due to a failure to appear for an unknown reason in Jackson County. That leaves only the evidence of Lasker's reaction when the deputy told her that her license was suspended on August 2, 2021 for failure to appear in Jackson County. If Lasker's reaction captured on the dashcam video is believed, Lasker had no knowledge that she had received a ticket of any kind in Jackson County, the antithesis of criminal negligence sufficient to establish the third element of the offense of driving while suspended. But even if the trial court disbelieved Lasker's self-serving expressions, the State presented no evidence that would permit a reasonable inference that Lasker had

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received a ticket or some other citation that would make her aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that suspension of her license would follow. There was no evidence of the charge or offense that required Lasker to appear in Jackson County. There was no evidence permitting an inference that Lasker actually received a ticket or citation in Jackson County. There was no evidence of Lasker's driving record. There was no evidence of any written notice of license suspension having been sent to Lasker. This case is thus distinguishable from State v. Ise, 460 S.W.3d 448, 456-57 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015), where this Court found that the admission into evidence of a license revocation letter directed to the defendant and the defendant's driving record showing points assessed sufficient to revoke his license were deemed sufficient to establish criminal negligence, the third element of a driving while suspended charge. To reach that conclusion, we relied on previous cases that had similarly held that "a driving record showing expiration or revocation is sufficient under [section 302.321] to prove knowledge or criminal negligence with respect to knowledge." Id. at 456 (citing State v. Collins, 413 S.W.3d 689, 697 (Mo. App. S.D. 2013); State v. Hurd, 877 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Mo. App. W.D. 1994); State v. Brown, 804 S.W.2d 396, 398 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991); State v. Huff, 879 S.W.2d 696, 698-99 (Mo. App. E.D. 1994)). Vaguely telling Lasker at the time of her arrest that a computer search showed her license status as suspended for failure to appear in Jackson County, without more, is not sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Lasker was criminally negligent. Because sufficient evidence was not admitted to prove the third element of a driving while suspended charge, the Judgment's conviction of Lasker for driving while suspended

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is reversed. Lasker cannot be retried on the offense. State v. Liberty, 370 S.W.3d 537, 553 (Mo. banc 2012) (holding that were a "conviction is reversed solely due to evidentiary insufficiency the double jeopardy clause requires judgment of acquittal"). Point One is granted. Point Two: Sufficient evidence supported the conviction for possessing a prohibited item in a county jail To prove that a defendant possessed a prohibited item in a county jail, the State must prove that the defendant "knowingly . . . possess[ed], deposit[ed], conceal[ed] in or about the premises of any correctional center" any controlled substance; alkaloid or intoxicating liquor; article or item of personal property prohibited by law, regulation, or rule; or weapon or item of personal property that can be used to endanger others. Section 221.111.1(1)-(4). In establishing that Lasker violated this provision, the State provided the deputy's testimony that during the booking process, he saw two objects in the body scan image that resembled "glass smoking pipes" in the pelvic region of Lasker's body, and that shattered glass with pieces resembling the bulb of a pipe were at Lasker's feet in the shower. In the argument portion of her Brief, Lasker argues that this testimony was insufficient to support her conviction under section 221.111 because the State failed to present physical evidence of the prohibited items; failed to prove that Lasker had knowledge or control of the prohibited items and that she had knowingly possessed the prohibited items; and failed to show that the Platte County Sheriff posted a rule prohibiting the items. For the reasons set forth, we disagree.

