State of Missouri vs. Jessie Randall Williams

STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Respondent, ) WD87393 v. ) ) OPINION FILED: ) February 24, 2026 JESSIE RANDALL WILLIAMS, ) ) Appellant. ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Boone County, Missouri The Honorable J. Hasbrouck Jacobs, Judge Before Division Three: Alok Ahuja, Presiding Judge, Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge, and Karen King Mitchell, Judge Jessie Williams appeals, following a jury trial, his conviction of second-degree murder pursuant to § 565.021. 1 Williams raises two points on appeal: (1) that the circuit court clearly erred in denying his motion to suppress and then admitting into evidence the first fifteen minutes of a video interview of Williams that police detectives conducted because Williams did not understand or waive his Miranda 2 rights before making statements to the detectives; and (2) that the circuit court plainly erred in issuing in its

1 All statutory references are to the Missouri Revised Statutes (2024). 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2 written judgment a sentence of "999 years" after orally pronouncing his sentence as life in prison. We affirm on Point I and remand on Point II. Background On October 4, 2022, Williams was arrested and charged with first-degree murder based on the allegation that, "after deliberation, [Williams] knowingly caused the death of [Victim] by forcing [Victim] off of an elevated roadway" in Columbia, Missouri. The "elevated roadway" was an overpass where the Highway 63 Connector crossed Clark Lane in Columbia (Overpass). Two Columbia Police Department detectives video- recorded an interview with Williams while Williams was in custody in a holding cell. At around the 15-minute mark of the interview, Williams said, "Plead the Fifth." The circuit court denied Williams's motion to suppress the entire interview but ruled that only the first fifteen minutes were admissible (the Redacted Video). During trial, over defense objection, the Redacted Video was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 56; a portion of the Redacted Video was played for the jury during trial, and the jury had access to the Redacted Video during its deliberations. The Redacted Video began with the two detectives approaching the holding cell where Williams was being kept in custody. When the cell door was unlocked and opened, Williams was shown lying down on a bench. One detective (Detective) took the lead in talking with Williams. 3 Detective's first questions to Williams were about going to an interrogation room on a different floor to talk. Williams initially did not respond

3 Although we refer to the detective who took the lead in questioning Williams as Detective, both detectives were present throughout the interview.

3 but then said, "What about right here?" Detective explained that going upstairs would allow them to "all sit down and talk"; Williams responded, "Nothin' to talk about." When Detective asked again about going to an interrogation room, Williams said, "Why don't you just crash?" Defendant then repeatedly told the detectives to "crash," and, when asked what that meant, he said, "Just go, just crash at me, man." Detective asked, "You want to speak with us right here?" Williams repeated, "Just crash at me," and Detective again asked Williams what that meant. Williams did not explain but then said, "I didn't do nothin'." When Detective asked again about going to an interrogation room, Williams said, "Right," then sat up on the bench and asked, "What's going on?" When told by Detective that they wanted to "chat about what's going on tonight," Williams said in a muffled tone, "Don't answer questions." Detective asked him twice, "You what?" and Williams repeated more loudly, "Don't answer questions." Detective then asked, "Are you wanting to speak with us about what's going on tonight, just give me your side about what happened?" Williams did not respond. Both detectives then stepped out into the hallway and closed the cell door for about a minute. When the detectives reentered Williams's holding cell, Williams was again lying down on the bench. Detective asked Williams if talking with them "was something [Williams was] willing to do." Williams sat up slightly and said, "I have nothing really to talk about. About what's going on, you know." At that point, Detective read the Miranda rights to Williams. When asked if he understood those rights, Williams at first did not respond but then said, "No." Detective asked if Williams would like Detective to

