State of Missouri vs. Lisa Marie Coots

STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Respondent, ) WD87420 v. ) ) OPINION FILED: ) January 20, 2026 LISA MARIE COOTS, ) ) Appellant. ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Worth County, Missouri The Honorable Corey K. Herron, Judge Before Division Two: Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Presiding Judge, Karen King Mitchell, Judge, and Cynthia L. Martin, Judge Lisa Marie Coots appeals, following a jury trial, her convictions of second-degree drug trafficking, § 579.068, 1 and possession of drug paraphernalia, § 579.074, for which she was sentenced to concurrent terms of seven years' imprisonment for trafficking and thirty days for possession. Coots raises two points on appeal. She argues first that the trial court erred in overruling her motion to suppress and admitting into evidence a straw and methamphetamine discovered following a traffic stop because, when the evidence

1 All statutory citations are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri (2016) unless otherwise noted.

2 was discovered, the purpose of the stop had already concluded without yielding additional reasonable suspicion justifying further detention. In her second point, Coots argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for possession of paraphernalia because there was no evidence that the straw alleged to be paraphernalia was used to inhale methamphetamine. Background On June 4, 2022, around 4:15 p.m., Corporal of the Missouri State Highway Patrol was traveling northbound on 169 when he observed a vehicle approach from behind at an excessive speed. Corporal pulled the vehicle over and approached the driver's side window, where he encountered Driver, who appeared nervous and was frantically speaking on his cell phone. Driver explained that he was trying to get insurance information for the vehicle; Corporal observed Driver to be "[v]ery fidgety" and "overly nervous." Coots was a passenger in the vehicle at the time. Corporal requested identification from both Driver and Coots and then, at 4:17 p.m., asked Driver to step out of the vehicle and join Corporal in his patrol car. In the patrol car, Driver "appeared overly nervous, [was] breathing heavy, was fixated [on] his phone, didn't want to make eye contact, [and was] talking very fast." Corporal asked Driver about his travels, and Driver indicated that he had picked Coots up in Ridgeway, Missouri, and that they traveled together to King City to see Coots's ex -boyfriend before heading back to Arkoe. When asked for the location of Coots's ex -boyfriend's house, Driver identified a residence that Corporal knew to be a "drug house." Corporal then asked Driver about drug usage, and Driver admitted that he had

3 "used methamphetamine within the last couple days." Driver also indicated that he had been arrested and "had a rather lengthy criminal history," including time spent in the Missouri Department of Corrections. When asked for information about Coots, Driver falsely indicated that her last name was Koontz. At 4:22 p.m., based on Driver's behavior and statements, Corporal requested consent to search the vehicle, but Driver refused, claiming the vehicle did not belong to him. Corporal advised Driver that, because Driver was in possession and control of the vehicle, he could give consent for the search, but Driver still refused. In light of the facts that Driver had already committed a crime, exhibited nervous and deceptive behavior, and indicated he was coming from a known drug house, Corporal "believed that there was illegal contraband somewhere in that vehicle," so he contacted a K-9 unit to assist. From the time Corporal first noticed the vehicle speeding up behind him to the time the K-9 unit arrived, approximately eighteen minutes elapsed. At 4:27 p.m., while awaiting the K-9 unit, Corporal approached Coots to advise her that a K-9 unit was en route and that Driver had refused consent to search the vehicle. Coots was initially pleasant and friendly until Corporal mentioned the K-9 unit, after which, Coots became unpleasant. Corporal asked Coots to step out of the vehicle to ensure she did not have any weapons. Around 4:33 p.m., after Corporal verified that Coots was unarmed, the K-9 unit arrived. Around 4:35 p.m., Corporal asked Driver and Coots to take their dog, who was also in the car, to a nearby concrete pad while the K-9 sniffed the vehicle. While the K-9 sniffed, Driver was fixated on the vehicle. Following an alert by the K-9 at 4:39 p.m.,

