TERESA J. WILLIAMS and DAVID WILLIAMS, wife and husband, Plaintiffs-Respondents v. WILLIAM and PHYLLIS DECKER, 2001 DECKER FAMILY TRUST, STEPHEN DECKER, Trustee, Defendants-Appellants

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TERESA J. WILLIAMS and DAVID WILLIAMS, wife and husband,

Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. WILLIAM and PHYLLIS DECKER, 2001 DECKER FAMILY TRUST, STEPHEN DECKER, Trustee,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. SD38974

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PULASKI COUNTY

Honorable Sidney T. Pearson, III, Senior Judge AFFIRMED Stephen Decker, as the trustee of the 2001 Decker Family Trust ("Appellant"), appeals from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Pulaski County ("trial court"), that quieted title to a 0.21-acre parcel of property in Teresa J. Williams and David Williams ("Respondents"), and denied Appellant's counterclaim against Respondents for trespass and an injunction following a bench trial. Appellant raises three points on appeal. We

In Division

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deny Appellant's Point I, dismiss his Points II and III for failure to comply with Rule 84.04, 1 and affirm the trial court's judgment. Factual Background and Procedural History Respondents brought a quiet-title action against Appellant, claiming that they had adversely possessed a one-acre tract of real property for the necessary statutory timeframe, and were entitled to ownership of the land in fee simple absolute. 2 Appellant filed a counterclaim against Respondents alleging that they had trespassed on the land at issue, and asking for an injunction to prevent future trespass. The trial court held a bench trial and subsequently found that, while Respondents had failed to establish their adverse possession of the entire one-acre tract of land at issue, they had established title to a 0.21-acre portion of that same land by way of adverse possession. The trial court denied Appellant's claims for trespass and injunction. The trial court entered judgment accordingly. Appellant timely appeals. Standard of Review When reviewing a bench-tried case, we "affirm the trial court's determination 'unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the weight of the evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the law.'" Dumproff [v. Driskill], 376 S.W.3d [680,] 687 [(Mo. App. S.D. 2012)] (quoting Watson v. Mense, 298 S.W.3d 521, 525 (Mo. banc 2009)). "We presume the trial court's judgment is valid, and it is the appellant's burden to show otherwise." Hurricane Deck Holding Co. v. Spanburg Invs., LLC, 548 S.W.3d 390, 393 (Mo. App.

1 All rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2025).

2 Respondents' petition set forth the legal description of the property at issue. Because the parties do not dispute the description of the property, and there is no issue with respect to the legal description of the property on appeal, for the sake of brevity and clarity, we do not repeat the legal description herein.

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S.D. 2018). This Court views all evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the judgment, while disregarding all contrary evidence. Trokey v. R.D.P. Development Group, L.L.C., 401 S.W.3d 516, 524 (Mo. App. S.D. 2013).

Pentecost v. Webster, 674 S.W.3d 195, 204 (Mo. App. S.D. 2023).

Analysis Point I In Point I, Appellant argues: The Circuit Court erred by concluding that Respondents had acquired title by adverse possession to the .21 acre parcel of property described in the Judgment, because whether Respondents had acquired title to such a parcel was an issue beyond the scope of the pleadings, in that the Petition claimed adverse possession solely to a larger, one-acre parcel, and there was no implied consent to try the narrower issue, for the evidence admitted at trial was relevant regarding the adverse possession alleged in the Petition.

We disagree. It is "a longstanding rule that trial is limited to the scope of the issues raised by the pleadings." Int'l Div., Inc. v. DeWitt and Assocs., Inc., 425 S.W.3d 225, 228 (Mo. App. S.D. 2014). In their petition, Respondents claimed that they had acquired ownership of one acre of Appellant's property by way of adverse possession. After hearing the evidence, the trial court awarded Respondents 0.21 acres of the one-acre property that they claimed to have adversely possessed. Appellant's argument, thus, is not that the trial court granted Respondents more relief than they requested in their pleadings, but rather gave them less relief than they requested. Such an argument is not supported by the case law or by common sense. As