4 read the Miranda rights to him again. Williams said, "Yeah," and Detective read the Miranda rights a second time but more slowly. When asked again if he understood those rights, Williams responded, "Yeah." Detective then told Williams, "The only way we're going to get your side of the story is hearing it from you. . . . So can you just tell me what happened tonight?" Williams responded, "Yeah. . . . It was like a bar fight; drunken brawl. Bodies hitting the floor left and right . . . and I've been harassed, you know? . . . I've just been harassed, man." When Detective said, "Run me through what you were doing today," Williams lay back down, covered his head, and said, "I don't have nothin' else." Twice, Detective then asked, "Why do you think you're here." Williams raised his head and said, "Death. Death." When asked to explain that comment, Williams said, "I'm all beat up, all right?" and pointed to his arm. Williams then asked, "Is there anything else you need to know?" Detective said they wanted to know what happened, and Williams said, "I can't even explain it." When Detective asked what Williams meant by "death," Williams said, "I . . . feel dead inside. That's all. I'm just looking for a fresh start, that's all." Detective again asked Williams what had happened that night. When Williams did not respond, Detective said, "I know what's up, I know what's going on. You obviously know what happened earlier." Williams said, "You've been pressing me, man. . . . Yeah, you are pressing me." Detective said, "I'm not pressing you. . . . We're just looking for you to be honest with us." Williams responded, "I'm just looking for an end to this discussion." Detective again asked, "OK, well, tell me why we're here; what

5 happened?" Williams responded, "You guys go down to admin, it's your guys's job." Then Detective asked "what happened on the overpass?" Williams responded "Just send me a razor." Detective then said, "This might be your one shot at telling your side of the story . . . to show that, you know, you have some sort of remorse for what happened. . . . Do you understand?" Williams responded, "Yeah. I'm sleeping." Detective asked, "Are you willing to talk with us about what happened some more?" Williams said, "I'm sleeping." Detective asked, "Is that a no?" Williams repeated, "I'm sleeping." Detective said, "Well, you're not sleeping right now, your eyes are open and you're talking to me. . . . Are you willing to tell me what happened?" Williams said, "Self-defense." Detective said, "Explain what you mean by that." After a few moments, Williams said, "Plead the Fifth" and then "I plead the Eighth." Although the recorded interview continued past that point, nothing past Williams's statement, "I plead the Eighth," was included in the Redacted Video that was admitted into evidence. At Williams's 2024 trial, near the beginning of Detective's testimony, defense counsel objected, based on the defense's motion to suppress, "to [Detective] being able to discuss [Williams's] interview" and "to formalize . . . my objection to any of the statements being made," based on the previous motion to suppress the entire interrogation (including the first 15 minutes). The objection was overruled, and Detective testified to Williams's statements made during the Redacted Video, and the Redacted Video was provided to the jury during deliberations, along with other admitted exhibits, after a jury note requested "all evidence."

6 The state also presented evidence from two local motorists (Witness 1 and Witness 2). Both witnesses had been on their way home shortly after 6:00 p.m. when they approached the Overpass where Victim fell to her death. Witness 1 stopped his car when he saw a man and woman engaged in a "physical struggle" on the Overpass and then saw the man lift the woman over the railing. He described the man as having "darker skin" and dark hair, wearing pants that were brown, gray, or khaki, wearing no shirt, and having some tattoos. Witness 2 saw a man and woman on the Overpass at the moment that "the man grabbed the woman and tried to throw her over the bridge." Witness 2 did not get a good look at the man but described him as having "brown hair, dark skin." The jury was shown video excerpts that had been collected from several stores along Conley Road near the Overpass and heard testimony from a Columbia police detective about the events shown in those videos. A video from a convenience store showed Williams with Victim several times during the afternoon of October 4, 2022. It also showed Williams leaving the convenience store at 5:42 p.m., walking in the direction of the Overpass, then returning to the store at around 6:23 p.m., at which point he was shirtless and chest tattoos were visible. Video collected from other nearby stores showed Williams proceeding along Conley Road away from the Overpass. A video showed Williams being apprehended in front of one of the stores, at which point he was shirtless, with visible chest tattoos, and wearing light-colored pants. In addition, the state presented evidence from two witnesses (Witness 3 and Witness 4) who saw Williams walking with Victim on October 4, 2022, near the Overpass. Witness 3 testified that he saw Victim follow Williams as both were walking