4 Corporal searched the vehicle and discovered in the center of the vehicle "a small rock, crystalline substance" that he believed to be methamphetamine. He also located a backpack in the passenger floorboard "that contained several [b]aggies of methamphetamine," a straw, and varying amounts of oxycodone pills. The straw was made of red plastic with one end "plugged off" as if it "had a lighter taken to it." This kind of straw could be used either to ingest methamphetamine (by snorting) or package methamphetamine. Either the backpack itself or items inside had the name "Lisa Marie" on them. Corporal seized all the evidence and arrested both Driver and Coots. The State charged Coots as a prior felony and drug offender with one count of second-degree trafficking, one count of possession of a controlled substance, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. Before trial, Coots filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained following Corporal's search of the vehicle on the ground that Corporal exceeded the scope of the initial stop and unreasonably prolonged the detention without further reasonable suspicion. The court denied the motion to suppress. At the close of the State's evidence, the State dismissed the possession of a controlled substance count. After hearing the evidence, the jury found Coots guilty of the remaining counts— second-degree drug trafficking and possession of drug paraphernalia. The court sentenced Coots to seven years' imprisonment, with a 120-callback under § 559.115.3, for trafficking and a concurrent term of thirty days in jail for possession of paraphernalia. Coots appeals.

5 Analysis Coots raises two points on appeal. First, she argues that the trial court erred in overruling her motion to suppress and admitting evidence seized from the vehicle following the search on the ground that Corporal unlawfully extended the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion. Second, she argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the charge of possession of paraphernalia because there was no evidence that she intended to use the red straw to inhale methamphetamine. Though we find no error in the co urt's ruling on Coots's motion to suppress, we find the evidence insufficient to support her conviction for possession of paraphernalia and, therefore, vacate that conviction. I. The trial court did not err in overruling the motion to suppress. When reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we consider the evidence presented at both the suppression hearing and the trial "to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to support the trial court's ruling." State v. Hicks, 408 S.W.3d 90, 94 (Mo. banc 2013). "The facts and reasonable inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling." Id. We will affirm the trial court's ruling unless it is clearly erroneous. Id. "A trial court's ruling is clearly erroneous if we are 'left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made.'" State v. Brashier, 695 S.W.3d 88, 92 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (quoting State v. Alford, 603 S.W.3d 725, 729 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020)). "The period of lawful seizure for a traffic stop encompasses that time during which the officer may conduct a reasonable investigation of the traffic violation." State v. Slavin, 944 S.W.2d 314, 318 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997). Reasonable investigation includes

6 "[ (1)] asking for the [subject's] driver's license and registration, [(2)] requesting [that the subject] . . . sit in the patrol car, and [(3)] asking the driver about his [or her] destination and purpose." Id. "Officers may[, however,] detain persons beyond the time necessary to investigate the traffic violation if the officer develops reasonable and articulable grounds to suspect illegal activity based on the behavior and responses of the persons during the traffic stop." State v. Ybarra, 637 S.W.3d 644, 652 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021). To determine whether a sufficient new factual predicate for reasonable suspicion exists, we view the totality of the circumstances. State v. Woolfolk, 3 S.W.3d 823, 829 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999). Here, the totality of circumstances suggest that Corporal's investigation remained lawful because, while investigating the traffic violation, he developed reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contained drugs. Corporal initially stopped the vehicle for a speeding violation. Upon approaching Driver, Corporal noticed that Driver was excessively nervous and agitated. Corporal requested identification from both Driver and Coots. He then asked Driver to accompany him to the patrol car, where he asked Driver about his travels while running Driver's information. All of Corporal's conduct during this time involved permissible investigation of the traffic violation. During the conversation with Driver in the patrol vehicle (which was still within the scope of reasonable investigation of the traffic violation), Corporal developed reasonable suspicion that drugs were in the vehicle based on the following facts: (1) Driver acknowledged recent commission of a drug crime (using methamphetamine), (2) Driver exhibited nervous behavior (heavy breathing, hyperfixation, fast speech, eye-

7 contact avoidance) and deceptive behavior (misidentifying Coots's last name), and (3) Driver indicated he was coming from a known drug house. While each of these circumstances in isolation may have been insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, when joined together, they suffice. 2

Coots acknowledges that Corporal requested the K-9 unit while he "was entering information for a traffic ticket." But she argues that "he testified at trial that he 'did nothing else' while waiting for the K-9 unit." This is a misrepresentation of the record. Corporal never testified that he "did nothing else" while waiting for the K-9 unit. Instead, he testified that he approached Coots to let her know what was happening: Q. Was there anything else that you were doing while you were, you know, running information, you talked to the Defendant, was there anything else that you did after that while waiting for the officer?