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First, Lasker asserts that the deputy's testimony was insufficient by itself because the State needed to introduce physical evidence of the pipes at trial. However, a single witness's testimony can constitute sufficient evidence to support a conviction. State v. Porter, 439 S.W.3d 208, 211 (Mo. banc 2014); State v. Bumby, 699 S.W.3d 459, 467 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) ("the testimony of one witness is enough to secure a conviction if the fact finder deems them credible and believable"). Accordingly, the State did not need to admit physical evidence of the pipes to meet their burden to establish that Lasker possessed pipes in the county jail. Second, Lasker contends that the deputy's testimony did not provide sufficient evidence that Lasker knew about the pipes or had any control over them. However, the items revealed by the body scan were hidden in Lasker's pelvic region. Although Lasker asserts that the mere fact that the pipes were on her person was insufficient to establish her awareness of or control over the pipes, she cites no authority for this proposition. Rather, the law supports that "[w]hen an unlawful substance or item is found in a location that is exclusively controlled or occupied by a defendant, the defendant is deemed to have knowledge of and control over the substance or item." State v. Glaze, 611 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (citing State v. Zetina-Torres, 482 S.W.3d 801, 807 (Mo. banc 2016)). The deputy's testimony that the pipes were observed in a scanned image of Lasker's pelvic region, an area solely occupied and controlled by Lasker, permitted a reasonable inference that Lasker had both knowledge of and control over the pipes. Third, Lasker argues that the State did not meet the knowledge requirement because she "did[ not] walk into [the] jail of her own accord—she was transported there

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by law enforcement" without an "opportunity to dispose of anything before entering the facility." Citing Jacobsen v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548-49 (1992), Lasker contends that "[w]hen someone is in custody and unable to avoid possession, we require 'clear evidence of prior intent' before criminal liability can attach." The cited portion of Jacobsen discusses entrapment, stating that the Government may use "[a]rtifice and stratagem" to catch criminals but "may not originate a criminal design, implant in an innocent person's mind the disposition to commit a criminal act, and then induce commission of the crime so that the Government may prosecute." Id. at 548 (citations omitted). Here, no evidence indicates that the police induced Lasker to commit any crime. Lasker thus cites no relevant authority for the proposition that the deputy was required to afford Lasker an opportunity to dispose of items she had concealed on her person before she entered the jail. See Jackson v. Sykes, 686 S.W.3d 393, 397 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024) (an appellant must cite legal authority to support her argument, and "if no authority is available, an explanation should be made for the absence of citations"). Instead, the record establishes that Lasker was placed under arrest for driving while suspended almost immediately after she was stopped by the initial officer. And the deputy's investigation of whether Lasker was under the influence began almost immediately thereafter. Whether Lasker already had the pipes concealed on her person when she was arrested for driving while suspended, or somehow managed to conceal the pipes after her arrest, is immaterial. There is no authority for the proposition that she was required to be given an opportunity to remove the pipes before arriving at the jail.

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Finally, Lasker argues that the Platte County Sheriff was required to post rules describing what constitutes an unlawful item under section 221.111, and the State did not admit any evidence to establish compliance with this requirement. Essentially, Lasker argues that unless a posted rule described the glass smoking pipes as an unlawful item, they could not be characterized as such for purposes of violating section 221.111. As noted, section 221.111 describes the offense of possession of unlawful items in a prison or jail, and sections 221.111(1)-(4) describe "unlawful items" that are prohibited. Relevant to this case, section 221.111(3) provides that an unlawful item includes "[a]ny article or item of personal property which a prisoner is prohibited by law, by rule made pursuant to section 221.060, or by regulation of the department of corrections from receiving or possessing . . . ." Section 221.060 requires the Sheriff to "make and post reasonable rules for the operation of the jail." Section 221.111(3) did not require the Sheriff to post a rule describing glass smoking pipes as unlawful items as a condition of charging the offense of violating section 221.111. The three categories described in section 221.111(3) represent discrete, independent means by which an item can qualify as "unlawful." One of those means prohibits the possession of an item "prohibited by law." The evidence supports that the pipes fell under this category. Drug paraphernalia includes "equipment . . . used, intended for use, or designed for use, in . . . ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance or an imitation controlled substance." Section 195.010(18). The possession of such drug paraphernalia violates section 579.074. The glass smoking pipes had been hidden in Lasker's pelvic region. "An act