7 away from a tent campsite toward the nearby Overpass and, about 10-15 minutes later, heard "a lot" of sirens in the area—"much longer than [the] average emergency response." Witness 4 testified that she saw Williams with Victim a few minutes before they walked away from the tent campsite and described Williams's appearance as "Hispanic, dark hair, tattoo across the neck, no shirt," and also with "a tattoo across his chest area." Witness 4 testified that she heard sirens about twenty minutes after seeing Williams with Victim. Both Witness 3 and Witness 4 identified Williams in court as the man they saw with Victim that day. Analysis Williams appeals his conviction, following a jury trial, of second-degree murder pursuant to § 565.021. Williams raises two points on appeal: (1) that the court clearly erred in denying his motion to suppress statements made in a video interview conducted by law enforcement officers and admitting the Redacted Video into evidence; and (2) that the court plainly erred in issuing in its written judgment a sentence of "999 years" after orally pronouncing his sentence as life in prison. We affirm on Point I and remand for correction of the record on Point II. I. The circuit court did not err in overruling Williams's motion to suppress the Redacted Video of his statements to detectives because Williams failed to prove that his Miranda waiver or his statements made during custodial interrogation were not "knowing, voluntary, and intelligent." In Point I, Williams claims that "the alleged waiver of [his] Miranda rights and his subsequent statements to the detectives were not 'knowing, voluntary, and intelligent,'" arguing that the circumstances of his interrogation "betray[ed] confusion, fatigue, and

8 vacillation as to any understanding of his Miranda rights." 4 We review a ruling on a motion to suppress "in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling and defer to the trial court's determinations of credibility." State v. Woodrome, 407 S.W.3d 702, 706 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013). "Ordinarily, [we] will reverse a ruling on a motion to suppress only if it is clearly erroneous and will reverse admission of testimony only if the trial court abused its discretion." Id. (quoting Foster v. State, 348 S.W.3d 158, 161 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011). Clear error is one that leaves the court with a definite and firm belief a mistake was made. State v. Esmerovic, 544 S.W.3d 695, 697 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018). We review the denial of a motion to suppress "for prejudice, not mere error, and will reverse only if the error was so prejudicial that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial." State v. Glass, 136 S.W.3d 496, 507 (Mo. banc 2004). Under a "totality of the circumstances" test, a valid waiver of Miranda rights requires "both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension." State v.

4 Williams's argument appears at times to conflate his claim that he did not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently waive his Miranda rights with a claim that he invoked his right to remain silent before the 15-minute mark and thus the trial court should not have admitted even the redacted recording of his interrogation. To the extent his argument attempts to raise a separate claim that he invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence, that claim is not preserved by his Point Relied On. See Rule 84.04(e) (limiting arguments to be addressed on appeal "to those errors included in the 'Points Relied On'"); Burg v. Dampier, 346 S.W.3d 343, 354 (Mo. App. W.D. 2011); Rea v. Moore, 74 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Mo. App. S.D. 2002) ("[T]he point itself defines the boundary of our review."). All rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2025). In addition, the argument section of Williams's brief does not adequately develop an invocation argument, as he does not identify exactly which statements should have been excluded or explain how the admission of those statements was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal. Therefore, we decline to exercise discretion to consider a claim that Williams invoked his right to remain silent before the 15-minute mark.