2 "[W]hile knowledge of past criminal activity alone is insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion, that 'can be one factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis.'" State v. Smith, 448 S.W.3d 835, 841 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014) (quoting State v. Grayson, 336 S.W.3d 138, 146 (Mo. banc 2011) (concluding that combination of knowledge of past criminal activity and evasive actions by suspect were enough to constitute reasonable suspicion)). And, though "[n]ervousness alone does not give rise to reasonable suspicion, . . . together with other factors, it can be relevant in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists under the totality of the circumstances." State v. Woolfolk, 3 S.W.3d 823, 829 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999). "False statements to police can give rise to an inference of guilty behavior." State v. Higgs, 649 S.W.3d 107, 123 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022) (quoting State v. Smith, 11 S.W.3d 733, 737 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999)). In Higgs, this court noted that, even where "circumstances, individually, may not be proof of any illegal conduct and are consistent with innocent behavior[,] . . . '[r]ather than look at each circumstance individually, . . . reviewing courts must consider the totality of the circumstances.'" Id. at 123-24 (quoting State v. Hawkins, 137 S.W.3d 549, 558 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004)). And, though "[a]n individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion, . . . officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).

8 A. No, he—he were—like I said, I spoke with the driver, briefly he denied consent, I knew the K-9 was in the area, I contacted the K-9, walked up to the vehicle, let her know what was going on so she wasn't worried, and spoke with her briefly. And then shortly thereafter, the K-9 arrived on scene. It all happened fairly quick. In any event, Corporal had already made sufficient factual observations to support reasonable suspicion before contacting the K-9 unit, which arrived within five minutes of being called. Because Corporal made sufficient factual determinations to support reasonable suspicion during his investigation of the traffic offense, the trial court did not err in overruling Coots's motion to suppress. Point I is denied. II. The evidence was insufficient to support the possession of paraphernalia charge. In her second point on appeal, Coots argues that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for possession of paraphernalia because there was no evidence that she intended to use the straw found in the vehicle to inhale methamphetamine. We agree. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we "accept[] as true all evidence tending to prove guilt together with all reasonable inferences that support the verdict," and we ignore all contrary evidence and inferences. State v. Winter, 719 S.W.3d 738, 746 (Mo. banc 2025) (quoting State v. Gilmore, 537 S.W.3d 342, 344 (Mo. banc 2018)). We must determine "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

9 elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (quoting State v. Tate, 708 S.W.3d 483, 489 (Mo. banc 2025)). A person commits the offense of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia if he or she knowingly uses, or possesses with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce into the human body, a controlled substance or an imitation controlled substance in violation of this chapter or chapter 195. § 579.074.1, RSMo (Supp. 2021). Possession of drug paraphernalia can be either a felony or a misdemeanor. Id. § .2-.3. Coots was charged with misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. The elements of the misdemeanor are: (1) possession of drug paraphernalia; (2) for the purposes of planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packing, repacking, storing, containing, concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing in the human body; (3) a controlled substance or an imitation controlled substance. State v. Barcelona, 463 S.W.3d 442, 453 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015). "When a criminal statute provides for various methods of commission of an element, the State is required to select a method and is then held to proof of the method charged as to that element." State v. Kelso, 391 S.W.3d 515, 519 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013). Here, the State charged Coots with possessing the straw with the intent to use it to inhale methamphetamine. At trial, the only evidence offered with respect to the straw was Corporal's testimony that it was "plugged off at the bottom," as if it "had a lighter taken to it." He further testified that, typically, people use straws to snort their drug of choice up their

10 nose to get high. With respect to this specific straw, however, Corporal testified that "the more [he] look[ed] at [it], the more [he] wonder[ed] if somebody wasn't just trying to package drugs in it instead of ingest drugs with it." Packing drugs is a different use than inhaling or ingesting drugs, and it is not the method of commission the State chose when charging Coots. And, given the fact that one end of the straw was plugged off, there is no evidence from which a jury could have determined that anyone, let alone Coots, would have been able to use the straw to inhale anything. Accordingly, the evidence is insufficient to support the charge that Coots possessed the straw with the intent to use it to inhale methamphetamine. Point II is granted, and Coots's conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia is vacated. Conclusion The trial court did not err in overruling Coots's motion to suppress. The evidence was, however, insufficient to support her conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia; therefore, that conviction is vacated. In all other respects the judgment and sentence are affirmed.

Karen King Mitchell, Judge Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Presiding Judge, and Cynthia L. Martin, Judge, concur.

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