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resembling an effort to conceal constitutes evidence reasonably implying consciousness of guilt." State v. Burnett, 955 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Mo. App. E.D. 1997). The concealed glass pipes, viewed with all of the other evidence of drug use found in Lasker's vehicle, support the inference that the pipes were unlawful drug paraphernalia. The Sheriff was not required to make and post a rule prohibiting the possession of items that are already made illegal to possess by other laws. Point Two is denied. Point Three: Sufficient evidence supported the conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia To prove that a defendant unlawfully possessed drug paraphernalia, the State must establish: (1) the defendant knowingly possessed the drug paraphernalia; (2) the item was drug paraphernalia; (3) the defendant knew or was aware of the drug paraphernalia's presence and nature; and (4) the defendant used the drug paraphernalia for the purpose of ingesting a controlled substance. Section 579.074.1; see MAI-CR 4th 425.22 (jury instruction for possession of drug paraphernalia). In the argument portion of her Brief, Lasker asserts that the State did not provide sufficient evidence to prove that she violated section 579.074 because it failed to produce any tangible evidence to establish that the pipe found in her vehicle constituted drug paraphernalia and that she knowingly possessed the pipe. We disagree. At trial, the deputy testified that during the search of Lasker's car, he located "a pipe with what appeared to be burnt marijuana residue." The deputy testified that he asked Lasker about the marijuana pipe and that she admitted it belonged to her. The

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State also admitted the dashcam video. The video showed the initial officer and the deputy searching Lasker's car. Although the video did not show the contents of the car, it showed the deputy finding something, sniffing it, and stating that he had found a marijuana pipe. Later, the dashcam video showed the deputy telling Lasker that he had located a marijuana pipe in her car and asking, "Do you smoke marijuana at all?" Lasker responded, "I have on occasion . . . but I haven't as of recently because I'm on probation." The deputy asked, "When was the last time you smoked it?" Lasker replied, "It was more than a couple months ago." Lasker argues that this evidence was insufficient to prove that she knowingly possessed drug paraphernalia because the State did not introduce the physical pipe into evidence, or the results of a test proving that the residue on the pipe was a controlled substance. However, as discussed in connection with Lasker's second point on appeal, the State was not required to admit the pipe seized from Lasker's vehicle to sustain its burden of proof. Witness testimony can provide sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. 5 Porter, 439 S.W.3d at 211; Bumby, 699 S.W.3d at 467. Additionally, the State did not solely rely on the deputy's testimony, but also offered the video to support

5 Lasker observes that the deputy's testimony was inconsistent because he testified to finding the marijuana pipe in the trunk at a suppression hearing preceding trial, and to finding the pipe in the passenger compartment at trial. However, "[t]he testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction even if the testimony of the witness is inconsistent." State v. Bell, 936 S.W.2d 204, 207 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996) (citing State v. Tomlin, 864 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Mo. App. E.D. 1993)). The inconsistency in the deputy's testimony did not render the evidence insufficient to sustain Lasker's conviction, and at best, would go to the weight afforded the testimony by the fact finder.

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that the deputy found the marijuana pipe in Lasker's car and that Lasker owned and knew of the pipe. The evidence admitted included the deputy's statement, captured on the dashcam, that the pipe was a marijuana pipe after he smelled the pipe. Lasker did not object to this evidence which came in for its truth. In asserting that the State needed to provide physical evidence, Lasker likens this case to State v. Keel, 565 S.W.3d 755 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019). There, the defendant was convicted of possessing drug paraphernalia with intent to use after a police officer found a digital scale with a crystal-like residue resembling methamphetamine in the defendant's car. Id. at 756-57. This Court reversed the conviction based on insufficient evidence because the State had only provided the "police officer's testimony about observing a crystal-like residue on the scale . . . to show the scale came within the drug-paraphernalia definition." Id. at 758. This Court noted that this testimony was admitted as an explanation of subsequent police conduct rather than as substantive evidence. Id. It further observed that because digital scales have "legitimate uses," the State needed to "present some additional evidence, beyond the defendant's possession of the item itself, that the defendant had used, or intended to use, the item in conjunction with a controlled or imitation-controlled substance." Id. In contrast, here, the deputy's testimony was properly admitted as substantive evidence. Additionally, a marijuana pipe lacks legitimate uses because it statutorily constitutes "drug paraphernalia." See section 195.010(18)(l), (l)(a) ("drug paraphernalia" includes "objects used, intended for use, or designed for use in ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing marijuana . . . into the