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long as the precise area claimed, and ultimately awarded, is readily ascertainable (and Appellant makes no argument that it is not), an award of less land than Respondents claimed is proper. Kitterman v. Simrall, 924 S.W.2d 872, 877-78 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996); see also Armstrong v. Burns & Wilcox, Ltd., 781 S.W.2d 209, 211-12 (Mo. App. E.D. 1989) (award to landlord of less than amount of rent specified in lease for premises was sufficiently supported by the evidence, and thus the pleadings were deemed to have been amended to conform to the evidence). Even when the facts are stipulated, the trial court may still award damages to a plaintiff in an amount less than he requests, if the award is supported by the evidence. Smith v. Est. of Harrison, 829 S.W.2d 70, 74 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992). While Respondents' pleading claimed adverse possession of an entire one-acre tract, the trial court found as follows with respect to the 0.21 acre of land at issue in this appeal: In 2009, [Respondents] began to lay gravel on the northwestern portion of Tract B to make a parking area for their use, and they began to use that small portion of Tract B to park trucks and to erect some sheds. By a preponderance of the evidence, they did this more than 10 years prior to the filing of this suit. Their possession of this small portion of Tract B was hostile, actual, open and notorious, exclusive, and continuous for more than 10 years.

As to the remainder of the one-acre tract, the trial court found: [T]here is no evidence that [Respondents] ever established possession by the criteria necessary to prove adverse possession. In fact, the testimony of Theresa Williams was to the effect that they were not using the remainder of Tract B, but were just "planning" to use it, and they "planned" to build on the southern part of Tract B. The testimony of David Williams was that one acre, which is what they directed the surveyor to survey, was what they "would need[."] Being covetous of another's real estate does not establish

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adverse possession. The only evidence that [Respondents] possessed the southern part of Tract B was the presence of a firepit and what appears to be their son's abandoned motor vehicle, and testimony that [Respondents] cut some brush on that portion of the tract. There was no credible evidence adduced that the firepit was ever used by anyone. The placing of a motor vehicle by the son of [Respondents] on the tract is not an act of [Respondents]. The timing of the initial use of the area beyond the area that was graveled and on which sheds were placed is not shown by a preponderance of the evidence, and may have been as late as 2015. The cutting of brush was sporadic at best, and did not constitute open and notorious, exclusive or continuous possession. None of these things constitute possession that is hostile, actual, open, and notorious, or exclusive and continuous for more than 10 years.

As such, Appellant's argument that "the issue of whether Respondents had acquired title by adverse possession to the .21 acre portion of the one acre set forth in Exhibit C wasn't tried by implied consent[,]" is unavailing. The trial court acted within its discretion in finding that Respondents had adversely possessed only a portion of the land at issue, and correctly awarded Respondents that smaller portion of property which the evidence proved they adversely possessed. Point I is denied. Points II and III Appellant's Points II and III fail to comply with Rule 84.04 and are so deficient that they materially impede our impartial review. "The failure to substantially comply with Rule 84.04 preserves nothing for our review and constitutes grounds for dismissal of the appeal." Int. of S.R.W., 715 S.W.3d 223, 228 (Mo. App. W.D. 2025) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Point II states as follows:

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The Circuit Court erred by concluding that Respondents acquired title by adverse possession to Appellant's property (whether the entire one-acre parcel described in the Petition or the .21 acre parcel described by the Judgment), because Respondents failed to adduce any evidence of color of title to Appellant's property or any evidence, found credible by the Circuit Court, that Respondents physically possessed the entire parcel of Appellant's property (however described).

Point III states: "The Circuit Court erred by denying Appellant any relief on his counterclaim, such as nominal damages, because Respondents trespassed on Appellant's property." These two points relied on, an integral part of the brief, fail to state concisely the legal reasons for the claim of reversible error, or to explain why, in the context of the case, the legal reasons support the claims of reversible error, as required by Rule 84.04(d)(1). Id. The argument section of Point II contains no citations to the record on appeal, and the argument section of Point III contains only two very broad and general citations to the record. Rule 84.04(e) requires that "[a]ll factual assertions in the argument shall have specific page references to the relevant portion of the record on appeal, i.e., legal file, transcript, or exhibits." Both argument sections are extremely short, and are comprised mostly of general statements of the law without any effort to connect them to the facts of the case. Appellant's failure to support his arguments with anything beyond general conclusions is considered abandonment of the points. S.R.W., 715 S.W.3d at 230. To analyze the potential merit of either of these points would surely require this Court to review the record and develop legal arguments on Appellant's behalf; this we cannot do. In re Marriage of Phillips and Stemel, 724 S.W.3d 838, 840 (Mo. App. S.D.

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2025). As such, we dismiss Appellant's Points II and III for failure to comply with Rule 84.04. The trial court's judgment is affirmed. JENNIFER R. GROWCOCK, C.J. – OPINION AUTHOR JACK A. L. GOODMAN, J. – CONCURS BRYAN E. NICKELL, J. – CONCURS