9 Mendez-Ulloa, 525 S.W.3d 585, 592 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017). When the waiver argument is primarily based on a defendant's "physical and mental condition," it is "insufficient to show [defendant's] statements were involuntary in the absence of any evidence of coercion by interrogating officers." State v. Gates, 683 S.W.3d 726, 730 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024). There is no evidence of coercion in the 15-minute portion of the video that was admitted into evidence. A waiver is not involuntary simply because detectives "presented themselves as sympathetic" and encouraged a defendant to "be honest with himself and detectives." State v. Lawson, 693 S.W.3d 82, 104 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023); State v. Wilson, 755 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Mo. App. E.D. 1988) ("Generally, an admonition to the accused that it will be in his or her best interest to tell the truth will not render a confession involuntary."). Thus, the only issue here is whether Williams "made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights." Gates, 683 S.W.3d at 730. A waiver is voluntary if the defendant understood the Miranda warning itself; there is no requirement that he "know and understand all of the possible consequences of the waiver." State v. Powell, 798 S.W.2d 709, 713 (Mo. banc 1990). A defendant's "lack of sleep and fatigue" does not preclude a "knowing and intelligent waiver" of his Miranda rights. State v. Olinghouse, 605 S.W.2d 58, 67 (Mo. banc 1980). Impairment, such as that caused by alcohol abuse, must "rise[] to a mania" before it renders a waiver of rights "unknowing and unintelligent." State v. Armstrong, 72 S.W.3d 327, 331 (Mo. App. S.D. 2002) (holding that such impairment affects only "the weight and credibility to be accorded the

10 statement"); State v. Loazia, 829 S.W.2d 558, 566 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992) (finding defendant's confession "knowingly made" despite his being on pain medication and in a weakened state following heart surgery). In the Redacted Video, Williams appears fatigued and even asleep when the detectives entered the holding cell, but the record reflects no evidence of detectives using "overtly or inherently coercive methods" during the first 15 minutes of the interrogation. See State v. Vinson, 854 S.W.2d 615, 624 (Mo. App. S.D. 1993). During the Redacted Video, Williams was at times unresponsive to questions posed by Detective, but Williams sat upright and answered many questions. At times, Williams stated he was sleeping, although his eyes were open and he was responding to Detective. Williams made lucid comments even when not directly responding to questions. At about the 6-minute point in the Redacted Video, Detective read the Miranda rights to Williams and asked Williams if he understood his rights. At first, Williams did not give a clear "yes" or "no" answer, but after Detective asked several more times if he understood his rights, Williams said, "No." Detective asked if Williams would like the rights read to him again, and Williams said, "Yeah." At that point, Detective read the Miranda rights to Williams a second time, more slowly, and again asked Williams if he understood his rights, at which point Williams said, "Yeah." This exchange indicates that Williams did understand what he was being asked—enough to clarify and request a second reading of his rights. There was no equivocation involved in his response that "yeah," he understood his rights once they were read to him a second time. At no point in the Redacted Video does Williams exhibit any mental or physical impairment

11 approaching a "mania." The totality of these circumstances shows that Williams knew and understood the Miranda rights that were read to him. Ultimately, near the end of the Redacted Video, he did invoke those rights. Because the trial court did not clearly err in admitting the Redacted Video, Point I is denied. II. The circuit court erred in executing its written judgment of Williams's sentence as "999 years," when its oral pronouncement was "life in prison." There is no dispute that the circuit court orally pronounced Williams's sentence as "life in prison," to run consecutively to crimes for which Williams had previously been paroled, and that the clerical entry of "999 years" was entered in error, is materially different, and must be corrected. When "[t]he failure to memorialize accurately the decision of the trial court as it was announced in open court [is] clearly a clerical error," Rule 29.12 allows the court "to correct such clerical errors in the judgment that obviously are the result of oversight or omission." State v. Skinner, 494 S.W.3d 591, 595 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (quoting State v. Taylor, 123 S.W.3d 924, 931 (Mo. App. S.D. 2004)). Therefore, we remand on Count II for the circuit court to correct the written judgment to reflect the judgment and sentence as announced orally in open court. Conclusion We affirm the circuit court on Point I and remand on Point II for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Karen King Mitchell, Judge Alok Ahuja, Presiding Judge, and Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge, concur.

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