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human body, such as" "[m]etal, wooden, acrylic, glass, stone, plastic, or ceramic pipes"). Keel is readily distinguishable. Lasker also contends that the State failed to prove that she knowingly possessed the marijuana pipe. We disagree. To prove the essential element of knowing possession, the State had to prove Lasker's "conscious and intentional possession of the [marijuana pipe], either actual or constructive, and awareness of the presence and nature of the [marijuana pipe]." Glaze, 611 S.W.3d at 795 (quoting Zetina-Torres, 482 S.W.3d at 807). "Proof of a defendant's knowledge of the presence and character of [drug paraphernalia] is normally supplied by circumstantial evidence of the acts and conduct of the accused from which it can be fairly inferred he or she knew of the existence of the contraband." Id. (quoting State v. Woods, 284 S.W.3d 630, 639 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009)). As noted in our discussion of Lasker's second point on appeal, a defendant is deemed to have knowledge of and control over an unlawful substance or item when it is found in a location over which the defendant has exclusive control. Id. The deputy testified that he found the marijuana pipe in Lasker's car and that she admitted that it belonged to her. The video corroborated the deputy's testimony that he found the marijuana pipe in Lasker's vehicle. Although Lasker did not expressly admit that she owned the marijuana pipe in the video, she effectively did so when she responded to the deputy's question about when she had last smoked "it," referring to the pipe. She did not deny knowledge of the pipe and admitted to smoking marijuana. The evidence was sufficient to permit the reasonable inference that Lasker knowingly possessed the pipe. Point Three is denied.

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Point Four: Sufficient evidence supported the conviction for driving while intoxicated To prove that a defendant drove while intoxicated, the State must establish: (1) the defendant operated a motor vehicle, and (2) the defendant operated while in an intoxicated condition. Section 577.010; see MAI-CR 4th 431.02 (jury instruction for driving while intoxicated). In the argument portion of her Brief, Lasker argues the State failed to provide sufficient evidence to support the second element. We disagree. As used in Chapter 577, "intoxicated condition" refers to "when a person is under the influence of alcohol, a controlled substance, or drug, or any combination thereof." Section 577.001(13). The State can prove that a defendant was in an "intoxicated condition" through both direct and circumstantial evidence. State v. Swalve, 598 S.W.3d 682, 687 (Mo. App. S.D. 2020). "[I]ntoxication is a '"physical condition usually evidenced by unsteadiness on the feet, slurring of speech, lack of body coordination and an impairment of motor reflexes."'" State v. Maggard, 906 S.W.2d 845, 849 (Mo. App. S.D. 1995) (quoting State v. McCarty, 875 S.W.2d 622, 623 (Mo. App. S.D. 1994)). Refusal to submit to chemical testing authorized by section 577.020.1 (which includes chemical testing of a person's breath, blood, saliva, or urine) is admissible in a proceeding relating to an arrest for operating a vehicle while under the influence. Section 577.041.1. Here, there was sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence from which the trial court could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Lasker was driving in an intoxicated condition from the combined effects of alcohol and prescription drugs. State v. Falcone, 918 S.W.2d 288, 293 (Mo. App. S.D. 1996). Lasker exhibited indicators of alcohol intoxication, such as a strong odor of alcohol, bloodshot and glassy eyes, dilated pupils,

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and slurred speech. Lasker also showed an inability to follow directions during the walk- and-turn test and swayed during the one-leg stand test. The deputy testified that Lasker's left eye could not smoothly follow his finger and that both eyes showed nystagmus at maximum deviation during the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Though Lasker originally denied having consumed any alcohol, she later admitted to having a glass of wine after the preliminary breath test registered positive for the presence of alcohol. A half- consumed bottle of wine was found in Lasker's vehicle. And Lasker's blood alcohol content was subsequently measured at 0.013 percent. While the legal limit for blood alcohol content is 0.08 percent and Lasker's content was only 0.013 percent, Lasker also admitted to taking prescription medications. "Any intoxication that in any manner impairs the ability of a person to operate an automobile is sufficient to sustain a conviction of driving while intoxicated." State v. Mattix, 482 S.W.3d 870, 875 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (quoting State v. Pickering, 473 S.W.3d 698, 704 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015)); see State v. Adams, 163 S.W.2d 35, 36-37 (Mo. App. S.D. 2005) (finding evidence sufficient to support conclusion that defendant was intoxicated though chemical breath test showed a blood alcohol content of 0.061). Lasker also exhibited indicators of drug intoxication which combined with the indicators of alcohol intoxication to further support the conclusion that Lasker was intoxicated. See State v. Honsinger, 386 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Mo. App. S.D. 2012) (a combination of alcohol, Xanax, and marijuana constituted an intoxicated condition); State v. Clarkston, 963 S.W.2d 705, 715 (Mo. App. W.D. 1998) (intoxicated condition can be caused by prescription drugs on their own or by prescription drugs making a driver more

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susceptible to the effects of alcohol). The deputy testified that Lasker's eyes did not converge during the lack of convergence test and that Lasker had involuntary eyelid tremors and an eleven second time delay during the modified Romberg test. Lasker admitted to having taken her prescription medications of Xanax, Adderall, and Lexapro. As previously discussed, a marijuana pipe and controlled substances were found in Lasker's vehicle, and two glass smoking pipes were concealed in Lasker's pelvic region. Despite this overwhelming evidence, Lasker argues that "[t]he State appears to have leaned heavily on the preliminary breath test (PBT) result" to prove her intoxicated condition. Lasker specifically asserts that the State could not use the PBT results to prove her blood alcohol content. However, the record does not support the premise of Lasker's contention. Though the result of the preliminary breath test was in evidence, a simple review of the record reveals that the State did not "lean heavily" on the result to prove that Lasker was in an intoxicated condition. Other sufficient evidence supported this conclusion. Lasker also challenges the evidence stemming from the deputy's administration of the vertical gaze nystagmus test and the modified Romberg test. Lasker argues that because these tests are not scientifically validated, the deputy's findings "amount to little more than observational notes." However, Lasker did not challenge the admissibility or validity of the results of these tests at trial pursuant to section 490.065.2, and does not raise as a claim of error on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting these tests,

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whether or not over her objection. 6 Her sole challenge is to the sufficiency of the admitted evidence to support her conviction. In reviewing this claim of error, we note that the deputy made no findings of impairment on the vertical nystagmus test. Lasker's challenge to test results that were not relied on to support finding that she operated her vehicle in an intoxicated condition is nonsensical. And, even if we disregard the results of the modified Romberg test, other sufficient evidence herein described supported the conclusion that Lasker was in an intoxicated condition. Finally, Lasker contends that the State failed to prove that she was impaired at the time that she operated her vehicle. However, evidence of Lasker's intoxication was observed by the initial officer immediately after Lasker was stopped. The deputy arrived on the scene shortly after the initial stop of Lasker's vehicle to further investigate whether Lasker had been operating her vehicle in an intoxicated condition. Lasker's contention that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she was operating her vehicle while in an intoxicated condition is without merit. Point Four is denied.

6 Section 490.065.2 governs the admissibility of expert testimony in criminal cases. State v. Aaron, 665 S.W.2d 401, 406 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023).

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Conclusion The trial court's Judgment is affirmed in all respects except that the Judgment is reversed with respect to the conviction for driving while suspended, which was originally entered in Case No. 22AE-CR03922. That conviction is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to amend the Judgment to reflect a judgment by acquittal on the charge of driving while suspended.

__________________________________ Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

All concur